

Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia

Communal commitment and political order in change

Paul Georg Geiss

PRE-TSARIST AND TSARIST CENTRAL ASIA

This study, written from the perspective of political sociology, represents the first comparative examination of Central Asian communal and political organisation before and after the tsarist conquest of the region. It covers Turkman, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and other tribal societies, analyses the patrimonial state structures of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Khokand, and discusses the impact of the established tsarist civil military administration on the communal and political orientations of the Muslim population.

Changing concepts of collective identity are described in reference to acknowledged or refuted claims of political authority by various population groups. The study also provides some evidence which helps us to understand the region's resistance to democratisation and the continuity of patrimonial politics in newly independent states.

Paul Georg Geiss is a Research Fellow at the German Institute for Middle East Studies, Hamburg. He specialises in the social history and comparative politics of Central Asia.

PRE-TSARIST AND TSARIST CENTRAL ASIA

Communal commitment and political
order in change

Paul Georg Geiss



RoutledgeCurzon
Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2003
by RoutledgeCurzon
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by RoutledgeCurzon
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 2003 Paul Georg Geiss

Typeset in Times by Taylor & Francis Books Ltd
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-415-31177-2

FOR CHRISTINA

Dynasties, kingdoms, and cities may at any time be dependent upon one man, and when that man is removed from his place, the dynasty crumbles, or the city is destroyed, or the country is thrown into confusion.¹

And listen to me now and mark my words: a commander is not elected. He is appointed by a superior.²

For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there is no friendship either, just as there is no justice.³

CONTENTS

<i>List of illustrations</i>	ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xii
Introduction	1
<i>Previous research</i>	3
<i>Political community and normative order</i>	6
<i>Methodological problems</i>	12
<i>Sources used and contemporary literature</i>	13
<i>Structure of the book</i>	16
1 Tribal communal commitment	28
<i>The tribal unit</i>	28
<i>Tribe as a community of law</i>	33
<i>Tribal units and changing tribal confederacies</i>	38
<i>Patrilineage and descent groups</i>	45
<i>Residence groups</i>	55
<i>Relations between descent and residence units</i>	60
2 Residential communal commitment	86
<i>Neighbourhood community</i>	87
<i>The impact of Islamic law (sharia)</i>	89
<i>Kinship and residency</i>	90
<i>Tribal and residential communal commitment</i>	91
<i>Conclusion</i>	92
3 Pre-tsarist tribal political integration	97
<i>Turkman acephalous political order</i>	97
<i>Cephalous tribal political order</i>	106

CONTENTS

4	Dynastic rule in the river oases: between tribalism and patrimonialism	126
	<i>The Emirate of Bukhara</i>	127
	<i>The Khanate of Khiva</i>	137
	<i>The Khanate of Khokand</i>	146
	<i>Conclusion</i>	159
5	The tsarist administration and its impact on communal commitment	172
	<i>The Kazakh Steppe</i>	175
	<i>The Turkmen in Transcaspia</i>	192
	<i>The Governor-generalship of Turkestan</i>	197
6	Tsarist protectorates	222
	<i>The Emirate of Bukhara</i>	222
	<i>The Khanate of Khiva</i>	226
	<i>Conclusion</i>	232
7	Prospects	238
	<i>Normative order in pre-Soviet Central Asia</i>	238
	<i>Some remarks on normative political order in Soviet and independent Central Asia</i>	239
	<i>Glossary</i>	255
	<i>Maps</i>	263
	<i>Bibliography</i>	283
	<i>Index</i>	306

ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps

1	Kazakh tribal structures	264
2	Kyrgyz tribal structures	265
3	Turkman tribal structures	266–7
4	Territories of Turkman tribes and confederacies	268–9
5	Territories of Kyrgyz tribes and tribal confederacies	270–1
6	Kara-Kalpak tribal structures	273
7	Territories of Kara-Kalpak tribal confederacies	274–5
8	Approximate location of Kazakh hordes in the eighteenth century	276
9	Tsarist conquest of Central Asia	277
10	Inner Horde, sultan and <i>prikaz</i> administration	278
11	Routes of migration within the Middle Horde	279
12	European settlement pattern in Kazakhstan in 1900	280
13	European colonisation of Kazakhstan in 1915	281
14	Tsarist administration in Central Asia, 1917	282

Figures

1	Political commitment and types of political order	11
2	Kazakh genealogy I	47
3	Kazakh genealogy II	48
4	Turkman genealogy	49
5	Sub-tribal and basic descent groups of the <i>Daz</i>	50
6	Turkman forefather group, of the <i>Chensuli</i>	52
7	Kyrgyz forefather group	54
8	Kazakh descent groups	55
9	Agnatic relationships of household heads in Aji Gui	63
10	Distribution of dominant descent groups among <i>Daz obas</i>	64
11	Location of <i>Sheref</i> and <i>Chony</i> tribes of the Gurgan <i>Iomut</i>	102

ILLUSTRATIONS

Tables

1	Transliterations and transcriptions	xiv–v
2	Kazakh khans	114
3	Ruling dynasties and patrimonial rulers of Central Asia	128
4	Governors-general of the Steppe	182
5	Governors-general of Turkestan	199

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AQ</i>	Anthropological Quarterly
<i>BIOST</i>	Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien
<i>BSOAS</i>	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
<i>CAJ</i>	Central Asiatic Journal
<i>CAM</i>	Central Asian Monitor
<i>CAR</i>	Central Asian Review
<i>CAS</i>	Central Asian Survey
<i>CdMRS</i>	Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique
<i>ÈO</i>	Ètnograficheskoe obozrenie
<i>IRGO</i>	Imperatorskoe Russkoe geograficheskoe obshchestvo
<i>JoCS</i>	Journal of Communist Studies
<i>JRAI</i>	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
<i>IV</i>	Istoricheskii vestnik
<i>PrCom</i>	Problems of Communism
<i>PV</i>	Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik
<i>PVS</i>	Politikwissenschaftliche Vierteljahresschrift
<i>ReMMM</i>	Revue du monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée
<i>RGO</i>	Russkoe geograficheskoe obshchestvo
<i>RV</i>	Russkii vestnik
<i>SÈ</i>	Sovetskaia ètnografiia
<i>SWJoA</i>	South-Western Journal of Anthropology
<i>TF</i>	Turkmenforschung
<i>TU</i>	Turkmenovedenie
<i>TV</i>	Turkestanskii vedomosti
<i>VE</i>	Vestnik Evrazii – Acta Eurasica
<i>VS</i>	Voennyi sbornik
<i>VK</i>	Voprosy kolonizatsii
<i>VRGO</i>	Vestnik Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva
<i>ZIVAN</i>	Zapiski instituta vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk SSSR
<i>ZRGO</i>	Zapiski Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva
<i>ZHS</i>	Zhivaia Starina

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During my research on this study I have accumulated debts of gratitude to many persons and institutions. To begin with, I am indebted to the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research for having granted a scholarship to start my theoretical inquiries for this research project at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1995. From 1997 to 1999, the Austrian Academy of Science endowed me with a Ph.D. grant that enabled research for the main part of this study. The Austrian Research Association (ÖFG) provided additional funding for research in the area.

Above all I am most grateful to Professors Heinrich Schneider and Andreas Kappeler, who assisted this study as academic advisors and provided me with instructive comments on all parts of the draft. It was Professor Janet Coleman's merit to have acquainted me with Aristotelian political discourse at the LSE, whereas Dr Leslie Sklair incited my endeavours to elaborate a theoretical approach that avoids the flaws of development sociology. I benefited greatly from the advice of Dr Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, who kept me honest about the anthropological implications of my study and gave me detailed comments on many parts of this study. I am also thankful to Professors Anke von Kügelgen and Jürgen Paul for their commentaries, especially on pre-tsarist state structures in the area. Dr Will Myer was also an excellent interlocutor for discussing research problems on Central Asia, and read parts of the draft. His sad and unexpected death is a great loss to his family, friends and colleagues. In addition I am indebted to the two anonymous reviewers of the Curzon Press for their useful comments on the draft. Nevertheless, all errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, my own.

I am obliged to numerous persons who enabled my fieldwork in Central Asia and my literary research in Moscow: they include the director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Research in Tashkent, Professor M. Ch. Rakhmankulov; the director of the Russian Centre for Strategic and International Research, Professor V. V. Naumkin; and Dr Bektour Essenkoulov of the Kyrgyz Academy of Science.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to all friends and scholars who took an interest in my research and whose hospitality I enjoyed. Local research would not have been effective and pleasant without the generosity and hospitality of Gul'nara and Dr Rafshan Hakimov, and of Tabyldy Akerov in 1997. Furthermore, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr Elmira Turdalieva, who helped me to learn Kyrgyz and often spent her valuable time for this purpose. She, Han Kurbanov and Zhanar Jampeissova also assisted me to solve transliteration problems. I owe special thanks to Andy Soutter and Simon Bailey from RoutledgeCurzon who rendered my English more readable and technically prepared the draft respectively.

Little research would have been done without the help of library personnel. Thus I am grateful to all members of staff who assisted my inquiries at the SOAS Library, the British Library, the British Library of Political and Economic Science, the Senate House Library, the Library of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, the National Library of Uzbekistan Alisher Navoy, the Library of the French Institute of Central Asian Studies in Tashkent, the Main Library of Indiana University, the Russian National Library, the Oriental Cabinet of the Historical State Library in Moscow, the Austrian National Library and the Library of the University of Vienna. I also gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of Daniel and Anya Dynin during my research in Moscow. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Udo Steinbach for providing me with the logistic and moral support to finish this study at the German Institute for Middle East Studies in Hamburg.

Erika Geiss deserves special gratitude for having taken over my family duties at numerous times during my field and literary research. Last but not least, I am most indebted to Christina, on whom I imposed considerable hardships during the writing of this monograph.

Portions of this book have been previously published as follows:

Chapter 2 was published as 'Mahallah and Kinship Relations: A Study of Residential Communal Commitment Structures in Central Asia of the Nineteenth Century', *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 20, 2001/1, pp. 97–106. The first section of Chapter 3 was published as 'Turkman Tribalism', *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 18, 1999/3, pp. 347–58; a shortened version of this was published as 'Communal and Political Commitment in Pretsarist Transcaspia: Some Remarks on Acephalous Turkman Tribalism', in *Kul'turnoe nasledie Turkmenistana (glubinnye istoki i sovremennye perspektivy)*, *Materialy k mezhdunarodnoï nauchnoï konferentsii. Evropeiskï Dom*, Ashgabat and St Petersburg 2000, pp. 167–9. A brief version of the second section of Chapter 3 was published as 'Tribal Commitment and Political Order in Central Asia. A Reconsideration', in *Why not Central Asia? A Decade of Reforms. Centuries of Memories*, ed. Giampiero Bellingeri, *Orientalia Venetiana*, Fondazione G. Cini, Istituto Venezia e l'Oriente /L. Olschki: Florence 2003. A shortened version of the third section of Chapter 4 is published as 'The

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Problem of Political Order in the Khanate of Khokand: Between Tribalism and Patrimonialism', in *Central Asia: Past, Present and Future: Proceedings of the Seventh ESCAS Conference*, eds G. Rasuly-Paleczek and J. Katschnig, Vienna University Press, Vienna 2003.

Transliterations

The use of Russian and local terms is based on transliterations from the Cyrillic alphabets of the respective languages. For reasons of convenience, the system used here aims at avoiding diacritical marks and attempts to be unequivocal. Thus every Cyrillic graph is transliterated by one or two specific Latin letters on the basis of a modified transliteration of the Russian employed by the Library of Congress, which is also used by scholars such as Bregel.⁴ In order to be able to transliterate certain special

Table 1: Transliterations

<i>Cyrillic letter</i>	<i>Russian</i>	<i>Kyrgyz</i>	<i>Kazakh</i>	<i>Kara-Kalpak</i>	<i>Turkman</i>	<i>Uzbek</i>	<i>Tajik</i>
А а	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Ә ә			ä	ä	ä		
Б б	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
В в	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Г г	g	g	g	g	g	g	g
Ғ ғ			gh	gh		gh	gh
Д д	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Е е	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
Ё ё	io	io	io	io	io	io	io
Ж ж	zh	j	zh	zh	zh	j	zh
Ж ж					j		
Э э	z	z	z	z	z	z	z
И и	i	i	i	i	i	i	i
Й й							ce
Й й	ī	ī	ī	ī	ī	ī	ī
І і			ī				
К к	k	k	k	k	k	k	k
Қ қ			q	q		q	q
Л л	l	l	l	l	l	l	l
М м	m	m	m	m	m	m	m
Н н	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Ң ң		ng	ng	ng	ng		
О о	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Ө ө		ö	ö	ö	ö		
П п	p	p	p	p	p	p	p
Р р	r	r	r	r	r	r	r
С с	s	s	s	s	s	s	s

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Transliterations

<i>Cyrillic letter</i>	<i>Russian</i>	<i>Kyrgyz</i>	<i>Kazakh</i>	<i>Kara-Kalpak</i>	<i>Turkman</i>	<i>Uzbek</i>	<i>Tajik</i>
Т т	t	t	t	t	t	t	t
У у	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Ў ў				w		ū	ū
Ү ү		ü	ū	ü	ü		
Ұ ұ			ū				
Ф ф	f	f	f	f	f	f	f
Х х	kh	kh	kh	kh	kh	kh	kh
Ҳ ҳ				h		h	h
Һ һ			h				
Ц ц	ts	ts	ts	ts	ts	ts	ts
Ч ч	ch	ch	ch	ch	ch	ch	ch
Ҷ ҷ							j
Ш ш	sh	sh	sh	sh	sh	sh	sh
Щ щ	shch	shch	shch	shch	shch		shch
Ъ	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Ы ы	y	y	y	y	y		y
Ь	'	'	'	'	'	'	'
Э э	è	è	è	è	è	è	è
Ю ю	iu	iu	iu	iu	iu	iu	iu
Я я	ia	ia	ia	ia	ia	ia	ia
	33	36	42	41	38	35	39

Cyrillic letters of the local languages, we use some diacritical marks where no suitable Latin letters are available in English. Three of these are used: double dots (e.g. *ï*) one dot (e.g. *è*) and the extenuation mark (e.g. *ū*).

Basically, we italicise all local terms which are transliterated. Names of persons and places are normally not italicised but reproduced according to their use in English. If we could not find a standardised English version of any Arab or Persian term, we preferred to use its local form. Nevertheless, some spellings of names may have remained imprecise, towards which we ask our readers to be indulgent.⁵

Notes

- 1 Royal Councillor about a Samanid ruler in 1086, from Nizam al-Mulk, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings*, trans. Hubert Darke, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London 1960, pp. 120–1. Quoted in E. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, Durham NC and London 1994, p. 59.
- 2 Tsch. Aitmatow, *Frühe Kraniche*, Munich 1980, p. 55 (Russian: 'Chingiz Aitmatov, Rannie zhuravli', *Novii Mir*, 1975/9, Moscow).
- 3 Aristotle, *Politics*, VIII, xi, 1161a30.
- 4 Cf. Y. Bregel (ed.) *Bibliography of Islamic Central Asia*, 3 vols, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies: Bloomington 1995; cf. R. K. Barry (ed.) *American Library Association/Library of Congress Romanization Tables. Transliteration Schemes for Non-Roman Scripts, 1997 Edition*, Washington 1997, pp. 138–53.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- 5 The best available dictionaries are: N. A. Baskakov, *Qaraqalpaqsha-Russha sözlik* (30,000 words) Moscow 1958; K. K. Iudakhin, *Kirgizko-Russkiĭ slovar* (40,000 words) Moscow 1965; M. V. Rahimee and L. V. Uspenskaia, *Lughati Tojikee-Rusee* (40,000 words) Moscow 1954; S. F. Akabirov, Z. M. Magrufov and A. T. Khodzhakhanov, *Uzbeksko-Russkiĭ slovar* (40,000 words) Moscow 1959. See also: Kh. Makhmudov and G. Musabaev, *Qazaqsha-oryssha sözdik*, Almaty, 1954; N. A. Baskakov and M. Ia. Khamzaev, *Russko-turkmenskiĭ slovar*, Moscow 1956.

INTRODUCTION

In his description of the Kazakh hordes, tsarist Privy Councillor A. Levshin poses the question how order will be possible within a nomadic society, if none of its members seems to be committed to a public weal. He states that Kazakhs do not only opportunistically escape Russian authority by moving across the Russian-Chinese border, but show a similar attitude towards their own 'superiors':

They deal with their own chiefs in the same way and change their obedience according to the circumstances. If a chief who has secured homage and loyalty calls someone to account for an assault, the latter will leave the former and join someone else. If that one refuses to hide him, he will go to a third or fourth person. ... What kind of order can be found by a commander, if his subjects will submit only when circumstances afford it, if they will not be prepared to sacrifice themselves for the general public good, if they will only aim at satisfying their own predatory inclinations and if each of them wants to command, when there is the slightest opportunity to do so?¹

Levshin's assessment of tribalism accentuates some of the problems of political order: how is order possible within a society whose members seem to be not really committed to shared values and action orientations? If commitment is temporarily limited and depends on fluctuating circumstances, how is enduring political order to be established? Levshin's statement indicates that political order refers to a code of authority, which regulates the commitment of a 'superior' in the righteous use of power (i.e. to give commands) and in that of a follower to be obedient. When tribesmen only obey when circumstances afford it and rather like to command others at the first opportunity than being responsive to orders, they do not seem to share such a code of authority and to participate in a common political order. This is at least Levshin's view, which holds moral and intellectual deficiencies to be responsible for this serious lack.²

INTRODUCTION

Levshin certainly is not correct when he emphasises the lack of authority structures among the Kazakhs, and it is obvious that he does not fully take into consideration that mobility and flexibility are important to the survival of nomadic tribesmen. Being an official of a patrimonial government, he primarily perceives Kazakh political order from the standpoint of a settled civilisation, and of a representative of the tsarist empire which was constantly threatened by invasions of nomads from its borderlands. Subsequently he perceived the tribal political order as disorder in the steppe. However, the shifting of tribal loyalties does not exclude *a priori* the existence of political order within these societies, as scholars like Becker erroneously claimed with regard to the Turkmen.³ Political order of tribal and non-tribal societies might be of a different kind. What seems to be chaos and anarchy from the perspective of centralised state power, might have referred to quite ordered patterns of tribal authority relations.

This conflated outside perception of political order did not merely result from ignorance and lack of information, as Levshin was one of the best Russian experts on the Kazakh hordes at that time. Neither did it remain limited to tribal societies. Seventy years later, after the tsarist conquest of Central Asia and the establishment of tsarist protectorates, Logofet published a monograph on the Emirate of Bukhara with the title *Country without Law*. In this book he attempts to present evidence for the unjust and despotic nature of politics in the emirate.⁴ These historical outside perceptions of political order do not differ from contemporary Western accounts on political order in Central Asia: Edward Allworth, for example, perceived 'intolerant communist dictatorship' in Tajikistan, and talks of 'Stalinist authoritarian mentality and police-state methods to suppress dissent' in Uzbekistan.⁵ Other scholars regard the Uzbek president Islam Karimov as a 'dictator'⁶ and point out the 'failure of the regime of President Islam Karimov to create official institutions through which ordinary citizens can effectively participate in the political process'.⁷ In the same way, President Niyazov's Turkmenistan is described as 'dictatorship', and he is attested to have managed to 'build a cult of personality to rival or even exceed that of dictator J. Stalin'.⁸

What historical and contemporary accounts of politics in Central Asia have in common is that they regard Central Asian political order as being unstable and fragile due to unjust rule, and consider that the political order must be improved by outside intervention or influence: Logofet argued that Russia should conquer the emirate to improve the political order and to establish more legitimate forms of government. Similarly, contemporary Western politicians and scholars press for democratisation in Central Asia to make politics more responsive to the needs of the local population and to establish enduring political order in the area.

In both cases scholars evaluate Central Asian politics from the perspective of their own political values, and use the experiences of their own

INTRODUCTION

political socialisation as blueprints for their analyses. There exist some doubts, however, as to whether these external points of evaluation deliver reliable indicators for political stability and the endurance of political order, if they do not take the impact of prevailing community structures into consideration.

In this study, Central Asian political order should be considered in its own terms, by analysing its perseverance and discontinuities with regard to their embedment in Central Asian community structures. How the use of political power is authorised in a society or not, depends on the type of political community structures established there. In nineteenth-century Central Asia these community structures were of various types, and shaped politics in different ways. They varied not only with regard to tribal and non-tribal settled populations: in addition to this, tribal communal commitment was established in Central Asia in dissimilar ways. This study aims at analysing these structures in Central Asia and seeks to elaborate their continuities and disruptions from pre-tsarist to tsarist times. As a political community emerges from the interpenetration of communal and political action orientations, we will have to deal with both changing communal commitment structures and political order in the region.

Previous research

The relation between communal commitment structures and the political order in Central Asia has never been analysed in a systematic and comparative way. The latest more comprehensive Anglo-American studies on communal commitment structures, which are often referred to as 'traditional social structures' or 'social organisations', were written several decades ago. A. E. Hudson wrote a monograph on Kazakh social structures in the 1930s, and was one of the few Western scholars who were able to do some field research in the area, although he depended on local interpreters.⁹ L. Krader published interesting comparative studies on social structures of the Mongol-Turkic Nomads, which also included the Kazakhs. In this study he tried to apply the anthropological models of tribal societies in Africa and the Middle East to Inner Asia.¹⁰ E. Bacon completed a comparative study on the social structures of Asian and European societies, in the 1950s.¹¹ All these monographs dealt with the Kazakhs, but neglected to analyse Turkman and Kyrgyz tribalism.¹² In addition, they often held a static view on tribalism and did not sufficiently consider tribal relations with the neighbouring patrimonial states and the impact of tsarist administration. More recent work on Central Asian tribalism was done by T. J. Barfield and A. M. Khazanov. In his work, Barfield opposes the Inner Asian model of the 'conical clan' to that of more egalitarian Arabian tribalism.¹³ Khazanov wrote the best synopsis on Asian and African nomadism in a historical perspective, which is based on a profound knowledge of both Western and Soviet ethnography. It is because of the enormous scope

INTRODUCTION

of this work that Central Asian tribalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century is treated very briefly.¹⁴ Both anthropologists are more interested in tribalism and less in patrimonial states, although both analyse the impacts of states on tribal structures.

Soviet studies analysed tribal structures from the perspective of class conflict. This was not a very suitable concept for the analysis of kinship-based societies. Nevertheless, it considerably shaped the conceptual imagination of Soviet scholars, for example in the idea of the 'patriarchal-feudal' nature of tribalism.¹⁵

The most authoritative scholarship on Turkman tribalism was demonstrated by W. König and W. Irons. The East German ethnologist König presented an analytically and empirically very sound study of the *Akhal Teke*, which is almost free from ideological interpretations. It is not only based on access to Soviet archives but also on field work in the area.¹⁶ Irons' study of the *Iomut* Turkmen is founded on field work in the 1960s in Northern Iran, and gives a very carefully reconstructed insight into Turkman acephalous tribal structures.¹⁷ Wood dealt with the *Sariqs* of Merv and their relations to the Khanate of Khiva in the early nineteenth century.¹⁸ Smaller studies were published more recently by Lorenz and Meserve.¹⁹

Further Western research on Kazakh tribalism was done by Janabel, who analysed Mongol and Kazakh steppe politics.²⁰ Bodger examined features of political competition among rivaling Kazakh sultans in the eighteenth century.²¹ In their books on the Kazakhs, both Akiner and Olcott paid little attention to tribal structures, however.²² More elaborated Western scholarship on Kyrgyz and Uzbek tribalism before the revolution does not exist.²³ Uzbek and Kyrgyz community structures were rather studied in northern Afghanistan, where anthropological fieldwork was possible up to the 1980s.²⁴

Soviet scholarship was much more developed with regard to Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Kara-Kalpak and Turkman tribalism, and literature on the subject is abundant. This is not the place to give even a rough overview of Soviet scholarship in this field, but much careful research was done by ethnographers such as Tolstov,²⁵ Zhdanko,²⁶ Tostova,²⁷ Karmysheva,²⁸ Abramzon,²⁹ Tolybekov,³⁰ Markov,³¹ Kisliakov³² and Poliakov.³³ Nevertheless, ideological prejudices did not always enable theoretically sound conclusions and empirically precise descriptions.

With regard to the patrimonial states of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, independent Western historical research based on Persian and Chaghatay sources is little developed: there exist some general histories of Central Asia which also deal with the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khokand and Khiva of that period.³⁴ These studies often are only compiled from a selective choice of sources and mostly older literature, so that they no longer reach the international standards of the critical study of historical sources. Monographs like M. Holdsworth's *Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century* rather reviewed existing Soviet literature than presented new results of

INTRODUCTION

historical research.³⁵ Other scholars like Bacqué-Grammont limited their historical research interests to the analysis of single documents.³⁶

The most authoritative studies on the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva are still those of Yuri Bregel,³⁷ who has also compiled the best bibliography on pre-modern Central Asia, consisting of three volumes.³⁸ McChesney wrote interesting studies on *waqf* estates and on political traditions of legitimacy in Central Asia.³⁹ Anke von Kùgelgen recently finished a study on the legitimation of Manghit dynasty by local historians.⁴⁰ We do not have similar studies on the Khanate of Khokand. Due to this scarcity, Soviet studies on Central Asian history have remained important in the field. As only few later historians had the same access to literature and sources in Oriental and Western languages, Barthold's *oeuvre* continues to represent a starting- and reference point for historical research.⁴¹ The work of Soviet orientalist like A. A. Semenov,⁴² P. P. Ivanov or V. M. Ploskikh⁴³ will continue to influence historical research on the Central Asian patrimonial states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, the existing literature is often silent about community structures, and it is difficult to find research on the relation between local solidarity groups and the patrimonial state administration.⁴⁴ Studies like Jürgen Paul's analysis of the interrelations between state structures and local communities in pre-mongol Eastern Iran and Transoxiana are still to be written about the patrimonial states in pre-tsarist Central Asia.⁴⁴

Although research on tsarist Central Asia could be based on abundant Russian sources and materials, it too has attracted few Western researchers. Since the 1960s Pierce's *Russian Central Asia* has remained the only general study on the tsarist civil-military administration, although it is written from a more Russian perspective and is less interested in communal and political commitment structures of the local population.⁴⁵ There only exist a few more specialised studies in this field: Raëff dealt with the Speransky reform of the Middle Horde, which was the first tsarist attempt to establish independent administrative structures among Kazakh tribesmen.⁴⁶ Demko's treatment of the European colonisation of the Kazakh Steppe is still the single Western monograph on this topic.⁴⁷ Virginia Martin recently published a differentiated account on customary law and civil military administration among the former Middle Horde.⁴⁸ Sabol wrote a thesis on the European colonisation of Central Asia and its impacts on rethinking collective identity among Kazakhs.⁴⁹

With regard to the settled population of the river oases, Western research is even more rare: in the 1960s Carrère d'Encausse published a study on Jadid reformers in Central Asia, which tried to present these various independent and isolated Central Asian reformers as members of a national reform movement.⁵⁰ A more reliable monograph on Central Asian Jadidism is Khalid's *Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, which represents the most systematic study of Jadid reformist thinking in Central Asia.⁵¹ Omnibus volumes like Allworth's *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance*

rather contain useful compilations of Soviet research than new genuine historical studies.⁵²

The tsarist protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara did not get more scholarly attention: Becker's *Russia's Protectorates*⁵³ is still the best and most comprehensive study on this topic. More recently, Chatterjee completed an enquiry on social and political change in the emirate and the impacts of tsarist influence in the area.⁵⁴ Bacon wrote a cultural history of Central Asia which covers the pre-tsarist, tsarist and Soviet periods. Due to its sensibility to the local populace and its focus both on tribal and oasis culture, it is probably the best general study on social and cultural change in Central Asia.⁵⁵

This brief overview of previous scholarship cannot be complete. It only lists the existing, mostly Western research which is relevant to the proposed study. Due to the enormous scope of the relevant Soviet literature, we have only been able to make few remarks in order to sketch the state of the art of historical research on Central Asia.

This study is not dedicated to idiographic historical research, however. It also does not aim at summarising and compiling previous research work to write another history of Central Asia. This study pursues its own ends from the perspective of political sociology. Consequently, we do not primarily aim at giving a balanced overview of historical events, as historians are used to doing, but we refer to events only if they help clarify action orientations and structural change in Central Asia.

Comparative sociological research is not possible without specifying one's analytical tools. What a 'state', a 'tribe' or 'authority' is, is not a question of political dispute or scholarly argument, but a matter of analytic convenience. It is the internal consistency and the empirical relevance which enable us to judge the soundness of the terminology used.⁵⁶ Consequently, we neither use Soviet political attributes like 'reactionary', 'bourgeois-nationalistic' or 'feudalistic' on the one hand, nor do we employ terms like 'dictator', 'personality-cult' or 'totalitarianism' which are – as negative concepts – more rooted in Western political discourse than in analytic academic scholarship, on the other hand. In the same way, concepts like 'despotism', 'fanaticism' or 'fundamentalism' are avoided for their ethnocentric connotations.

As nomothetic sociological research is done from a theoretical perspective and based on hypotheses, we will first have to develop our theoretical framework and specify the analytical tools used in this study.

Political community and normative order

Our theoretical approach starts from the basic sociological fact that a common normative order is a basic precondition of every society. This is not only an argument linked to the integrative pole of the AGIL-scheme of

INTRODUCTION

action theorists,⁵⁷ but also a theoretical insight which is as old as the academic field of sociology itself. In the classic study *De la division du travail social*, Durkheim emphasised the normative character of both segmented and stratified societies. The normative structure of social order appears in the mechanical solidarity of highly segmented primitive societies, and in the organic solidarity of industrialising societies based on division of labour and complex role differentiation.⁵⁸ Utilitarian theorems exclude this normative aspect from their explanations. They assume a social contract which is implicitly or explicitly agreed to, because it guarantees the maximal happiness of the greatest number of people or a maximum of utility. However, Durkheim already shows that social relations which arise from the contractual agreement of individuals can never lay a foundation for a sustainable social order. If a society depends only on privately entered contracts based on interests, it can never be stable.⁵⁹

Similarly, power relations which are not integrated in an order of authority enable only *factual orders*. The binding decisions produced by such orders are as contingent as the changing power relations in societies.⁶⁰ Regulation by a *normative order*⁶¹ will be needed to prevent it from becoming an object of forceful confrontation and struggle.⁶² Thus the answer to the question of whether political order is stable and sustainable or not, depends highly on its specification as a normative order and the establishment of *political community* structures.⁶³

The basic hypothesis of this study is that enduring political order in Central Asia emerges from the successful *interpenetration* of opposing communal and political action orientations. Enduring political order will emerge, if societies are able to establish political community structures which ensure its members' commitment to the common political order. If social and political change do not lead to factual orders, opposing political and communal action orientations will have to interpenetrate to enable a new normative order.⁶⁴ It is the successful interpenetration of political and communal orientations which strengthen the political community structures of societies. This implies that the problem of political integration is linked to the fact of how prevailing community structures are referred to in the political sphere.⁶⁵

A political community arising from the interpenetration of communal and political action orientations can be acephalous or cephalous. An acephalous political community does not have regular leaders and subsequently lacks political *authority* relations.⁶⁶ A cephalous political community is based on a commitment to authority relations. This commitment is based on a belief in the righteousness of the authoritative use of *power*,⁶⁷ which roots the obligation of the ruler to rule and which informs the motivation of the ruled to obey. The use of negative sanctions (force) to enforce collective goals only represent an ultimate case. *Legitimate authority* relations are consequently not based on every motivation of obedience, as

INTRODUCTION

one might read Max Weber.⁶⁸ Legitimate authority is rooted in a normative order and based on political community which regulates political obedience. Thus legitimate authority informs the obligation of the ruler to rule and his or her expectation of obedience of the ruled.⁶⁹ If authority is not at all based on political community and lacks political legitimacy, it is called *domination*.⁷⁰

Four types of political community

According to the lack of authority relations and the different kinds of legitimacy, there are four main types of political communities:⁷¹

The acephalous political community lacks both leaders and staff of authority. It is politically decentralised and based on a community of law. Order is maintained and enforced by all able-bodied members of the community who pursue rightful force, feud and resistance to restore the communal order whose rights and claims are perceived as having been harmed. In many tribal societies, feud and strife are often widespread, since every tribesman sues for his claims and does not hesitate to enforce them. Thus frequent raids were not undertaken arbitrarily, but were linked to rightful claims. Every able-bodied man's rightful claim is based on customary law which shapes legal community structures.⁷² *Political representation* does not exist in acephalous political communities, since political decisions need the consent of its members and cannot be ascribed.⁷³ Medieval lordship over land and segmented tribal societies is based on acephalous political community structures.

Political communities based on patriarchal authority can inform more centralised or decentralised cephalous political orders. In both cases political order is based on personal authority relations and lacks an administrative staff. In these types of political order, authority relations do not rely on bureaucrats, priests or other officials, but only on the obedience of followers to a leader. These authority relations are informed by community of law which restrains the arbitrariness of ruling and which informs the obligations of the leader and the duties of his followers.⁷⁴ The monopoly of command and the authorised use of coercive power are not fully appropriated by the leader, who remains dependent on followers. Authority relations are relations of piety⁷⁵ and protection between the leader and his followers on the one hand and/or relations of piety towards the divine order of life (*Lebensordnung*) on the other. Chieftainships, tribal confederacies and hordes are based on this type of political community.⁷⁶

A political community based on patrimonial authority informs political orders which rely on a staff of authority and relations of loyalty and piety

INTRODUCTION

between ruler and ruled.⁷⁷ In this type of personalised political community structure, political power is centralised and enables the establishment of *states*. These are political organisations whose regulations are enforced by an administrative staff within a defined territory and which successfully monopolise the levying of taxes and use of legitimate coercive power. *State* authority refers to the materiality that the ruler can dispose of an administrative staff in order to enforce his commands without being fully dependant on the cooperation of followers. As the ruler, he is able to give orders to officials and to command subjects.⁷⁸

Patrimonial authority can inform quite different political orders. It is most purely developed when the administrative staff is the personal staff of the ruler and supplied by him. In estate-type patrimonialism, members of the staff appropriate powers and means of administration, and the ruler's disposition of the staff is limited with regard to these estates. This is often the case in *agricultural states*.⁷⁹ In *mercantile* states the ruler's staff is not only involved in fiscal, judicial and military sovereign acts, but also maintains monopolies in trade and the exploitation of natural resources. In patrimonial *industrialised* states, personalised state authority promotes the industrialisation of economy and society. This process can be based rather on state property and central planning, or rather on private property and free entrepreneurship. All these different types of state can be rooted in political communities structures which enable patrimonial authority relations.

Patrimonial authority is not based on kinship ties, but on established relations of piety and protection between ruler and ruled. Since piety can be more directed towards an authorised leader or towards a divine order of life, patrimonial authority can be built more on a divine order (e.g. within an Islamic state) or more on personal devotion to leaders or rulers (e.g. in a presidential republic). Patrimonial authority is maintained with the help of an administrative staff which is recruited primarily with regard to loyalty to the ruler. Professional qualification is often of secondary importance for recruitment.

A political community which is informed by legal authority is based on political consent about the rule of law in civil and public affairs. Effective monopolisation of the legitimate use of physical force and the state's monopoly of taxation secure this type of political order. Administrative staff are only recruited with reference to competence and qualification, and officials are paid by the state.

Collective goal attainment depends on communally defined legitimate claims of interest towards politics, and influences itself the shared borders and values of the community system. Since there is a communal consensus about what is a matter of political disposition and what is not, and about procedures to form a political will, the ruled are committed to the results of

INTRODUCTION

collective goal attainment, whereas the rulers are accountable and committed to political responsibility.

The analysis of social and political change basically deals with changing communal and political orientations of social agents. From the applied theoretical perspective we have to analyse these changes and examine what promotes and prevents the establishment of new normative political orders. Not every change of political and economic action orientations destroys or transforms established normative orders. Such change might establish a new form of political regime or leadership, without changing the underlying feature of political community structures.

As a result we have differentiated four main types of political communities which shape different types of normative orders. These four types of political communities correspond to the four basic types of political commitment: (tribal) commitment to political equality; (tribal) commitment to patriarchal authority; commitment to patrimonial authority; and commitment to legal authority. Figure 1 represents these different types of political commitment and order. From this perspective, the institutional logic of political regimes does not basically depend on formal institutional arrangements like those of presidential republics or monarchies, but on the type of political community structure which is implied.

This analytical systematisation of political orders is not complete, and its implied criteria are not all exclusive. For example, agricultural states can be more or less centralised and can be monetised to some extent. However, the elaboration of the different types of political community with similar political commitment structures should make it clear that similar commitment structures might inform quite different political regimes. As previous systematisations of political order did not sufficiently pay attention to these different forms of political commitment, their typologies are less helpful for systematising political regimes in European and non-European countries, and for explaining political change.⁸⁰

In any case, the problem of normative order will emerge, if a new political order based on a different type of political commitment is promoted. It will also occur if political regimes try to integrate political orders which rely on a different type of commitment. Political integration will be also problematic between political elites, which share a similar type of political commitment, but interpret their political commitment in a different way by linking it to distinct legal and cultural traditions. According to the proposed perspective, political elites will be only able to solve the problem of political order if they find a way to influence communal commitment structures, or if they succeed in integrating prevailing communal commitments in a new normative order. If communal commitment changes, it will take a long time and will be linked to processes of acculturation, like those, for example, of the full conversion of animistic pastoral tribesmen to literary religions like Islam or Christianity.

INTRODUCTION




Figure 1: Political commitment and types of political order

Note: ¹Nomadic empires are more similar to tribal confederacies than states. They differ from states in their minor significance of an interchangeable administrative staff. They often consisted of an administrative hierarchy of the imperial leaders and their courts, their governors appointed to oversee tribes, and the tribal leaders. In these confederacies, politics was based on personal oaths of allegiance of the free man to the imperial leader, on the subservience of slaves, and on the tribal following of allied tribesmen. Conquered tribesmen and non-tribal settled populations often became tributaries of the conqueror (cf. Barfield 1992, 5-8).

From this theoretical perspective, the elaborated analytical framework is used to analyse the changing political order and communal commitment in Central Asia. As the focus of our study is directed to pre-Soviet Central Asia, not all aspects of the analytical scheme will be applied in this study. Nevertheless, we have not omitted these other aspects for systematic and comparative reasons. Thus the analytical framework is also designed to be applied and further developed for the study of political change in other contemporary and historical societies. Economic and cultural issues are only picked up if they are necessary to understand political and solidarity action orientations. Thus the zones of interpenetration between communal commitment and the economic and cultural sphere are not within the scope of this study.

Methodological problems

This study is committed to nomothetic sociological research which aims at gaining more generalised knowledge about causal relations in the field of community structures and politics in Central Asia. It represents a preliminary study to the problems of political reform in contemporary Central Asia, which strive to design policy strategies to make contemporary political orders more sustainable in the area. For this reason the study's overall goal is to discover those factors which promoted or prohibited enduring political order in pre-Soviet times, and to describe how the establishment of the tsarist administration changed communal commitment and patterns of political integration in the area. As contemporary political elites act in a historical context and there exists political and communal continuity in the area, the prevailing conditions for reforms can only be estimated, if their historical context is reconstructed.

Theoretically inspired nomothetic research, consequently, formulates theoretically deduced hypotheses which are modified by and tested against the available empirical evidence in the research process. The quality of such a research approach is highly dependant on the relevance of the applied theoretical perspective and the quality of available literature and scholarship on the issues involved. Due to the low international standards of Central Asian historical research,⁸¹ this study is written in a difficult research environment and is challenged by many insufficiencies in the related research fields.

The choice of topic and scope of this study has been determined by theoretical considerations and the availability of related literature. For this reason it embraces a thematically, geographically and chronologically wide subject area, of the kind which historians have traditionally avoided due to the methodological constraints of critical and systematic study of sources and the practical considerations of workability and availability of these. In the course of the systematic reconstruction of pre-Soviet political and communal commitment structures, it turned out that some of the topics involved had not been studied at all, while others were only partly mentioned in the literature or conflated by the theoretical constraints of Soviet scholarship. In order to give some indicative descriptions of these 'blank spots', we had to consider source materials and contemporary studies to a certain extent. This auxiliary study of sources was done in a very selective way, and only in part. The choice of sources was limited to travel literature in Western languages, Russian and Kyrgyz materials, and was highly regulated by the degree of accessibility of materials. Thus we only used published source editions and official reports whose reliability was sometimes difficult to estimate.

The structural analysis of social and political change faces further methodological problems. When an analyst describes specific social struc-

tures, he or she often tends to assume that these structures are uniform, that they do not change and that they can be attributed to particular societies. This assumption is problematic, since, for example, the customary law of a tribal society might differ considerably from locality to locality. Even if it is true that the Islamisation of societies via the teaching of Islam in schools led to an increased homogenisation of those societies, many local particularities survived. The focus on general structures does not deny these local differences. However, being beyond the scope of this study, the latter cannot be described sufficiently.

The problem of generalisation is closely linked to the first-mentioned problem. If we generalise from specific sources due to the lack of reliable historical scholarship, we can never be sure not to have generalised specific aspects of general structures. On the other hand, it is impossible to quote a representative number of sources for each descriptive statement, even if such sources exist. However, these sources often do not exist or have only survived sporadically. Thus deductive descriptions sometimes cannot be avoided. According to the density of quoted literature and source evidence, readers can judge for themselves which issues need further research. We give more cautious formulations in those cases where descriptions are based more on conclusions than on direct empirical evidence. Consequently, this study should not be regarded as a completed research work, but must be read as a work in progress.

As sources cannot speak for themselves, they always have to be interpreted from a theoretical perspective. In this sense there exists a primacy of theory, as historians like R. Koselleck have argued.⁸² The theoretical perspective, however, cannot be detached from the source evidence. Whereas sources cannot tell us what we have to say, they can show us what we cannot say. Thus reference to primary sources represents an important means of controlling and improving our descriptions and hypotheses.

Sources used and contemporary literature

In order to undertake this study, we examined various source materials and contemporary reports. These materials were of varying reliability and included relevant information for our research to varying extents. As materials were only accessible in Russian and in Western languages, and only a few Persian and Chaghatay materials could be dealt with in translations, the auxiliary use of sources and their quality varied from topic to topic.

For the work as a whole we used several Soviet source editions compiled for the study of the pre-Soviet history of the Central Asian republics.⁸³ These compilations include translated extracts from local historiographies, documents from the patrimonial rulers' archives, tsarist legislative acts, reports of tsarist officials on local affairs, and internal administrative correspondence and other documents. With regard to the Kazakhs, we mainly

used Levshin's description of the Kazakh hordes, which is based on the evaluation of documents from the archive of the Asiatic Department of the tsarist foreign office, the Orenburg border commission and Levshin's personal experiences as tsarist envoy to the Kazakh Steppe.⁸⁴ Some useful remarks on Turkman tribalism could be found in travel reports, of which those of Murav'ev,⁸⁵ Burnes⁸⁶ and Vámbéry⁸⁷ were the most interesting. Valuable observations on Kyrgyz tribalism were discovered in Radloff's *Tagebuch*.⁸⁸ Further valuable materials on the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs could be found in the scholarly work of Valikhanov, who was the son of the former Khan of the Middle Horde. Having received Russian education, he was the first Kazakh ethnographer who was able to describe the history and customs of the steppe nomads from an internal perspective.⁸⁹

With regard to the patrimonial states, we used Khanykov's account on the Emirate of Bukhara, which is one of the best descriptions of the emirate before the tsarist conquest.⁹⁰ The same is true for Danilevsky's description of Khiva.⁹¹ Most contemporary travel reports, however, provide little information on our topic, or are merely compilations of inaccurate or distorted information from hearsay about the rulers and their administration.⁹² Translated Persian and Chaghatay sources often turned out to be of greater value.⁹³

The tsarist conquest of Central Asia is also mirrored in the different types of sources which it left: as tsarist authorities were able to guarantee their security, Western missionaries, officers and other travellers started to discover this previously inaccessible area and published their narratives.⁹⁴ Some travellers, like the American ambassador Schuyler, did not merely describe their route and encounters, but published quite balanced descriptions about the economic, political and social situation of the populations in various parts of the river oases and in the steppe and desert areas.⁹⁵ Tsarist control of the area also facilitated various scientific expeditions by geographers, geologists, ethnographers and other academics, who subsequently published scholarly treatments.⁹⁶

Some reports were compiled by military officers who took part in the conquest campaigns and gathered information about the defeated population.⁹⁷ Another type of source that we consulted were those accounts written by tsarist officials who were on duty in various oblasts. In the Kazakh Steppe these officials were most interested in studying local customs and customary law, in order to better administer the local population.⁹⁸ Such collections of customary law also exist for the Turkmen.⁹⁹ Maev delivered some useful information about the *guberniya* of Turkestan and its capital Tashkent.¹⁰⁰ Girshfel'd and Galkin give basic geographic and ethnographic information about the protectorate of Khiva.¹⁰¹

Valuable systematised information about tsarist Central Asia was written by imperial commissions like those headed by Girs¹⁰² and by Count Palen,¹⁰³ who tried to collect information for the reform of the tsarist

INTRODUCTION

administration. Palen's revision report is especially precious, as he evaluated and analysed all aspects of the civil-military administration, including its impact on local community structures and native courts in a report of eighteen volumes. Legal statutes and regulations represented further important sources of information.¹⁰⁴

The introduction of administrative structures also promoted the research of tsarist ethnographers who collected materials about the local population.¹⁰⁵ Because they tried to systematise the population in terms of culturally defined language groups, their ethnographic accounts differ considerably regarding the names, boundaries and peculiarities of the Central Asian 'peoples' who were organised along different lines. Ostroumov's endeavours to describe a *Sart* people and language was such an attempt.¹⁰⁶

The tsarist conquest also focused the interest of Western scholars on the area. After the publication of his travel account, Vámbéry published a history of Bukhara¹⁰⁷ and a study on the 'Turkic people'.¹⁰⁸ The British orientalists Skrine and Ross wrote a history of Russian Turkestan,¹⁰⁹ and the Danish explorer Olufsen published a study on the Emirate of Bukhara after he had visited the area in the 1890s.¹¹⁰ Collett and Trotter compiled from various Russian and Western sources comprehensive descriptions of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva.¹¹¹ These studies were often compiled exclusively from Russian sources, however, and did not emerge from a genuine study of both Chaghatay and Persian sources. For this reason they did not encourage further Western historical research on the area. Western ethnographic research based on field work in the area is more reliable in this respect.¹¹²

Last but not least, there emerged also an abundant number of studies written by Russian orientalists and other scholars: studies like Nalivkin's history of Khokand are unique, but of low value for historians, as he did not specify the local sources which he used.¹¹³ Other research, like Logofet's study on the Emirate of Bukhara as Russian protectorate,¹¹⁴ specifies its sources, but is often based solely on Russian materials and is therefore inclined to describe administrative structures rather from a Russian perspective. Russian publications on the tsarist colonies and the civil-military administration are often little interested in describing local community structures and the impacts of the administration on them.¹¹⁵

This brief overview of sources and contemporary literature represents only a selective sample of historical materials. There exist many other important sources which could not be used within the framework of this study. Because the systematic analysis of historians' sources is neither intended nor possible within the framework of this study, and Western historical research is anyway very limited in scope and content, we often were forced to critically appeal to Soviet historiography and to use those research results which we considered to be the most reliable.¹¹⁶

Structure of the book

Chapter 1 begins the empirical analysis on pre-tsarist Central Asia and deals with tribal communal commitment. First the tribal units are defined with reference to our understanding of tribe as community of peace and law. From this basis we try to identify tribal units among Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Kara-Kalpak, Uzbek, *Qipchoq* and Turkman tribespeople. The second part of this chapter works out the different tribal descent and residence groups, and analyses the relation between both types of grouping. It is shown that the affiliation of strangers rendered tribalism complex.

In Chapter 2, residential communal commitment is analysed as the second basic form of communal commitment which existed in rural and urban mahallahs. The change from tribal to residential commitment is perceived as a process of acculturation in which tribal customary law is replaced by the Islamic *sharia*. It is shown that groups which share residential communal commitments are not politically autonomous but depend on some kind of government which ensures their political integration. This is not the case among tribesmen who remain politically self-reliant.

Chapter 3 is focused on the political integration of Central Asian tribesmen who formed acephalous and cephalous political orders. First, Turkman acephalous tribalism is described and the checkerboard order and the order of segmentary opposition are analysed as two instances of Turkman political integration which resulted from the interpenetration of political action orientations and communal commitment to equality. The Kazakh hordes, and the Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpak confederacies are analysed as cephalous tribal political orders. It is shown that they are based on the interpenetration of political orientations and the communal commitment to patriarchy.

In Chapter 4, we deal with the strained relations between tribalism and patrimonialism in the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Khokand before the tsarist conquest. In each case we give a brief overview of the political history to be able to analyse the changing political foundations of these more or less patrimonial states. The analysis of the patrimonial administration concentrates on the political integration of the local population, and illustrates the problematic nature of patrimonial state structures in the area. The inquiry about the impacts on communal commitment deals with the effects of patrimonial rule on both settled *Sart* and neighbouring tribal populations.

Chapter 5 investigates the tsarist civil-military administration in Central Asia. As some Kazakh tribes already made alliance with Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century, the chapter starts with the analysis of Kazakh tribal confederacies along the Russian borderline, and continues with the sultan and *prikaz* administration in the first half of the nineteenth century. Subsequently the civil-military administration after 1868 is discussed. The impact of the tsarist administration on the Kazakhs is

INTRODUCTION

described with regard to the loss of indigenous political orientations, migration and settlement patterns, the territorial reorientation of leadership and the changing judicial orientations. The establishment of civil-military administration in Transcaspia is more briefly described, and the impact on Turkman communal commitment is treated. In the third part of this chapter the civil-military administration of the Governor-generalship of Turkestan is analysed, and it is shown that the tsarist administrative order had to politically integrate five different groups of native and European populations. Thus we describe the local administration of tribesmen, *Surt* dwellers, Russian peasants, Cossacks and European urban settlers, and outline the tsarist land and tax reform in the Governor-generalship. Tsarist efforts at the *sblizhenie* (rapprochement) of Central Asians to Russia are sketched as well. The impact of the tsarist administration on political orientations is discussed with regard to the loss of indigenous political orientations, the impact on communal commitment with reference to the rise of Islam, and the change from tribal to residential communal commitment.

In Chapter 6, we outline the political implications of the establishment of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva as tsarist protectorates, and briefly sketch its impact on communal and political commitment structures.

The concluding chapter sketches out the implication of our theoretical approach on Soviet and independent Central Asia. It promotes the view that despite the regime change after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the type and the weakness of political community structures have not changed in the area. Politics continues to not be rooted in a legal culture and follows the logics of patrimonialism, which sets the limits for democratisation and political reforms.

Notes

- 1 A. Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili kirgiz-kaïssatskikh ord i stepei*, St Petersburg 1832, quoted by, W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien. Lose Blätter aus dem Tagebuch eines reisenden Linguisten*, vol. 1, Leipzig 1884 (I), pp. 407–8. Cf. A. de Levchine, *Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks ou Kirghiz-Kaïssaks*, Paris 1840, pp. 392–3.
- 2 Cf. G. Meyendorf, *Voyage d'Orenburg à Boukhara*, Paris 1826, pp. 48–9.
- 3 S. Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia. Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, Cambridge MA 1968, p. 99.
- 4 D. I. Logofet, *Strana bez praviva. Bukharskoe khanstvo i ego sovremennoe sostoianie*, St Petersburg 1909.
- 5 E. Allworth, 'The Hunger for Modern Leadership', in E. Allworth (ed.) *Central Asia. 130 Years of Russian Dominance. A Historical Overview*, Durham and London 1994, p. 595.
- 6 Sh. Akbarzadeh, 'Nation-building in Uzbekistan', *CAS*, 1996/1, p. 26.
- 7 J. Critchlow, 'Uzbekistan's Prospects', *CAM*, 1998/4, p. 1.
- 8 A. Bohr, 'Turkmenistan and the Turkmen', in G. Smith, *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, 2nd edn, London and New York 1996, pp. 356–7.

INTRODUCTION

- 9 A. E. Hudson, *Kazak Social Structure*, London 1938.
- 10 L. Krader, 'Principles and Structures in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe Pastoralists', *SWJoA*, 1955, vol. 12/2, pp. 67–92; L. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Nomads*, The Hague 1963.
- 11 E. Bacon, *Obok. A Study of Social Structure in Eurasia*, New York 1958.
- 12 On the concept of tribalism used in this study, see Chapter 1.
- 13 Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757*, Cambridge MA and Oxford 1992 (1989).
- 14 A. M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, Cambridge 1984.
- 15 L. P. Potapov, 'O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniĭ u kochevykh narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana', in Akademiia Nauk SSSR, a.o. (ed.) *Materialy ob "edinennoi nauchnoi sessii, posviashchenoi istorii Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana v dooktiabr'skii period*, Tashkent 1955, pp. 17–42; B. F. Shakhmatov, 'O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniĭ u kochevykh narodov Kazakhstana', in Akademiia nauk SSSR 1955; V. F. Shakhmatov, *Kazakhskaiia pastbishchno-kochevaia obshchina (voprosy obrazovaniia, ėvoliutsii i razlozheniia)*, Alma-Ata 1964; D. Kshibekov, *Kochevoe obshchestvo: genezis, razvitie, upadok*, Alma-Ata 1984.
- 16 W. König, 'Zur Gesellschaftsorganisation der Turkmenen. Die Stammesstruktur der Teke', in Museum für Völkerkunde Leipzig (ed.) *Beiträge zur Völkerforschung. Hans Damm zum 65. Geburtstag. Veröffentlichungen des Museums für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig*, Heft 11, Berlin 1961, pp. 342–51; W. König, *Die Achal-Teke. Zur Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft einer Turkmenen-Gruppe im XIX. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1962.
- 17 W. Irons, *The Yomut Turkmen. A Study of Social Organisation among a Central Asian Turkic-speaking Population*, Ann Arbor 1975.
- 18 W. Wood, 'The Sarii Turkmen of Merv and the Khanate of Khiva in the Early Nineteenth Century', Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, Bloomington 1998.
- 19 R. Lorenz, 'Die Turkmenen. Zum historischen Schicksal eines mittelasiatischen Volkes', in E. von Mende (ed.) *Turkestan als historischer Faktor und politische Idee. Festschrift für Baymirza Hayit zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*, Cologne 1987, pp. 120–48; Ruth I. Meserve, 'A description of the position of Turkmen tribal leaders according to nineteenth century Western travellers', in *Altaica Berolinensia. Permanent International Altaistic Conference, 34th meeting, Berlin 21–26 July 1991: The concept of sovereignty in the Altaic World*, ed. B. Kellner-Heinkele, Berlin 1993, pp. 139–48.
- 20 J. Janabel, 'From the Mongol Empire to the Qazaq Hordes: Studies on Steppe Political Mechanisms', Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University 1997.
- 21 A. Bodger, 'Change and Tradition in Eighteenth-Century Kazakhstan, the Dynastic Factor', in Sh. Akiner (ed.) *Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia*, London 1991, pp. 344–60.
- 22 Sh. Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity. From Tribe to Nation-State (Former Soviet South Project)*, London 1995; M. Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Stanford 1987.
- 23 Anglo-American scholarship has neglected research on Central Asian tribalism in the last decades for several reasons. To start with, research on tribalism is a domain of cultural anthropologists and has attracted little attention from neighbouring academic fields like sociology, history or political science. In addition, political reasons have prevented field research in former Soviet Central Asia, and discouraged research on tribalism. Third, due to Soviet industrialisation and social change, tribalism itself became a historical phenomenon, which also rendered it less interesting to anthropologists, who are used to basing their research on field work, which was no longer possible. These factors have led to

INTRODUCTION

the situation where there exists an enormous and rich literature about tribalism and related issues on Afghanistan, whereas we know little about Central Asia in this respect.

- 24 G. Rasuly-Paleczek, 'Kinship and Politics among the Uzbeks of Northeastern Afghanistan', in I. Baldauf and M. Friedrich (eds) *Bamberger Zentralasienstudien. Konferenzakten ESCAS IV - Bamberg 8.-12. Oktober 1991 (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen - Band 185)*, Berlin 1994, pp. 11–28; R. Dor, *Contribution à l'étude des Kirghiz du Pamir Afghan (Cahiers Turcica 1)*, Paris 1975; R. Dor and C. Naumann, *Die Kirghisen des Afghanischen Pamir*, Graz 1978.
- 25 S. P. Tolstov, 'Perezhitki totemizma i dual'noi organizatsii y turkmen', *Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv*, Moscow and Leningrad 1935/9–10, pp. 3–41.
- 26 T. A. Zhdanko, *Ocherki istoricheskoi étnografii karakalpakov. Rodo-plemennaiia struktura i rasselenie v XIX – nachale XX veka*, Moscow 1950.
- 27 L. S. Tolstova, *Karakalpaki ferganskoï doliny K (Istoriko-étnograficheskii ocherk)*, Nukus 1959; *Karakalpaki za predelami khorezmskogo oazisa v XIX – nachale XX veka*, Nukus and Tashkent 1963.
- 28 B. Kh. Karmysheva, 'étnicheskie i territorial'nye gruppy naseleniia severovostochnoi chasti Kashka-Dar'inskoï oblasti Uz. SSR', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta étnografii AN SSSR*, t. XXXIII, Moscow 1960(a); *O nekotorykh drevnikh tiurkskikh plemenakh v sostave uzbekov (po étnograficheskim dannym) (XXV Mezhdunarodnyi kongress vostkovedov. Doklady delegatsii SSSR)*, Moscow 1960(b).
- 29 S. M. Abramzon, *Kirgizy i ikh étnogeneticheskie i istoriko-kul'turnye sviazi*, Leningrad 1990 (1971).
- 30 S. E. Tolybekov, *Kochevoe obshchestvo kazakhov v XVII – nachale XX veka*, Alma-Ata 1971.
- 31 G. E. Markov, *Ocherk istorii formirovaniia severnykh Turkmenov*, Moscow 1961; *Kochevniki Azii*, Moscow 1976.
- 32 N.A. Kisliakov, *Sledy pervobytnogo kommunizma u gornykh tadzhikov Vakhio-Bolo*, Moscow and Leningrad 1936; *Patriarkhalno-feodalnye otnosheniia sredi osedlogo sel'skogo naseleniia Bukharskogo khanstva v kontse XIX – nachale XX veka*, Moscow and Leningrad 1962; *Ocherki po istorii sem'i i braka u narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, Leningrad 1969; *Nasledovanie i razdel imushchestva u narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (XIX – nachalo XX v.)*, Leningrad 1977.
- 33 S. P. Poliakov, *Istoricheskaiia étnografiia Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, Moscow 1980.
- 34 G. Hambly (ed.) *Zentralasien*, Frankfurt 1988 (1966); B. Spuler (ed.) *Geschichte Mittelasiens (Handbuch der Orientalistik. Erste Abteilung – Der nahe und mittlere Osten. Fünfter Band – Altaistik, Fünfter Abschnitt)*, Leiden and Cologne 1966.
- 35 M. Holdsworth, *Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century. A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva*, Oxford 1959.
- 36 J. L. Bacqué-Grammont, 'Türân, une description du khanat de Khokand vers 1832 d'après un document ottoman', *CdMRS*, vol. XIII, 1972/2, pp. 192–231.
- 37 Y. Bregel, *Khorezmskie turkmeny v XIX v.*, Moscow 1961; 'Nomadic and sedentary Elements under the Turkmenen', *TF*, vol. 12, Hamburg 1989, pp. 131–64. (English: 'Nomadic and sedentary elements among the Turkmenen', *Central Asiatic Journal*, vol. XXV, 1981/1–2.); 'The Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva', *Journal of Asian History*, vol. 12, 1978/12, pp. 120–51; *The administration of Bukhara under the Manghīts and some Tashkent Manuscripts (Papers on Inner Asia no. 34)*, Bloomington 2000. About the state of art of Western historiography on Central Asia, see Y. Bregel, *Notes on the Study of Central Asia. (Papers on Inner Asia, no. 28)*, Bloomington 1996.

INTRODUCTION

- 38 Y. Bregel (ed.) *Bibliography of Islamic Central Asia*, 3 vols, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies: Bloomington 1995.
- 39 R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, Princeton 1991; *Central Asia: Foundations of Change*, Princeton 1996.
- 40 Anke von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie in den Werken ihrer Historiker (18.-19. Jahrhundert) (Türkische Welten, vol. 9/Beiruter Texte und Studien, vol. 86)*, Ergon-Verlag: Würzburg 2002.
- 41 V. V. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, 10 vols, Moscow 1963–9.
- 42 A. A. Semenov, *Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroïstva Bukharskogo khanstva*, (*Trudy Sredne-Aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriia II. Orientalia, vyp. 1*), Tashkent 1928; 'Bukharskii traktat o chinakh i zvaniakh i ob obriazannostiakh nositelei ikh v srednevekovoi Bukhare', in *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie V*, Moscow 1948; *Ocherk ustroïstva tsentral'nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo chanstva pozdneishego vremeni*, Stalinabad 1954.
- 43 P. P. Ivanov, *Vosstanie kitai-kipchakov v Bukharskom khanstve, 1821–1825. Istochniki i opyt ikh issledovaniia*, Moscow and Leningrad 1937; 'Kazakhi i Kokandskoe khanstvo (K istorii ikh vzaimootnosheniï v nachale XIX v.)', *ZIVAN*, 1939, vol. 7, M.-L., pp. 92–128; *Arkhiv khivinskikh khanov XIX v. – Issledovanie i opisaniie dokumentov s istoricheskim vedeniem*, Leningrad 1940; *Ocherki po istorii Srednei Azii (XVI – ser. XIX v.)*, Moscow 1958. V. M. Ploskikh, *Ocherki patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniï v iuzhnoi Kirgizii (50-70-e gody XIX v.)*, Frunze 1968; *Kirgizy i Kokandskoe khanstvo*, Frunze 1977.
- 44 Jürgen Paul, *Herrscher, Gemeinwesen Vermittler. Ostiran in vormongolischer Zeit (Beiruter Texte und Studien, vol. 59)*, Beirut 1996.
- 45 R. A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia 1867–1917. A Study in Colonial Rule*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1960.
- 46 M. Raëff and M. Speransky, *Siberia and the Reforms of 1822*, 2nd edn, The Hague 1969 (Seattle 1956).
- 47 G. J. Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896–1916*, Bloomington and The Hague 1969.
- 48 V. Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe. The Kazakhs and the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century*, London 2001.
- 49 St. Sabol, 'Awake Kazak!: Russian Colonization of Central Asia and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness, 1868–1920', Ph.D. thesis, Georgia State University 1998.
- 50 H. Carrère d'Encausse, *Réforme et révolution chez les Musulmans de l'Empire russe*, Paris 1981 (1966).
- 51 A. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1998.
- 52 E. Allworth (ed.) *Central Asia. 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, updated 3rd edn, Durham NC and London 1994 (1967).
- 53 S. Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia. Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, Cambridge MA 1968.
- 54 S. Chatterjee, 'Emirate of Bukhara, 1868–1924: Encounters with "Transition"', Ph.D. thesis, Calcutta University 2000.
- 55 E. B. Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule. A Study in Cultural Change*, Ithaca NY 1966.
- 56 The Glossary of Technical Terms indicates where and how important terms of this study are defined.
- 57 The AGIL-scheme was introduced by T. Parsons, R. F. Bales and E. A. Shils in their *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, Glencoe IL 1957.

INTRODUCTION

- 58 E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, New York 1933 (French: *De la division du travail social: étude sur l'organisation des sociétés supérieures*, Paris 1893).
- 59 The differentiation between rule- and act-utilitarianism does not escape the limitations of utilitarian theorems. The introduced assumption that it is useful to renounce short-term benefits for long-term ones (i.e. benefits arising from the disrespect of rules for long-term security of peaceful exchange profits) is still highly problematic. See R. Münch, *Theorie des Handelns*, Frankfurt 1988 (1982), pp. 286–7. Also: B. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, London 1985.
- 60 With regard to authority relations in Niger, Gerd Spittler seems to describe a political order which he holds to be only based on selective and demonstrative use of force of the rulers towards the ruled. Although this order is not rooted in a normative order, he regards it as being more stable than orders based on legitimacy. This view is only possible due to his overemphasis of the coercive aspect of power and his misleading interpretation of orientations towards authority. If it is only based on demonstrative physical force, it will never reach the observed degree of stability. Nevertheless, his empirical case also refers to elements of normative commitment of the peasant towards the Nigerian state. G. Spittler, 'Herrschaftsmodell und Herrschaftspraxis. Eine Untersuchung über das legitimitätslose Herrschaftsmodell von Bauern in Niger', *PVS*, 1976. *Sonderheft 7*, pp. 270–88.
- 61 The differentiation between normative and factual orders was introduced by Talcott Parsons in his famous study *The Structure of Social Action* (New York 1961 [1937] p. 91) and refers to the fact that not every order is sustainable. A stable order, at least, must be rooted to a certain extent in the normative commitment of its members to it. Cf. J. C. Alexander, *The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons (Theoretical Logic in Sociology, vol. 4)*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1983, pp. 20–7.
- 62 Münch 1988, pp. 172–90.
- 63 Cf. Paul Georg Geiss, 'Communal Commitment and Political Order in Change. The Pre-tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia', Ph.D. thesis, University of Vienna 2000, pp. 64–79.
- 64 There are different ways in which communal and political action orientations can be related: the dominance of communal orientations leads to the communalisation of politics, which impedes the effective use and maintenance of political power and promotes political particularism. The dominance of politics erodes communal commitment structures and makes social life vulnerable to political contingencies. If the political and communal sphere are mutually isolated, both spheres will exist according to their own logic without also being able to perform the functions of the other sphere: politics will be fragile due to a lack of political integration, just as community structures will be unable to set and perform new tasks in a changing world. Only in the case of interpenetration will both spheres continue to perform their functions on a qualitatively new basis, and increase their potential for the establishment of normative order. cp. Münch 1988, pp. 59–77, 123–190.
- 65 Münch 1988, pp. 509–25; *Die Kultur der Moderne. Bd. 1*, Frankfurt 1993 (1986), pp. 14–23
- 66 Authority (*Herrschaft*) is – after Max Weber – defined as the probability of obedience to commands among a specified group of people. Cf. M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft – Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1972 (1921–5) p. 28 (English: *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, eds G. Roth and C. Wittich, 2 vols. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1978, p. 53.

INTRODUCTION

67 Max Weber's classic definition ('Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht') is ambiguous, since its content depends on the interpretation of the word *auch*. Roth translated this definition as 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests' (Weber 1978, p. 53.) The translation of *auch* as 'despite' is incorrect, since *auch* means basically 'also' or 'as well'. Thus it reduces power to coercion and force. Such a reading would imply that established authority relations do not represent power relations which are rooted in political community structures. Weber's definition explicitly refers to 'carrying out ones own will also against the resistance of others', however. Thus his definition also includes cases in which the use of power does not face resistance, and the carrying out of one's will corresponds to that of followers or ruled subjects.

In contrast to Parsons' overemphasis on the aspect of negative sanctions (T. Parsons, 'Über den Begriff der Macht', in T. Parsons, *Zur Theorie der sozialen Interaktionsmedien*, Opladen 1980, pp. 76–8; Münch 1988, p. 127) we define power as the ability to carry out one's own wishes against or in accordance with the will of others. This accordance emerges from political community structures and leads to shared political commitment which regulates authority relations. This is possible due to the human capacity to associate with others and to act in agreement with them. See J. Habermas, 'Hannah Arendts Begriff der Macht', in *Politik, Kunst, Religion. Essays über zeitgenössische Philosophen*, Stuttgart 1989 (1978), pp. 103–26. Thus power is not necessarily oriented on the successful realisation of one's aim against the will of others, and the coercive aspect of power relations can be more or less developed.

Associated human agency may exist for different goods. Political freedom represents just one of these. In the same way, communicatively established common convictions, which emerge from argument and inform agency, only represent a special case analysed by Habermas (Habermas 1988). Nevertheless, commitment to common agency is often created by charismatic movements, and reproduced by, unreflected habituation and established customs. See also Habermas 1989, pp. 101–26. Cf. Aquinas' differentiation between *potestas directiva* and *potestas coactiva* (Aquinas II–II 671c) in P. Tischleder, *Ursprung und Träger der Staatsgewalt nach der Lehre von Thomas von Aquin und seiner Schule*, n.p. 1923.

68 Weber 1972, p. 122. The motivation for obedience must be linked to a belief in righteousness. Political rule based only on force and economic interest does not constitute legitimate authority. Weber remains unclear about this. In section 6 of *Sociological Basic Concepts of Economy and Society*, he states that order can be also guaranteed by external interests, although he emphasises the fragility (*ibid.*, pp. 16, 122) and even illegitimacy of authority with strong economic orientations. Cf. Weber 1978, ch. 16, 'Non-legitimate Authority: Typology of Towns'.

69 Cf. also W. Hennis, 'Legitimität. Zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft', *PVS*, Sonderheft 7, 1976, pp. 7–38.

70 In Roth's translation of the *Basic Sociological Terms*, the central term of Weber's political sociology, *Herrschaft*, is translated as 'domination'. (Weber 1978, p. 53.) This is misleading because the term 'domination' rather excludes the integration of power relations by political community structures. Thus 'authority' represents a much better term for *Herrschaft*, which is used in other parts of Weber's *Economy and Society*.

71 In the classic collection of studies on African political orders, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard outlined two types of political orders in the introducing chapter, which

INTRODUCTION

was written as contribution to *Comparative Politics*. These two types are similar to what is discussed here as acephalous political community and political community based on patrimonial authority (M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds) *African Political Systems*, London 1940, pp. 1-23).

- 72 Medieval lordship over land is partly similar to this type, and was exercised by able-bodied men who pursued rightful force, feud and resistance to restore the communal order, damage to which had affected their rights and claims. Nevertheless, it is also different due to the political integration of these territorial domains into kingdoms and empires. O. Brunner, *Land and Lordship. Structures of Government in Medieval Austria*, Philadelphia 1992. pp. 296-364 (German: *Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter*, 3rd edn, Vienna 1943).
- 73 Representation is the materiality within authority relations that the agency of the representative (= ruler) is ascribed to and regarded as being bound by the ruled. The types of representation within authority relations can be differentiated with regard to (a) what is represented (object of representation); and (b) who is perceived to be qualified to represent (subject). With regard to the object of representation, and in reference to Benedikt Haller's dichotomy of societal representation and representation of an transcendent order (B. Haller, *Repräsentation*, Münster 1987), we differentiate between societal and absolute representation. In both cases societies articulate themselves as political communities which authorise an existing representative to make binding decisions for their members. The difference consists in the fact that societal representation represents the political unity of members of a 'people' or of a society in terms of narrative symbolisations of collective identity, whereas absolute representation refers to a divine, cosmic or holy order. In the second case, political order is always just a mirror of this holy order, and the representative is not responsible to the ruled but to the divine (e.g. the 'Last Judgement'). Cf. E. Voegelin, *Die Neue Wissenschaft der Politik. Eine Einführung*, Freiburg and Munich 1991, pp. 52-83 (English: *The New Science of Politics. An Introduction*, Chicago 1952); H. Hofmann, *Repräsentation. Studien zur Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1974).
- 74 The Greek *polis*, for example, was also based on a community of law (*nomos*). Its political order included various offices, but normally lacked a staff of authority which was typical for the patrimonial rulers of the Persian empire. Only Greek tyrants resembled patrimonial rulers, who put their relatives in offices and maintained soldiers or guards in urban areas where tribal structures were weak. The *polis*, however, remained a community of people committed to different levels of political equality and patriarchal authority.
- 75 In the ancient Greek tradition piety was called *eusébia*, which was the respectful devotion towards humans and gods. But it was also granted to the *polis*, the civic community, in which one lives and to which the citizens owed their political existence. The Romans also attributed *pietas* to ancestors, relatives, gods and to their polity, which they called *res publica*. In the Christian tradition the concept of piety was extended and piety was primarily directed to God, as the ground for all life and to whom everything is owed in last instance. It is important to our analysis that piety is not only a relation between humans but may also be oriented towards a divine order of life (see H. Schneider, 'Patriotismus und Nationalismus', *Concilium*, December 1995, pp. 499-509).
- 76 Nomadic conquest movements are often quite unstable, as they depend on the military and charismatic qualities of their leaders. These leaders often failed to institutionalise their power, which led to the decline of their empires after their death.

INTRODUCTION

- 77 In contrast to tribal gerontocracy and patriarchalism, patrimonialism is a type of piety based authority relation which included rulers and subjects and where the ruler(s) could dispose of an administrative staff to enforce their commands without being dependant on the cooperation of the subjects. Pure patrimonialism occurs, when the staff of the authority is the personal staff of the ruler and supplied by him, whereas in estate-type patrimonialism members of the staff possessed the means of administration themselves. Patrimonial offices often lack the separation of the 'private' and the 'official' sphere (cf. Weber 1978, pp. 231–5, 1010–15) In contrast to Pipes, we do not think that the rulers' extended rights of ownership and their 'being both sovereigns of the realm and its proprietors' must be always linked to patrimonialism. For example, Islamic rulers did also acknowledge private ownership of *mulk* property. R. Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, London 1995 (1974), pp. xxii, 19–24. Like Pawelka, we think that patrimonialism is linked to a ruler, who directs all political decisions with the help of dependant officials and politicians personally loyal to him (Peter Pawelka, *Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten*, Heidelberg 1985, pp. 21–8). Nevertheless, we use 'patrimonialism' only as an analytical term. Thus we neither share the evolutionary and evaluative assumptions of modernisation theorists operating with similar concepts, nor do we use it as a heuristic model to explain politics within a 'static' or 'traditional' society.
- 78 The significant difference between tribal and state authority relations is often not fully recognised by anthropologists and historians who use concepts like 'tribal-consanguineous states' or 'tribe-states' (L. Krader, *Formation of the State*, London/Sydney/Toronto/New Delhi/Tokyo 1968, pp. 1–6) or 'nomadic states' (S. A. M. Adshead, *Central Asia in World History*, London 1993, pp. 19–20; Ch. F. Carlson, 'The Concept of Sovereignty in Kazakhstan', in *Altaica Berolinensia: Permanent International Altaistic Conference, 34th meeting, Berlin 21–26 July 1991: The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World*, ed. B. Kellner-Heinkele, 1993, pp. 60–4). Statements like 'There is "state" within every tribe and "tribe" within every state' or "'Tribal" stresses personal, moral and ascriptive factors in status, while "state" is impersonal and recognises contract, transaction and achievement' also conceal this difference (R. Tapper [ed.] *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, New York 1983, pp. 66–7.)
- 79 Cf. Weber 1978, pp. 231–5.
- 80 For example: as Almond regards only states as political systems, his typology includes Anglo-American, pre-industrial, totalitarian and Continental European political systems. In this way he is indifferent to the underlying forms of political community (G. A. Almond, 'Zum Vergleich politischer Systeme', in G. Doeker [ed.] *Vergleichende Analyse politischer Systeme. Comparative Politics*, Freiburg 1971, pp. 57–76). Shils' famous typology included 'political democracy', 'tutelary democracy', 'modernising oligarchy', 'totalitarian oligarchy' and 'traditional oligarchy' (E. Shils, *Political Development in the New States*, The Hague 1962). Berg-Schlösser and Theo Stammen added to this list the types of 'static oligarchy' and 'praetorian system' and elaborate three different types of 'totalitarian' systems ('mobilisation systems', 'Fascist systems' and 'Communist systems') without explaining why these political systems of non-European societies differ from each other to the same extent as they differ from 'parliamentary democratic systems' (D. Berg-Schlösser and Th. Stammen, *Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft*, Munich 1995 (1974) pp. 223–55). Friedrich differentiated thirteen types ranging from 'political anarchy' to 'totalitarian dictatorship' (C. J. Friedrich, *Politik als Prozeß der Gemeinschaftsbildung. Eine empirische Theorie*, Köln-Opladen 1970 (English: *Man and His Government. An Empirical Theory of Politics*, New York 1963) p. 57). Pawelka reasonably argued why patrimonial

INTRODUCTION

politics functions differently from politics in Western liberal democracies (Pawelka 1985, pp. 73, 95, 456); his systematisation of political systems includes 'authoritarianism' and 'populism' as patrimonial types of political order being based on more coercive or distributive means respectively. He identifies certain periods of Egyptian politics with two of the four types of 'neo-patrimonialism' (i.e. normative, utilitarian, controlled and repressive) elaborated by him. On doing so, he seems to suggest that Egyptian politics operated without any normative foundation after 1965 (Pawelka 1985, pp. 449–50).

- 81 Cf. Y. Bregel, *Notes on the Study of Central Asia (Papers on Inner Asia, no. 28)*, Bloomington 1996.
- 82 Cf. R. Koselleck, 'Standortbindung und Zeitlichkeit. Ein Beitrag zur historiographischen Erschließung der geschichtlichen Welt', in *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Frankfurt 1995 (1979), pp. 176–207 (English: *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time*, Cambridge MA 1979).
- 83 'Materialy po istorii karakalpakov', in *AN SSSR – Trudy Instituta vostokovedeniia, t. vii*, Moscow and Leningrad 1935; 'Materialy po istorii Kazkhskoi', *SSR*, Moscow and Leningrad 1940; *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana (co vremeni prisoedineniia Kazakhstana k Rossii do Velikoï Oktiabr'skoï revoliutsii), tom I*, Alma-Ata 1960; *Materialy po istorii turkmen v Turkmenii, vol. II – Iranskie, Bukharskie i Khivinskie istochniki (MITT II)*, Moscow and Leningrad 1938; *Materialy po Kazakhskomuy obychnomuy pravuy (Istoriia Kazakhstana: Issledovaniia, dokumenty)*, Almaty 1998, pp. 39–40 (first edition: *Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR. Materialy po kazakhskomuy obychnomuy pravuy, Sbornik I*, Alma-Ata 1948); *Materialy po istorii Uzbekistana*, Tashkent 1963; A. L. Troitskaia, *Materialy po istorii Kokandskogo Khanstva XIX v. po dokumentam arkhiva Kokandskikh Khanov*, Moscow 1969.
- 84 A. Levshin, *Opisanie Kirgiz-Kazakhikh ili Kirgiz Kaisakskikh ord i stepei*, St Petersburg 1832 (French: *Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks ou Kirghiz-Kaissaks*, Paris 1840).
- 85 N. Murav'ev, *Puteshestvie v Turkmeniiu i Khivu v 1819 i 1820 godakh gvardeïnskogo general'nogo shtaba kapitana Nikolaia Murav'eva*, Moscow 1822 (German: *Reise nach Turkomanien und Khiva in den Jahren 1819 und 1820*, Jena 1823).
- 86 A. Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, 3 vols, London 1834.
- 87 H. Vámbéry, *Reise in Mittelasien von Teheran durch die Turkmanische Wüste an der Ostküste des Kaspischen Meeres nach Chiwa, Bochara und Samarkand, ausgeführt im Jahr 1863*, Leipzig 1865 (English: *Travels in Central Asia: Being the Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara and Samarcand*, New York 1865).
- 88 W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien. Lose Blätter aus dem Tagebuch eines reisenden Linguisten*, 2 vols, Leipzig 1884.
- 89 Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Sochineniia', in *Zapiski IRGO po otdeleniiu étnografii, tom XXIX*, St Petersburg 1904; Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, 5 vols, Alma-Ata 1984–6 (1958–68).
- 90 N. V. Khanykov, *Opisanie Bukharskogo Khanstva*, St Petersburg 1843 (English: *Bokhara: Its Amir and Its People*, London 1845).
- 91 Colonel G. I. Danilevskii, 'Opisanie Khivinskogo khanstva', *IRGO, Zapiski V* (1851) pp. 62–139.
- 92 N. Ignat'ev, *Missiia v Khivu i Bukharu v 1858 gody*, St Petersburg 1897 (English: *Mission of N. P. Ignat'ev to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858*, edited with notes, introduction and translated by J. L. Evans, Newtonville 1984); Vámbéry 1865; *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve (Otchety P. I. Demezona i I. V. Vitkevicha) – Tsentral'naiia Aziia v istochnikakh i materialakh XIX – nachala XX veka*, Moscow

INTRODUCTION

- 1983 (1834); A. P. Fedchenko, *Puteshestvie v Turkkestane* (reprint of *V Kokandskom khanstve*, St Petersburg and Moscow 1875) Moscow 1950.
- 93 Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi, *Firdaws al-iqbāl – History of Khorezm*, translated from Chaghatay and annotated by Yuri Bregel, Leiden/Boston/Cologne 1999; Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l'Asie. Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand depuis les dernière années du règne de Nadir Chah, 1153, jusqu'en 1233 de l'hégire, 1740 – 1818 A. D.* (texte persane, publié d'après un manuscrit unique, avec une traduction française accompagnée d'une introduction, des notes et appendices, par Ch. Schefer, Amsterdam 1970 (Paris 1876); Mirza Shams Bukhari, *O nekotorykh sobytiakh v Bukhare, Khokande i Kashgare. Zapiski Mirzy-Shemsa Bukhari*, Izdannia v tekste, s perevodom i primechaniiami, ed. V. V. Grigorev, Kazan 1861; H. M. Fazil Khan, *Tarikh-i-Man azili-Buhara*, Srinagar 1981 (1813).
- 94 For example: A. E. Brehm, *Reise zu den Kirgisen. Aus dem Sibirienbuch 1876*, Leipzig 1982; F. Burnaby, *Travels and Adventures in Central Asia: A Ride to Khiva*, New Dehli 1996 (1876); H. Lansdell, *Russian Central Asia*, 2 vols, London 1885; H. Moser, *À Travers l'Asie Central*, Paris 1885.
- 95 E. Schuyler, *Turkistan. Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, 2 vols, London 1876.
- 96 For example: Ch. E. de Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd, *Le Kohistan, le Ferghanah & Kouldja avec appendice sur la Kachgharie*, Paris 1878; *Le Syr-daria – le Zérafchâne. Le pays des sept-rivières et la Sibérie-occidentale*, Paris 1879.
- 97 N. I. Grodekov, *Khivinskii pokhod 1873 g. Izd. 2.*, St Petersburg 1888; *Voïna v Turkmenii. Pokhod Skobeleva v 1880–1881 gg.*, St Petersburg 1883–4.
- 98 N. I. Grodekov, *Kirgizy i karakirgizy Syr-dar'inskoï oblasti – Iuridicheskiï byt*, Tashkent 1889; B. Iuzefovich, 'O byte kirgizov Turgaïskoï oblasti', *RV*, vol. 146, 1880, pp. 799–832; L. Chermak, 'osedlye kirgizy-semledel'tsy na r. Chu', *Zapiski Zapadno-Sibirskog otdela IRGO* (Omsk) 1900, XXVII, pp. 1–24; I. Koslow, 'Das Gewohnheitsrecht der Kirgisen', *Russische Revue*, v. 21, 1882, pp. 456–74; L. A. Slovochotov, *Narodnyi sud obychnogo prava kirgiz maloï ordy*, Orenburg 1905; G. S. Zagriazhskii, 'Iuridicheskiï obychai kirgiz i o narodnom sude u kochevogo naseleniia Turkestanskogo kraia, po obychnomy pravu (zan')', in Maev 1876, pp. 151–202; V. Anichkov, *Prisiaga kirgiz pered russkim sudom*, Tashkent 1899; N. Izraztsov, 'Obychnoe pravo ("adat") kirgizov semirechenskoï oblasti: semeïnye soiuzy', *étnograficheskoe obozrenie – Izdanie étnograficheskogo otdela imperatorskogo obshchestva liubitelei estestvoznaniia, antropologii i étnografii, sostoiashchego pri moskovskom universitete*, 1897/3, pp. 67–94.
- 99 A. Lomakin, *Obychnoe pravo turkmen (adat)*, Ashkhabad 1897; A. P. Andreev, 'Turkmenskii sud', *IV*, 1900, vol. 81, pp. 524–55; V. V. Rusinov, *Vodozemel'nye otosheniia i obshchina u turkmen*, Tashkent 1918.
- 100 H. A. Maev (ed.) *Materialy dlia statistiki Turkestanskogo kraia*, vyp. IV, St Petersburg 1876; 'Aziatskii Tashkent', in Maev 1876, pp. 260–313; L. Kostenko, *Sredniaia Azia i vodvorenii v nei russkoï grazhdanstvennosti*, St Petersburg 1871; L. Kostenko, *Turkestanskiï kraï. Opyt voenno-statisticheskogo obozreniia Turkestanskogo voennogo okruga. Material dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii, tom I*, St Petersburg 1880.
- 101 Kapitan Girshfel'd and General-maïor Galkin, *Voenna-statisticheskoe opisaniie Khivinskogo oazisa, chast' 2*, Tashkent 1903.
- 102 F. Girs, 'Ob"iasnitel'naia zapiska komissii k proektu polozheniia ob upravlenii v Kazakhskikh stepiakh (1867)', TsGIA KazSSR, f. 4, op. 1, d. 490. Some extracts are published in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana*, vol. 1, pp. 258–78.

INTRODUCTION

- 103 K. K. Palen, *Pereselencheskoe delo v Turkestarskom krae. (Otchet po revizii Turkestarsnogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910, 18 vols.
- 104 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii. Sobranie vtoroe (1825–1881)*, 55 vols (St Petersburg 1830–84); *Sobranie tret'e (1881–1913)*, 33 vols (St Petersburg 1885–1916); Kraft (ed.) *Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh*, Orenburg 1898.
- 105 A. D. Grebenkin, 'Tadzhiki', in Trotskiĭ 1872, pp. 1–50; 'Uzbeki', in Trotskiĭ 1872, pp. 51–109, both in V. N. Trotskiĭ (ed.) *Russkiĭ Turkestan. Sbornik izdanyĭ po povodu politekhnicheskoi vystavki, vyp. II - Stat'i po etnografii, tekhnike, sel'skomu khoziaistvu, i estestvennoi istorii*, Moscow 1872; N. Aristov, 'Opyt vyiasneniia etnicheskogo sostava kirgiz-kazakov bol'shoi ordy i kara-kirgizov na osnovanii rodoslovnykh skazanii i svedenii o sychshestvuiushchikh rodovykh deleniakh i o rodovykh tamgakh, a takzhe istoricheskikh dannykh i nachinauiushchikhsia antropologicheskikh izsledovaniĭ', *ZHS*, 1894/3–4, pp. 391–486; N. A. Aristov, 'Zametki ob etnicheskom sostave tiurkskikh plemen i narodnostei i svedeniia ob ikh chislennosti', *ZHS*, 1896/3–4, pp. 277–458; N. O. Katanov, *etnograficheskii obzor turetsko-tatarskikh plemen*, Kazan 1894; P. P. Rumiantsev, *Kirgizskii narod v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, St Petersburg 1910.
- 106 N. P. Ostroumov, *Sarty. etnograficheskie materialy*, Tashkent 1890.
- 107 H. Vámbéry, *Geschichte Bochara's oder Transoxaniens von den frühesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart. Nach orientalischen benützten und unbenützten handschriftlichen Geschichtsquellen*, Stuttgart 1872.
- 108 H. Vámbéry, *Das Türkenvolk in seinen ethnologischen und ethnographischen Beziehungen*, Osnabrück 1970 (1885).
- 109 F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross, *The Heart of Asia. A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times*, London 1899 (reprint in The Middle East Collection, New York 1973).
- 110 O. Olufsen, *The Emir of Bokhara and His Country*, London and Copenhagen 1911.
- 111 H. Collett, *Central Asia, Section 1 – Part IV. A Contribution towards the better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnography, Resources and History of the Khanate of Khiva*, Calcutta 1873; J. M. Trotter, *Central Asia – Section II. Part IV. A Contribution Towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnography, Resources and History of the Khanate of Bokhara*, Calcutta 1873.
- 112 V. Dingelstedt, *Le Droit coutumier des Kirghiz d'après l'étude entreprise sous ses auspices du gouvernement russe (Revue générale du droit, de la législation et de la jurisprudence en France et à l'étranger)*, Paris 1890; R. Karutz, *Unter Kirgisen und Turkmenen. Aus dem Leben der Steppe*, Leipzig 1911.
- 113 P. V. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskogo khanstva*, Kazan 1886.
- 114 D. N. Logofet, *Bukharskoe Khanstvo pod russkim protektoratom*, 2 vols. St Petersburg 1911.
- 115 I. I. Geier, *Turkestan*, 2nd edn, Tashkent 1909; A. I. Dobrosmyslov, *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoiashchem. Istoricheskii ocherk*, Tashkent 1912; *Goroda Syr-dar'inskoĭ oblasti. Kazalinsk, Petrovsk, Turkestan, Aulie-ata i Chimkent*, Tashkent 1912.
- 116 This is no easy task, as most Soviet and post-Soviet historiography was or remains biased. Careful Western historical studies are rare, however, or suffer from improper or insufficient use of historical sources. Cf. Y. Bregel, *Notes on the Study of Central Asia (Papers on Inner Asia, no. 28)* Bloomington 1996.

1

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

The tribal unit

There is considerable confusion about the boundaries and subdivisions of tribes in Central Asia and how they were named.¹ Some of these terminological problems arise from the difficulty of defining the level of segmentation to which 'tribe' as the largest unit has to be referred. Tsarist and Soviet ethnographers were inclined to name all units immediately below the diagnosed people (*narodnost'*) or nationality (*natsiia*) as tribes (*plemia*).² Such classifications are precipitative and pretend to describe social reality from an objective point of view which is not available and which is arbitrary. The question of whether the *Chony*, a subdivision of the Turkman Gurgan *Iomut*, is a tribe, a sub-tribal group or even a tribal confederacy can neither be answered with reference to the 'objective' cultural and linguistic criteria of ethnographers and linguists, nor can it be solved with regard to the level of segmentation within the much younger Turkman titular-nationality of the Turkman Soviet Republic. What is to be examined is the relevant unit of communal commitment.³

Tribe as exogamic unit?

One way to define 'tribe' is to conceptualise it as a unit of exogamy. Tsarist and Soviet ethnographers tended to define *rod* as the an exogamous unit in contrast to *plemia*, which often represented an endogamous confederacy of several *rods*. They applied this differentiation to describe all Central Asian tribal societies.⁴

According to Grodekov's and Kaufmann's reports, marriage was forbidden between patrilineally related kinsmen up to the seventh generation in the Kazakh hordes.⁵ The Kyrgyz also would have known a similar rule of exogamy, which forbade marriage between kin of patrilineal descendant up to seven generations.⁶ Krader argues that the 'tribes' (*clans* in his terminology) were originally the units of exogamy among the Kazakh, and that exogamy was later defined by 'a rule of prohibited degrees of consanguineous relationship for marriage, usually to the seventh degree'.⁷ This view

is supported by earlier reports about the Kazakhs⁸ of Levshin, which state that Kazakhs of the Great Horde married outside the tribal subgroups (*section de tribu*) and preferably even outside the 'tribe', too.⁹ Most Kara-Kalpaks of the Amu-Darya delta were also strictly exogamous, and marriage was only allowed with women outside the 'lineages' (*rods*). This was also the case between members of far distanced camps (*awylys*) which belonged to the same 'lineage'.¹⁰

Exogamy is not typical of all the tribal people of Central Asia, however. Turkman tribes, in contrast, were endogamous, and marriage was not proscribed with any category of kin.¹¹ Uzbek tribesmen also did not arrange exogamous marriages, but there was a preference for parallel cousin marriage.¹² The same is true for *Qipchoq* tribesmen of the Ferghana and Zarafshan valley.¹³ Thus Russian ethnographers faced severe descriptive problems in using the term *rod* as an exogamic unit.¹⁴

In addition, some of the implied terminological problems emerge from possibly different levels of segmentation within one tribal confederacy: According to Zhdanko, the *Qypshaq* tribe (*plemia*) of the Kara-Kalpak *On Tört' Uruw* confederacy consisted of fourteen lineages (*rods*). Seven of them formed the group of the *Zheti-Käshe* (seven lineages), whereas the other five belonged to the group of *Alty-Ata* (five fathers).¹⁵ In Russian terminology these groupings could neither be called *rods* because they do not represent exogamic units, nor could they be analysed in terms of *plemia* due to their lack of shared war cries (*urans*) and brands.¹⁶ In addition, subdivisions of so-called *rods* could be exogamic units, as was the case with the *Qaishlyk* of the *Qtaï plemia*.¹⁷ Sometimes a confederacy of exogamous tribes may even have included endogamous subdivisions.¹⁸

We can conclude that the exogamic unit may but does not have to correspond with the tribal unit. The tribal lineage was often the unit of exogamy, but it was also often not the case.¹⁹ As the criterion of exogamy supplied too implicit a definition of 'tribe', Russian ethnographers could only apply it to endogamous tribal groups in an arbitrary way.²⁰

Tribes as a military unit?

Tsarist and Soviet ethnographers use the term *plemia* to describe larger groups which consisted of exogamous subdivisions (*rod*). Sometimes these larger units were identified with military units which shared a common war cry (*ūran*). Consequently these *ūrans* were cited as tribal symbols.²¹

Aristov's report has already shown that *ūrans* were not exclusive features of units which shared the same level of tribal segmentation. They were used by groups which formed so-called 'tribes' and tribal confederacies.²² Thus the Great Horde had its particular *ūran*, as its constitutive 'tribes' had theirs. Grodekov emphasised that – at least in the Great Horde – the *ūrans* of the *rods* seemed to have been also those of the *plemia* to which they belonged.²³ Radloff

similarly mentioned that there existed *uraans* for the two Kyrgyz confederacies *Sol* and *Ong* and separate ones for its single 'tribes'.²⁴ In his analysis of the Kara-Kalpaks, Zhdanko identified some of the *urans* of the Kara-Kalpak *plemia*, whereas he could not find any *uran* for their exogamous subdivisions. One of the two Kara-Kalpak confederacies, the *Qongyrat*, also had its own *uran*.²⁵

However, Aristov emphasises that *ūrans* were quite subject to change and that long ruling kin-heads and successful military or predatory leaders replaced the old *ūrans* with their names.²⁶ It seems to be obvious that war cries represented military units and that they were changed according to changes of military coalitions. Military units, however, were not necessarily tribes, but often formed only short-lived alliances. These military alliances between tribes were formed in times of external danger in order to prevent the invasion of other tribes, to protect oneself against expected raids or to undertake raids for oneself. If the purpose was fulfilled, such coalitions could end.²⁷

Tribe as a community at peace

Il as a *Iomut* term cannot be accurately translated into English. It was used in two different ways: As an adjective it refers to the status of peace between individuals and groups.²⁸ As a noun it was applied to residing units and to larger groups which lived on peaceful terms and which might be called friendship groups. König states that the largest friendship groups were the *khalks* like the *Iomut*, *Salyr* or *Teke* which differed in tribal ancestors, dialects, carpet patterns, military ensigns and histories.²⁹

Irons' systematic and careful field research on the Gurgan *Iomut*, however, presents some evidence that the *khalk* – translated as *plemia* in Russian – represented only occasionally a friendship group.³⁰ At the end of the 1960s, Irons still observed a checkerboard-like alliance pattern between territorially neighbouring *il*-groups along the Gurgan river.³¹ One or two friendship groups had always two groups as neighbours, which were their enemies (*iagys*),³² but which were on peaceful terms with each other. Thus we get two alliances of friendship groups which mutually shared borders with inimical neighbours.³³

Alliances and single friendship groups differed in their degree of internal stability and territorial compactness. Friendship groups were much more stable than alliances between them, and occupied often compact bordered territories. In contrast, alliances were less stable and more subject to change, and could occupy no unified territory, as was the case among the Gurgan *Iomut*. Due to the believed shared genealogical descent, it is meaningful to call these friendship groups *tribes* and their alliances *tribal confederacies*.³⁴ These friendship groups represented communities at peace which were also communities of law.

Kazakh tribesmen had their own terms to refer to groups which maintained peaceful relations: *uru* or *ru* referred to groups which lived on peaceful terms with each other and was 'applied to all types of social groupings usually understood as tribe, *gentes* and their subdivisions'.³⁵ *Uruk* and *uruu* were similar terms which were used among Kyrgyz tribesmen.³⁶ *El (él)* was another Kazakh and Kyrgyz term which referred to peaceful relations within a collective grouping like a tribal alliance.³⁷ *Uruv* and *Urugh* were the analogous terms among *Qipchoqs* and *Uzbeks* respectively.³⁸

Our first approach in defining the concept of tribe differs from those of Soviet ethnography: it neither defines the tribal unit with regard to exogamy, as *rod* was understood, nor does it outline tribe as a military unit sharing a common *uran*, as *plemia* was used by Soviet scholars. Our definition is closer to the concepts which Western anthropologists like Bacon and Krader introduced to analyse tribal social structures in Central Asia: Bacon's *obok* and Krader's *clan and lineage system*.

Avoiding the terminology 'tribal genealogical organisation', Bacon brings in the Mongol term *obok* and opposes it to her notion of *clan*. Accordingly, *obok* is a structure of social organisation based on common descent which includes gradually, relatively open, interlocked segments with a decreasing degree of mutual rights and responsibilities from the smaller family units through the larger lineages to the tribe. She states that 'the newly formed components do not break sharply from the parent group but simply change their position in the line leading up from family to tribal subsection and beyond'.³⁹ It is a highly flexible structure which could easily absorb new groupings and which includes a series of groups to which one individual could belong.⁴⁰ In contrast, *clan* is conceptualised as a rigid and closed structure which comprehends just one group affiliation and one name. This grouping is usually not a territorial one and does not fulfil political functions.⁴¹ Its members also trace the origin of the grouping to a common ancestor, but there are no privileged positions within the grouping due to patrilineal primogeniture and seniority.⁴²

Krader operates with the terms *clan* and *sib*, which he uses similarly to Bacon's *obok* and *clan*. He also defines *clan* (i.e. Bacon's *obok*) as a social structure 'composed of a hierarchy of corporate groups, from the extended family to the confederacy of clans, which share a common genealogy and which includes kin related by descent',⁴³ whereas *sib* is based on an exclusive group name which is transmitted to newcomers. In contrast to Bacon's *clan*, he regards *sib* as a strictly territorial grouping, whose leader becomes part of an imperial administration.⁴⁴

Both anthropologists oppose a flexible lineage system based on genealogy to a more rigid type of social organisation whose members share common ancestry, but do not trace genealogies, and they both apply the first model to Eurasian tribal societies.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, both terminologies are not fully precise and consistent, as both authors do not sufficiently differentiate between

descent and *residence* units of tribal societies.⁴⁶ Some contemporary anthropologists are more receptive to this differentiation and modified the theoretical concepts of their predecessors: Barfield operates with the concept of the 'conical clan' in order to explain Inner Asian Turco-Mongolian tribalism, which he defines in terms of hierarchy of lineage segments based on age seniority and primogeniture of noble estates. He opposed this model to the egalitarian tribal model of Arabian tribes of the Middle East based on more egalitarian lineages, little hierarchy and segmentary opposition.⁴⁷

Dealing with current anthropological criticism of the concept of 'tribe' often identified with the segmentary lineage system, Bastug shows that most criticism refers to 'those elements [of the model] which should not have been included in the first place'.⁴⁸ She specifies her model of the segmentary lineage system as a 'particular form of unilinear kinship organisation'. Whereas *clan* is a unilinear descent group based on common ancestry, a single group name and unspecified genealogical connection – here one can find some similarities to Krader's concept of *sib* – the *segmentary lineage system* consists of fluid descent groups whose members establish overlapping concentric groupings by genealogies and generation-counting, and organise themselves along the principle of structural opposition.⁴⁹ Although Barfield rather applies his model of the 'conical clan' to Inner Asian nomadic empires with strong noble estates and uses the term 'clan', he nevertheless refers it – like Arabian egalitarian tribalism – to a similar type of segmentary lineage system which Bastug holds constitutive for the tribal organisation of Altaic and other nomadic people.⁵⁰ Consequently they both define tribe as the largest grouping within a segmentary lineage system which shares a common genealogy.⁵¹ In contrast, tribal confederations are conceptualised as political units which need not have a common genealogy or kinship ties. On the other hand there are many anthropologists who regard tribe as a political unity as well.⁵²

These conceptual differences might be linked to the fact that anthropologists apply different concepts of politics which they usually do not make explicit and which we cannot elucidate here. We only consider 'common genealogy' to be a spongy criterion to distinguish tribes from tribal confederations, as tribesmen also tend to perceive the latter in terms of kinship and often establish more inclusive genealogies, after political alliances had been formed.

For the purposes of this study, we define *political* orientations as action orientations which enable larger entities and emerge from the management of the allocations of resources and the regulation of conflicts within more populous societies.⁵³ Thus tribal confederacies, hordes, khanates or patrimonial states represent political entities. In contrast we define *tribe* as a more enduring consenting group based on community of law and peace and organised along the segmentary lineage system. For this reason, tribes and *residential groups* like neighbourhood wards (*mahallahs*) within patrimonial state structures are units of communal commitment which normally do not

embrace more than a few thousand people. In this way one can better analytically elaborate the types of political integration of tribal and non-tribal societies alike.

Central Asian tribes which formed communities of law maintained a clear delimitation between their members or allies and their enemies.⁵⁴ The difference between allies of a confederacy and members of a tribe was not visible to tribal people and is more an analytic one: whereas segments of tribes seldom became enemies, this was frequently the case among allies. Forming an alliance always implied extending the community of law to hitherto hostile groups.⁵⁵

The boundary of tribal legal community stands out very clearly in the liabilities of vengeance among Turkman tribesmen. Only members and allies of a tribe respect the rule that taking revenge is only allowed between *hir ata* groups (*Teke*) or the *gan dushar* kin (*Iomut*), which is a patrilineal descent group of seven generations in depth. Non-allied strangers were not bound by these regulations and took vengeance on any member of the tribe, if they could not get hold of the homicide.⁵⁶

Thus 'tribe' is a peaceful and legal community, whose members are obliged to maintain peaceful relations. The commitment to such a group enables conflict regulation and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Due to common legal community structures, tribesmen share one normative framework which provides the rules for this task. In contrast to Schoeberlein-Engel, who did not pay attention to legal community structures in his critical study on conceptions of collective identity in Central Asia, we hold legal structures to be highly significant factors for the construction and maintenance of collective group identity in Central Asia and elsewhere.⁵⁷

Tribes as a community of law

A *ru* or *il* group referred to a community of law whose members were supposed to keep peaceful relations.⁵⁸ If someone endangered these relations, common rules regulated their restoration. Depending on the circumstances, involved members avenged injuries, received or gave material compensations. Thus members of the group were responsible for the payment of fines due to damages caused by one of them. They were involved in blood feuds, and also benefited from compensation paid by other tribal groups.⁵⁹

The communal commitment to feud or the payment of fines was quite different with regard to tribesmen and enemies. Whereas it was wrong to steal or to injure someone whom one lived in peace with, it was a glorious deed to do so to enemies.⁶⁰ These different normative orientations were rooted in customary law and depended on whether or not tribesmen shared common legal community structures.

Vendetta and liabilities

Generally speaking there existed a joint liability between kin whose ancestors were not removed by more than seven generations. The Gurgan *Iomut* expressed this relationship of shared blood responsibility with the kin term *gan dushar*, which means 'blood reaches'. Consequently, the rights to revenge and the dangers of becoming a victim of vengeance were limited to *gan dushar* kin.⁶¹ The Akhal *Teke* called this liability group *bir ata* (from one father).⁶² Except in the case of accidental homicides, the Gurgan *Iomut* were not used to paying blood money in order to compensate for blood debts. Only a homicide in vengeance erased the blood debt and made friendly relations possible again.⁶³ Among the Balkhan *Iomut* blood revenge was more usual among rich pastoral tribesmen.⁶⁴ As a result, the recurrent reaction to homicide was the flight of endangered relatives to distant pastures and villages where they hid. These relatives could become targets of revenge if they were not able to defend themselves. Among the *Teke* blood money (*khun*) could also be paid.⁶⁵

Levshin reports similar cases of revenge between families and residence groups in the Kazakh hordes, which urged some families to leave their habitat and relatives for ever and join far distant groups.⁶⁶ Such cases of vendetta were less frequent among Kazakhs, however, due to the existence of larger tribal confederacies and hordes. Accordingly, friendly relations within these groupings implied strong commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the payment of the *qūn* became widespread among Kazakhs.⁶⁷

Turkman tribesmen could directly enforce their judicial claims, and avenge homicides immediately without contacting the elders of the *oba*. Only if the murderer could escape and hide somewhere, did the involved village councils negotiate about indemnities to restore peaceful relations between the villages.⁶⁸ In contrast, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz immediately submitted their cases to their *aqsaqals* or *bis*, who decided as judges about these claims. Both offender and accused had the right to nominate additional judges. The decision of these judges was binding. If the offender did not accept it or did not turn up at the court, the plaintiffs were entitled to start a *barymta* among the offender's relatives and drive their livestock away in compensation for suffered harms. Tribal leaders, however, made sure that they did not take more than they could legitimately claim as indemnities. In this way village elders and tribal leaders tried to keep hostilities under control, and raiders sought the authorisation of their claims by the former.⁶⁹

Relations between members of hostile tribes were different and were based on the tribe as the basic unit of communal commitment. Thus conflicts between members of different tribes did not become their own private affair, but brought about hostilities to all involved tribal groupings.

Strictly limited vendettas between the involved forefather groups were not respected, if inimical tribes were involved. Among Turkmen like the *Iomut* the seven-generation rule did not apply between inimical groups. Thus every member of the perpetrator's tribe could become a possible target of blood revenge, undertaken by the closest relatives of the victim. Since a vengeance killing often did not satisfy the blood debt, it led to a chain of mutual blood feuds. Mutual military expeditions and raids could increase the level of hostilities.⁷⁰

Levshin noticed that hostile activities also occurred within Kazakh tribes and tribal confederacies. If influential leaders were involved in the conflict and if there were additional disputes over territory, mutual raids on a low level could easily escalate into open warfare between fighting contingents of the involved tribes.⁷¹

However, in contrast to the more peaceful regulation of conflicts within tribes and tribal confederacies, blood revenge and rivalry over territories frequently escalated to open violence on a higher level or reinforced hostilities between inimical tribal groupings, and led to severe casualties. These hostilities were highly visible to Russian observers, and reinforced Russian prejudice about the lack of order in the steppe.

The above analysis indicates that tribes represent communities of law. Such communities shared common judicial perceptions about the settlement of disputes. If vendetta was acknowledged as a legitimate means of conflict regulation, it would be strictly limited by these perceptions. Inimical tribes disregarded these boundaries and avenged a victim by raiding livestock or by the arbitrary killing of inimical tribesmen.

In Central Asia the judicial structures were more complex, as some of the tribesmen became more Islamised. Both customary law and Islamic law informed the structures and content of these communities. Thus we have to examine to what extent sharia influenced tribal communities of law.

Tribal customary law (Adat)

In Central Asia customary law had different names. It was called *zang, döp, nark* or *adat*⁷² and limited blood revenge. Khan Tauke's (1680–1718) codification of Kazakh customary law clearly illustrates this limitation, although it does not seem so at first sight, because Levshin asserted the law of retaliation as being of basic importance to the code.⁷³ He states:

The place of first importance is occupied by the law of retaliation: for blood, revenge is taken in blood, and for mutilation by similar mutilation. For theft, robbery, violence, adultery, the culprit is to be punished by death. According to these laws the relatives of the victim had the right to put the slayer to death, while a person cutting off an arm, leg, ear etc., was to be deprived of the corresponding part of his body.⁷⁴

The code's emphasis on the principle of retaliation seems to confirm the partial Islamisation of Kazakh customary law.⁷⁵ Islamic penal law, which is one part of sharia, includes this right of retaliation, but also limits this right. The next male relative of the victim is only allowed to execute the homicide by sword or is entitled to inflict the same mutilation to the offender that he had caused, under the supervision of a kadi, after the latter has delivered the verdict of guilty.⁷⁶ The categorical punishment of adultery and robbery by the death penalty also supports the Islamic impact, since the punishment of *ḥaqq Allāh* offences could not be mitigated by the payment of blood money.⁷⁷

The obligatory death penalty in the case of theft also reminds us of the severity of Mongolian customary law (*yasa*) which punished many offences with death.⁷⁸ According to Islamic law thieves would lose just their right hand, and in addition, in case of recurrence, the left foot.⁷⁹

The Islamisation of Tauke's code remained quite superficial, however. Both Levshin and Radloff emphasised that it was up to the plaintiff to call for the death penalty for the offender, or to demand material compensation through the payment of *qūn*.⁸⁰ Thus *ḥaqq Allāh* offences could be reconciled by the payment of material compensation, although sharia prescribed the death penalty or physical mutilation in these cases, because divine and not human rights had been contravened. Thus a murderer could save his life, if he was able to pay up to 1,000 sheep in case of a male victim. Up to 500 sheep had to be paid for a murdered woman.⁸¹ Both Levshin and Slovokhotov reported the equal value of 100 camels, 300 horses and 1,000 sheep, as a *qūn*.⁸²

Qūn payments were also different with regard to estates. The killing of a sultan or *khoja*⁸³ could demand blood money from up to seven men. This is confirmed by Levshin's description of Tauke's code, by the 'Customs of the Kyrgyz' published in Samokvasov's collection of customary laws of the Siberian natives in 1876, as by Radloff's inquiries.⁸⁴ In cases of the murder of a slave among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, the murderer had to pay just half of a *qūn* to his owner.⁸⁵

Moreover, adultery and rape also were offences which were punishable by death, but which could be reconciled by the payment of *qūn*. In the case of adultery this would be possible if the abductor paid the bride price (*qalyngmal*; Russian: *kalym*) to the betrayed husband and procured for him a maiden.⁸⁶ Rape was not punished by death, if the blood money was paid to the husband of a wife or to the relatives of a maiden. However, marriage to the raped maiden and payment of the *qalyng* freed the offender both from execution and the payment of blood money.⁸⁷

The payment of *qūn* was not just a theoretical option, but a widespread practice among Central Asian tribal people. Although blood revenge was more common among Turkmen than among Kazakhs, Turkman homicides also could sometimes escape vendetta by the payment of blood money. One hundred camels represented the full *khun*, which had to be paid to

reconcile the death of a man, whereas fifty camels (half a *khun*) were due in the case of a female victim.⁸⁸ The refunding of blood money was customary among Kyrgyz as well.⁸⁹ It must be noted that the payment of blood money was only possible within politically allied tribal groups. Thus homicide led to vendetta among inimical Kazakh tribesmen as well.⁹⁰ As more Kazakhs were allied in one tribal confederacy or horde, it less frequently occurred in the Kazakh Steppe.

In cases of smaller offences *aïyp* (fine) was the penal money paid to the relatives of the victim. Radloff reports that the Kazakhs paid one *aïyp*, i.e. nine animals of all kinds, for a broken thumb, three ninths for a broken arm or for a lost left hand.⁹¹ Thus some Kazakhs and Kyrgyz called this fine also *toghyz* or *toguz* respectively ('the nine').⁹² In all these cases it was the duty of the kin-group to compensate the victim's relatives for losses suffered.

Tribal customary law was neither familiar with the concept of personal responsibility which informs Islamic law, nor did it place importance on the protection of property. Nomadic tribesmen were not interested in the ownership of land. They struggled for free access to pasture land, of which tribes tried to secure rights of usage. Their only property consisted of their livestock, which was very vulnerable to natural conditions. In the Kazakh Steppe it happened quite often that nomads faced the loss of their herds due to starvation (*zhūt*) caused by ice-storms and grassland covered through impenetrable layers of ice in winter.⁹³ Since survival on the steppe depended on the possession of sufficiently large stocks, impoverished herders often replaced their losses by raids into their neighbour's territory exempted from *zhūt*.⁹⁴ *Barymtas* took place also as a mean to defend rights, to enforce the payment of blood money or bride price or to revenge insults. It was not done secretly, but in full view, and a successful raid was regarded as a sign of bravery and excellence. When it was done secretly, the raiders had to give reasons for their attack. The nomads were more interested in getting back their livestock than in the punishing of raiders. In contrast to settled peoples, they were also able to do so by pursuing the raiders.⁹⁵

According to Grodekov, cattle rustling among relatives were not punished in the Great Horde. Stealing of stock between brothers' sons or between sons and (grand)fathers was not prosecuted. Even the sisters' sons could take away unauthorised livestock three times without losing the status and rights of a nephew.⁹⁶

The slight customary protection of property enabled flexibility within a natural environment which did not make it sufficiently possible to control the vulnerability and contingency of life. This contingency sometimes left only two possibilities: to raid or to become dependent on other tribesmen. In the Kazakh Steppe this vulnerability was especially linked to the *zhūt*. The loss of the stock did not only imply the loss of the social position of a stock owner, but also endangered his and his family's life.⁹⁷

The different concept of personal responsibility,⁹⁸ the ignorance of the differentiation between *ḥaqq Allāh* and *ḥaqq ādamī* offences, the mentioned blood money norms and the customary hereditary rules based on ultimogeniture, indicate the superiority of *adat* over Islamic law (sharia) among Islamised tribal people. This was even the case among tribesmen like the Turkmen, whose putative ancestors converted to Islam during the period of the Seljuks.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, independent Turkman tribes lacked Muslim kadis who judged offences according to sharia. As Turkmen were not allied to the Khan of Khiva or the Emir of Bukhara, who could appoint kadis, Turkmen enforced their customary conception of law by themselves.¹⁰⁰ As König analyses with regard to the *Teke*, Islam became only influential in the sphere of family law, which mullahs implemented during ceremonies on the occasion of birth, circumcision, marriage and funerals.¹⁰¹ Among Turkmen these mullahs were mainly adherents of Sufi orders called *ishans* and *pirs* and or were members of the holy tribes.¹⁰²

Nevertheless, collective responsibilities and low standards of property protection represented basic principles of customary law. Commitment to tribal law, which better fitted the necessities and vulnerabilities of nomadic life, prevented any more far-reaching Islamisation of legal community structures.

Tribal units and changing tribal confederacies

Accounts of the tribal affiliations of Central Asian nomads are confusing and at first sight contradictory. On comparing the different reports about the tribal affiliation of the Kazakh hordes, this confusion becomes manifest. According to Levshin and Valikhanov, the *Ūly Zhüz*¹⁰³ should have consisted of four tribes,¹⁰⁴ whereas Radloff and Aristov identify ten 'tribes', but not the same ones.¹⁰⁵ Spassky also recognises four 'tribes', but neither exactly those of Levshin nor of Valikhanov.¹⁰⁶ In more recent research, Hayit states eight of Aristov's 'tribes' with three additional ones,¹⁰⁷ Vostrov and Mukanov ascertain nine of them,¹⁰⁸ and Bennigsen gives Aristov's list with one addition.¹⁰⁹

The description of the *Orta Zhüz* is more uniform, since all accounts mention the five 'tribes' *Arghyn*, *Kereï*, *Qypshaq*, *Naïman*, *Qongrat*.¹¹⁰ Valikhanov and Olcott mention a sixth one, the *Uaq*.¹¹¹ But the data about the composition of these 'tribes' differ considerably in size and number: the number of 'tribes' of the *Arghyn* differs from 9 (Rychkov)¹¹² to 18 'lineages' (Levshin), that of the *Kereï* from 2 (Potanin)¹¹³ to 3 (Levshin, Radloff), the number of the *Naïman* subgroups from 17 (Balkashin)¹¹⁴ to 9 (Levshin), the *Qypshaq* from 5 (Rychkov)¹¹⁵ to 9 (Levshin, Radloff) and the *Qongrat* from 6 (Radloff) to 9 (Levshin) 'lineages'.

With regard to the *Kishii Zhüz* Levshin's, Aristov's and Radloff's accounts are quite similar. They all identify the *Ālim* and *Baï Ūly* as the two branches of

the *Alshyn* and the *Zheti Ru* confederacy, which was an association of seven 'lineages'.¹¹⁶ They also give almost the same data about number and names of the 'lineages'.¹¹⁷ Spassky's report from 1805 is similar as well.¹¹⁸ Only Rychkov's report from 1759 differs widely, since he did not know about the hordes' division into three distinct groupings. Nine of his ten mentioned most well known 'subtribes' are still in one of the three later reported groups, however¹¹⁹ (cf. Map 1).

There also exist different data about the tribal compositions of the Kyrgyz at the end of the nineteenth century. All sources identify two wings *Ong* and *Sol* of a tribal confederacy. In addition, a third grouping, the *Ichkilik*, is sometimes mentioned as a separate unit. There is no consistency about the number and names of the 'tribes' and 'lineages', however.¹²⁰ Some local accounts described the main divisions *Ong*, *Sol* and *Ichkilik*, but reproduced only some of the tribal groups¹²¹ (cf. Map 2).

The same materiality is also typical for Turkman 'tribes'. For example, Vámbéry identifies four divisions of the *Iomut*: the *Atabaï* with five subdivisions,¹²² the *Jafarbaï*, devised in the two sections of the *Iaralï* with seven and the *Nuralï* with four subdivisions; the *Sheref Chony* with a Gurgan branch (*Gara Bölke*, *Devedshi*, *Jafer*) and a Khivan one (*Öküz*, *Salak*, *Ushak*, *Kodshuk*, *Meshrik*, *Emrely*), and the *Ogurjaly* with the *Semedin*, *Giray*, *Terekme*, *Nedim* subdivisions.¹²³ Fifteen years later, Marvin's report mentioned a dual organisation of the *Iomut*: the Khivan *Bairam-Shaly* and the Gurgan *Gara-Choka*, whose dual division consisted in the (*Chony*) *Ak-Atabaï* and (*Sheref*) *Jafarbaï*. He described the later as a dualistic lineage system including six *Nuraly* and four *Iaraly* subdivisions. The seven divisions of the *Ak-Atabaï* were almost those which Irons was still able to observe in the 1960s.¹²⁴ Grodekov affirmed this dual division of the Gurgan *Iomut*,¹²⁵ as did Karpov, who gave a detailed account of the subgroups of the four Khivan branches of the *Iomut*. His account of the *Gara Choka* differed considerably, since he focused more on the Caspian *Iomut* under Tsarist rule.¹²⁶ Roliakov's diagrammatic description of the *Iomut* of the nineteenth century in *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* also differentiates between the Gurgan and the Khivan *Iomut*, which he calls *Bairam-Shaly* and which contained four groups. He labels the first section of *Gara-Choka Chony-Atabaï* and enumerates the same groupings as Marvin and Irons do. But he describes the *Sheref-Jafarbaï* as an alliance between the dualistic *Sheref* confederacy of the *Iaraly* and *Nuraly* and the *Jafarbaï confederacy* which consisted of six groupings being almost identical with those of Irons¹²⁷ (cf. Map 3).

Ethnographers of the nineteenth century were already complaining about the inconsistencies of groupings which complicated their work, and explained these with reference to changing tribal coalitions and names.¹²⁸ This is doubtless true, since the chronological difference between reports often corresponds with the amount of inconsistencies. In the above mentioned reports about the Kazakh hordes this chronological dependence

becomes obvious: the earlier reports of Rychkov, Levshin and Spassky differ considerably from the later ones of Radloff, Aristov and Vámbéry. Similarly, the difference between Vámbéry's, Marvin's and Irons' reports about the *Iomut* are linked to the tribal reshuffle after the establishment of the Russian-Persian border in 1887.¹²⁹

There are also other reasons for the incongruence of reports, however. Researchers usually were not involved with every segment of a tribal confederacy. Their data depended on the knowledge of their informants about tribal genealogies and political affiliations. Since this knowledge is orally passed on and is more precise about the neighbouring groupings, it is obvious that informants will rather only know the larger divisions of distanced groupings than their smaller branches and subdivisions. If some shifting occurs within far distanced groups, the informant will not know about it at once.

In addition, there did not exist uniform knowledge about affiliations and genealogies.¹³⁰ Every lineage perceived these from their own standpoint, and omitted distanced lineages due to their ignorance or political irrelevance.¹³¹ Valikhanov, for example, observed that Kyrgyz tribesmen at the Issik Kol had no direct information about the Kyrgyz tribes in southern Kyrgyzstan.¹³²

Third, most of the reports were done during Tsarist rule, when Russia had already introduced its administrative order. Above all, this is true for the Kazakh hordes. The Small Horde was abolished in 1824, when its last Khan, Shir Ghazi (1812–24), died and the Russians introduced a new administrative three-tiered system consisting of regional sultan administration, tribal group and *auyl*. Russian administration was introduced among the Middle Horde by the *Rules for the Siberian Kyrgyz* (Kazakh) in 1822, and abolished khanship and broke up the Middle Horde as a political entity. In 1867 the *Provisional Statute on the Administration of Semirechie and Sir Darya Oblast* implied the same for the Great Horde. Consequently, tribal affiliations and genealogies lost their political significance, and new arrangements of groupings took place within the newly created administrative units. This is another reason for inconsistencies.¹³³

Due to the lack of precise data, it is quite difficult to identify clearly the tribal units in each case. Sometimes the difference between tribe and tribal confederacy was gradual, since relatively stable confederacies could easily be interpreted as tribes, since tribes which broke up in smaller branches in consequence of inimical or economic pressure, became similar to tribal confederacies.

The following overview does not aim at giving a final judgement about tribes and tribal confederacies in Central Asia. It only seeks to indicate the level of segmentation, where tribal units have to be sought before Tsarist rule. Due to their stability, these tribal units were also the basic units of a communal commitment which more or less preserved their integrity in times of political turmoil and 'tribal' reshuffle.

Turkman tribal units

With regard to the Turkmen, some scholars agree that so-called Turkman *plemias* like the *Iomut*, *Teke* or *Ārsary* are rather tribal confederacies than tribes, due to the lack of tribal unity and the existence of hostilities within smaller branches¹³⁴ (cf. Map 4). Irons' research on the *Iomut* Turkmen confirms this view. The results of his fieldwork permits even more far-reaching conclusions. It illustrates that the Gurgan *Iomut* consisted of two mutually hostile tribal confederacies which were settled in a checkerboard-like alliance pattern between territorially neighbouring tribes along the Gurgan river. Therefore neither the *Iomut*, nor the *Chony* and *Sheref*, represented the tribal unit, but groups like the *Jafarbaï*, *Baga* and *Bükhelke* at the one side, and the *Ak-Atabaï*, *Daz*, and *Badrak* at the other side.¹³⁵

A similar structure could be observed within the *Teke*. Khivan sources indicated the severe division within the *Teke*. Thus its two main branches *Tokhtamysh* and *Otamysh* were considered as separate 'tribes' to which different begs were sent to collect the tax on livestock (*zekat*).¹³⁶ According to this division, the *Tokhtamysh* settled on the left, the *Otamysh* on the right bank of the Murghab. In the Akhal oasis, parts of both groupings settled down on separate canals (Turkman: *iap*, Russian: *aryks*). Hostilities quite frequently occurred between these main divisions. In addition, König emphasises that these hostilities existed between their dual subdivisions as well: between the *Bagshy* and *Sychmaz* of the *Otamysh* and between the *Beg* and *Vekil* of the *Tokhtamysh*. König's own field research in 1956 delivered further evidence for these divisions.¹³⁷ Probably, the *Teke* tribal units were rather groups like the *Sychmaz*, *Uchuruk*, *Bagshy*, *Gara*, *Amansha-Gökche* or *Gongur* – entities described as *rods* by Russian ethnographers – than groups like the *Beg* or *Vekil*.¹³⁸

Due to the lack of information, it is difficult to determine exactly the tribal units of the other so-called Turkman *plemia*. Nevertheless, the constant reshuffle of sub-tribes refers more to tribal confederacies, in contrast to smaller *plemia* like the *Murchaly* or *Alili*, which rather represented tribes.¹³⁹

Kyrgyz tribal units

Large Kyrgyz *plemias* like the *Bugu*, *Sary Bagysh*, *Solto*, *Adigine* or *Saruu* were tribal confederacies rather than tribes, since their composition changed. Thus the *Sary Bagysh*, for example, consisted of the four divisions *Bulat*, *Temir*, *Nadyrbek* and *Tynaï* at the beginning of the nineteenth century, whereas Radloff reported seventy years later that *Sary Bagysh* included five divisions (*Isöngül*, *Assyk*, *Tynaï*, *Chirikchi* and *Nadyrbek*) which five *manaps* led.¹⁴⁰ Smaller *plemia* like the *Munduz*, *Kalmak* or *Döölös* resembled rather tribes (cf. Map 5). Evidence which supports this view arises from the matter that most of these divisions, often described as *rods*, are

headed by *manaps* or prominent *bīis*, whose decisions were binding on all tribal members. In addition, these divisions often maintained hostile relationships with the neighbouring ones. If the *manap* commanded it, all men capable of military service had to take up arms immediately, either to defend themselves or to fall upon others.¹⁴¹ In order to meet these military challenges, they did not nomadise in *añl* units, but in tribal ones. Thus they camped along the riversides in long continuous rows of yurts during winter. In summer they nomadised along mountain ridges so that they could form an efficient army within a few hours.¹⁴² As a result, tribes occupied delimited territories in contrast to their smaller subdivision at the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁴³

Kazakh tribal units

With regard to the Kazakh hordes, it is most problematic to define the tribal units. Since the tribal structure was already in decline at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there is less reliable data to work with, whereas little information is available about eighteenth-century tribal structures. For the reasons stated above, available reports are inconsistent.

Nevertheless, it seems to be reasonable to assume that the so-called *plemia* of the Small, Middle and Great Horde rather did not represent tribes, as their composition tended to change. Some of their sections disappeared and others would newly emerge.¹⁴⁴ Thus the *Dulat* or *Qangly* of the Great Horde, the *Arghyn*, *Naïman*, *Qypshaq* or *Kereï* of the Middle Horde and the *Älim Üly*, *Baï Üly* and *Zheti Ru* of the Small Horde were rather tribal confederacies.

The source material also confirms the confederative character of some of these units. Levshin reports that the Small Horde was originally dominated by the *Alshyn* confederacy consisting of two wings: the *Älim Üly* and *Baï Üly*. This confederacy outnumbered all other tribes of the Small Horde. That is why Khan Tauke (1680–1715) should have arranged an alliance between the latter. This association became the confederacy of *Zheti Ru*, i.e. the confederacy of the 'seven tribes'.¹⁴⁵ Levshin also refers the formation of the *Arghyn*, *Naïman*, *Qypshaq* and *Kereïas* tribal confederacies within the Middle Horde to Tauke's reshuffling of the Kazakh Hordes.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, it is possible that small *plemia* like the *Sary Üsüm*, which did not include more than one or two thousand yurts, already represented the tribal units.¹⁴⁷

The more interesting question is whether the branches of these tribal confederacies, i.e. groupings like the *Botnaï*, *Shymyr*, *Aghysh*, *Tört Ül* or *Mürun* represented tribes or whether they or some of them were rather tribal confederacies themselves.¹⁴⁸ The answer won't be a uniform one, since the cohesion of groupings of 50,000 and of 2,000 is a different one. It is also quite difficult to extrapolate the tribal units from later reports like those of Grodekov and Radloff and their informants, since their reported *rods* both

refer to the tribal confederacies and their branches. Maksheyev's data about the Sir Darya Oblast, which Radloff refers to, sometimes bring up more inclusive, sometimes more exclusive groupings. Thus he mentions groupings like the *Shymyr*, *Syïqym*, *Zhanys*, i.e. branches of *Dulat*, in the Chimkent and Aulie Ata Uezds, whereas he imparted a *Dulat* grouping in the Tashkent Uezd. In the Turkestan Uezd he identifies a *Zheti Ru* unit, in the Tashkent Uezd its branch *Ramazan*.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless there is some tendency to identify branches of large tribal confederacy like that of the *Dulat*, *Ālim Ūly*, *Baï Ūly* and *Zheti Ru* as basic groupings.¹⁵⁰ The relative long continuity of these groupings within colonial administration – despite their declining political importance – gives them the feature of tribal units.

Spassky's reported six groupings of the *Arghyn*, led by the Khan Vali (1781–1819) or his relatives, confirms this view.¹⁵¹ According to situational circumstances these groupings might change, but the basic units, between eighteen¹⁵² and twenty-two tribes¹⁵³ remain the same. Consequently, *rods* like *Agysh*, *Qanzhyghaly* or *Bura* rather than smaller branches seemed to have been the tribal units of the Kazakh hordes¹⁵⁴ (cf. Map 1).

Kara-Kalpak tribal units

Kara-Kalpak (*Qaraqalpaq*) tribes nomadised on the middle and lower course of the Sir Darya in the eighteenth century and became increasingly targets of Kazakh and Oirat (Jungarian) raids. Due to their refusal to pay tribute to the Small Horde, Khan Abulkhayr's troops (1718–48) attacked Kara-Kalpak tribes on the lower course of the Sir Darya in 1743 and captured many tribesmen.¹⁵⁵ As the Kara-Kalpak tribes could no longer defend their land, they dispersed in three directions: some moved up the Sir Darya and settled in the Ferghana valley,¹⁵⁶ others escaped towards the Ural and Volga. The majority moved to the Amu-Darya delta. In 1811 these tribes accepted the rule of the Khan of Khiva. As the *biïs* were basically the leaders of what Soviet ethnographers called *rods* and often maintained inimical relations to each other, the tribal units must have been *uruws* like *Qyiat*, *Qytaï* or *Keneges*¹⁵⁷ (cf. Map 6).

Uzbek, Qipchoq and other tribal groups

In the middle of the nineteenth century there existed various tribal groups of Turkic and Mongol origin along the river oases. These tribal groups were basically divided into two groups: one group of tribesmen, whose ancestors invaded the river oases under the leadership of Shaybani Khan, acknowledged Shaybanid Chingizid claims of political supremacy and were called Uzbeks. They represented the ruling class of the patrimonial states, and the ruling dynasties emerged from among them (*Ming*, *Manghit*, *Qunghiroi*).¹⁵⁸ According to oral traditions there should have existed ninety-two different

Uzbek tribes and tribal confederacies of which the *Manghits*, *Qunghirots*, *Qiiats*, *Keneges*, *Dūrmans*, *Qirks*, *Mings*, *Iuz*, *Saroīs*, *Loqāis*, *Qataghans* and *Qushchis* were the better known ones. These tribal groups were scattered in various border areas of the patrimonial states where they lived in their tribal territories. Some tribal groups split and settled down in different khanates, and could also join newly formed tribal confederacies established by the patrimonial rulers or in opposition to them.

Tribes which did not acknowledge Shaybanid claims could either be of pre-Shaybanid origin or have arrived in the river oases after the Uzbek conquest. The pre-Shaybanid tribes were originally called Chaghatays, as they acknowledged Chaghatay claims of political supremacy:¹⁵⁹ tribal groups like the *Jalair*, *Barlos*, *Orlat*, *Qauchin* and *Mūghul* are of Mongol origin, whereas the *Ktaï*, *Qanghli* and *Qalluq* have a Turkic root.¹⁶⁰ In the middle of the nineteenth century members of many of these tribal groups called themselves and were called *Tūrks*, like the tribal group itself of this name.¹⁶¹

The *Qipchoqs*, tracing back their origin to pre-Mongol tribes nomadising in Desht-i-Kipchak and called *polovzy* by medieval Russian chroniclers, represented tribal groups of which some allied to the Kazakh hordes and others arrived in the river oases between the sixteenth and eighteenth century. Some of them might also have arrived there earlier. Basically there existed three main areas of *Qipchoq* tribal groups: the *Qipchoqs* of Khorezm, of the Zarafshan valley and of the Ferghana valley. The *Qipchoqs* of Khorezm became part of the Uzbek ruling class in the Khanate of Khiva. In the course of the administrative reforms of Abul Ghazi Khan (1643–63) they were politically organised within the *Qanghli-Qipchoq* tribal confederacy which represented one of the four newly established political units along the lower course of the Amu-Darya.¹⁶² The second group of *Qipchoqs* formed an alliance with the *Ktaï* settled along the Zarafshan valley. Thus the *Ktaï-Qipchoq* played an active political role in the Emirate of Bukhara, were opposed to patrimonial state structures and seemed also to have acknowledged Shaybanid political claims.¹⁶³ The third group, the *Qipchoqs* of the Ferghana valley, occupied their tribal lands much later. They originally nomadised in Kazakh areas to the north of the middle course of the Sir Darya, and were part of the Middle Horde. When the latter could no longer defend its territories against Oirat invasions, a considerable proportion escaped into the Ferghana valley, where most of them took up their winter quarters around Andizhan and Namangan. Due to the lack of pastures many of them remained poor and were forced to settle. Those *Qipchoqs* who became part of the Kyrgyz *Ichkilik* confederacy were better off.¹⁶⁴

As the Ferghana *Qipchoqs* arrived from a Kazakh background in the Ferghana valley only in the eighteenth century and became partly allied with Kyrgyz tribal confederacies, they did not acknowledge – in contrast to their Uzbek namesakes – Shaybanid claims of political supremacy. Thus some

ethnographers of the nineteenth century still described them as a distinct group.¹⁶⁵

All these Shaybanid and non-Shaybanid tribal groupings had in common that they reorganised themselves or were considerably reshuffled by patrimonial state structures before, during and after the Shaybanid conquest of the river oases. Former tribal confederacies became scattered across various parts of the oases, and became followers or subjects of patrimonial rulers. Corresponding with the extension and strengthening of state structures and the spreading of Islamic law, processes of detribalisation took place in various ways and to a different extent, which makes it difficult to differentiate tribal units from tribal confederacies. In addition, such distinctions would not be very helpful, were they not related to administrative state structures and to the functions which the latter were able to take over from tribal institutions.¹⁶⁶ For these reasons we will have to define the tribal units from case to case when the relations of these groupings to administrative state structures are discussed.

Patrilineage and descent groups

It is a mistaken conceptualisation of Central Asian tribal society to identify its commitment structures with kinship relations. It is not suitable to identify tribes with the segmentary lineage model, as Hudson and Bacon tend to do with reference to the Kazakh hordes.¹⁶⁷ Our analysis of customary law shows that slaves and newcomers also enjoyed tribal protection. Thus kinship and descent played an important role, but did not take over an exclusive position in the commitment structures of tribesmen. In order to clarify the role of kinship in tribal society we will have to define and confine the descent groups.

'What is your *ru*?' ('*Ruyng kim?*') was one of the first questions asked by strangers when meeting for the first time.¹⁶⁸ In reply one uttered the name of the first tribal subdivision which one expected the questioner to be familiar with. Although the question was very basic and simple, the answer was equivocal. As previously discussed, *ru* could refer to the unit of communal commitment and indicate the tribal group or subgroup, or it could even refer to larger units like tribal alliances. This was just one way in which this term was understood, however.¹⁶⁹

In addition, *ru* was also used in a purely genealogical way and was applied to a number of people who claimed descent from a common ancestor.¹⁷⁰ In this sense, the concerned person named the smallest subdivision which he expected to be familiar to the questioner. If the subdivisions were unknown to the responder, he gave a more distant and inclusive genealogical subdivision of a higher stratum. If he encountered a close relative, it was enough just to specify the names of the nearest groupings.¹⁷¹

Genealogy, patrilineage and seniority

Genealogies played an important role in Central Asian tribal societies. They represented the backbone of the society, built a societal web and informed commitment to societal and political order. This was so due to its basic principle of patrilineage. Tribesmen formed a body of agnatic kin and traced their origin from common ancestors. In this way descent group names were inherited through the male line.¹⁷² Mutual relations were established according to the closeness and distance of shared ancestors. Tribal or political union was always experienced and perceived in terms of kinship and patrilineal origin.

Genealogies based on primogeniture could inform orders of seniority between groupings. These rankings were sometimes estimated differently. Valikhanov asserts that the Small Horde directly established patrilineal descent from the first Kazakhised *batyrs*.¹⁷³ In this way members of the *K̄shī Zhūz* claimed a privileged position within the Kazakh hordes. In contrast, Grodekov noted that the lowest ranked tribal confederacy and tribe of the Great Horde still enjoyed higher prestige than the most influential tribal confederacy of the Middle Horde.¹⁷⁴ Grodekov's statement seems to reflect his informants' overestimation of the seniority of the Great Horde, since it is unlikely that tribes like the *Ishim* or *Malai* ranked higher than the powerful *Arghyn* confederacy of the Middle Horde. This would gravely contradict the prestige and power of mighty tribal alliances and the role they played in tribal societies, although members of the Great Horde seemed to have made such claims.

The *Zhalañyr* should have been the senior grouping of the Great Horde. Thus at the beginning of a meal one asked whether there was someone from the oldest *ru Zhalañyr*. Members of *Zhalañyr* were also the first to begin the singing at weddings. Only if there were none of these, was it up to the *Oshaqty*. Informants of the latter confederacy decisively denied this seniority and claimed it for themselves, however.¹⁷⁵

Nevertheless, an order of seniority and an etiquette were observed. Tribesmen respected etiquette, when they shared the war booty, entered yurts or took seats. The most esteemed seat was always opposite to the entrance. Etiquette also had to be observed during celebrations and meals, where the most honoured guests were served first.¹⁷⁶

Confederate descent groups

Figure 2 shows a typical Kazakh genealogy which Aristov collected from Dikambay-Batyr, an informant of the *Botpai* tribe, which belongs to the *Dulat* confederacy of the Great Horde. It traces the common ancestor of the Kazakhs to Abulkhayr. Krader identifies this mythical ancestor with Khan Abulkhayr (1818–48) of the Small Horde, who lived in the eighteenth century and accepted tsarist protection.¹⁷⁷ It is, however, also possible that

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

this genealogy refers to Abulkhayr (1428–68), who unified the nomadic hordes in the fifteenth century and created a khanate, which also became known as the Uzbek Khanate.¹⁷⁸

Such a genealogy is not to be mistaken with a historical account of the succession of Kazakh rulers, nor does it necessarily refer to historical persons. Historians also do not regard Abulkhayr as the founder of the Kazakh hordes.¹⁷⁹ Somehow the name Abulkhayr remained in the collective memory and was prestigious enough to trace back ancestry to. Thus it is narrated that he had the three sons Baishora, Zhanshora and Qarashora, who became the rulers of the three hordes. Between Baishora and Botpai there were eleven generations of ancestors, of whom often just the direct ancestor was passed on.

This genealogy is a written one, since it is quite complex and includes many generations. Contrary to accurate genealogies, it excludes the personal descent relations of the informant and linked tribal and political groupings within a meaningful cosmos.

Its potential to inform action orientation emerged from its embedment in the religious world view of Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribesmen. As animists they revered nature. They prayed to the sun, the moon and the stars and worshipped all phenomena which revealed the eternal and inexplicable supreme power which the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz called *Kök Tangri* (blue heaven) and *Kök Tengir*




Figure 2 Kazakh genealogy I

Source: Aristov 1894, p. 394–6.

respectively.¹⁸⁰ Heaven was perceived as a being responsible for gratifying and punishing mortals on earth. The well-being of people depended on it.¹⁸¹ Animistic tribesmen ascribed to the heaven, the sun and the moon an immense influence on them. Their birth might have been a wonder due to divine protection, just as the anger of *Tangri* may cause their death. But once he died, a man became a free and redeemed spirit (*aruaq, ongon*) who himself could influence human affairs. Thus ancestor worship was of high importance. Only if the spirits of the ancestors were revered would they remain protectors of their relatives. The latter built precious monuments for their deceased ancestors, offered sacrifices on special occasions and showed gratitude to their spirits. This piety was greater, the more influential an ancestor was during his life, because his spirit was regarded to be as mighty as the deceased was on earth.¹⁸²

Based on this religious experience, genealogies and epic narratives related tribal groups and conjured the protection of mighty ancestors shared by these groups. It emotionally rooted tribal commitment and assured the spirit's protection of political and military alliances. Thus we fully subscribe to DeWeese's view that Central Asian native religion was basically a religion which valued life and well-being. It asserted community bonds and their origin, and informed the political ties of larger entities like tribal confederacies.¹⁸³

Figures 3 and 4 give further examples of confederate genealogies which elaborate the descent relations of tribes and tribal confederacies. Figure 3 represents another Kazakh genealogy which refers its origin to Alash, the most prominent mythical ancestor of the Kazakhs. In this case, a tribesman of the *Baï Üly* confederacy reported this genealogy, since the informant more accurately remembers closer groupings of his community. As confederate genealogies link various tribal descent groups, we call groups of tribesmen who trace common ancestry a *confederate descent group*.¹⁸⁴

Figure 4 represents a Turkman confederative descent group. Irons collected this genealogy during his field research among *Iomut* Turkmen and compiled it from a written source. Also in this case it is obvious that the informant was from the *Chony* confederacy, since its mentioned segments are more elaborate.




Figure 3 Kazakh genealogy II

Source: Kharuzin, in Bacon 1958, p. 67.

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT




Figure 4 Turkman genealogy

Source: Irons 1975, p. 42.

All tribes traced their descent to *Iomut*. *Iomut* Turkmen did not regard their genealogical accounts as complete and precise. When Irons confronted his informants with his most detailed written genealogy, they were not disturbed by the discrepancies. They attributed low importance to omitted segments and claimed that their recollected genealogies are accurate only to the extent that they explain relationships between existing descent groups.¹⁸⁵

Larger Turkman confederative descent groups like the *Iomut*, *Teke* and *Ärsary* were often called *khalks*,¹⁸⁶ whereas their smaller subdivisions (like the *Beg*, *Vekil*, *Sychmaz* and *Bagshy*) could also be called *urugs*.¹⁸⁷ It has to be noted that some of these confederate genealogies are rather of constructive than of political concern, as local historians like Abul Ghazi traced descent also between inimical tribal confederacies.¹⁸⁸

Tribal and sub-tribal descent groups

Tribal descent groups informed the relation between tribes and basic descent groups and often corresponded closely to the territorial division of sub-tribes. The *Daz* tribe of the *Gurgan Iomut* is given as an example in Figure 5. Among Turkmen all these descent groups could be called *taipa* regardless of the level of segmentation.¹⁸⁹ Since sub-tribes consisted of basic descent groups, disputes between descent groups of different sub-tribes could involve a few hundred families. Conflicts over territories quite often occurred, and it was important to belong to a large descent group whose manpower could settle territorial disputes to its advantage. If such antagonism resulted in a homicide, the subsequent vengeance or payment of blood money was regarded as a different matter, which primarily only confronted the affected forefather groups.¹⁹⁰

Grodekov also confirms the social importance of such groupings among the Kazakhs. He describes solidarity groups which guaranteed protection of their members and whose members paid the *qün* and other indemnities. These

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT




Figure 5 Sub-tribal and basic descent groups of the *Daz*

Source: Irons 1975, p. 43.

groups also accepted mutual duties of hospitality, and members were vulnerable to blood killing if *qūn* was not paid.¹⁹¹ Grodekov calls this unit *rod*, and described how the liability mechanisms functioned among the Kazakhs of the Sir Darya Oblast:

Not the individual, but the descent group (*rod*) received the kun. If the killed and the killer were from one tribal descent group (*rod*), the sub-tribal descent group (*koleno*) would pay and receive it; if both are from one sub-tribal descent group (*koleno*), the basic descent group (*podkoleno*) would pay and so on.¹⁹²

In addition, he gives an example which should illustrate the liability of these descent groups:

For example, if the one is from the sub-tribal descent group (*koleno*) *Bisat* and the other from the sub-tribal descent group (*koleno*) *Zhamanbaï* (both mentioned descent groups belongs to the tribal descent group (*rod*) of *Kutenshi*, and their confederate descent group (*glavnyĭ rod*) is *Qongrat*), all five *volosts* of *Bisat* paid the blood money, and all five *volosti* of *Zhamanbaï* received it.¹⁹³

Grodekov's example is not clear, as he described liabilities of descent groups and of territorial groups like *volosti*. Nevertheless, he still observed the segmented forms of liability relations which must have been typically for independent Kazakh tribesmen.

Grodekov underlines the equality of shares which each member of the descent groups had to pay and to receive, independent of the wealth or the degree of affinity to the convict.¹⁹⁴ Grodekov's observation seems to confirm the view that homicide did not exclusively involve the group of seven forefathers among Kazakh tribesmen, as it was among the Turkmen, but the whole descent group. The members of such groupings were also called *qūndas*, which

meant relatives through *qūn*.¹⁹⁵ It also implies that material burdens and compensations differed from case to case. Most devastating was homicide within a basic descent group, since one group of seven forefathers had to pay *qūn* to the other. This was a serious hardship, when the group was small and only included 10–20 households so that each one had to pay 100 or 50 sheep. Thus it happened that this grouping became an indebted descent group which gradually had to pay off its due, unless the debt was mercifully remitted.¹⁹⁶

If homicide occurred between different basic descent groups of one sub-tribal unit, the material burdens were lower. Supposing such groups included 100 to 150 yurts, each household had to pay 7–10 sheep. If casualties occurred between sub-tribal descent groups, the *qūn* could be one or two animals. Only if distinguished personalities like Kazakh sultans or *qozhas* were killed, was the burden to larger descent groupings similarly high, since up to five *qūns* became due.¹⁹⁷

Due to this structure, disputes over territories and other conflicts could involve many people. Levshin reports that sometimes hundreds of related families had to leave their territories for distant pastures in order to escape persecution by powerful inimical descent groups.¹⁹⁸ Such cases refer to instances of conflict between sub-tribal descent groups which were not settled peacefully, but which compelled the smaller descent group to leave its territory.

Anthropologists like Krader do not differentiate confederate, tribal and basic descent groupings from forefather groups of single tribesmen. This leads to some confused views on group boundaries. On arguing against Grodekov's emphasis on the seven-generation rule of exogamy, Krader points out:

Without disparagement to Grodekov, who was an accurate and meticulous ethnographer, especially in matters of law-ways, it may be pointed out that a rule of seven prohibited degrees cannot work in named units, because the head of the lineage would be shifting downward every generation, always seven generations behind, so that if there had been n generations, and one lineage formed in each generation, there would have been n minus 6 lineage heads at any given time, and the name of the unit would be changing every generation.¹⁹⁹

In his comment, Krader confuses personal descent groups of the forefathers with larger descent groupings, based on imprecise genealogies and putative ancestors.²⁰⁰ Bastug also holds the view that there existed a 'continuum of genealogical relationships, extending from the apical ancestor to each individual descendant'.²⁰¹ The members of forefather groups, however, usually had an accurate memory of their seven-forefathers group, as vendetta was often bound to this unit. This difference is crucial for the understanding of tribal commitment at the local level.

Basic descent and forefather groups

Basic descent groups were solidarity groups which incorporated one or several forefather groups whose members precisely recollected their forefathers up to seven generations. The ancestors beyond the seventh generation were mostly not accurately recollected, but were merely referred to as founders of the basic descent group which the Gurgan *Iomut* and the *Teke* called *tire*.²⁰² According to Hudson, Kazakhs also named such groupings of close relatives *ru*. Kara-Kalpaks used several terms for smaller descent units. The most common ones were *tire* and *köshe*.²⁰³

Irons is one of the few anthropologists who systematically researched *forefather groups* and their relation to other descent groups through field work in Central Asia. He collected data among the Gurgan *Iomut* and reported all basic descent groups and precise genealogies of forefathers shared by members of the village Aji Gui, where he did his main research.²⁰⁴

Figure 6 shows a forefather group which resided in different camp groups and villages (*obas*). The numbered households resided in Aji Gui, households with letters belonged to other *obas*. Black triangles indicate the households or family heads of deceased relatives, white ones refer to existing households. This is an accurate genealogy, since all names of deceased forefathers were well known. All relatives of the upper generations' forefathers were not recollected, but only those which genealogically linked all the households of this group.²⁰⁵

The forefather group as the smallest possible descent group could be the descent unit of blood revenge, which according to Turkman *düp* assumed liability for all relatives having a common forefather up to the seventh generation. The *Iomut* called this smallest descent group *gan dushiar*, which means 'blood reaches'.²⁰⁶ The members of this grouping shared commitments to avenge their blood relatives. Similarly, they could become victims of vendetta as well.




Figure 6 Turkman Forefather group, of the *Chensuli*

Source: Irons 1975, p. 55.

Among the *Teke*, the forefather group also paid the *khun*, collected the ransom and redeemed its deported or enslaved members from hostile tribes. In addition, it was the group of solidarity which compensated losses of stock and defrayed frequently high expenses arising from festivities like circumcision, wedding or funeral. If a member of this group granted hospitality, all other members would treat this guest as their own.²⁰⁷

In the case of the *Chensuli*, twelve families would be most vulnerable to vengeance in cases of homicide caused by one of their members in Aji Gui. This would involve approximately sixty family members. In addition, five families would be endangered in *oba a*, four in *oba b*, and three in both *obas c* and *d*. Overall this *gan dushar* group embraced twenty-eight households which included approximately 140 people. According to König, a *Teke bir ata* group included approximately ten to fifteen extended families with 100, 200 and more members, who normally represented three to five generations descending from one father.²⁰⁸ The *Salyr* also called this group *bir ata*.²⁰⁹

Kara-Kalpaks seemed to have used the term *köshe* to designate the forefather group. Zhdanko describes it as a group of close relatives who were 'children of one father'.²¹⁰

Among the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, forefather groups were less linked with blood revenge. Due to the authority of *aqsaqals* and *bīs*, blood revenge seldom occurred, since the leaders of the involved descent groups usually negotiated the payment of *qūn*. Thus Kyrgyz and Kazakh forefather groups were groups of close relatives who celebrated family feasts together. Kyrgyz tribesmen called this group *bir atany baldary* ('one father's children'). The members of this group joined at marriages, funerals, memorial and circumcision days, and mutually assisted in these activities.²¹¹

Abramzon gives one example of a Kyrgyz forefather group which lived in the Jumgal' Rayon in central Kyrgyzstan (cf. Figure 7). It was called *Baïkozunun baldary* according to its common ancestor Baïkozu, and formed one red brigade in the kolkhoz *Kyzyl-Oktiabr'* (Red October) in 1951. It included twelve households and linked five generations. In former times members of this forefather group resided in one or several neighbouring *aïyls*, held all stock in one herd during the summer and mutually assisted each other. They celebrated feasts (*tois*), shared funeral repasts (*ash*) and supported the wedding preparations of its individual members.²¹²

Kazakhs called the forefather group *ata balasy*,²¹³ which seemed to have played a minor role in the nineteenth century. Grodekov only reports that if other close relatives did not exist, members of this group would become guardians of orphans.²¹⁴ Nevertheless, the forefather group was frequently referred to as an exogamic unit among Kazakhs during tsarist rule. In contrast to most Turkmen, Kazakhs had limited blood revenge through the payment of *qūn* which was equally paid by all members of the involved descent groups. However, the existence of the forefather group might also indicate that it was originally a unit of blood vengeance.²¹⁵

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT




Figure 7 Kyrgyz forefather group

Source: Abramzon 1951, p. 154.

Note: Existing households are indicated by bold type; the age of their heads is shown in parentheses.

In order to illustrate the different descent groups and how they are related, I would like to give another example from the Kazakhs of the Small Horde. Iuzefovich collected this genealogy with the descent groups among the *Tama* of the *Zhetï Ru* confederacy (cf. Figure 8).

It traces back the three Kazakh Hordes to three brothers, but it neither mentions Abulkhayr nor Alash as the founding ancestor. Iuzefovich collected this apparently written genealogy when the tribal system no longer existed and names of the basic descent group were already forgotten, as he observed.

Before tsarist rule, the forefather group was the smallest descent unit. The forefather group and the basis descent group, which normally also includes other forefather groups, shared the same name. Several basic descent groups formed a sub-tribal group. In the case of *Tama*, there apparently existed two levels of sub-tribal groups. This may be explained by the fact that the formation of the *Zhetï Ru* confederacy by Tauke's reform of the hordes occurred through the alliance of original tribal confederacies which could no longer resist pressure by the *Alshyn*.²¹⁶ Nevertheless, the sub-tribal descent groups made up the tribal ones, the tribal the confederative ones.

When Levshin reported that a member of the *Zhaghalbaïly* was not allowed to take a wife from his own 'tribe', he implies that tribes represented exogamous units. However, the forefather group is a quite different kind of group since it refers to a group of around 20–30 households which only included close blood kin. Only after tribal decline did it become an exogamic unit.²¹⁷ Bastug's equation of the forefather group with the exogamous unit is not only for this reason too general. Among Turkman and Uzbek tribesmen cross-cousin marriage was widespread. Thus exogamy was not typical to all Altaic tribal societies.²¹⁸

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT




Figure 8 Kazakh descent groups

Source: Iuzefovich 1880, pp. 801-2.

Residence groups

Residence groups differ from descent groups because of the inclusion of strangers and distant relatives.²¹⁹ This seems to be a simple materiality, but it makes tribal society complex. The alignment of strangers is not a late phenomenon linked to the decline of tribal society. It was rather a basic feature of such societies that enabled their flexibility and adaptability to external pressures. Tribal structure exclusively based on kinship never existed, although tribal people tended to perceive community in these terms.²²⁰

Residence groups and their leaders

Residence groups were tribal economic communities based on mutual consent. The smallest residing unit was the *camp group*, which could include up to ten yurts. Close kinsmen like brothers, cousins and their families of one forefather group preferred to form such groups. These groupings also camped during summer, when stock breeding was done in smaller groups.²²¹ Such groups were led or headed by *elders*, who were senior members of extended families. One or several camp groups formed pastoral nomadic, pastoral semi-nomadic or even settled agricultural *tribal camps* or *villages* with temporal pastoral occupations of some of their members. A camp or village included up to fifty or sixty families and was guided or represented to the outside by a *headsman*. Several villages formed a *subtribe* led sometimes by a *chieftain*, who was most likely a wealthy tribesman from the most numerous descent subgroup. It incorporated several hundred yurts. A *tribe* consisted of a number of sub-tribes which might be headed by a *tribal chief* and could include up to a few thousand households.

Kyrgyz residence groups

Like other Central Asian *nomadic* people,²²² the camp group was the basis residing unit where close Kyrgyz relatives normally lived together. Camp groups usually consisted of close agnatic kin, mostly brothers, their married or unmarried sons and their families. In contrast to Turkman camps, Kyrgyz family *aksakals* were authoritative patriarchs whose authority was also recognised by married sons. Thus the patriarch could make decisions for adult males and their families, without consulting them.

Such camp groups could form either one extended household (*chong üi*) with communal meals (*chong kazan*), or several households. A extended household included up to fifty close relatives and was headed by the *aksakal*, who decided on internal affairs and could punish family members in cases of disobedience or indecent behaviour. Even married sons who had founded independent households could not administer their own property without the consent of their fathers. According to reports of Soviet ethnographic expeditions, the *chong üi* was typical for all parts of Kyrgyzstan in the nineteenth century.²²³

Several camps formed the Kyrgyz villages (*aiyl*), which could also include semi-nomadic tribesmen who dealt with agriculture, as Radloff and others observed.²²⁴ Most often, poverty forced pastoralists to become farmers who were disregarded by nomadic tribesmen.²²⁵ Exclusively agricultural villages were less widespread than they were among the Turkmen, but existed also among Kyrgyz. This was not only the case in areas next to agricultural population of the Ferghana valley, but also in central Kyrgyzstan, in regions like the At-Bashy valley, the Naryn valley or the Susamyr valley.²²⁶

Due to the omnipresent threat of hostile invasions and raids, and due to their general belligerency, Kyrgyz often nomadised in long rows of yurts along

river banks. Such encampments could be twenty kilometres long and were commanded by chieftans (*bis*), whom all members of the subtribe had to obey. Thus *bīs* could quickly mass a military troop to defend the tribal territory or to attack a hostile neighbouring tribe. tsarist statistics from 1862 indicate that *bīs* commanded on average two or three hundred families. Tribal chiefs (manaps) could lead entire tribes and tribal confederacies, which included up to a few thousand yurts. Thus within the confederacy of *Bugu*, Toksaba was *manap* of the Aryk and Tabulda *manap* of the *Bor*. Some influential *bīs* like Biy Iman and Biy Borsuk could also lead similar groups, however.²²⁷ In contrast to the Turkmen, Kyrgyz *bīs* negotiated the payment of blood money which was, according to Grodekov, divided between relatives up to the third grade and the *bīs*.²²⁸

Kazakh residence groups

Kazakhs resided in pastoral nomadic villages which they called *auyls*. The nomadic *auyl* resided together primarily at their winter quarters and could include up to forty families or more, if livestock were kept separately or hay was harvested to feed livestock through the winter.²²⁹ *Aqsaqals* headed extended families which acknowledged their authority and obeyed their orders. As family heads they disposed of the property and 'their word became law to the rest'.²³⁰ Kazakhs moved and lived, similarly to the Kyrgyz, in tribal or sub-tribal groups headed by chieftans (*bis*). One tribe could consist of up to hundred *auyls* which migrated within an established geographic zone. Migration routes were orchestrated by a runner system called *ūzyn qūlaq* (long ear), which enabled *auyls* to warn each other of emerging threats.²³¹ In the course of the Russian conquest of the Kazakh Steppe this yurt order disappeared.²³²

Kazakh *bis* were both (sub)tribal leaders and judges. They were expected to defend the tribe's access to summer and winter pastures and to coordinate migration routes. In contrast to Turkmen, Kazakh tribesmen were allowed to start raids to compensate for suffered injustice only with prior knowledge of the *auyl aksakal* or the *bi*.²³³

Bis attained their authoritative position through their sense of justice and their charismatic abilities. Most often they were also heads of numerous kinship groups, and enjoyed considerable material wealth which they used to spread their influence. Due to their leadership abilities, *bis* could often extend their influence over neighbouring tribes to form tribal alliances.²³⁴

As judges, *bis* settled disputes between *auyls* and balanced competing claims on resources. Principally, their awards were based on arbitration which plaintiffs and defendants voluntarily appealed to. In cases of more serious assault both plaintiff and defendant had the right to nominate two *bis* who deliberated with the concerned *auyl aqsaqals* about the award. In serious disputes between tribal groups, up to twenty-four judges could form a common court which was called *zhūgimūs*. If the defendant did not appear in court, or if he and his *aqsaqal* did

not obey the decision of the court, the plaintiff would be authorised to enforce his right in a *barymta* against the *auyl* of the offended. This right became particularly important when members of strong tribal groups had harmed weaker ones and did not want to pay indemnities. Due to the offender's free choice of influential arbitrators, mostly reputable *bis* became arbitrators; their judgement was of great weight and they received a tenth part of the value in dispute.²³⁵

Kara-Kalpak residence groups

The basic Kara-Kalpak residence unit was the *auyl*. It included one or more camps or hamlets of forefather groups (*köshes*), which included relatives from three or four generations engaged in stockbreeding, fishing and agriculture.²³⁶ In the Amu-Darya delta, the *köshe* was the smallest group which could hold property rights on water and land. It consisted of up to ten or more households of nuclear families who lived in yurts or houses. Among Samarkandian and Bukharan Kara-Kalpaks, the average family size was between 13 and 17 members, which seemed to have represented *köshes* as well.

The head of the *köshe* disposed of the property of the extended family and all family members; even the married sons had to obey his commands. Headsmen of large *köshes* were also called *köshe bīs*, who had considerable influence on the village life and formed the village council.²³⁷ The *auyl* represented a community of water and land users which regulated the distribution of land and water rights. In addition, pastures for stockbreeding were also collectively held.²³⁸ Often several villages could share common pastures as well.²³⁹ In the Ferghana valley, Kara-Kalpak lived in yurts and reed huts which formed camps. They spent the summer in their summer pastures on the banks of rivers and lakes, where they planted melons and millet. In the winter they resided at their winter grazing lands.²⁴⁰

Five to twenty-five villages could form a tribes (*uruws*) which were headed by chieftans (*bīs*). In the Amu Darya delta, each tribe had its own territory, which included a main channel, irrigated land, wells and pastures. The *bī s* regulated the allocation of these resources between various villages, and settled disputes between different villages.²⁴¹

Turkman residence groups

Turkman residence units differed significantly from those of the Kazakh for two reasons: first, due to their acephalous structure; and second, due to their more widespread division into *chomry* and *charva*. The Turkman village was called *oba* and could either be pastoral nomadic or settled agricultural. Members of pastoral nomadic *obas* were called *charvas*, whereas the *chomrys* lived in settled villages. Both groups could be members of the same tribe, and mutually supported each other during disputes with other tribes, as occurred, for example, between the *Gongur* and *Amansha* of the *Teke Beg* confederacy.²⁴²

Charvas were always regarded as being better off, enjoyed a higher prestige and were richer than *chomrys*, since only impoverished pastoralists involuntarily became *chomrys*. This different social status was not irreversible, however. Just as *charvas* could become *chomrys*, the latter could turn into *charvas*, after they had again accumulated enough livestock for pastoralism. This was often the case after successful *alamans*.²⁴³

Obas could be described as groups of households or groups of camps. The latter represented the smallest residence group, which mostly consisted of close relatives. Members of one *oba* could be members of one descent group, but often included several descent groups. Nevertheless, mixed *obas* were usually dominated by a single numerous descent group.²⁴⁴

Sole elders (*iashulys*) could neither usurp authoritative leadership in the camp group, nor in the *oba*.²⁴⁵ Unlimited authority was only exercised over slaves, wives, daughters and unmarried sons within the nuclear family. Due to the principle of residential ultimogeniture, typical for all Central Asian Turkish people, the youngest son usually remained with his parents after his marriage and inherited the father's homestead.²⁴⁶

Married sons usually formed independent households after some years and received a share of the paternal stock.²⁴⁷ If the *oba* was overpopulated, married sons were expected to leave the camp and joined other *obas* with better economic conditions. If they remained in the camp of the father, they stood no longer under their father's patriarchal authority in the same way as they did as unmarried sons. In contrast to Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpaks, Turkman fathers tended to involve their sons in decisions even before they married. Despite their senior rank, the elders usually consulted all members of the family before important decisions were made. Thus relations between male adults were more egalitarian and did rather acknowledge seniority than patriarchal authority. Common or coordinated action was always in need of consent and agreement.²⁴⁸

Obas had headmen who acted as spokesmen of the groups without being granted any privileges. They were chosen and authorised to act on the basis of the common consent of the group. Any infringement of competence led to the removal of the headman. An office of chieftain like that of a *bi*, whose holder could command whole tribes, did not exist among Turkmen.²⁴⁹ Thus there was no authoritative judge, but only the council of the elders of the descent group (*maslakhat*), which made binding consentient judicial decisions for its members.²⁵⁰

Being a member of a *chomry* village implied sharing rights in water supplies and pastures occupied by one *oba* or a group of *obas*. Every able-bodied man who was able to defend and maintain common resources held equal rights. These rights usually were appropriated through occupation or conquest. The Gurgan *Iomut* granted to every accepted new household head full rights in the joint estates of the *oba*.²⁵¹ This was not necessarily the case among other Turkman tribal confederacies. In the Akhal oasis, *Teke chomry* recognised two

forms of land holdings: *mülk* and *sanashik*. *Mülk* plots were small land parcels where dwellings, gardens and orchards were located. Due to their labour intensity, these plots could become hereditary. Property rights on *mülk* land were limited. Most of the land was called *sanashik* ('the sliced') and submitted to annual or biennial redistribution to every well armed male resident of the *oba*, or to all the heirs with water rights. This custom privileged numerous families with many sons, but economic differentials remained small, due to the annual redistribution of water rights.²⁵²

The consenting nature of residence groups

The consenting nature of residence groups emerged from the mutual need for assistance and cooperation. In smaller residence groups like camps and villages help was ample. It could be aid in domestic and economic matters and include activities such as sheep-shearing, harvest assistance or the digging and maintenance of canals and wells. Larger units like sub-tribes and tribes could build or maintain large canals, but normally they were less involved in economic matters. More often they acted as military units which occupied and defended territories or secured and coordinated routes of migration.

The consenting nature of residence groups becomes obvious in the case of leaving or joining them. If a Turkman head of household wanted to leave his camp in order to find better opportunities elsewhere, he would consult the heads of the camp's households. Close agnatic kin especially could withhold their consent, since they did not want to lose reliable support. Similarly, a camp would contact all the other camps of the village if it wanted to join another village. The same was the case with groups of villages within tribes. All these groupings also had to obtain permission from the camps and villages which they wished to join. Permission could be granted, if one group wanted to increase its defensive capability, but it could also be denied. The latter was the case when water resources and pastures were scarce within the controlled territories of the approached group.²⁵³

The consenting nature of residence groups arose from the fact that they collectively and exclusively used or owned pastures and wells based on the principles of first occupation, first usage or conquest from hostile groups.²⁵⁴ Members of mixed *obas* did not hold exclusive rights on resources which they could share with non-affiliated relatives from other villages. Also in this case, the consent of the whole group was necessary.²⁵⁵ Relatively poor strangers and relatives without stock could more easily join such groups, but without receiving rights to resources and opportunities to establish separate households.²⁵⁶

Relations between descent and residence units

Ethnographic reports about Central Asian tribal people are widely imprecise and misleading because they often identify descent groups with residence

groups. The applied terminologies often pre-defined the range of what could be observed. These reports are conceptually confusing due to their one-sided emphasis on descent and kinship, to the inadequate concepts of tribal groups with reference to exogamy or military organisation, and to the insufficient differentiation between levels of segmentation.

One reason for this confusion is rooted in the ambivalent indigenous use of related group terms.²⁵⁷ As Hudson reports, Kazakhs sometimes applied the term *ru* to residence groups, sometimes they used it in a 'purely genealogical sense' and applied it to 'any number of groups claiming descent from a common ancestor however remote'.²⁵⁸ Even distinguished anthropologists like Barfield did not sometimes accurately differentiate between descent and residence groups. He wrote, for example:

In contrast to states, tribal political structures employed, in theory, a model of kinship to build groups that acted in concert to organize economic production, preserve internal political order, and defend the group against outsiders. Relationships among people and groups in such systems were mapped through social space rather than geographical territory. Political units and the territories they occupied existed primarily as products of social relations: rights to use land and exclude outsiders were based on tribal affiliation. Nontribal groups were generally organized in a converse fashion, with social groups defining themselves in terms of common residence, system of cultural beliefs, or political affiliation.²⁵⁹

In contrasting tribal groups based on 'tribal affiliation' with non-tribal groups based on 'political affiliation', Barfield seems to suggest that tribes are descent groups, whereas tribal confederacies and empires are political groups. With regard to his similar operative concept of politics, the second statement is doubtless true, and it would be wrong to call groups of small scale to be political ones.²⁶⁰ Since Barfield opposes residency to tribalism, he might be understood as saying that tribalism could not be based on the principle of consent which informs common residency and migration of people with different descent affiliation.

In Central Asia there existed many mixed *auls* whose members held common pasture rights within clearly defined territories. This was particularly the case with winter pastures among semi-nomadic tribesmen. Thus tribalism could be territorial as well.²⁶¹ Only pure nomadic tribalism was less territorially oriented.²⁶²

More recent Soviet scholars like Poliakov and Abramzon realised some of these flaws and contradictions, and clearly differentiate between descent and residence groups. Poliakov contends that the nomadic village (*oba, aïyl*) could include members of different descent groups (*tire, rod*), though he ascertains the frequent instances of both groupings.²⁶³ Criticising terminological

inaccuracies and misleading views of previous Soviet scholarship on Kyrgyzstan, he emphasises that residence groups like the *añl* could be mixed and include several forefather groups.²⁶⁴ Both, however, still interpret the descent commitment to residence groups like the *añl*, which they regard basically as an economic unit, as survivals of a past societal formation. In their view, mixed villages already belonged to other societal formations in which inequality and class difference should have emerged.²⁶⁵ However, tribal society was based both on the principle of genealogy, which informed descent groups, and on the principle of consent, which safeguarded the formation and break-up of residence groups.²⁶⁶

Detailed studies of the relation between descent and residence groups are rare. This is not only linked to the different interests of tsarist military observers and the different research designs of Soviet ethnographers, but also to the fact that independent tribal groups were rather exceptional than common at the end of the nineteenth century. Thus most records refer to social groups which had lost their political independence under tsarist civil-military administration or whose independence was partially limited by Khivan, Khokandian or Bukharan rule. Few Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkman tribes maintained their autonomy as border tribes at the periphery of the Russian and Chinese empires and in the areas bordering Afghanistan and Persia.²⁶⁷

The Gurgan *Iomut* on the tsarist-Persian border belonged to these groupings. Since a significant amount of retribalisation occurred, after Riza Shah's (1825–41) centralisation policy had declined in the 1940s, Irons was still able to observe some independent tribes in the Gurgan plain in the 1960s. For the purpose of elucidating the relationship between residing and descent groups, he completely recorded all households and forefather groups of the *charva* village Aji Gui (cf. Figure 9).

The schema in Figure 9 represents all fifty-nine households of Aji Gui which – with one exception – traced their descent from the two different tribal descent groups *Daz* and *Ak-Atabañ* both belonging to the *Chony Iomut*. The single *Bähellke* household was even of *Sheref* descent. As a single household it was without any influence in the *oba*. In addition, members of these groups belonged to different sub-tribal descent groups. Thus for example, members of the *Daz* tribal descent groups belonged also to the sub-tribal descent groups of *Pakka*, *Hanka* and *Dört Ata Ogul*. These groupings included several basic descent groups, of whom usually only one was represented in the *oba*. This schema demonstrates that basic descent groups could incorporate several forefather groups, and that precise genealogies were only recollected as far as they linked existing households or household groups. It also illustrates the balance or imbalance between dominant and inferior groupings within an *oba*. People or groupings who did not reside with their agnatic kin were called *gongshy's* (neighbours).²⁶⁸

Fig. 10 shows the distribution of dominant descent groups among the *Daz* tribe in their tribal territory. It indicates that not all basic descent groups were




Figure 9 Agnatic relationships of household heads in Aji Gui

Source: Irons 1975, p. 54.

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT




Figure 10 Distribution of dominant descent groups among Daz obas

Source: Irons 1975, p. 57.

also dominant descent groups in one or more *obas* and that the level of descent segmentation was not the same within each *oba*. In some *obas* the sub-tribal descent groups could simultaneously be the dominant basic descent group. This was the case in the two *Pakka* villages. Among the *Daz* there was no *gongshy-oba*, i.e., an *oba* dominated by a basic descent group of a different tribe, but such cases also occurred, as Irons emphasises.²⁶⁹ In general, *obas* which were dominated by the same basic descent groups, tended to delimit their territories from those of others, as *obas* of the same sub-tribal descent group did. This was especially the case among settled *obas* and in places with abundant economic resources like water, fertile grounds and pastures which attracted people and enabled relatively dense settlement.

In the wide steppe or in the desert such territorial delimitation did not exist. There every nomad was free to move, unless he did not stay too close to another camp. However, in the more fertile areas of Kazak Steppe tribal and sub-tribal residence groupings knew how to move in large groups in order to occupy abundant spacious pastures.²⁷⁰

Perhaps, Irons' extremely mixed village Aji Gui represents not the most typical case of a tribal village due to the special political situation of the *Iomut* as an Iranian border tribe. Barfield's generalised view about the disproportionate relation between size and kin bias of tribal groups and the correlation between size and the political nature of such groupings is doubtless true in Central Asia.²⁷¹ Thus most ethnographic reports confirm that the smallest camp units included most often close relatives. This is less true for village, sub-tribal and tribal groups, however.²⁷² In these cases, one dominant descent group always tried to favour its own group within territories or on pastures which they commonly occupied and shared with other descent groups. Rivalry and competition for the best pastures was one of the main reasons for conflict, and the group which included most agnatic kinsmen or which was able to establish the most effective alliances was likely to drive the weaker groups away.²⁷³

In comparison to the agnatic kin relations, residence relations were weaker. Non-agnatic people were disadvantaged, if they got involved into disputes with people which were affiliated to the dominant descent group within one migrational group. This was so due to the lack of support of their far-distance agnatic kin during conflicts. This disadvantage was limited, however. Co-residence always implied a strong obligation to keep peaceful relations with all members of the group. Thus hostile agency was quite rare between co-residents, unless people were involved in blood feuds.²⁷⁴

The consenting nature of tribe is also visible in the case of slaves. Blood money had also to be paid for their homicide.²⁷⁵ Among the *Iomut*, homicide of a slave was a case of blood vengeance where the blood debts from one slave (*gul*) was reckoned equal that of one free man (*ig*).²⁷⁶ The tribal solidarity group included commoners and slaves, and the barriers between the estates of slaves and commoners were not absolute ones. There is some evidence that some slaves became commoners who shared similar rights and duties as members of the tribe in the second or third generation, although their descent affiliation was often not forgotten.²⁷⁷

All the evidence suggest that tribal society was rooted in two interlocked more or less hierarchical structures. One was the consenting structure of migrational groups, the other one was the real or fictitious kinship structure of descent groups. Only in the ideal case were both groupings congruent. Residence groups usually did not represent uniform descent groups due to the alignment of non-related descent groups, strangers and slaves. The tribal paradox consisted in the materiality that tribes were residence groups based on consent and friendship – as opposed to hostility and enmity²⁷⁸ and that

they were *not* descent groups. They were *perceived* as descent groups, however, since they were dominated by the latter. Consent and friendship were its *constitutive* principles. Kinship and genealogy were their most *dominant* ones.

Notes

- 1 Most Soviet scholars used the terms *plemia* and *rod* to describe tribal units and their sub-branches. With regard to Anglo-American scholarship, Hudson used in his analysis the terms 'tribe', 'gentes' and 'subdivisions' (A. E. Hudson, *Kazakh Social Structure*, London 1938), whereas Krader prefers 'clan' and 'lineages' (L. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Nomads*, The Hague 1963). Bennigsen and Wimbush use 'tribe', 'clan' and 'sub-clannish division' (A. Bennigsen and W. E. Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire. A Guide*, London 1985) and Wheeler speaks about 'clan' and 'sub-clannish division' (G. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Central Asia*, London 1964). This terminological confusion seems to be deeply rooted in anthropological theory itself. See: A. Southall, 'Tribes', in *Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 4, New York 1996, pp. 1329–36; A. M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, Cambridge 1984, pp. 118–22. Cf. note 51.
- 2 For example: N. A. Aristov, 'Zametki ob étnicheskom sostave turkskikh plemen i narodnostei i svedeniia ob ikh chislennosti', in *ZHS*, vol. 6, 1896, nos. 3–4, pp. 277–458; G. Karpov, *Plemennoi i rodovoi sostav Turkmen*, Ashkhabad 1925, pp. 1–24; *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, ed. S. P. Tolstov, T. A. Zhdanko, S. M. Abramzon and N. A. Kisliakov, tom I, Moscow 1962, pp. 172–3, 412–23; tom II (1963): pp. 7–28, 175–83, 322–31.
- 3 It is difficult to decide how many tribal societies existed in pre-Soviet Central Asia. Soviet historians and ethnographers applied the concept of society to single 'peoples', of which the societal organisation and order is analysed. (For example: G. E. Markov, *Kochevniki Azii. Struktura khozjai stva i obshchestvennoi organizatsii*, Moscow 1976; S. E. Tolybekov, *Kochevoe obshchestvo kazakhov v XVII – nachale XX veka. Politiko-ekonomicheskii analiz*, Alma-Ata 1971; S. Z. Zimanov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi kazakhov pervoi poloviny XIX veka*, Alma-Ata 1958) As they tended to construct national histories of the Central Asian republics created in 1924, careful examination is necessary to determine to what extent it is meaningful to apply concepts like 'people' or 'society' to Central Asia before the Soviet conquest. Cf. John S. Schoeberlein-Engel, 'Identity in Central Asia: Construction and contention in the conceptions of 'Özbek', 'Tājik', 'Muslim', 'Samarqandi' and other groups', Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 1994, pp. 44–80, 122–78.
- 4 For example: W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien. Lose Blätter aus dem Tagebuch eines reisenden Linguisten*, vol. 1, Leipzig 1884, pp. 513–15; Aristov 1896; A. Kaufmann, *Russkaia obshchina v protsesse ee zarozhdeniia i rosta*, Moscow 1908 (quoted in an unpublished German translation by A. Augustin, 'Der russische gemeinschaftliche Bodenbesitz im Prozess seiner Entstehung und seines Wachstums', Department of Social Anthropology, University of Vienna); T. A. Zhdanko, *Ocherki istoricheskoi étnografii karakalpakov. Rodo-plemennaiia struktura i rasselenie v XIX – nachale XX veka*, Moscow 1950; *Narody Srednei Azii I and II*; N. A. Kisliakov, *Ocherki po istorii sem'i i braka u narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, Leningrad 1969, p. 48.
- 5 N. I. Grodekov, *Kirgizy i karakirgizy Syr-dar'inskoï Oblasti – Iuridicheskii byt*, Tashkent 1889.

- 6 S. M. Abramzon, *Kirgizy i ikh étnogeneticheskie i istoriko-kul'turnye svyazi*, Frunze 1990 (1971), p. 232.
- 7 Krader 1963, pp. 368–9.
- 8 There exist several views on the original meaning of 'Kazakh'. One of these views holds this term to have meant 'wanderer, wandering horseman'. (R. Fox. *People of the Steppe*, London 1925, p. 137; A. O Samoïlovich, 'O slove "kazak"', in S. I. Rudenko, *Kazaki – Antropologicheskie ocherki* (Akademiia nauk SSSR – Materialy osobogo komiteta po issledovaniuu soiuzyntkh i avtonomnykh respublik, vyp. 11) Leningrad 1927, pp. 5–16).
- 9 Levchine 1840, p. 364. Levshin's example indicates that Kazakh tribes like the *Töleu* or *Zhaghalbaily* were originally strictly exogamous. After the decline of tribal structures exogamy was often only observed within the seven-forefather group. The Sovietisation of Kazakh society eroded the collective memory of the seven-forefather group (*Zheti Ata*). For this reason the tribal descent group (*ru*) has come to replace *Zheti Ata* as a more practical rule of exogamy. (Bruce G. Privaratsky, *Muslim Turkestan. Kazakh Religion and Collective Memory*, London 2001, pp. 115–7.) Nevertheless, since national independence public concern for the knowledge of one's *Zheti Atas* increased, and Kazakhs are blamed for not being able to remember their seven forefathers.
- 10 Zhdanko 1950, pp. 70–1; *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 494.
- 11 S. P. Tolstov, 'Perezhitki totemizma i dual'noi organizatsii y turkmen', in *Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv*, nos. 9–10, Moscow and Leningrad 1935, pp. 39–40; W. Irons, *The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social Organisation among a Central Asian Turkic-speaking Population*, Ann Arbor 1975, pp. 127–33; A. Orazov, 'Familie und Familienverhältnisse bei den Turkmenen des Balchan-Gebietes Ende des 19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts', in *TF, Band 6*, Hamburg 1985, pp. 120–1 (Russian: 'Sem'ia i semeinye otnosheniia pribal'khanskikh turkmen v kontse XIX. – nachale XXv', in *Khoziastvo i kul'tura naseleeniia severo-zapadnoi Turkmenii v kontse XIX–nachale XXv.*, Ashkhabad 1972, pp. 80–149); A. Bennigsen and W. E. Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire. A Guide*, London 1985, p. 98.
- 12 Kisiakov 1969, pp. 54–5, 58. More recently Sharon Bastug argued that the 'number of generations within which marriage was forbidden varied, but was usually seven, nine or eleven, as it was also for the vengeance groups', and that both groups were referred to by generation-counting among Altaic peoples. On attributing cousin marriage to Semitic people of the Middle East only, she considers generally that similar marriage patterns also existed among Turkman, Uzbek and *Qipchoq* tribesmen. (S. Bastug, 'Tribe, Confederation and State among Altaic Nomads', in K. A. Ertürk (ed.) *Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*, Reading 1999, pp. 88–91).
- 13 K. Shaniiazov, *Kémicheskoi istorii uzbekskogo naroda (istoriko-étnograficheskoe issledovanie na materialakh kipchakskogo komponenta)*, Tashkent 1974, pp. 305–7.
- 14 Due to these problems, Soviet scholars avoid the term *rod* to describe lineages of Turkman tribes, and emphasise the decline of Turkman 'tribalism' in the nineteenth century. Instead they use the term 'razdelenie' (subdivision). If *rod* is still used, it will be in the meaning of a basic economic unit. *Narody Srednei Azii II*, pp. 18–25.
- 15 The lineages of both groups probably formed exogamic units in former times, as did some *plemia* groups of the *Qtaï* like the *Tanke* group consisting of the lineages *Anna*, *Kutsyn*, *Aïteke* and *Sherushi*, or the *Manzhuli-Boqlyqtaï* group (Zhdanko 1950, p. 46).
- 16 Ethnographers sometimes also tried to determine the relevant tribal units with the help of brands and war cries, but their use in different levels of tribal segmentation

- made this approach highly problematic as well. See E. E. Bacon, *Obok. A Study of Social Structure in Eurasia*, New York 1958, pp. 72–3. Although data about brands is scarce, Aristov did the most systematic research on the use of brands in the Great Horde and among the Kyrgyz (Aristov 1894, pp. 391–486).
- 17 Zdanko 1950, p. 71.
 - 18 The *Qangly*, the fourteenth *rod* of the Kara-Kalpak *Qypshaq*, was such an endogamous unit (Zhdanko 1950, pp. 71–2).
 - 19 Krader 1963, p. 251.
 - 20 Endogamous tribes are quite typical for the more Islamised Middle East. For comparison between Middle Eastern and Central Asian tribesman see: R. Patai, 'Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian', *SWJoA*, 1951, pp. 401–14; Ch. Lindholm, Kinship Structure and Political Authority. The Middle East and Central Asia, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 28, 1986, pp. 334–55.
 - 21 Bacon 1958, p. 73.
 - 22 In contrast to Elisabeth Bacon we could not find evidence in Aristov's report that different *urans* were used to groups at five different levels of tribal segmentation (cf. Bacon 1958, p. 74).
 - 23 N. Aristov: 'Opyt vyiasnenia étnicheskogo sostava kirgiz-kazakov bol'shoï ordy i kara-kirgizov na osnovaniï podoslovnnykh skazaniï i svedeniï o sychsh-estvuiushchikh rodovykh deleniakh i o rodovykh tamgakh, a takzhe istoricheskikh dannyykh i nachinaiushchikhsia antropologicheskikh issledovaniï', in *ZHS*, 1894/III–IV, pp. 408–9. In some cases the *uran* of some 'tribes' was that of the horde. So was 'Bakhtiar' the *uran* of the Great Horde and of its 'tribes' *Dulat* and *Zhalaiyr*.
 - 24 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 534.
 - 25 Zhdanko 1950, pp. 37–62.
 - 26 Aristov 1894, pp. 408, 446.
 - 27 Sometimes brand marks were referred to as tribal group symbols, but Aristov and Karpov had already made clear that Turkman and Kazakh war cries were used by groups of different levels of segmentation. (Aristov 1894, pp. 410–15; G. I. Karpov, 'Tagma', in *Turkmenovedenie* 1929/8–9 (translated and reprinted in *TF*, vol. 2, Hamburg 1979, pp. 31–41). Cf. Bacon 1958, pp. 72–3.
 - 28 Irons 1975, p. 49.
 - 29 König 1962, p. 81.
 - 30 See also: V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Vol. III, Mir' Ali-Shir - A History of Turkman People*, Leiden 1962, pp. 169–70.
 - 31 Irons 1975, pp. 65–6.
 - 32 Being *iagy* was the opposite of being *il* and represented a relation of strife and hostility (Irons 1975, p. 61).
 - 33 See Chapter 3, first section.
 - 34 Consequently, the ethnographers' reports of the nineteenth and early twentieth century must be analysed carefully with regard to use of the terms 'tribe', *plemia* or *Stamm*.
 - 35 Hudson 1938, p. 17. Some Russian ethnographers expressed the problem that there exists just one term (*uru* or *ru*) for different levels of affiliation. For example: Samoïlovich: *Zapretnye Slova*, p. 162, note 6; Asfendiarov: *Istoriia Kazakhstana*, p. 100. (Both quoted in Hudson). Medieval Mongols knew a similar duality of relations: *urug* (relative) and *jad* (stranger). Cf. B. Ia. Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyï stroï mongolov*, Leningrad 1934, p. 48, quoted in: Zhdanko 1950, p. 92.
 - 36 *Kyrgyzstandyn Tarykhy I*, p. 230; K. Imanaliev and J. Mukambaev, *Pamirdik-Karategindik Kyrgyzdarda. Tarykhyi-étnografiialyk, lingvistikalık jana fol'klorduk kabarlar*, Frunze 1966, p. 14. According to Vinnikov *uruu* was rather used for sub-

tribal units (Ia. R. Vinnikov, 'Dorevoliutsionnoe rodoplemennoe delenie kirgizov i rasselenie ikh v iuzhnoi Kirgizii', in *Kratkie Soobshcheniia Instituta étnografii AN SSSR*, vyp. XXVI, Moscow 1957, p. 72).

- 37 M. A. Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day*, Oxford 1918, p. 40. Cf. Yuri Bregel, 'Notes', in Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi, *Firdaws al-iqbāl - History of Khorezm*, Leiden/Boston/Cologne 1999, p. 547 (note 82).

In literary Kyrgyz the meanings of *él* also include 'people', 'country' and 'state'. In this way *él* commitment was newly interpreted and extended to a Kyrgyz country, a Kyrgyz people and a Kyrgyz republic established by the Soviet nationality policy (see for example: A. Chotonov, *Éldik traditsiialar jana alardyn tarbiialyk maanisi*, Frunze 1967).

- 38 K. Shaniiazov, *K étnicheskoï istorii uzbekskogo naroda (istoriko-étnograficheskoe issledovanie na materialakh kipchakskogo komponenta)*, Tashkent 1974, p. 294. Cf. G. P. Valil'eva, 'Turkmeny-Nokhurli', in *Sredneaziatskii étnograficheskii sbornik 1*, Moscow 1954, p. 177.

- 39 Bacon 1958, pp. 42–3.

- 40 Bacon 1958, pp. 183–185.

- 41 In this point Bacon is inconsistent. On the one hand she holds that 'a clan cannot be localized' and that 'a local group is likely to include representatives of several clans' (Bacon 1958, p. 184), on the other hand she states that, for example, 'the Scottish clans were mappable territorial units' (p. 154) and that 'there was a marked cultural preference for *tsu* [which she had identified as the clan-unit before] localisation' as entities like villages (p. 170).

- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 42. Bacon thinks that such a clan rather dissipates than is able to adapt to new situations, whereas *obok* structure is highly adaptive. Due to her view, the Kazakhs are a typical exponent of *obok*. In contrast, she names the pagan Hausa of northern Nigeria as clan groupings which dispersed through Islamisation. According to her opinion, *obok* structure even survives the settlement of its group. In this respect she does not fully consider the the various patterns of detribalisation and group settlement under the authority of different protective power (see chs 2, 4 and 5). In addition, she is quite inconsistent in her terminology. On analysing the Kazakhs she still uses the terms 'tribe', 'sub-tribe' and 'tribal genealogical group'.

- 43 Krader 1963, pp. 8–9.

- 44 Krader 1963, pp. 10–11. In contrast to Bacon he perceives both structures not to be parallel ones, but that clan structures transform themselves to *sib* structures through the settlement of their people and the recognition of hetero-cephalic governmental authority, as he analysed it with regard to the Monguor of the Kansu-Tibetan frontier (*ibid.*, p. 287. Cf. L. Krader, 'Principles and Structures in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe Pastoralists', *SWJoA*, vol. 12, 1955/2, p. 81). However, the transformation of tribal structures does not occur in the same way, as its change depends on whether, for example, tribes got settled within the boundaries of Islamic patrimonial states based on *sharia*, faced tsarist administration or became a part of the Chinese empire whose population overwhelmingly performed ancestor cult based on patronymic *sibs*.

- 45 This differentiation between lineage and clan is current in contemporary anthropology (cf. F. R. Vivelo, *Handbuch der Kulturanthropologie. Eine grundlegende Einführung*, Munich 1988, pp. 157–178 (English: *Cultural Anthropology Handbook. A Basic Introduction*, 1978, pp. 287–8).

- 46 Some more recent scholarship on Central Asian tribalism also does not sufficiently clarify this relationship. Thus Akiner claims on the one hand that 'encampments were grouped into tribal units', but she also holds that 'members of the same tribe

often came to be divided between different hordes' (Sh. Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State (Former Soviet South Project)*, London 1995, p. 15.) Olcott uses both the terms 'clan' and 'tribe' without specifying her use. M. B. Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Stanford 1987, pp. 9–16. Svanberg describes the Kazakh *zhüz* as 'tribal federations' being subdivided into 'lineages'. As he gives the 'lineages' of Soviet and present day Kazakh leaders, he also uses the term lineages as 'descent group' (I. Svanberg, 'The Kazakh Nation', in *Contemporary Kazaks: Cultural and Social Perspectives*, London 1999, pp. 7–8). Similarly did Odgaard and Simonsen (K. Odgaard and J. Simonsen, 'The New Kazakh Elite', in Svanberg 1999, pp. 27–8).

- 47 Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757*, Cambridge MA and Oxford 1992 (1989) pp. 160–70. According to Barfield, egalitarian tribal group solidarity remained politically dominant in the Middle East, since Arabian tribalism was only confronted with relatively weak small regional states. Acephalous segmentary organisation was never challenged by large-scale states or empires, because there were not enough resources to meet the costs of maintaining the armies of nomadic empires or large tribal confederacies. In contrast to the Middle East, Turco-Mongolian nomadic empires like the Hsiung-nu and the Mongols emerged in opposition to the strong, sedentary Chinese centralised state, and he explains the long-enduring stability of these empires with their leader's capability 'to deliver luxury goods, border trade, and military protection from the outside world to participating tribes'.
- 48 Bastug states to the contrary:

Included in the confounded model are notions such as: the unvarying mutual support of brothers; that groups allied or opposed in conflict will align themselves solely on the basis of genealogical closeness; that spatial distribution and residence patters will also necessarily map the genealogy; and the assumption that social system must necessarily be egalitarian, precluding any sort of hierarchy or state organisation.

(Bastug 1999, p. 178)

- 49 Bastug 1999, pp. 80–6.
- 50 Whereas Bastug emphasises – arguing against the view of the necessarily egalitarian nature of the segmentary lineage system – that there is 'nothing inherent in the structure of segmentary lineage systems which renders permanent leadership or social stratification theoretically impossible', Barfield is interested in explaining with regard to different outside relations why Arabian tribalism was egalitarian and Inner Asian was not.
- 51 Bastug defines 'tribe' 'to denote the maximal grouping a segmentary lineage system, which united by a consensual genealogy' (Bastug 1999, p. 95). Barfield specifies 'tribe' as the 'largest unit of incorporation based on a genealogical model' (Barfield 1990, p. 156).
- 52 Ph. C. Salzman, 'Tribal Chiefs as Middlemen: The Politics of Encapsulation', *AQ*, vol. 47, 1974/2, pp. 203–10; R. Tapper, 'Introduction', in R. Tapper (ed.) *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, New York 1983, pp. 1–75; E. Gellner, 'The Tribal Society and its Enemies', in Tapper 1983, pp. 436–48. Ph. S. Houry and J. Kostiner, 'Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East', pp. 1–24; I. M. Lapidus, 'Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History', p. 26; R. Tapper, 'Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East', pp. 48–73; E. Gellner, 'Tribalism and the State in the Middle East', pp. 109–26; all in Ph. S. Houry and J. Kostiner (eds) *Tribes and State*

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

- Formation in the Middle East*, London and New York 1991; P. B. Golden, *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples. Ethnogeny and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East*, Wiesbaden 1992, p. 4. Cf. also A. Southall, 'Tribes', in *Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology IV*, 1996, pp. 1329–35.
- 53 With regard to tribal confederacies and empires, Barfield operates with a similar concept of politics, although he sometimes relates it to small-scale groups as well. This leads to some terminological inaccuracies. T. J. Barfield, 'Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective', in Khoury and Kostiner 1991, p. 156; Barfield 1992, pp. 26–8.
- 54 See Schmitt's classical conception of politics based on the friend/enemy dichotomy (C. Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Berlin 1996 [1932]).
- 55 With regard to the differentiation between tribe and tribal confederacy, we follow current anthropology. See: Tapper 1983, p. 9. Khoury and Kostiner 1991, pp. 7–13; Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757*, Cambridge MA and Oxford 1992 (1989) pp. 26–7.
- 56 Koslow, 'Das Gewohnheitsrecht der Kirgisen', in *Russische Revue*, vol. 21, 1882, pp. 456–7; Irons 1975, p. 61; Y. Bregel, *Khorezmskie turkmeny v XIX v.*, Moscow 1961, p. 75. Grodekov describes the similar liability for members of Kazakh tribes, although the difference between the legal claims of members and non-members has to be extrapolated from his data (Grodekov 1889, pp. 12, 233–9). It seems probable that the peaceful settlement of disputes through the payment of *qūn* was also possible between rival tribal confederacies. Due to the establishment of hordes, the community of law could loosely transcend tribal boundaries, but tribal confederacies often maintained minimal relations for years.
- 57 As Schoeberlein-Engel conceptualises identity with regard to situational experiences and group perceptions of individuals, he does not pay sufficient attention to the impacts of institutional arrangements on the formation of collective identity. These arrangements make collective identity enduring and less fluctuating (Schoeberlein-Engel 1994, pp. 1–18, 179–214).
- 58 Community of law was based on customary law, which differed locally but also had common features. Some of the contrary reports are due to this local heterogeneity.
- 59 About the customary law, see: Levchine 1840, pp. 339–406, 467–509; Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 523–526; Grodekov 1889; B. A. Kuftin, 'Kirgiz-Kazaki: Kultura i Byt', in *Ėtnologicheskie ocherki tsentral'nogo muzeia narodovedeniia*, no. 2, Moscow 1926, pp. 8–9; V. A. Riasanovsky, 'Customary Law of the Kirghiz', *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. XXI, 1937/2, pp. 190–220; Abramzon 1990, pp. 171–8.
- 60 See for example: Vámbéry 1865, p. 58; F. Moser, *À Travers L'Asie Central*, Paris 1885, pp. 19–21; A. Lomakin, *Obychnoe pravo turkmen (adat)*, Ashkhabad 1897, p. 94; Irons 1975, p. 61; 'Zametki o turkmenskom dukhovenstve', in *Turkmenovedenie*, 1928/3–4 (7–8), p. 10.
- 61 Irons 1975, p. 61.
- 62 König 1962, p. 72.
- 63 Irons 1975, p. 61.
- 64 V. F. Oshanin, *Karategin i Darvaz*, St Petersburg 1881, p. 154.
- 65 Grodekov 1883, p. 81.
- 66 Levchine 1840, p. 315.
- 67 T. M. Kul'teylev, 'Kazakh Customary Law', *CAR*, vol. V, 1957/2, pp. 131–4.
- 68 Lomakin 1897, pp. 88–89; Oshanin 1881, pp. 153–4.

- 69 Levchine 1840, pp. 349, 400; P. P. Rumiantsev, *Kirgizskii narod v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, St Petersburg 1910, p. 13; Hudson 1938, p. 66. At the end of the nineteenth century vendetta was still customary in some areas of Sir Darya (Grodekov 1889, p. 234).
- 70 Zimanov 1958, p. 61; Irons 1975, p. 65.
- 71 Levchine 1840, p. 315; Dingelstedt 1890, p. 66; Hudson 1938, p. 67; S. Z. Zimanov, *Politicheskii stroi Kazakhstana kontsa XVIII i pervoi poloviny XIX vekov*, Alma-Ata 1960, p. 75; Irons 1975, p. 65.
- 72 *Adat* is the Arabic term for customary law. Turkmen called it *düp*, whereas steppe nomads used the term *zang*. *Nark* was a Kyrgyz term for it. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, interest in these legal traditions increased and several studies and compilations of Russian sources haven been published: A. A. Nikishenkov, *Stepnoi zakon. Obychnoe pravo kazakov, kirgizov i turkmen*, Moscow 2000; V. Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe. The Kazakhs and the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the nineteenth century*, London 2001.
- 73 Cf. Levchine 1840, pp. 398–401. Since the French translation does not fully reproduce Levshin's whole remarks about Tauke's codex, I prefer to quote Riasanovsky's translation in Riasanovsky 1937, pp. 192–7. Levshin got the data from his own observations and experiences among Kazakhs (Levchine 1840, p. III), but he is only able to summarise parts of it. Tauke's code was orally handed down and therefore open for modifications by later khans. Cf. Olcott 1987, pp. 14–16.
- 74 Riasanovsky 1937, pp. 192–3.
- 75 Referring to Tauke's codex, Olcott confirms this impression in stating that 'the Kazakhs had accepted some of the principles of the sharia at the end of the seventeenth century' (Olcott 1987, p. 19).
- 76 K. Dilger, 'Tendenzen der Rechtentwicklung', in W. Ende and U. Steinbach (eds) *Der Islam in der Gegenwart*, Munich 1984, p. 189. See also: Lomakin 1897, p. 88; M. B. Durdyev, 'K voprosu o sootnoshenii shariata i adata v Turkmenskom prave v kontse XIX – nachale XX v. Turkmenistan', in *Turkemenistan SSR Ylymlar Akademiiasyning khabarlary jemgyetchilik Ylymlaryng Seriiasy – Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Turkmenskoï SSR, Serii obshchestvennykh nauk*, 1969/1, p. 20.
- 77 According to the Islamic law, this was not possible because *hadd* offences injure the right of Allah (*haqq Allāh*) in contrast to the harm of human rights (*haqq ādamī*) through murder, bodily harm or material damages (Dilger 1984, p. 190).
- 78 Cf. G. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents of Chingiz Khan's Yasa', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 3, 1938/1, pp. 337–60. More recent research dismissed Vernadsky's and his followers' view about a Great Yasa as a single written legal code which Chingiz Khan should have established at the *quriltai* of 1206 due the lack of source evidence. D. O. Morgan, 'The "Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan" and Mongol Law in the Ilkhanate', *BSOAS*, vol. 49, 1986/1, pp. 163–76; *The Mongols*, Oxford 1986, pp. 96–100; R. D. McChesney, *Central Asia: Foundations of Change*, Princeton 1996, pp. 120–3. Nevertheless, Mongolian *yasa* as customary law remained important up to the political order of the Kazakh hordes. See Chapter 3, second section.
- 79 Dilger 1984, p. 188.
- 80 Dilger 1984, p. 192; Radloff 1884 (I), p. 523.
- 81 Levchine 1840, p. 399; Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l'Asie. Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand depuis les dernière années du règne de Nadir Chah, 1153, jusqu'en 1233 de l'hégire, 1740–1818 AD. (Texte persane, publié d'après un manuscrit unique, avec une traduction française accompagnée d'une introduction, des notes et appendices)*, ed. Ch. Schefer, Amsterdam 1970 (Paris 1876), p. 196; Dingelstedt 1890, p. 67; L. A. Slovokhotov, *Narodnyi sud obychnogo prava kirgiz Maloi Ordy*, Orenburg 1905, p. 127; A. I. Dobrosmyslov, *Sud u kirgiz*

- Turgai'skoï Oblasti v XVIII i XIX vekakh*, Kazan 1904, pp. 68–9; Riasanovsky 1937, pp. 192–3; Durdyev 1969, pp. 19–20.
- 82 Radloff, Moser and Grodekov confirmed this usage, but in different variations: Radloff attested 100 horses or 1,000 sheep to be the full blood money for homicide (Radloff 1884 [I] p. 523), whereas Moser referred to 600 cattle as the blood price in certain Kazakh regions (H. Moser, *À Travers l'Asie Central*, Paris 1885, p. 22). Grodekov reported that in various districts of the Sir Darya Oblast *qūns* like 200 horses, 100 camels or 1,000 sheep were usual (Grodekov 1889, pp. 237–8). Cf. G. S. Zagriazhskii, 'Iuridicheskiĭ obyčaj kirgiz i o narodnom sude u kochevogo naseleñiia Turkestan'skogo Kraia, po obychnomy pravu (zan')', in H. A. Maev (ed.) *Materialy dlia statistiki Turkestan'skogo Kraia*, vyp. IV, St Petersburg 1876, pp. 163–4; L. Meier, 'Kirgizskaia step', *Materialy dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannye ofitserami general'nabo shtaba*, St Petersburg 1865, pp. 256–7.
- 83 In Central Asia *khojas* were religious people who claimed descent from the four caliphs. They often were members of Sufi orders, especially that of Naqshbandi, which played an important role in the Islamisation of Central Asian tribesmen. About Sufism in Central Asia, see note 101 below.
- 84 Riasanovsky 1937, p. 193, 201. Riasanovsky used this collection and states that the 'Customs of the Kirghiz' were compiled in 1824 at the demand of the Russian authorities to prepare the codification of customary law of the Siberian tribes. *Ibid.*, p. 192. Radloff 1884 (I), p. 523; §66 of *Sobranie kirgizskikh zakonov (1825)*, p. 51.
- With regard to the Small Horde, Slovkhotov reports liabilities of up to 3 *qūn* (Slovkhotov 1905, pp. 127–8). Grodekov gives a source which ascertains the same *qūn* for all males, both sultans and thieves. But this may not only refer to divergent usage in different areas, but also could represent a later customary development which corresponded to the political decline of the sultans. Grodekov 1889, p. 235. Cf. L. Balliuzek, 'Narodnye obyčaj imevshie, a otchasti i nyne imeiushchie, v maloi kirgizskoi orde sily zakona', in *Materialy po kazakhskomy obychnomy pravu 1998*, pp. 274–6.
- 85 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 524; *Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR – Tom I. S drevneishikh vremen do serediny XIX v.*, ed. V. M. Ploskikh, Frunze 1984, p. 468.
- 86 Riasanovsky 1937, p. 194. The Customs of the Kyrgyz only confirms the procuring of a maiden in case of adultery, but foresees corporal punishment for not doing so (*ibid.*, p. 201).
- 87 *Ibid.*, pp. 193–4. The Customs of the Kyrgyz also includes this rule, but they applied only to maids not betrothed. Due to this code, the rape of a betrothed afforded the payment of one maid, one servant, one suit of armour, one camel and twenty-four head of cattle, whereas the rape of a married woman was punished by the payment of half a *qūn* (*ibid.*, p. 201). Radloff certified the payment of half a *qūn* for the rape of a maiden (Radloff 1884 (I), p. 524).
- 88 Koslow 1882, p. 459; Lomakin 1897, p. 91; A. P. Andreev, 'Turkmenskii sud', IV, vol. 81, 1900, p. 548; König 1962, p. 72; M. Saray, *The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism: A Study of the Turkmen People and their Incorporation into the Russian Empire*, Ankara 1982, p. 49.
- 89 *Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR I*, p. 472; *Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR. – Tom II: Dobrovol'noe vkhozhdenie Kirgizii v sostav Rossii i ego progressivnye posledstviia (razložhenie patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh i razvitie kapitalisticheskikh otnoshenii 1855 – Mart 1917 g.)*, ed. S. I. Il'iasov, Frunze 1986, p. 186.
- 90 Meyendorf 1826, pp. 49–54.
- 91 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 523; Levchine 1840, pp. 398–400; Grodekov 1889, p. 12.
- 92 Grodekov 1889, p. 229. Grodekov describes a variety of different fines and their names which Kazakhs and Kyrgyz used in the Sir Darya Oblast. (Grodekov 1889, pp. 225–45).

- 93 B. Iuzefovich, 'O byte kirgizov Turgaĭskoi Oblasti', *RV*, vol. 146, 1880, p. 803; Olcott 1987, p. 17.
- 94 Ch. Ch. Valichanov, 'Zapiska o sudebnoi reforme u kirgiz Sibirskogo Vedomstva (1864)', in Ch. Valikhanov, 'Sochineniia', in *Zapiski IRGO po otdeleniiu étnografii, tom XXIX*, St Petersburg 1904, p. 174.
- 95 Severtsov 1860, pp. 30–3; Kaufmann 1908, p. 55 (p. 95); Valichanov 1904, pp. 173–4; König 1962, pp. 71–2.
- 96 Grodekov 1884, pp. 33–4, 160.
- 97 Radloff 1884 I, pp. 511–2; R. Karutz, *Unter Kirgisen und Turkmenen. Aus dem Leben der Steppe*, Leipzig 1911, p. 44; Tolybekov 1971, p. 301; Schuyler 1966, p. 23. Markov 1976, p. 152.
- 98 It was the tsarist view that tribesmen lacked personal responsibility. Thus tsarist authorities encouraged Tatar mullahs to Islamise the Kazakhs in order to spread moral standards. This view is not entirely true, however. Tribal people were personally responsible as well: not to outside authorities or to a unitary God on the Day of Judgement, but to the descent community and their common ancestor. Oath-taking was a typical instance of this experienced responsibility. Both Kazakhs and Turkmen tried to avoid oaths, since such a situation implied the possibility of unintended perjury. As the charging party of a dispute had the right to nominate a neutral oath-taker to take an oath upon the innocence of the accused before the *bi*, one could misinterpret the causes which had led to the visible offence and thus the legitimate claims of the accused. As a result, perjury could not only lead to serious impurity of a person, but also to the expulsion from the descent group (§ 45, 'Sobranie kirgizskikh zakonov i polozhenie na onye Omskogo Vremennogo komiteta [8-go fevralia 1824 goda]', in *Materialy po Kazakhskomy obychnomy pravu*, Almaty 1998, p. 46; E. Petrie, 'Über die Rechtsbegriffe der Kirgisen', *Das Ausland*, 1886/4, pp. 70–1; Koslow 1882, pp. 465–66; Lomakin 1897, pp. 80–4).
- 99 Owing to the lack of historical sources, it is not possible to prove direct continuity from Turkmen tribes of the Seljuk period and post-Mongol Turkmen of the sixteenth century (D. Nissman, 'Turkmenistan', in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. IV, New York and Oxford 1995, pp. 254–55; B. Kellner-Heinkele, 'Türkmen', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. X (fascicles 175–6), p. 683).
- 100 Lomakin 1897, pp. 56, 88–9; A. P. Andreev, 'Turkmenskii sud', *Istoricheskii vestnik*, 1900, vol. 81, pp. 548–9; Durdyev 1969, p. 20. On quoting Vámbéry having asserted that the mullahs and kadis exercised greater influence on Turkman tribesmen in comparison with their own elders (*iashuly*). Bacon misinterpreted Vámbéry (Bacon 1966, p. 54). The latter only wrote that some Sufi mullahs (*ishans*) enjoyed higher reputations than some *iashuly*s due to the 'superstition' of the Turkmen. Neither these *ishans*, nor *iashuly*s, would have been influential if they had tried to become political leaders disregarding *dāp*. When *ishans* became politically active, they did often so as mediators between inimical groups. They best could perform such missions, since their life and property was sacrosanct even to inimical Turkman tribesmen (cf. H. Lansdell, *Russian Central Asia*, vol. 2, London 1885, p. 479; S. M. Demidov, 'Sufismus in Turkmenistan', *TF. Band II*, Hamburg 1988, pp. 123–4, 129 (Russian: *Sufizm v Turkmenii – Evolutsiia i perezhitki*, Ashkhabad 1978).
- 101 König 1962, p. 74; *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR II*, p. 41.
- 102 Vámbéry 1865, pp. 251–3; König 1962, p. 72; *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 25; Saray 1982, p. 49. About Sufism in Central Asia, see: S. Mambetaliev, *Kyrgyzstandagy musulman sektalary*, Frunze 1966; *Sufizm jana anyn kyrgyzs-*

- tandagy agymdary*, Frunze 1972; S. M. Demidov, *Turkmenskije ovlady*, Ashkhabad 1976; *Sufizm v Turkmenii - Évolutsiia i perezhitki*, Ashkhabad 1978; A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lémecier-Quelquejey, *Le Soufi et le Commissaire. Les confréries musulmanes en URSS*, Paris 1986; U. Halbach, "‘Heiliger Krieg’ gegen den Zarismus. Zur Verbindung von Sufismus und Djihad im antikolonialen islamischen Widerstand gegen Rußland im 19. Jahrhundert", in Kappeler *et al.* 1989, pp. 213–34; Ch. Lémecier-Quelquejey, 'Sufi brother-hoods in the USSR. A Historical Survey', *CAS*, vol. 2, 1983/2, pp. 3–35; N. A. Alekseev, *Der Schamanismus und Sufismus in Mittelasien (Studia Eurasia. Monographienreihe zur Anthropologie und Archäologie der Völker Eurasiens)*, Hamburg 1985; R. M. Mustafina, *Predstavleniia, kul'ty, obriady u Kazakhov (v kontekste bytovogo islama v iuzhnom Kazakhstane v kontse XIX-XX vv.)*, Alma-Ata 1992; R. D. McChesney, *Central Asia: Foundations of Change*, Princeton 1996, pp. 16, 69–116; a critical assessment of Sufism in Kazakhstan has been carried out by Privratsky (2001, pp. 98–109).
- 103 The Kazakhs themselves call the Great, Middle and Small Horde, *Üly Zhüz*, *Orta Zhüz* and *Kīshī Zhüz*. This means the senior, the middle and the junior part. The term 'orda' was only introduced by the Russians and is a mistranslation of *zhüz*. Some sources assert that the term *zhüz* originally meant 'unit of hundred'. Valikhanov as one of the first Kazakh writers also used the term *zhüz* in this way (cf. *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 326.; Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Kirgizskoe rodoslovie', in Valikhanov 1904, p. 289; A. N. Nusurpekov, *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR*, vol. 2, Alma-Ata 1979, p. 248).
- 104 Levchine 1840, pp. 503–4; Valikhanov 1904, p. 289.
- 105 Aristov 1894, p. 398; 1896, p. 353; Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 235–6.
- 106 Spasskii, 'Kirgiz-Kaisaki bol'shoi, srednei i maloi ordy', in *Sibirskii vestnik 1820, chast' 9*, pp. 86–109, quoted in: Aristov 1896, pp. 391–2.
- 107 B. Hayit, *Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt 1956, p. 218.
- 108 V. V. Vostrov and M. S. Mukanov, *Rodoplemennoi sostav i rasselenie Kazakhov*, Alma-Ata 1978, pp. 23–9.
- 109 Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985, p. 69.
- 110 Some of the authors prefer to quote the *Qongrat* as tribe of the Great Horde because of its close affiliation to the latter. Levchine 1840, p. 503; Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 236–7; Aristov 1896, pp. 253–71; Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985, p. 69.
- 111 Valikhanov 1904, p. 289; Olcott 1987, p. 12. In other sources the *Uaq* is regarded as one of the three wings of the *Kerei* (*Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 325; Vostrov and Mukanov 1978, pp. 78–80).
- 112 Rychkov, *Istoria Orenburgskaia - Sochinenia i perevody, k pol'ze i udovol'stii sluzhashchikh, 2-e polugodie*, 1759, p. 110. Quoted in Aristov 1896, p. 362.
- 113 G. N. Potanin, *Ocherki s. z. Mongolii*, vyp. 2, 1881, p. 2–6. Quoted in Aristov 1896, p. 354.
- 114 N. N. Balkashin, *O kirgizakh i voobshche o podvlastnykh Rossii musul'manakh*, St Petersburg 1887, p. 29. Quoted in Aristov 1896, pp. 359–60.
- 115 Rychkov 1759: p. 5. Quoted in Aristov 1896, p. 367.
- 116 Levchine 1840, p. 378; Aristov 1896, p. 393; Radloff 1884 (I), p. 237.
- 117 Only Radloff mentions two *Bai Üly* 'sub-tribes' less, and one 'subtribe' of *Zheti Ru* is not clearly recognisable, whereas Aristov identifies two more *Bai Üly* 'sub-tribes'. Both quote also Levchine's report.
- 118 In addition he mentions only an *Atyn* group within the *Bai üly* (Spasskii, 'Kirgiz-Kaisaki bol'shoi, srednei i maloi ordy', in *Sibirskii vestnik 1920, chast' 9*, pp. 86–109. Quoted in Aristov 1896, pp. 391–2).
- 119 Rychkov 1759, p. 110, quoted in Aristov 1896, pp. 378–9.

- 120 Aristov 1894, pp. 427–44; Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 234–4; Vámbéry 1885, pp. 265–6. Cf. B. Hayit, *Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt 1956, pp. 218–9; Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985, pp. 77–80; Paul Georg Geiß, *Nationenwerdung in Mittelasien (Reihe Politikwissenschaft – Band 269)*, Frankfurt/Berlin/Bern/New York/ Paris/Vienna 1995, pp. 67–8.
- 121 For example: A. Abyshkaev, *Karateginskije kirgizy v kontse XIX–nachale XX vv.*, Frunze 1965, p. 15.
- 122 Vámbéry 1865, pp. 243–9; 1885, pp. 391–402; Ch. Marvin, *Merv, The Queen of the World and the Scourge of the Man-Stealing Turcomans*, London 1881, pp. 44–64; cf. W. König, 'Zur Gesellschaftsorganisation der Turkmenen. Die Stammesstruktur der Teke', in Museum für Völkerkunde Leipzig (ed.) *Beiträge zur Völkerforschung. Hans Damm zum 65. Geburtstag. Veröffentlichungen des Museums für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig, Heft 11*, Berlin 1961, p. 345; *Narody Srednej Azii II*, pp. 18–21; Irons 1975, p. 59; Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985, pp. 98–100; A. Dshikijew, 'Das turkmenische Volk im Mittelalter', *TF*, vol 18, Berlin 1994, pp. 180, 269.
- 123 Vámbéry 1865, p. 248; 1885, pp. 55; K. Bode, 'O turkmenskikh pokoleniakh: iamudakh i goklanakh', *Zapiski RGO, kn. II*, 1847, pp. 234–5.
- 124 Marvin 1881, p. 55; Irons 1975, p. 59.
- 125 Grodekov 1883, p. 28.
- 126 G. I. Karpov, 'Die Jomud', in *Turkmenovedenie*, 1931/7–9 (translated and reprinted in *TF*, vol. 2, Hamburg 1979, pp. 45, 52).
- 127 *Narody Srednej Azii II*, p. 18.
- 128 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 234; Aristov 1896, pp. 283–4.
- 129 The *Iomuts* represent a good case for the reorganisation of tribal confederacies. During his travels through Turkmenistan in 1863, Vámbéry – as we have mentioned above – asserted four *Iomut* groupings: the *Atabaï* with five branches and the *Jafarbaï* with its two divisions. Both became the dominant tribes within the tribal confederacies of the Chony and Sheref. Marvin, who undertook enquires in northern Persia and received information from the consul Bakouline of Astrabad at the end of the 1870s, could already make out the tribal confederacy of the Chony, whose composition still known during Irons' field work in the 1960s. Marvin called these confederacies (Chony) *Ak-Atabaï* because the *Atabaï* represented the dominant group. His account of the *Sheref* confederacies is practically a description of the *Jafarbaï* sub-tribes, however. Irons' research and Roliakov's diagram illustrate that tribes of Vámbéry's third grouping, the Sheref-Chony confederacy which existed both in Khiva and in the Gurgan plain, joined for the most part the Sheref confederacy. Tribes like the *Ïylgaï* and *Gojuk* still existed in the 1960s. Tribes like the *Öküz*, *Salak* or *Ushak* remained in Khiva and formed the Khivan *Baïram-Shaly*. Vámbéry's fourth grouping, the *Ogurjali*, disappeared completely. The shifting of relatively small groups into new tribal alliances also indicates that some Turkman tribal units are smaller than often assumed.
- 130 Levshin notices:
- Quel zèle et quel amour pour la généalogie ne faudrait-il avoir, pour se déterminer à vérifier et compulser les rapports des Kirghiz! L'un dit que sa tribu se divise en cinq ou six sections; un autre affirme qu'elle se divise en douze: un troisième confond les sections de sa tribu des tribus voisines; un quatrième enfin, plus sincère que tous les autres, avoue francement son ignorance.
- (Levchine 1840, pp. 301–2)
- 131 Cf. Irons 1975, pp. 40–46; König 1964, pp. 63–4.

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

- 132 Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Zapiski o kirgizakh', in *ibid.*, *Sobranie. sochineni v piati tomakh*, vol. II, Alma-Ata 1985, pp. 8, 40.
- 133 Cf. Chapter 5, first section.
- 134 For example, König 1962, pp. 81–2. Cf. Grodekov 1883, p. 49.
- 135 Irons 1975, pp. 40–82.
- 136 Mukhammed Riza Miraba Agekhi, 'Riiz-ud-dovle' (Rukopis' IV AN D 123 [590oc]), in *Materialy po istorii Turkmen II*, p. 469.
- 137 König 1962, pp. 67–8. Cf. Dshikijew 1991, pp. 169
- 138 Evidence for this view is given by Karpov who, for example, reported that severe hostilities existed between units like the *Amansha* and *Gongur* due to a dispute over a large well and its surrounding pastures. Only tsarist rule could settle this dispute after long negotiations with the involved groups (König 1962, p. 91). On the other hand, commitment to the federative descent groups was strong, and it informed the shaping of defensive military alliances or offensive confederacies like that of *Teke* tribesmen from the over-populated Akhal oasis, who moved eastwards towards the Tejen river and occupied Merv. Due to the organised occupation of the oasis, *Teke* tribal groups are territorially based on tribal and confederate descent groups, in contrast to the more mixed groupings in the Akhal oasis.
- 139 Our understanding of tribe and the outlining of the tribal units imply that a Turkman collective identity was beyond the horizon of experience of *Teke* or *Iomut* tribesmen. If we still use 'Turkman' as a collective term of nineteenth-century Turkmen, we do it in an etic way in order to describe common features of various tribes in Transcaspia.
- 140 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 233–4.
- 141 *Ibid.*, p. 533–4.
- 142 *Ibid.*, p. 527. See also Chapter 3, second section.
- 143 Vinnikov 1957, p. 72. Vinnikov's map is based on his own field research in the Jalalabad and Osh *Oblasts* in the 1950s and on the evaluation of available ethnographic sources.
- 144 Cf. Levchine 1840, pp. 502–4; Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 235–7; Aristov 1896, pp. 353–94.
- 145 Levchine 1840, pp. 301–2.
- 146 *Ibid.*, p. 303.
- 147 According to Aristov, there existed only 1,500 households among the *Sary Ūsi m* and no more than 4,000 of the *Suan*. In contrast, larger *plemia* like the *Dulat* and the *Abdan* still included up to 40,000 households at the end of the nineteenth century (Aristov 1896, pp. 351–2).
- 148 This is quite a difficult question, which might be answered, if all the existing sources of the eighteenth and nineteenth century are evaluated and studied.
- 149 Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 238–241. Cf. Dingelstedt 1891, p. 10.
- 150 Cf. Grodekov 1889, pp. 17–20.
- 151 Spasskii, *Sibirskii vestnik 1805*, p. 86–109. Quoted in Aristov 1896, p. 391. Thus Spassky reported that in 1805 the *Arghyn*, the dominant confederacy of the *Orta zhiiz* incorporated 68,000 yurts, i.e. households. Khan Vali (1781–1819) directly led 11,000 households, Sultan Bukey, the later khan, commanded 30,000, whereas Sultan Batyr-Khan and Sultan Zhumy Khudamendin each led 2,000.
- 152 Levchine 1840, p. 503–4.
- 153 *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 325.
- 154 Nevertheless, further research has to be done to clarify this point.
- 155 *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 415.
- 156 Cf. L. S. Tolstova, 'The Kara-Kalpaks of Fergana', *CAR*, 1961/IX, pp. 45–52; L. S. Tolstova, *Karakalpaki ferganskoï doliny (Istoriko-étnograficheskii ocherk)*, Nukus 1959.

- 157 Zhdanko 1950, p. 74. This is just a rough estimation, which needs further confirmation. Cf. *Narody Srednei Azii I*, pp. 413–4.
- 158 Cf. Chapter 4, note 101.
- 159 Cf. B. F. Manz, 'The Development and Meaning of Chaghatay Identity', in J.-A. Gross, *Muslim Central Asia. Expressions of Identity and Change*, Durham NC and London 1992, pp. 27–45. In the nineteenth century 'Chagatay' was widely used as a term of self-designation among both Turkic and Iranian-speaking urban population without tribal affiliations. In the 1910s and 1920s it came to be more often applied only to the Turkic-speaking population. Cf. B. Kh. Karmysheva, 'Nekotorye dannye k étnogenezu naseleniia iuzhnykh i zapadnykh raionov Uzbekistana', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta étnografii AN SSR*, vol. XXVII, Moscow 1957; I. Baldauf, 'The Making of the Uzbek Nation', *CdMRS*, vol. 32, 1991/1–3, pp. 79–96.
- 160 B. Kh. Karmysheva, 'étnicheskie i territorial'nye gruppy naseleniia severo-vostochnoi chasti Kashka-Dar'inskoï oblasti Uz. SSR', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta étnografii AN SSSR*, t. XXXIII, Moscow 1960(a); *O nekotorykh drevnikh tiurkskikh plemenakh v sostave uzbekov (po étnograficheskim dannym) (XXV Mezhdunarodnyi kongress vostkovedov. Doklady delegatsii SSSR.)*, Moscow 1960(b); K. Shaniiazov, *Uzbeki-karluki (istoriko-étnograficheskiï ocherk)*, Tashkent 1964.
- 161 Karmysheva 1960a, p. 52.
- 162 Shaniiazov 1974, p. 107.
- 163 Shaniiazov 1974, pp. 105–7. Cf. P. P. Ivanov, *Vosstanie kitai-kipchakov v Bukharskom Khanstve, 1821–1825. Istochniki i opyt ikh issledovaniia*, Moscow and Leningrad 1937, pp. 23–32, 82–6.
- 164 Soviet ethnographers called these people 'Kirgiz-Kipchaks' (Shaniiazov 1974, p. 104–5, 113–6; T. K. Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh-i Shakhrukhi' kak istoricheskii istochnik*, Alma-Ata 1987, p. 9; 'Migration in the Qöqand Khanate in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century', in H. Komatsu, Ch. Obiya and J. S. Schoeberlein [eds] *Migration in Central Asia: Its History and Current Problems [JCAS Symposium Series 9 – Population Movement in the Modern World III]*, Osaka 2000, pp. 35–6).
- 165 For example: Vámbéry 1865, pp. 304–5. In the 1926 census the *Qipchoqs* are still listed as a distinct 'ethnic' group.
- 166 Cf. Chapter 2, fourth section.
- 167 Hudson 1938, p. 22; Bacon 1958, p. 71.
- 168 See also Zhdanko 1950, p. 79.
- 169 As Hudson pointed out, smaller units could also be called *ru* (Hudson 1938, p. 19). My emphasis on *ru* as a unit of communal commitment does not aim at concealing the numerous different terms for tribal and descent units like *el*, *sütek*, *taïpa*, *atavalas*, *uru*, *ru*, *bir top* and their different use by tribesmen of the Kazakh Steppe (cf. Zimanov 1958, p. 61; Markov 1976, pp. 170–4). On describing idealtypically the different possible meanings of *ru*, I want rather to emphasise similar structures than postulate a uniformity of names which did not exist among Central Asian tribesmen.
- 170 Hudson pointed out these two meanings, although his terminology differs (Hudson 1938, p. 20).
- 171 Krader 1963, p. 22.
- 172 Irons 1975, p. 58; Hudson 1938, p. 24.
- 173 Valikhanov 1904, p. 292. Valikhanov confusingly links this position to the principle of ultimogeniture which was already part of customary law during the Mongolian rule, and prescribed that the youngest son stayed with his parents and inherited his father's homestead (Vernadsky 1938, p. 357).
- 174 Grodekov 1889, p. 7.

- 175 *Ibid.*, p. 8. Cf. N. Masanov, *kochevaia tsivilizatsiia kazakhov (osnovy zhiznedielatel'nosti nomadnogo obshchestva)*, Almaty and Moscow 1995, p. 48.
- 176 Some of these rules of etiquette are still observed in Central Asia, as I could observe during my research in Kyrgyzstan.
- 177 Krader 1963, p. 197.
- 178 Aristov's commentary also supports this view. It is unlikely that a member of the Great Horde would trace back his origin to a khan of the Small Horde who could not even extend his authority to all tribes of his horde and who accepted Russian support to strengthen his position.
- 179 In 1468 Zhanibek and Kirai, both sons of Barak Khan, broke away from his successor Abulkhayr, joined the rulers of Mughulistan and finally defeated and killed Abulkhayr and his son Sheikh Haidar, who refused to recognise Zhanibek's and Kirai's claim to pastures in western Jeti Su (Semirechie). Zhanibek, Kirai, his son Buyunduk (1480–1511) were regarded as the first Kazakh rulers, whereas the latter's successor Qasim Khan is generally believed to be the creator of a more centralised and unified Kazakh khanate (cf. Ch. Lemerrier-Quellejey, 'Die Kasachen und Kirgisen', in Hambly 1988, pp. 152–5; Olcott 1987, pp. 7–9; J.-P. Roux, *L'Asie Centrale – Histoire et civilisations*, Paris 1997, p. 355).
- 180 Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Sledy shamanstva u kirgizov', in *ibid.*, 1904, p. 11. About shamanism in Central Asia, see S. M. Abramzon, 'K kharakteristike shamanstva v starom byte kirgizov', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta étnografii AN SSR, vyp. XXX*, Moscow 1958, pp. 143–50; B. Amanaliev, *Kyrgyzstandagy diniî zhana êrkin oïloonunun tarykhyndan*, Frunze 1967; V. N. Basilov (ed.) *Sredneaziatskoe shamanstvo*, Moscow 1973; M. M. Balzer, *Shamanism. Soviet Studies of Traditional Religion in Siberia and Central Asia*, London 1990. Cf. W. Heissig, *Die Religionen der Mongolei (Die Religionen der Menschheit, vol. 20)*, Stuttgart 1970, pp. 299–427; R. Yöngsiyebü, 'White, Black and Yellow Shamans among the Mongols', unpublished article, quoted in K. Hesse, *Abstammung, Weiderecht und Abgabe. Zum Problem der konsanguinal-politischen Organisation der Mongolen des 13. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1982, pp. 282–6.
- 181 Valikhanov 1904, p. 20.
- 182 Islamisation did not change the patterns of religious experience which secured community and political alliances and explained their origin. It rather put them into a new narrative context which revealed revered ancestors as Muslim saints, and animist deities like *Tangri* as Allah. Typical instances of Islamisation are Islamic genealogies which trace back the origin of tribal ancestors to Adam. Aristov found such a genealogy at the *Botpai* compiled by Dikambay-batyr. It traces back the ancestry of Abulkhayr through Mohammed, Jacob, Isaac and Abraham to Adam (Aristov 1894, pp. 394–5; Valikhanov 1904, pp. 11–4; *Zametki o turkmenskoy dukhovenstve 1928*, p. 9. See also Vámbéry 1865, 250–2; Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Tenkri (Bog)', in *ibid.* 1984 (I), pp. 208–15; Amanaliev 1967, pp. 3–31; Tolybekov 1971, pp. 193–7; R. M. Mustafina, *Predstavlennia, kul'ty, obriady u kazakhov (v kontekste bytovogo islama v iuzhnom Kazakhstane v kontse XIX–XX vv.)*, Almaty 1992, pp. 91–101, 128–9.

More recently Bruce Privratsky undertook considerable scholarly efforts to show that Kazakh ancestor spirits were Muslims for several reasons: Kazakhs do not memorise ancestors in a Turkic terminology and their cults, like the memorial meals, can be referred to the Semitic and Quranic concept of spirit (*aruaq*). He has doubts about the Kazakh use of the Mongol term *ongon*, which Valikhanov referred to in its studies on Kazakh religion (Privratsky 2001, pp. 136–51). In his well researched ethnographic study on contemporary Kazakh Islam, Privratsky presents some reasons why Kazakh Islam has to be understood and studied in his own terms and not from the perspective of school Islam. He is also to be

- applauded for criticism on the previous use of the concept of shamanism to describe Kazakh religion and to apply it as a residual category for analysing Kazakh Islam from the perspective of orthodox school Islam (cf. pp. 16–8). Nevertheless, we do not share Privratsky's view on the ancestor cult as being only 'grounded in the Muslim funerary traditions' which had been 'widely dispersed across the Muslim world' (p. 138). It is true that its Muslim form resulted from the process of Islamisation. Kazakh receptivity for these forms were, however, grounded in the animistic world view and common religious cult of tribesmen who perceived friendship and solidarity bonds in terms of kinship and genealogy.
- 183 D. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde. Baba Türkles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition*, Pennsylvania 1994, pp. 32–50, 516–32.
- 184 In Anthropology various terms are used to describe the various levels of the segmentary lineage system: 'minimal lineage', 'mid-level lineage', 'maximal lineage', 'segment', 'sections', 'lineages', 'sub-tribe', 'tribe' and sometimes, erroneously, also 'clan'. Here we prefer the term 'descent group' to distinguish these groupings from tribal residence groups, which included strangers as well.
- 185 Irons 1975, pp. 40–4. Cf. G. I. Karpov, 'Rodoslovnaia turkmen', *TU*, 1928/12, pp. 27–33.
- 186 Irons 1975, p. 40; König 1962, p. 81.
- 187 König 1961 *Rodoslovnaia turkskogo plemeni*, Kazan 1854.
- 189 Turkman basic descent groups like the *Togdari*, *Al Goli* and *Chensuli* could also be called *taïpa*, although they more often were referred to as *tire*.
- 190 See Chapter 1, fourth section. Cf. Irons 1975, p. 62.
- 191 Grodekov 1889, p. 12. But his further elaboration attests that he uses it both with regard to peace groups and their smaller subdivisions.
- 192 The translation of Grodekov's terms *rod*, *koleno* and *podkoleno* as tribe, sub-tribe and camp, i.e. in terms of independent, tribal residence groupings, would not be correct anywhere in the Kazakh Steppe, since Russian administration was also introduced in Sir Darya and Jety Su in 1867. It is also not correct because such a translation confuses descent with residing units. See Section 6 of Chapter 3.
- 193 Grodekov 1889, p. 233.
- 194 Grodekov 1889, p. 233–4. Cf. Dingelstedt 1890, pp. 66–7. Krader asserts the opposite. With reference to Izraztsov, he states

if the murderer and his family or village could not make up the sum among them, wider circles of kinsmen were called in, contributing in proportion to the degree of closeness of kinship, provided the man was of good standing in his community

(Krader 1963, p. 230)

Radloff also confirms a solely subsidiary liability of distant relatives, which was not compulsory but depended on the goodwill of distant relatives (Radloff 1884 [I], p. 525). Slovkhotov is not precise about this point (Slovkhotov 1905, pp. 127–31). But Krader himself also emphasises that the *auyl* became the unit of former compulsory liability after the reorganisation of Kazakh society under Russian rule. In this way, liabilities of distant relatives which depended on the position of the involved groups in the tribal descent system turned into the exclusive liability of the *auyl* community. Thus more distant relatives could help one *auyl*, but it was no longer their duty. That means that Izraztsov referred to the new system, whereas Radloff describes an intermediate stage or confused the former tribal liability with the latter under colonial rule.

195 Grodekov 1889, p. 234; Slovkhotov 1905, p. 131.

196 Grodekov 1889, p. 234.

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

- 197 Grodekov 1889, p. 237; Slovokhotov 1905, p. 127–8.
- 198 Levchine 1840, p. 315.
- 199 Krader 1963, p. 206.
- 200 Cf. also Krader 1955, p. 78.
- 201 Bastug 1999, p. 82.
- 202 Irons 1975, p. 40.; König 1962, p. 80. The vague use of the term *rod* as translation of *tire* is obvious also in this case (see *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 21).
- 203 Hudson 1938, p. 19. Cf. Zimanov 1958, p. 61.
- 204 Zhdanko 1950, pp. 78–81; *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 491. As was the case among Kazakhs, originally precise terms lost their social significance due to the loss of the tribal structure. In addition, socio-political semantics were decentralised before tsarist rule and similar social structures referred to by different names. Thus Samoylovich ascertains in his commentarial notes about one of the Khivan chroniclers that various terms like *taife*, *kabile*, *tabakè*, *tire* or *urug* were used for small descent groupings. Cf. A. N. Samoïlovich, 'Sokrashchennyi perevod otryvkov iz khivinskikh khronik XIX veka o khivinsko-karakalpakskikh otnosheniakh', *Trudy instituta vostokovedeniia*, vol. 7, 1935, p. 92 (footnote 5).
- 205 Cf. Figure 9.
- 206 Irons 1976, p. 61.
- 207 König 1962, pp. 72–3.
- 208 König 1962, p. 72. König's estimated household size is more than ten family members. Irons' collected average household size in Aji Gui was a little more than five (Irons 1975, p. 91).
- 209 G. I. Karpov and P. B. Arbekov, 'Die Salor', *TU*, 1930/6–7 (translated and reprinted in *TF*, vol 1, Hamburg, pp. 52–7).
- 210 Zhdanko 1950, p. 81. At the time of Zhdanko's expedition to Khorezm, tribal structures no longer existed. Reflection by the interviewed elders provided evidence that the basic descent units had already transformed into residential groupings at the end of the nineteenth century during Khivan rule. The significant feature of seven forefather groups was that they were not named after their leader, as Zhdanko discovered, but after their descent group. This was also not an exclusively territorial group, and allied strangers did not change their name, i.e. their descent affiliation (T. A. Zhdanko, 'Karakalpaki', in *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 491).
- 211 Abramzon 1990, pp 209–10. Abramzon quotes from material of the 1920s and 1940s on Kyrgyzstan and notes that these commitments could still be observed. See also S. I. Iliasov, 'O patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniakh kochevykh narodov Kirgizii', in Akademiia Nauk SSSR (ed.) *Materialy Ob'edinennoi nauchnoi sessii, posviashchennoi istorii Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana v dooktiabr'skii period*, Tashkent 1955, pp. 47–8; *Kyrgyzstandyn Tarykhy I*, p. 231; Vinnikov 1957, p. 72; Imanaliyev and Mukambaev 1966, p. 14.
- 212 S. M. Abramzon, 'Formy rodoplemennoi organizatsii u kochevnikov Srednei Azii', *Trudy instituta ètnografii*, vol. 14, 1951, pp. 154–5.
- 213 Zimanov 1958, p. 61; Khazanov 1984, p. 129.
- 214 Grodekov 1889, p. 39.
- 215 Cf. N. Izraztsov, 'Obychnoe pravo ("adat") kirgizov semirechenskoi oblasti: semeinye soiuzy', *ètnograficheskoe obozrenie – Izdanie ètnograficheskogo otdela imperatorskogo obshchestva liubitelei estestvoznaniia, antropologii i ètnografii, sostoiashchego pri moskovskom universitete*, 1897/3, pp. 70–1, Karutz 1911, p. 99; Kisliakov 1969, pp. 29–32.
- 216 It is more an analytical problem as to whether units like *Tama* and *Töleu* are called tribes or tribal confederacies.
- 217 But this was also an intermediate stage. See Chapter 4, fourth section.
- 218 Bastug 1999, pp. 86–8.

- 219 König 1962, pp. 72, 79; Markov 1976, p. 218; Abramzon 1990, pp. 214–15.
- 220 Cf. Bastug 1999, pp. 90–4.
- 221 Grodekov 1889, p. 110; Radloff 1884 (I), p. 417; Bacon 1958, pp. 69–70; Hudson 1938, p. 24; Irons 1975, pp. 25–6.
- 222 Nomadism is used as a category of mobility, whereas pastoralism is an adaptive strategy based on cattle breeding. Thus nomadism is always pastoral, whereas pastoralism could also be linked with settlement. Semi-nomadism refers to tribesmen who spend a part of the year in fixed dwelling units, but who nomadise in yurts during the rest of the year. Cf. Viveló 1988, pp. 122–3; Khazanov 1984, pp. 17–25; Y. Bregel, 'Nomadische und seßhafte Elemente unter den Turkmenen', *TF*, vol. 12, pp. 134–6.
- 223 Abramzon 1990, pp. 253–70. See also Schuyler 1966, pp. 261–2; V. M. Ploskikh, 'Politicheskaia istoriia i patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnosheniia Kirgizov vo vtoroi polovine XVIII–seredine XIX v', *Istoriia Kyrg. SSR*, vol. 1, p. 525.
- 224 Radloff 1884 (I) p. 528; Oshanin 1881, pp. 28–9; Valikhanov 1985 (II) p. 33. Thus Kyrgyz like the *Bugu* and *Sary Bagysh* cultivated millet, barley and wheat by lakes and rivers.
- 225 A. S. Bezkovic, 'Nomadenwirtschaft und Lebensweise der Kirgisen (19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts)', in L. Földes (ed.) *Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur*, Budapest 1969, p. 99.
- 226 *Istoriia Kyrg. SSR*, vol. 1, 1984, pp. 472–5.
- 227 Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 230–5. Due to changes and reshuffling of such large groups, they seem to have represented tribal confederacies rather than tribes.
- 228 Grodekov 1889, p. 239.
- 229 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 513. Olcott's estimated *auyl* size is forty families (Olcott 1987, p. 13). Kaufmann's assertion that smaller *auyl* villages lived in higher ranges is linked to the fact that winter pastures on mountain slopes can only supply enough fodder for small herds (Kaufmann 1908, pp. 167–9).
- 230 Evreinov, *Vnutrenniaia ili Bukeevskaia kirgiz-kazach'ia orda*, p. 84. Quoted in Abramzon 1990, p. 254. See also: Schuyler 1966, p. 22; 'Zamechanie o sude i rasprave kirgizov, o pravakh lichnykh, imushchestvennykh i semeinykh, nekotorykh obriadakh i obyknoveniiaikh ikh. (29 marta 1846 goda)', in *Materialy po Kazakhskomy*, p. 118; I. V. Erofeeva, 'Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Kazakhskogo obshchestva v XVIII – ser. XIX.v', in M. K. Kozybaev (ed.) *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, Alma-Ata 1993, p. 197.
- 231 S. E. Tolybekov, *Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskii stroi kazakhov v XVII–XIX vekakh*, Alma-Ata 1959, p. 206, quoted by Khazanov 1984, p. 134; Markov 1976, pp. 138–9. Olcott 1987, p. 17.
- 232 Radlov 1884 (I), p. 527. Radlov reported that tsarist officers told him when he visited the Solto in 1864 that the Kyrgyz similarly started to form separated *aiyls* as the Kazakhs did. Cf. 'Report of the Girs Commission', in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, pp. 260, 268.
- 233 Martin 2001, p. 142.
- 234 Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 513–14.
- 235 Levchine 1840, pp. 399–400; Slovochotov 1905, pp. 49–50, 74–83; Valikhanov 1904, pp. 171–4; Hudson 1938, p. 66.
- 236 It is still open for further research, to what extent *köshe* originally were seven-fore-father groups.
- 237 Tolstova 1963, p. 149; *Istoriia Karakalpakskoi ASSR (S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei)*, Tashkent 1986, p. 76–7.
- 238 Zhdanko 1950, pp. 80–81; *Narody Srednei Azii I*, pp. 491–2.
- 239 Zhdanko 1950, p. 66.
- 240 Tolstova 1961, p. 45.

TRIBAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

- 241 *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 416; Tolstova 1961, p. 47.
- 242 Lansdell 1885 II, p. 445; König 1962, p. 91. For the historical development of nomadism and settlement among Turkmen see Bregel 1989, pp. 131–64.
- 243 Mouraviev 1823a, p. 39; Grodekov 1883, p. 48; Moser 1885, p. 274; König 1962, p. 42; Irons 1975, p. 26.
- 244 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, Ashkhabad 1957, p. 29; Bregel 1961, pp. 70–7; König 1962, pp. 117–20; Irons 1975, p. 56; Markov 1976, p. 218.
- 245 Cf. Markov 1976, p. 219.
- 246 This principle is also valid in Central Asian societies today, as the author observed during his stays in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. After the decline of the Soviet Union it became even more important, since the system of linking social security to the work place declined too.
- 247 New households could only be established if the family could afford the bride price for the son and if the paternal herd remained big enough. Thus the paternal herd had to include at least 160, in which case the marrying son would receive sixty. Smaller herds could not establish an sufficient economic base for an independent household (see Irons 1975, pp. 83–90).
- 248 Irons 1975, pp. 95–102. Europeans who maintained Turkman domestic servants experienced this lack of obedience. Curtis, for example, reports that ‘they will follow, but will not be driven, and they will do anything upon request but nothing upon command’ (W. E. Curtis, *Turkestan: The Heart of Asia*, London 1909, p. 44). Despite the ideological pressure to describe ‘feudalism’ within nomadic societies, Markov already emphasised the egalitarianism of independent nomadic Turkmen in the 1960s, and presented various source evidence from the nineteenth century. He also mentioned that Turkmen were committed to sharing all presents they received and did not acknowledge privileges of the *iashuly* in this respect. Therefore Turkmen tried to hide presents in order not to share them, as tsarist military officers observed (G. E. Markov, *Ocherk istorii formirovaniia severnykh Turkmen*, Moscow 1961, pp. 69–72. Cf. Bregel 1961, p. 87). This, however, did not prevent him – like many other Soviet scholars – from ascertaining ‘patriarchal social ties’ and a ‘patriarchal tribal system’ among the Turkmen (G. E. Markov, ‘Les sociétés traditionnelles d’Asie Centrale’, *CdMRS*, XXXI, 1990/2–3, p. 401; A. D. Dzhikiev, *Étnicheskaia istoriia naseleniia iuzhnogo i iugo-vostochnogo Turkmenistana v XVI–XIX vv.*, Avtoreferat, Tashkent 1988, p. 37).
- Nevertheless, some Russian sources assert also patriarchal relations between Turkman fathers and sons. These sources seemed rather to rely on the elaboration of Russian prejudices about Asiatic patriarchy than on careful ethnographic research, however. It is also possible that these observations referred to Turkmen whose ancestors had lost their political independence and become subjects of the Khivan khan (see for example Lomakin 1897, pp. 41–4).
- 249 Vámbéry had already noted this amazing acephalous character of Turkman society and emphasised the limited power of *iashuly*s. Vámbéry 1865, pp. 249–52; Grodekov 1883, p. 65; Khazanov 1984, p. 175.
- 250 Cf. Chapter 3, first section.
- 251 Irons 1975, p. 48.
- 252 Particular water rights (*silakh-su*) were linked to official duties like that of a *mirab*, and to the maintenance of shrines and madrassahs. *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, p. 31; König 1962, p. 129.
- 253 Irons 1975, pp. 46–9. Cf. Kaufmann 1908, pp. 99–102 (175–181); Markov 1976, p. 219.
- 254 According to Turkman, Kyrgyz and Kazakh customary law, groups who first occupied a pasture or territory or who dug wells or aryks gained the common right of exclusive use of these resources. Within such grouping, access rights to a

- particular well or field were determined according to the principle of contribution or were equally shared among its able-bodied members (Grodekov 1889, pp. 102–11; Kaufmann 1908, pp. 150–64 (261–80); Karpov 1978a, p. 30; König 1962, pp. 122–3; Markov 1976, pp. 141–2; Kozybaev 1993, p. 192.) Customary law might be quite different in detail from area to area, although these principles were widely respected.
- 255 Kaufmann 1908, p. 100 (178). A. Karryev, 'Rodo-plemennaiia organizatsiia i rasselenie turkmenskikh plemen. Khoziai stvo turkmen v pervoi polovine XIX v., in *Istoriia Turkm. SSR I*, pp. 26–46. p. 33; König 1962, p. 122.
- 256 Rejection or inclusion of strangers depended on circumstances and was not uniform. Their inclusion could also be only temporal or linked to regular payments for usage rights of wells and land. About *gongshy*-relations among the *Teke*, see König 1962, pp. 91–6.
- 257 According to Khazanov this was typical for most nomadic societies. Khazanov 1984, pp. 120–1.
- 258 Hudson 1938, p. 22.
- 259 Barfield 1990, pp. 155–6.
- 260 Thereto he is inconsequent, as he also speaks of the 'political unit' of such groups.
- 261 Figure 10 represents such a territorially oriented, settled tribal group, which consisted of villages, and Figure 7 illustrates one village with mixed descent groups. See sixth section of Chapter 3.
- 262 One significant difference between tribal and non-tribal groups (for example, neighbourhood quarters) is not rooted in the existence or lack of co-residency, territoriality or political alliances, but linked to the question of whether the political integration of groups was performed by these groups themselves with the help of the flexible lineage system, genealogical thinking and forming of alliances, or whether tribes had submitted to centralised bureaucratic states which ascertained their political integration and collected taxes. This difference was often a gradual one, as tribesmen like the Uzbeks became part of a patrimonial administration without entirely losing their tribal institutions.
- 263 Poliakov 1980, pp. 116–7. Cf. Khazanov 1984, p. 153.
- 264 Abramzon 1990, pp. 205, 214–5. But also Il'iasov, one of the criticised authors, emphasised the mixed nature of residential groups and described its relation to forefather groups (Il'iasov 1955, pp. 43–9). See also Vinnikov 1957, p. 72.
- 265 Abramzon 1990, pp. 216–8; Poliakov 1980, p. 116. The excessive use of the term *patriarkhal'no-feodal'no* is based on the Marxist teleological view of history and social and political change. This view assumes that social relations result from the prevailing mode of production and from the ownership of the means of production. Thus kinship is regarded as linked to a 'tribal' (*rodovoi*) formation, where ownership of stock and pastures is commonly held and where, due to the undeveloped division of labour, the 'state' represented the interests of the whole 'tribal' community. Due to the development of the division of labour and the increasing difference in wealth, the 'state' becomes 'feudal', because the owners of the means of production monopolised political power according to their own interests. Thus politics became 'exploitative' and 'suppressive'. Since there is source evidence about economic inequality in all later historical societies, scholars like Potapov dated back this original form of 'tribal' society to the eighth or seventh century BC. Ironically he also admits that he does not have any source evidence about this society. As a result, Soviet scholars acknowledged empirical evidence about simultaneous kinship solidarity and economic inequality insofar as they referred to it as 'patriarchal-feudalism' where social consciousness survived its economic base. Thus the identification of individual, common or 'feudal' ownership of stock and/or pastures had far-reaching theoretical implications. See for example:

- Abramzon 1951, pp. 144–9; L. P. Potapov, 'O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniĭ u kochevykh narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana', in *Akademiia Nauk SSSR* 1955, pp. 17–42; B. F. Shakhmatov, 'O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniĭ u kochevykh narodov Kazakhstana', in *Akademiia Nauk SSSR* 1955, pp. 50–9; B. Baĭ bulatov, *Adamdardyn ang-sezimin-degi ötköndüin kaldyktaryn joiuu jönündö*, Frunze 1957, pp. 7–25; Zimanov 1960, pp. 29–71; V. M. Ploskikh, *Ocherki patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniĭ v iuzhnoi Kirgizii (50–70-e gody XIX v.)*, Frunze 1968. About the Marxist theory of tribe and state, see for example: St. C. Caton, 'Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power', in Houry and Kostiner 1991, pp. 74–85. A further bibliography can be found in his article. Cf. also E. Gellner, 'Foreword', in Khazanov 1984, pp. ix–xxv.
- 266 In his study of the Turkmen. Lorenz also does not sufficiently differentiate between residence and descent groups by interpreting the settling of nomads as a process of change from tribal to territorial community, as Soviet scholars used to do (R. Lorenz, 'Die Turkmenen. Zum historischen Schicksal eines mittelasiatischen Volkes', in E. von Mende [ed.] *Turkestan als historischer Faktor und politische Idee. Festschrift für Baymirza Hayit zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*, Cologne 1987, pp. 123–4, 130).
- 267 See: I. Svanberg, 'The Nomadism of Orta jüz Kazaks in Xinjiang 1911–1949', in L. Benson and I. Svanberg (eds) *The Kazaks of China. Essays on an Ethnic Minority*, Uppsala 1988, pp. 109–21; R. Dor and C. Naumann, *Die Kirghisen des Afghanischen Pamir*, Graz 1978, pp. 43–8; M. Nazif Shahrani, *The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan: Adaption to Closed Frontiers*, Seattle 1979.
- 268 Irons 1975, p. 51.
- 269 *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- 270 Kaufmann 1908, pp. 106–7.
- 271 Barfield 1990, p. 156.
- 272 Mouraviev 1823(a), p. 22; Karpov 1929(a), p. 20.
- 273 König 1962, p. 94.
- 274 Irons 1975, p. 58; Hudson 1938, p. 24.
- 275 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 524; *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, p. 468.
- 276 Irons 1975, p. 121–2.
- 277 Gullibef de Blokwill: 14-mesiachnyĭ plen` u turkmentsev. In *Vsemirnyĭ puteshestvennik*, St. Peterburg 1868/31, p. 24, quoted by: Dshikijew 1994, p. 12; Bacon 1958, p. 74; König 1962, p. 96; Krader 1966, p. 153; Irons 1975, pp. 121–2; Abramzon 1990, p. 171. On the other hand, different smaller groups could be absorbed by the dominant descent group because of long co-residence. In this case earlier descent affiliation was forgotten and those of the dominant group were overtaken. Thus Krader's asserted causal relationship that 'the fusion of clans and lineages caused the establishment of a common genealogy' (Krader 1966, pp. 156–63) did not take place automatically, and not in all cases. Krader postulated this, as he regarded tribal society to be rooted in kinship, patrilineage and descent genealogy in a too narrow way.
- 278 Some scholars also might use the term *political* in this context, if they inform their implied concept of politics by Schmitt dichotomy friend/enemy. (Cf. C. Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Berlin 1996 (1932).)

RESIDENTIAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT¹

The basic unit of residential communal commitment is the neighbourhood community. This community is called by different names in Central Asia. The most common term applied is mahallah (Uzbek: *mahalla*), which is also used in the Near East to refer to neighbourhood quarters in urban areas. *Guzar* is another, more specifically Central Asian term which designates wards in towns. *Qavm* is a third term which is used for neighbourhood communities. It is interesting to note that in Uzbek and Tajik one meaning of *qavm* refers to 'tribe', 'tribal group' and relatives. It is also applied to the mahallah as ward and religious community. In Khorezm the second meaning of *qavm* was emphasised when a group of farmsteads was called *machit-qavm* (mosque ward).²

As tribes and subtribal groups represented religious communities under the protection of common ancestors, so did the neighbourhood community in pre-revolutionary Central Asia. This religious community, however, was based on the devotion to Islam and on the acknowledgement of the demands of Islamic law (*sharia*) interpreted and spread by supporters of orthodox or school Islam (*Islam-i kitāb*).³

Membership could be acquired by consent of this group, if it agreed to a newcomer's purchase or construction of a house within its territory. The position of a newcomer was not defined in terms of kinship space or in relation to genealogies and descent groups. One became a full member by participating in the communal and religious life of the group and by leading an Islamic way of life.

As membership in a ward is based on residency and wards formed territorially defined communities, we call commitment to such groups *residential communal commitment*. In the following we discuss how neighbourhoods were organised in urban and rural settings, and how Islamic law shapes social relations within these quarters. Afterwards we discuss what role kinship relations played in these groups. Last but not least, we sketch the historical context of this form of communal commitment and its relation to tribal and non-tribal people in Central Asia.

Neighbourhood community

Krader proposed that we should regard the Central Asian city as a 'dense agricultural settlement (*qishloq*), interwoven with basic urban functions'.⁴ This comparison with Central Asian towns is not only relevant due to similar functional relations with their surroundings. Both could be walled and fortified and include permanent or temporary bazaars.⁵ It is also relevant with regard to internal community structures. As towns consisted of an increasing number of mahallahs depending on their size, *qishloqs* could include several wards as well. At the time of the tsarist conquest, Tashkent, one of the biggest towns in Central Asia, included 149 mahallahs which were located in four town districts.⁶ Large *qishloqs* could consist of three or more mahallahs, whereas smaller ones formed mahallahs themselves. Urgut, a *qishloq* near to Samarkand is said to have included thirteen mahallahs.⁷

In the nineteenth century mahallahs were neighbourhood communities which were inhabited by the *Sart* population.⁸ In urban areas the mahallah could be walled and have one or two gates. Access to it was only possible through these gates during the day, as they were closed at night. In such cases the mahallah was a small fortress that provided protection for its residents, who controlled access to its territory. If a mahallah had two gates, both could be linked via a large street, on both sides of which were the craftsmen's workshops. This was the trade centre of the mahallah, which sometimes also included a bazaar. Urban mahallahs originally monopolised the crafts and were closely interwoven with single professional guilds⁹, but they became more mixed in the nineteenth century.¹⁰

Small lanes (*tupiks*) connected the main street to the ground-floor houses and inner courts. In some of these lanes, close relatives lived, with houses linked by inner doors. The mahallah, however, was not a community of relatives, since people from different areas and professions could acquire a house and consequently the status of a resident: soldiers with their families could live there, like migrated families from other towns, people from the near countryside who established a second domicile, or long-established urban inhabitants.¹¹

The leader of both urban and rural mahallahs was the *oqsoqol* (Tajik: *arbob*) who was elected with assistance of the imam in the mosque. He was advised by respected elders and had some assistants (*poïkors*) for the implementation of his decisions. He was normally from a reputable family and maintained influence and authority in the mahallah due to his personal integrity and wealth. Although his election had to be acknowledged by the administration, he was a man of the mahallah and represented it externally. In case of internal or external disputes, he was contacted and he sought to settle conflicts peacefully. Due to his authoritative influence, members could not easily ignore his opinion, advice or decisions.¹²

Residency within the mahallah was based on consent. Thus the sale and acquisition of houses were restricted. Although Islamic laws concerning

neighbours made the free sale and purchase of property only to be dependent on the approval of the bordering neighbours, this limitation was extended to the whole mahallah in Central Asia. Due to *adat*, not only neighbours – as *sharia* demands – but all inhabitants of the mahallah had a right of first refusal. If someone had disregarded *adat* and had sold a house according to *sharia*, the new resident would have faced strict disapproval and the rejection of neighbourhood assistance. Thus a willing purchaser normally informed the *oqsoqol* about his plans of sale, as a potential external purchaser would ask for permission to buy a house and to become a member of the mahallah. This permission was granted, if the honesty and uprightness of the newcomers could be confirmed.¹³

The communal ties were quite tight. This was not only due to the necessity of common maintenance and cleaning of water reservoirs (*hovuz*) and other common facilities, but also to the numerous communal celebrations and ceremonies. Many people of the mahallah were invited on occasions of family ceremonies like circumcision, marriage or memorial days. It was impossible to refuse such an invitation, as it was compulsory to contribute one's share to the celebrations. Participation in celebrations was also expected from temporary inhabitants.¹⁴

Every mahallah tended to have its own mosque, cemetery and communal buildings. Even though the buildings might have belonged to a person or to a religious foundation, this infrastructure was regarded as communal property which was used by all residents. The mosque was of great importance. It was the public place where people met, exchanged news and made decisions. In towns with strong Persian influence, like Bukhara, it was the most important public place, since the teahouse (*choikhona*) did not exist there, unlike in Tashkent or in the towns of the Ferghana valley. Nevertheless, among some Farsi-speaking *Sarts* there existed the *olavkhona* (house of fire) where male adults of the mahallah regularly met.¹⁵

The mullah was the religious leader of the mahallah, who led family ceremonies like circumcision, marriage, funerals and memorial days. Participation in religious life was compulsory. There existed often a *rais* who observed residents' attendance at the first prayer. If someone failed to turn up without an adequate excuse, he would face harsh criticism or even could be beaten.¹⁶

The mahallah was also the place where junior family members learnt to show respect to older ones and where the family head disposed, as patriarch, of the family property. He decided on the marriage matters of his sons and daughters, who often did not know their spouses. His decisions had to be obeyed even by his married sons. Women often led a secluded life at home.¹⁷

Wards usually had at least one *maktab*, where basic Islamic knowledge was transmitted and proper behaviour (*adab*) was taught. In towns like Bukhara and Samarkand, mahallahs could also include Islamic seminars (*madrassahs*), where residents and people from the countryside who also lived in these *madrassahs* became students of a professor (*mudarris*).

In mahallahs residential ties were also strong, because the neighbourhood quarter was a collective unit of taxation. It was the *oqsoqol* who was responsible for timely tax collection. Through this he gained some extra income which could be spent on mahallah affairs. If a person was in need, the *oqsoqol* could grant financial support.

As the *oqsoqol* was normally contacted to assist the preparation of family celebrations, he and the elders were invited into the house of the family concerned. There they would fix all organisational and financial details of these celebrations. In the case of a death, the assistance of the *oqsoqol* was especially important. In all these cases the *oqsoqol* ordered and paid for the necessary items and presented the bill at a later date. It was up to his judgement to what extent poor families were financially assisted.¹⁸

Due to the tight communal ties and the relative seclusion from the outside, residents knew best their neighbourhood quarter and those leaving there. Hostilities between mahallahs could also occur from time to time.¹⁹

The impact of Islamic law (*sharia*)

In contrast to some agricultural Turkmen *obas* or Kazakh *auyls*, residents of mahallahs in towns and non-tribal *qishloqs*²⁰ did not trace genealogies or acknowledge bonds of solidarity and political affiliation with neighbouring tribal groups. In the river oases it was often that nomadic tribal groups appropriated irrigated land or built new *ariqs* in order to settle in villages. This could lead to the loss of their tribal affiliation and submit them to stronger Islamic and state influence. Tribalism could remain strong among such villagers, but tended to decline as far as kadis or state officials were able to replace or modify customary law. The transformation of communal action orientation from kinship to residency and neighbourhood became most visible in the spheres of penal and hereditary law.

In contrast to *adat*, Islamic penal law is based on the principle of personal responsibility.²¹ Thus all *hadd* offences demand the personal punishment of the offender: adultery among married people is punished by stoning of both adulterers; defamers, due to false accusation of adultery, and unmarried adulterers receive eighty or hundred lashes with a whip respectively, whereas the consumption of alcohol is punished by forty to eighty lashes. In addition *sharia* acknowledges high standards for the protection of property. The sincerity of this protection becomes obvious in the prosecution of theft and robbery, with severe *hadd* punishments. In the first case the offence is punished by the cutting off of the right hand and in case of recurrence, the left foot. The second offence is punished by the severing of both hand and foot.²²

Unlike in tribal villages, robbery, theft and adultery by one member did not affect large descent groups, but only the guilty person was liable and faced punishment. In cases of homicide, *sharia* limited the right of retaliation. Theoretically, only the closest male relative was allowed to retaliate

against the offender under the supervision of a mufti, after being found guilty in an ordinary trial.²³ Thus kinship no longer held any obligations of revenge or expectations of liability of related kinsmen. If the victim or the relatives renounced their right and demanded blood money in cases of mutilation or homicide, this claim normally involved only close kinsmen on both sides, and not descent groups of villages or even several villages.²⁴

Nevertheless, *sharia* norms were not respected everywhere in river oases. Uzbek villagers could often be influenced by *ishans* without being committed to school Islam, which tried to spread commitment to Islamic law. Thus they did not acknowledge *kadis*, but had their own *oqsoqols* who decided about disputes. Criminal offences which involved different villages had to be brought before the emir or his representatives, the *beg* or the *amlokdor*.²⁵ Only the emir could decide on life-and-death matters. The *kadi's* independence was only acknowledged in civil affairs, and not everywhere. Some Uzbek villages which acknowledged *ishans* still continued to deal with their civil affairs by reference to *adat*. According to Karmysheva, Uzbek tribes were affiliated as *murids* to particular *ishan* who kept written genealogies of their tribes. If tribal elders doubted the affiliation and closeness of other tribal groups, they would try to discover of which *ishan* families concerned tribal leaders became *murids*.²⁶ In this way they could define duties and fix responsibilities with regard to other tribal groups.

Penal judicial protection of property was linked to property rights. Tribal agriculturists held individual and common usage rights of wells and *ariqs* which determined access to land and pastures and which were partly submitted to annual redistribution. In contrast, Islamised non-tribal villagers approved private property (*mulk*), which could be bought, sold, donated or transferred by will. This could lead to accumulation of wealth. But accumulation was also quite limited. As Islamic hereditary law prescribed division of property after the death of the father between his wife, his daughters and sons (in contrast to *adat*), large and small estates were spilt up into minor ones. This caused the parcelling-out of land.²⁷ It also motivated married sons to move out to a different mahallah, if his native mahallah lacked space. Thus both fragmentation of property and transferable property rights discouraged kinship ties and promoted mixed neighbourhood quarters.²⁸

Kinship and residency

Kinship ties could be important in various ways within the mahallah. First, religious estates (*vaqf*) usually remained under the control of *khoja* or sheikh families. Donations to religious estates could not be split, as property which was transformed into such estates became immune to Islamic hereditary law. Thus sheikhs and *khojas* became heads of family dynasties which had established tax-free philanthropic estates and religious shrines. In this way they could accumulate much influence and wealth, which they spent

partly for charitable purposes.²⁹ Although such religious dynasties might be quite influential in local or even regional affairs, they nevertheless did not promote communal commitment based on kinship.³⁰ In contrast, they advanced Islamic precepts of *sharia*, since they financed Islamic education and Islamic judicial scholarship. Their estates often formed the centres of mahallahs which offered various services to the residents and provided some infrastructure commonly used by the inhabitants.

Kinship ties also remained strong where the splitting-up and purchase of land were economically impossible due to its extreme scarcity.³¹ This was the case in the mountainous eastern provinces of the emirate, where Ismaili Shiites and other dwellers subsisted upon agriculture and herd stocking. Due to the lack of fertile land, petty family estates were indivisible and headed by family patriarchs, who made decisions about all issues with more or less participation of the other adult members. Such households could include up to fifty persons. Tillage and stock breeding were done together. The household could not be split, as fields were not saleable. After the death of the father, his sons would lead the household, the eldest becoming head of the family. Several such households formed blocs of the village community, who held collective usage or property rights on water resources, pastures, hayfields and woods. The people of such villages were mostly close relatives.³² These extended family groupings were often called *avlods*, to which – according to Poliakov – the history of the mahallah should go back to Tajikistan.³³ However, there remains some doubt as to whether these *avlods* should really be regarded as mahallahs. In mountainous areas of Eastern Bukhara, villages rather consisted of several *avlods*.

Third, there were many extended families who lived closely together in the mahallahs. They often lived in small houses which bordered on each other and were linked by small doors. On the other hand they used the residents' right of first refusal to obtain new accommodation for married sons.

Although kinship relations played a role within the mahallah, membership of it did not depend on kinship, but on residency. The importance of this principle was most visible in the fact that family feasts did not only involve relatives, but all residents of a mahallah. Whereas in tribal societies only kinsfolk participated in family feasts, circumcisions, marriages and funerals concerned all residents of the mahallah. They had to contribute financially or materially to such feasts. They were expected to take part in them as well.

Tribal and residential communal commitment

We mentioned that residential groups which relied on neighbourhood relations naturally included groups of close kinsmen, but group solidarity was not based on kinship, as was more the case among Central Asian Muslim tribesmen. The Islamisation of society based on school Islam entails a high

potential for the transformation of kin-based to neighbourhood-based communal commitment. Thus the erosion of tribal communal commitment is linked to the extent to which *sharia* is able to replace customary law in domains like hereditary or penal law. This relation should be kept in mind when the problem of political order is analysed in the following chapters.

The interesting question is how the change from tribal to residential communal commitment occurred among settled tribesmen like the Uzbeks, who resided in villages named after their former winter quarters. Due to lack of research, we can only give an approximate answer.

In Transoxiana the transformation from tribal *qishloqs* to residential *qishloqs* was a gradual one, and did not occur everywhere simultaneously. Many intermediate stages of detribalisation and residentialisation of communal commitment were possible. An Uzbek tribe could acknowledge the khan as supreme owner of all land, but could actually possess its tribal territories by owing military service exclusively to the ruler. Further, it could be urged to pay an overall annual tribute for the whole tribal land, which was collected by the tribal leaders themselves. If the state's influence increased, villages became units of tax liability. As a further step, the khan could grant certificates on individual property, whose holders had to pay the prescribed land taxes. In addition responsibility for conflict regulation could switch from tribal institutions to state officials or even *kadis* who enforced *sharia* norms. Thus it is difficult to say when tribal commitment became a residential one in the process of detribalisation, centralisation of state structures and Islamisation by school Islam.³⁴

We hold the view that Uzbek tribes ceased to exist when state structures took over tribal duties of conflict regulation and became able to acknowledge personal property and to protect the personal security of inhabitants. Thus tribal leadership had to give way to state officials who maintained order and organised taxation. In this process of change, kinship and customary law could remain important locally, where *sharia* norms spread in a selective way. There local tribal leaders could keep some influence.³⁵

In southern Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz tribesmen could also become *Sart* and get settled in mahallahs, as did some Kazakh tribesmen in the Sir Darya valley. In comparison to Uzbek tribesmen, this was the exception rather than the rule.³⁶

Conclusion

So far our analysis has aimed at explaining communal commitment structures in pre-tsarist Central Asia. To this end we have analysed tribal communal commitment based on customary law, and have opposed it to residential communal commitment, which was rooted in Islamic law. Tribal communal commitment emerges as a very complex social phenomenon, which we have tried to disentangle by analysing the various levels of descent and consenting

groups, which should not be intermingled. We have also tried to define the tribal units of Central Asian tribesmen by critically evaluating nineteenth-century sources and Soviet ethnographic research. This should help us to locate the Central Asian tribes which represented friendship groups based on communities of law and peace. On the other hand, we have described residential commitment structures in non-tribal villages and urban wards.

In both cases we have outlined the main features of penal, hereditary and matrimonial Islamic law, and described leadership roles. The differences in judicial orientation are obvious: whereas Islamic law is based on personal responsibility and serious offences are punished by lashes, mutilation or the death penalty, most offences of this kind only led to the payment of blood money among tribesmen. Tribal hereditary law was agnatic only, and acknowledged ultimogeniture. In contrast, Islamic hereditary law prescribed the division of property among daughters and sons after the death of the father. Tribal land was held collectively, and shares were submitted to regular redistribution among settled, able-bodied tribesmen. However, Islamic law acknowledged personal property rights in land and rights in water shares, which could be purchased or sold, leased or donated. These differences have to be kept in mind, when the impact of the Islamic patrimonial state structures on tribal commitment is assessed, and the ways in which Islamised tribesmen became allied to patrimonial rulers are discussed.

There existed also another decisive difference between tribal and residential commitment, however. Whereas tribesmen were able to secure their own political integration, residential villages were usually not. *Sart* mahallahs in rural and urban settings depended on some kind of government which maintained order. Thus the political integration of villages and towns based on residential communal commitment relied on centralised power-structures which could be of different kinds.

Having analysed communal commitment structures, it is now possible to focus our study on the problem of political integration of groups of solidarity, as Roy calls them. In the next two chapters we analyse different kinds of political power structures which integrated politically those communities based on tribal or residential commitment, and we examine their impact on communal commitment. For this purpose we will refer to historical events only if they help to illuminate these structures.

Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this chapter has been published as 'Mahallah and Kinship Relations. A Study of Residential Communal Commitment Structures in Central Asia of the Nineteenth Century', in *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 20, 2001/1, pp. 97-106.
- 2 Kapitan Girshfeld and General-maïor Galkin, *Voенно-statisticheskoe opisanie Khivinskogo oazisa, chast' 2*, Tashkent 1903, p. 25; *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 276; V. I. Pogorel'skiaiï , *Ocherki èkonomikheskoï i politicheskoi istorii Khivinskogo khanstva kontsa XIX i nachala XX vekov*, Leningrad 1968, p. 37; Poliakov 1992, p.

- 77; O. Roy, *La Nouvelle Asie Centrale ou la fabrication des nations*, Paris 1997, pp. 52–3 (English: *The New Central Asia*, London and New York 2000).
- 3 This term refers to orthodox forms of Islam and is used by Will Myer, who opposes it to what he calls *Islam-i Halq* (folk Islam). By using this terminology he seeks to avoid misleading dichotomies in Central Asian studies, like ‘official Islam’ and ‘parallel Islam’, which represent the perspective of rulers who aim at controlling religion (cf. W. Myer, *Islam and Colonialism: Western Perspectives on Soviet Asia*, Curzon Press: London 2002). The relation between school Islam and folk Islam is complex, as both might be linked to Sufi brotherhoods. On the other hand, customs of folk Islam might or might not contradict the demands of *sharia*. Sufism usually carries orthodox concepts of Islam based on *sharia*, and Sufi brotherhoods often successfully used the *murid* organisation to spread school Islam. Nevertheless, *ishans* could be highly appreciated among tribesmen who continued to obey tribal customary law and who had only accepted Islamic legal concepts in hereditary and matrimonial affairs, as was the case among Turkmen for centuries. For the literature, see Chapter 1, second section, note 102.
- 4 Krader 1966, p. 219.
- 5 Radloff 1882 (II), pp. 431–3; Krader 1966, pp. 164–5.
- 6 N. A. Maev, ‘Aziatskii Tashkent’, in Maev 1876, pp. 262–5; A. I. Dobrosmyslov, *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoiashchem. Istoricheskii ocherk*, Tashkent 1912, pp. 42–3.
- 7 Narody Srednei Azii I, p. 274; N. A. Kisliakov, *Patriarkhalno-feodal’nye otnosheniia sredi osedlogo sel’skogo naseleniia Bukharskogo khanstva v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka*, Moscow and Leningrad 1962, pp. 58, 156.
- 8 In the nineteenth century *Sart* was used in various ways and was attributed to people who called themselves Tajiks, Farsigus, Uzbeks, Chaghatays or used terms of local or Islamic affiliation. Here *Sart* is applied to the non-tribal rural and urban settled population of Persian and Turkish tongues. This use, however, does not aim at concealing that in some areas, as in the *bekliks* of Shahr-i Sabz and Karshi, the term *Sart* was not used at all. Instead, ‘Tajik’ was used for rural and urban settlers without tribal background there, independent of their Turkish or Persian tongue (cf. A. D. Grebenkin, ‘Tadzhiki’, in V. N. Trotskii (ed.) *Russkii Turkestan. Sbornik izdanyĭ po povodu politekhnicheskoi vystavki, vyp. II – Stat’i po etnografii, tekhnike, sel’skomu khoziaĭstvu, i estestvennoi istorii*, Moscow 1872, pp. 1–3; B. Kh. Karmysheva, ‘etnicheskie i territorial’nye gruppy naseleniia severo-vostochnoi chasti Kashka-Dar’inskoi oblasti Uz. SSR.’, in *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta etnografii AN SSSR, t. XXXIII*, Moscow 1960, pp. 52–6; M. M. Ėrmatov, ‘K istorii proiskhozhdeniia slova “Sart”’, in *Sbornik iz istorii Uzbekistana. Nauchnykh trudov, tom 146*, Tashkent 1975, pp. 133–41).
- In the literature the *Sart* population is regarded as being bilingual. This is true for urban areas, but less typical for rural settlers (cf. e.g. Khanykov 1843, p. 71; N. P. Ostroumov, *Sarty. etnograficheskie materialy*, Tashkent 1890, p. 11; Olufsen 1911, p. 283). What *Sart* people shared was their commitment to school Islam and *sharia*, in contrast to the customary law of Uzbek and *Qipchoq* tribesmen. About the socio-political semantics of *Sart*, see: L. Kostenko, *Turkestanskii kraĭ. Opyt voenno-statisticheskogo obozreniia Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga. Material dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii, tom I*, St Petersburg 1880, pp. 352–75; Ostroumov 1890; Olufsen 1911, pp. 283–4; V. V. Bartol’d. ‘Sart’, *Sochineniia*, vol. II, part 2, Moscow 1964, pp. 527–9; Bacon 1966, pp. 17–18; Y. Bregel, ‘The Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva’, *Journal of Asian History*, vol. 12, 1978/12, pp. 120–151; B. G. Fragner, ‘Probleme der Nationswerdung der Usbeken und Tadschiken’, in A. Kappeler, G. Simon and G. Brunner (eds) *Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien. Identität – Politik – Widerstand*,

- Cologne 1989, pp. 19–34 (English: A. Kappeler, G. Simon, G. Brunner and E. Allworth (eds) *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, Durham NC 1994); G. Hausmann, 'Türksprachen', in H. Bauer, A. Kappeler and B. Roth (eds) *Die Nationalitäten des russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897 – Quellenkritische Dokumentation und Datenhandbuch, Band A*, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 259–62; I. Baldauf, 'The Making of the Uzbek Nation', *CdMRS*, vol. 32, 1991/1–3, pp. 79–82; O. M. Bronnikova, 'Sarty v étnicheskoï istorii Sredneï Azii (k postanovke problemy)', in *Étnosy i étnicheskie protsessy. Pamiati R. F. Itsa*, Moscow 1993, pp. 151–8; A. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1998, pp. 199–209.
- 9 Poliakov 1980, pp. 120–2.
- 10 O. A. Sukhareva, *Kvartal'naia obshchina pozdnefeodal'nogo goroda Bukhary (v svyazi s istorieï kvartalov)*, Moscow 1976, pp. 13–7; L. I. Rempel', *Dalekoe i blizkoe*, Tashkent 1982, pp. 115–21.
- 11 Sukhareva 1976, pp. 13, 18.
- 12 'Zapiski P. I. Demezona', in *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve (Otchety P. I. Demezona i I. V. Vitkevicha)*, Moskau 1983 (1834), p. 57; Sukhareva 1976, p. 35; M. Abramov, *Guzary Samarkanda*, Tashkent, 1989, pp. 3–5; Mustafina 1992, pp. 29–30.
- 13 Sukhareva 1976, pp. 17–18. The author could still observe this limited access to residency in the older mahallahs and more recently established ones in modern cities like Tashkent.
- 14 Cf. Maev 1876, p. 263.
- 15 R. R. Rakhimov, *Muzhskie doma' v traditsionnoï kul'ture tadjikov*, Leningrad 1990, pp. 27–37, 100–1, 108–11.
- 16 H. Khanykov, 'Gorodskoe upravlenie v Sredneï Azii', in *Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennikh del*, St Petersburg 1844, 5, pp. 346–8; F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross, *The Heart of Asia. A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times*, London 1899 (reprinted in *The Middle East Collection*, New York 1973) p. 381; Maev 1876, pp. 276–7; Ostroumov 1890, pp. 38–9; N. Mordvinov, 'Sud u osedlykh inorodtsev Turkeстана', *RV* 1899/6, pp. 708–9; Sukhareva 1976, pp. 22–3.
- 17 Cf. *Narody Sredneï Azii I*, pp. 324–5.
- 18 Sukhareva 1976, pp. 36–7.
- 19 O. A. Sukhareva, 'Traditsionnoe sopernichestvo mezhdu chastiami gorodov v Uzbekistane (konets X IX – nachalo XX v.)', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta étnografii AN SSR, vyp. XXX*, Moscow 1958, pp. 128–9.
- 20 According to Radloff, *qishloq* originally meant 'winter quarters', which recalls the originally nomadic mode of life of settled Uzbeks (Radloff 1884 [II], p. 431). In modern Uzbek, winter quarters are called *qishlovs*.
- 21 Penal Islamic law included five offences that lead to *hadd*-punishments: These were adultery (*zinā*), defamation due to adultery (*qadhf*), consumption of alcohol (*shurb al-khamr*), theft (*sariqa*) and highway robbery (*qaf' at-tariq*) (Dilger 1984, pp. 186–97; Lomakin 1897, p. 88; Durdyev 1969, pp. 18–20).
- 22 Cf. Chapter 3, second section.
- 23 Cf. H. M. Fazil Khan, *Tarikh-i-Man azili-Buhara*, Srinagar 1981 (1813), p. 51; Logofet 1911 (I), pp. 318–19.
- 24 Renunciation was not possible if robbery had led to homicide, since homicide belonged to the class of offence which only harmed human rights (*haqq adami*).
- 25 Logofet 1909, pp. 58–65.
- 26 Karmysheva 1960(a), p. 51.

RESIDENTIAL COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

- 27 One of the most systematic studies of hereditary law and the division of property is N. A. Kisliakov, *Nasledovanie i razdel imushchestva u narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (XIX – nachalo XX v.)*, Leningrad 1977; see also: Izraztsov 1897, pp. 68–70.
- 28 In Soviet terminology this change was described as an evolutionary process from 'patriarchal family' to more 'progressive' family relations within 'feudalism', which should have opened new exploitative opportunities for the property owner. See for example Poliakov 1980, pp. 113–15.
- 29 About shrines in Central Asia and literature, see McChesney 1996, pp. 71–115.
- 30 Even today some descendants of *khoja* families show difficulties in fully identifying with nationalities of a tribal background. For example, residents of Almaty who are descendants of *khojas* do not believe themselves to be Kazakhs, although they received the status of a Kazakh nationality in Soviet times (cf. H. Eitzen, 'Refiguring Ethnicity through Kazakh genealogies', *Nationality Papers*, vol. 26, 1998/3, p. 443).
- 31 S. Dzhabbarov, 'Shariat, semëinoe i obychnoe pravo v Uzbekistane: istoriia i sovremennost' (opyt sotsial'no-pravovogo issledovaniia), Tashkent 1996, pp. 68–9.
- 32 Poliakov 1980, pp. 112–13; Kisliakov 1977, pp. 68–9.
- 33 Poliakov 1992, p. 76.
- 34 Soviet historians and ethnographers tried to describe the Uzbeks of the nineteenth century as a sedentary people (see for example: G. E. Markov, 'Les sociétés traditionnelles d'Asie Centrale', *CdMRS*, XXXI/2–3, 1990, pp. 397–402). In this way they identify the Turkic-speaking *Sarts* as Uzbeks. This identification conceals the fact that many rural Uzbeks were rather tribesmen than subjects of the emir or khan in the middle of the nineteenth century.
- 35 Cf. G. Rasuly-Paleczek, 'Beg, Moyzafid und Arbab: Das politische System der Chechka-Usbeken und der afghanische Zentralstaat', in Gingrich *et al.* 1993, pp. 89–105; G. Rasuly-Paleczek, 'Kinship and Politics Among the Uzbeks of Northeastern Afghanistan', in I. Baldauf and M. Friedrich (eds) *Bamberger Zentralasienstudien. Konferenzakten ESCAS IV – Bamberg 8–12 Oktober 1991 (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen – Band 185)*, Berlin 1994, pp. 11–28.
- 36 Abramzon 1951, p. 141.

PRE-TSARIST TRIBAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION¹

Pastoral nomads imposed theoretical problems on Soviet Marxists, since nomadic-pastoral societies were neither class-based, nor did there exist an elaborate division of labour. Due to the common ownership of pastures, they also lacked the institution of property as an origin of social inequality and as a means of 'exploitation'.² Nevertheless, Marxist scholars described 'class struggle' and 'exploitation' within tribal society, by overemphasising the limited role of political and military leadership and by asserting 'class consciousness' as one dominant fracture between tribesmen with sufficient or abundant stock and those without.³ It was most difficult to uphold this theoretical outlook with regard to acephalous tribal structures. Cephaly was perceived as a political phenomenon rooted in 'class interest' of the owners of the means of production. Its emergence was understood as being linked to the appearance of state structures and government officials who were the owners of property themselves or protected such owners. Thus acephaly was only possible in pre-political, i.e. 'stateless' societies. Scholars like Potapov regarded this first society as a tribe based on kinship community, collective ownership and communal households which might have existed in the eighth or seventh century BC in the southern Altai mountains only for a short time because of its intrinsic tendency towards social inequality.⁴ In this view acephalous political order is analytically impossible and contradictory.

Nevertheless, in Central Asia an acephalous political order existed among Turkman tribesmen, on which we shall focus next.⁵

Turkman acephalous political order⁶

We have already mentioned above that Turkman tribes did not develop powerful authority roles among male adults.⁷ Political authority was neither hereditary, nor could it be appropriated by military talent, wealth or religious reputation. Wealthy tribesmen, military leaders (*serdars*) or saints of holy tribes (*övlats*) were all capable of generating high esteem, but they

could not turn their reputation into political leadership. If a wealthy group *iashuly* had tried to command his tribal followers, he soon would have lost his reputation and faced disobedience.⁸

Acephaly

Turkman village elders could enjoy some communal authority and get involved in cases of dispute between family groups. Distinguished elders were regarded both as heads of the forefather groups and headmen of the *obas* who represented their group to the outside. In this way heads of strong forefather groups could also 'lead' subtribal groups. The office of the group *iashuly* did not imply any special privileges and authorisations, however. The headman had no power to make decisions or to fix obligations of the group, but he depended on its consent. It was the *maslakhat*, the elders' assembly of one or more forefather groups, which deliberated and decided about economic, penal and political matters of the *oba*. The consenting decision of the *maslakhat* represented the condensed public opinion of the group which balanced the usurping ambitions of single tribesmen.⁹

Neither did the position of the *serdar* constitute political leadership. Turkman leaders of predatory excursions organised raids into Khorasan, Khivan or Bukharan territories, and could temporarily unite up to 1,000 and more armed horsemen. Successful raid leaders were experienced, audacious and familiar with routes and places like those in Khorasan. They started an *alaman* on informing the able-bodied *oba*-members about a planned raid and about the place and time of departure. Whoever wanted to participate and possessed quick horses, met at the defined place or joined him on the way.¹⁰ During the campaign the *serdar* commanded the life and death of his followers, but this power ceased to exist after the raiders had shared the booty and returned to their different *obas*. No authority relations were established.¹¹

Hence Turkmen used to say that they were a 'people without head' and admitted that they did not want to have one, since among them every one was his own master.¹² They did not like to obey the commands of others and were offended when someone tried to do so.¹³

Some scholars like Elisabeth Bacon argue that Turkman saints (*ishans*) were politically more influential than the tribal elders.¹⁴ Bregel also underlines the political influence of *ishans*, and mentions some cases where *ishans* could influence the decisions of *maslakhats*.¹⁵ We should not deduce from this political influence any enduring political authority relations, however. Neither these *ishans*, nor *iashulys* could have kept their limited influence, if they had tried to become political leaders disregarding customary law. When *ishans* became politically active, they did so often as mediators between inimical groups. They best could perform such missions, since their life and property were sacrosanct to inimical Turkman tribesmen.¹⁶

Here one might object that political order would not be possible if there was no kind of authority and obedience which checked individual arbitrariness and excess. This is doubtless true. Turkmen also were 'ruled' by a sovereign, but their 'khan' was invisible, yet nevertheless very powerful. 'He' was called *däp* or *adat*, and Turkman tribesmen obeyed what *däp* demanded, and detested what it ruled out.

Grodekov confirmed that the power of *däp* was so strong among Turkmen that they regarded anyone's attempt to change the old customs as a criminal whom they forced to obey the law or drove out of their community.¹⁷

One of the basic principles of *däp* was the political equality of simple tribesmen, elders and chiefs. Only decisions based on *däp* were held to be binding and had to be obeyed. Due to this equality, decisions had to be built on the consent of the group. Therefore decisions of the *maslakhat* and not of a leader were authoritative, since the assembly represented the mutual consent of the group. Nobody would have dared to disobey the common decision of the *maslakhat*.¹⁸ It was important that all concerned people agreed to decisions, and if agreement was not yet reached, meetings were prolonged or decisions postponed, as Grodekov remarked:

In cases of disagreement an assembly was held about the same matter three days later, hoping to find a common base for consent between the disputants. If the later meeting was not successful, the question was considered to be not solved and deferred for some time. When a distinctive majority supported a particular decision of public importance, the meeting was prolonged for three additional days. In case of the minority's persistence in their view, the case can only be settled through public pressure of the whole tribe.¹⁹

As a result, the commands of leaders would only be obeyed if they conformed to *däp*. If a leader had violated customary law, he would be immediately deprived of his power.

Due to *däp*, the influence of leaders and the *maslakhat* was limited and specific. The *maslakhat* did not decide in all matters. For example, the council only dealt with cases of vendetta after the successful flight of the assassin. Avengers were not obliged to consult the *maslakhat*, but regarded the immediate revenge as their genuine right and duty.²⁰ Turkman homicides could sometimes escape vendetta by the payment of blood money. Unlike among Kara-Kalpaks, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, Turkmen had to pay the same *khun* for each killed tribesmen. Thus the equal *khuns* reflected the egalitarianism among Turkman tribesmen.²¹

The above discussion of raids has already indicated that Turkman leadership was situational and could not be appropriated. Extensive authority was only delegated when the defence of one's own territory afforded it. This was

especially the case in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Turkman tribes faced the Russian advance in Central Asia and pressure from Iran. In this situation experienced and successful *serdars* were elected as political leaders and were called khans. According to Abd-us-Sattar-Kadi, Oraz Khan was the first well known *Teke* leader who became khan.²² His authority emerged from his successful occupation of the Merv oasis, which drove the *Saryk* and *Salyr* out of their land in the early 1830s.²³ The influence of his successor Kushid-Khan from the *Teke Beg* confederacy arose from his victory over the Khivan army in 1855, as Nur Verdi Khan from the *Vekil* federation was elected as khan of the Akhal oasis after he had successfully united the *Gökleng*, *Iomut* and *Teke* federations to defeat the governor of Bujnurd, Jafar Kuli Khan, three years later.²⁴ Nevertheless, his influence was limited and he could only prevent his tribesmen from raiding Bukharan or Persian territories by regularly distributing money among them.²⁵

In comparison to the Kazakh hordes, Turkmen understood and perceived khanship differently. This office was neither hereditary nor was it linked to Chingizid descent. It could not be appropriated, but relied on the delegation of authority by the tribesmen. According to Grodekov, Turkmen regarded their khan rather as the principal servant of the whole community.²⁶ He was not an absolute monarch, but a leader subject to recall. The assembly which elected the khan could also impeach him. As the eldest of the assembly said after the vote 'You are khan!', he could similarly say at the next meeting 'You are no longer khan!'²⁷ Khans like Nur Verdi knew about the delegated character of their power, since he wrote in a letter to the Persian Governor of Bujnurd:

All the population of the Republic (Jum-Gurie) of Akhal from one end to the other, are united and have with one accord in public assembly given the supreme power over the country [to me].²⁸

In this way Turkmen also used other titles like *vekil*, *batyr* or *beg*, which indicated noble descent, rank and leadership positions among other Turkish tribesmen. Among Turkmen these titles, however, had no special or uniform meaning and could be held by representatives of *obas* as of whole tribes.²⁹

Political integration

Political order based on consent was problematic where tribesmen formed minority and majority groupings. I have already mentioned this problem on the local level. Political order demanded some extent of obedience, obedience required consent, and consent must be shared to inform obedience. But how was it possible that majority groupings did not dominate minority groups and that in cases of conflict the interests of both sides were considered?

The Turkman solution, and that of many other acephalous, tribes was to form tribal confederations and political alliances which constituted dualistically balanced segmentary political orders.³⁰ The basic principle of segmentary political orders was quite simple.³¹ Tribesmen, whose political orientations were directed towards peace-keeping, the protection of resources and the maintenance of some kind of stability, formed political alliances or tribal federations with those groups which suited best the realisation of these aims under the prevailing circumstances. Genealogical thinking and ties provided the shared mental infrastructure to form such alliances.

Political stability emerged from the interpenetration of solidary and political orientations. Thus communal commitment was extended to the political sphere. This implied the duty to assist mutually in disputes and to maintain peaceful relations, as long as an alliance endured. In Central Asia political orientations of acephalous tribesmen led to two types of political order: the checkerboard order and an order of segmentary opposition.

Checkerboard order

A checkerboard political order existed among the Gurgan *Iomut* along the Russian-Iranian border, at least since the 1880s. Whether this or a similar alliance pattern existed before, is not known.³² Nevertheless the dual division between the tribal federation of the *Chony* and *Sheref* resulted from the tribal reshuffle after the Russian conquest of Turkmenistan. This structure could still be observed in the 1960s, and it is Irons' merit to have systematically studied it.³³

The *Chony* and *Sheref* formed two tribal federations, whose members were inimical to each other. This implied that disputes between both groupings were not negotiated peacefully, as occurred within these units. Raids for livestock were the usual means to recompense for damage or losses suffered. These raids were answered by counter-raids at a similar level. Few people were killed during these hostilities. But when homicide occurred, the seven-generation rule, which defines the *bir ata* groups of blood liability, was not applied. As a result, every member of the inimical tribe could become a target of revenge. Also the rule that a vengeance killing satisfied the blood debt of a homicide and restored peaceful relations was not acknowledged between *iagys*.³⁴

Despite these enduring hostilities, fighting and warfare between parts of the two federations were relatively rare. This was so due the checkerboard-like alliance pattern between territorially neighbouring tribes. One or two tribes always had inimical tribes as neighbours, which were on good terms with each other. Thus we get two alliances of tribes which mutually share borders with inimical neighbours (see Figure 11).³⁵

PRE-TSARIST TRIBAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION




Figure 11 Location of Sheref and Chony tribes of the Gurgan Iomut, Irons 1975, p. 64.

When groupings of one tribe started a raid, they were not only opposed by the raided, but in case of emergency also by all the allied tribes of the latter. This materiality ensured reciprocity of retaliations and hindered a full escalation of hostilities. Such alliance patterns were the more stable, the more balanced the seizure and territories of tribes were. In the case of the *Iomut* it was a quite stable political order, since both confederacies included approximately the same number of *obas*: 129 *Sheref obas* balanced 119 *Chony obas*.³⁶

Further research has to be done to determine whether other Turkman tribes also formed such alliance patterns in the nineteenth century. This will not be an easy question, since sources are not too 'loud' about the internal dimension of dualistic tribal confederacies. Nevertheless, it was typical of Turkman confederacies that members of one tribe were not allowed to enter their neighbouring ones.³⁷ This is not only possible due to the checkerboard order, as I will show below.

Order of segmentary opposition

The origin and implications of the dualistic tribal organisation – as it prevailed among the Kyrgyz, Kara-Kalpak, *Iomut* or *Teke* – were controversially discussed among Soviet ethnographers. Scholars like Zhdanko and Abramzon suggested that these structures might have served to regulate marriage relations between originally exogamic tribes. According to this view, these structures survived their original function when exogamy ceased to exist.³⁸ Other researchers emphasised the military significance of this structural dualism.³⁹

Today the first view appears to be wrong due to its mistaken assumption that tribes have to be exogamous, which is, for example, rarely the case among nomadic people of the Middle East. The second standpoint is doubtless more relevant, since opposed tribal federations could form short-lived alliances to defend their territories against outsiders or to start an attack. However, it was often not sufficiently acknowledged that the dualistic political organisation of tribesmen differed considerably between those with and those without significant cephalous structures.

Among the acephalous Turkman tribesmen, dualistic segmentation was quite typical.⁴⁰ Above I have described the checkerboard order as one possibility of a balanced political order. Below I discuss a second type of order with reference to the case of the Merv *Teke*.

According to Alikhanov there existed around hundred small canals (*inche iaps*) supplied by twenty four larger *iaps* which formed the territorial units in the Merv oasis. These units consisted of ten to twelve allotments occupied by *Teke nökers* at the end of the 1860s, after Persian Sultan Murad had chased the *Teke* from the Tejen river and the latter had pushed back the *Saryk* from the oasis. Each six of the larger *iap* territories belonged to and were occupied by the tribal *Teke* divisions of *Beg*, *Vekil*, *Bagshy* and *Sychmaz*.⁴¹ As I have already mentioned, *Tokhtamysh Beg* and *Vekil* tribesmen settled on the left bank of the Murghab in separated areas, whereas the *Otamysh* tribal federations of *Bagshy* and *Sychmaz* occupied the right bank. Thus non-irrigated pastures with wells also belonged to single tribal territories. As a result we get a dualistic territorial order which territorially separated both the *Tokhtamysh* from the *Otamysh* along the Murghab.⁴²

In Merv, tribesmen were less settled than in Akhal, due to the dependence on sufficient water supplies, which were harmed by a deficiency of snow during the winter and a lack of spring rains.⁴³ This implied that some tribesmen would have to leave less advantaged areas during dry periods. Thus disputes about access to the most suitable place must have been severe.

What we have to analyse is how political order could be maintained within the oasis without relying on established authority relations. Considering the lack of adequate sources, the question is difficult to answer. But there is also some indication that political order emerged from the forming of alliances which strengthened the balance between opposed tribal segments. Therefore I call this structural configuration order one of *segmentary opposition*.⁴⁴

Karryev mentions that the number of *Tokhtamysh* and *Otamysh* tribesmen was not the same, since the *Tokhtamysh* federation was more numerous at the time of the conquest of the oasis. This was also the reason why the *Tokhtamysh* alliance obtained three fifths of the Murghab's water, whereas the *Otamysh* only obtained two fifths. After the *Otamysh* confederacy increased their seize through newly arrived kinsmen, this initial water sharing became a cause of constant dispute between the two confederacies.⁴⁵ Despite these original imbalances, hostilities between *Tokhtamysh* and *Otamysh* were limited, since their territories were separated by the Murghab canal. But there existed the danger that tribesmen of a subdivision like that of the *Beg* could push the other subdivision of the *Vekil* from its territory or the other way round. Also, Turkman tribesmen were familiar with the experience of being wronged by stronger tribal alliances.⁴⁶

Tribal political orientation towards stability favoured the re-establishment of the old Oghuz order of the twenty-four tribes in four confederacies.⁴⁷ In this way, six tribes of one division balanced six tribes of the other. The equilibrium between and within the tribes was secured by the allocation of equal allotments of irrigated land. As a result all segments on all levels of segmentation were approximately of the same size. No group could dominate the neighbouring ones.⁴⁸ Only the number of the two inimical confederacies was not fully balanced at the time of the conquest.

Since it was highly unlikely that an exact number of *Teke* tribesmen with the right descent affiliations joined the tribal order of the oasis, people systematically must have settled down also in discordance with their descent origin.

Only the two confederative descent groups corresponded with the political and territorial units, due to the enduring hostile relations between *Tokhtamysh* and *Otamysh* tribesmen. This hostility between both descent groups prevented *Tokhtamysh* tribesmen from joining the *Otamysh* on the other side of the Murghab. But a balance between both groups was established due to the arrival of tribesmen of the less numerous confederacy.

Taking into consideration the lack of enduring authority relations among independent *Teke* or *Iomut* tribes, we have reason to confirm Bregel's view that the 2,000 *nökers* which Alikhanov described as the personal police troop of Kushid Khan represented rather a Turkman militia set up by the *obas* councils than the personal following of a Turkman khan.⁴⁹

Acephalous tribal order as a result of the interpenetration of political orientations and communal commitment to equality

We can conclude that tribesmen's political action orientations only led to segmentary political orders under specific situational conditions *and* under specific commitment structures.⁵⁰ These conditions could not automatically cause segmentary political orders, but their existence was necessary for tribesmen to develop political action orientations. There are two situational conditions for segmentary political order.

First, such political patterns could only emerge where abundant resources existed to support a relative high density of population. This was especially the case in areas of rich pastures, along rivers, in areas protected from harsh winters and at places with water supplies during the dry season. Second, it arose only under circumstances of scarce resources and diminished mobility due to dense population and lack of sufficient alternative pastures. Military pressure from the outside (for example other tribes) could become a catalyst for its formation.

In his more theoretical article, 'Political stratification among pastoral nomads', Irons goes further and attributes to both conditions also a causal significance for the change from segmentary to stratified tribal society, when increased internal conflicts made the development of authority relations 'individually more advantageous'.⁵¹ But his behavioural-utilitarian outlook, which tries to reduce commitment to self-interested choices, prevents him from realising the relevance of commitment structures for political order. He writes:

Intermediate conditions in terms of production density and mobility are likely to produce intermediate advantages for each form of organisation. This at some point may equalise the relative advantages of stratification and segmentary lineage systems. Under such conditions either system might be equally probable.⁵²

He seems to believe that political order is only conditional on situational circumstances. If there is segmentary tribalism, it will be because of prevailing advantages to the tribal 'individuals'. If there is stratification and there exist political authority relations, the latter are supposed to be more advantageous. Only if there existed an equality of advantages, were both orders likely. In addition, he does not fail to add that such an equilibrium is

extremely unlikely, probably due to the fact that some tribal communities keep their acephalous structures, whereas others acknowledge leadership under similar situational circumstances.⁵³

What Irons fails to acknowledge is that different communal commitment structures make the difference. Under similar conditions of military threat, tribesmen committed to political equality would keep their segmentary tribal system and only temporarily submit to the military leader, as was the case among the Turkmen. In contrast, tribal people who are committed to political authority relations acknowledge the authority of their leader also after military menaces. The fame and authority of the Kazakh Tauke Khan is an example of this materiality. Hence political commitment is not chosen, but emerges from the interpenetration of political orientations and communal commitment.

As a result, segmentary political order was only possible when tribesmen's communal commitment was more egalitarian. This ruled out the formation of enduring authority relations.⁵⁴ Military pressure from the outside did not necessarily lead to the formation of authority-oriented commitment structures, since acephalous dualistic political orders were able to mobilise considerable defensive forces. The failure of the Qajar government to control the Gurgan *Iomut* with military expeditions and institutions of indirect rule like the *saklau* in the nineteenth century clearly indicated this materiality.⁵⁵

Cephalous tribal political order

Lawrence Krader states that Central Asian nomadic society, which includes the three estates of aristocracy, commoners and slaves, was based on two basic principles:

1. The principle of patrilineal descent, through the male line, which united the society into an agnatic group.
2. The principle of primogeniture which divided the society into nobility and commoners.⁵⁶

With reference to these principles Krader tries to 'set down the structure of the traditional society of Central Asia as a whole': Patrilineage, which structured kinship bonds, was the principle of societal unity, primogeniture the principle of social and political differentiation upon which aristocracy was founded and which sharply distinguished between nobility and commoners. The slaves as third element came from the outside by capture or purchase.⁵⁷

Krader extrapolates this view mainly from his analysis of Kazakh social organisation, where he argues that the principle of primogeniture constituted Kazakh nobility and led to the political stratification of Kazakh

society. He even speaks about a 'state founded upon consanguine principles'.⁵⁸ It can be hardly denied that kinship is a basic principle of Central Asian tribal societies. The kin-based communal commitment structures, the ancestor cult and the dominant horizon of perception and expectation confirm this view.

It is less correct, however, to assume that Central Asian tribalism which depended on some kind of political order was based on primogeniture.⁵⁹ The analysis of nomadic Turkman political order has already shown that Krader's view cannot be applied to Turkman tribalism, which is political, but lacks both noble estates and cephalous structures. The analysis of Kazakh and Kyrgyz political tribalism aims at showing why Krader's point of view was also not entirely correct with regard to Central Asian cephalous tribal societies.

Cephalous tribal political order is based on political authority relations which inform the obedience of the followers and the commitment of the leader to give commands. In this respect Kara-Kalpak, Kyrgyz and Kazakh tribes differed considerably from the Turkman ones, since the former acknowledged enduring political leadership roles and the latter did not.⁶⁰

Kara-Kalpak confederacies

Kara-Kalpaks differed from Turkmen in their acknowledgement of tribal leaders which were called – as among Kazakhs – *biīs*.⁶¹ Nevertheless, they did not recognise khans as supreme leaders, but appointed only *batyrs* as military leaders in wartime. Since Kara-Kalpak tribes lacked a coordinating instance, tribal leaders formed tribal alliances which secured the balance of power between rival groups. The dualistic decisions of Kara-Kalpak tribal confederacies of the Amu-Darya delta indicates these political orientations. The settlement pattern of the *On Tort Uru* confederacy is a good example of these orientations. According to the main dual division *Qtaī* and *Qypshaq* got settled on the right bank of the Kegeyli *aryk*, whereas *Keneges* and *Mangyt* took the left bank (see Map 7). It is interesting to note that these subdivisions were territorially intermingled.⁶² Whether this materiality can be interpreted as a checkerboard-like alliance pattern is open for further research. Reported hostilities between smaller units might have indicated the rivalry between the branches of the two groupings.⁶³ It is probable that similar political orientations informed the political order of the Kara-Kalpaks at the lower Sir Darya.

Kyrgyz confederacies

In the 1770s a Chinese chronicler noticed the following about 'Kyrgyz' border tribes:

220 years ago they (the Kyrgyz) jointly undertook peace talks and separated the population in equal parts. They formed two divisions, they elected two representatives from among the rich, and territories were shown to everybody: land, river and mountains. Two wings were formed, a northern and a southern one. ... Each of these was internally divided into branches.⁶⁴

If this notice is precise, a loose dualistic Kyrgyz tribal federation was already formed by the 1550s in the Tian Shan area; when the Khanate of Mughulistan declined, mountainous tribesmen regained their political independence and restructured their political affiliations.⁶⁵ The division between a northern and a southern wing would also corresponded to the Kyrgyz confederative wings *Ong Kanat* (right wing) and *Sol Kanat* (left wing) which nomadised in northern and southern Kyrgyzstan.⁶⁶ This loose confederation was not the only political alliance involving Kyrgyz, since Kyrgyz tribes sometimes formed military alliances with Kazakh tribes as well. Nevertheless, many Kyrgyz tribes had to escape Buddhist Oirats (Kalmyks) in the second half of the seventeenth century and moved south to the mountainous areas between Kashgar and the Alai. Some of them even advanced to the Karategin and Hissar ranges, as some *Kypchak* and *Teiit* tribal groups began to look for pastures in the Pamir area.⁶⁷ Others remained and submitted to Jungarian rule. After Manchu troops had destroyed the Jungarian Khanate in 1757 and incorporated Sinkiang ('new province') as a border region to China, Kyrgyz tribes moved back into Central Tian Shan, formally accepted Chinese rule, but actually regained their political independence. As a result, tribal territories were newly divided among tribes and tribal federations which also included considerable Mongol groups.⁶⁸ This reorganisation remained influential up to the twentieth century, although some changes occurred during Khokandian rule in the nineteenth century.⁶⁹

Kyrgyz tribes were usually divided in the three basic groups: the biggest grouping was the *Ong Kanat* (right wing) which included the *Tagai* grouping in northern and central Kyrgyzstan and the *Adigine* and the *Mungush* groupings in the eastern Alai mountains. The second largest grouping was the *Sol Kanat* (left wing) in the northern part of the Ferghana valley and in the Talas district, whereas *Ichkilik* was located in the western Alai mountains and in the eastern Pamir.⁷⁰ Each of these groups occupied defined regions (see Maps 2 and 5).

These groupings consisted of tribes and tribal confederacies which could form temporary alliances or oppose each other. The tribal chiefs of the Kyrgyz wings, on which Chinese sources reported, were elected among the chiefs of the biggest tribes, but their authority was quite limited and probably only played a role in times of serious external military threat.⁷¹ In contrast, tribal chiefs (*aga biis*) chiefs of the tribes and tribal federations could be acknowledged leaders with authority and influence.

Each tribe had its own territory which included summer and winter pastures, and it was the *aga biī* who decided on the allocation of pastures and migration routes in larger tribal federations. In addition he was the supreme judge who decided rival judicial claims and settled disputes among his tribesmen.⁷²

Smaller tribes which did not acknowledge *aga biīs* either settled disputes in councils (*dubuns*) of involved chieftans (*biīs*) or by military means.⁷³ As members of the same tribal confederacy were not allowed to use the pastures of other allied tribes, members of independent neighbouring tribes were not to do so, either. If they had tried to enter other tribes' territory, they would have immediately faced inimical action.⁷⁴ The *aga biī* decided also about the external relations of the tribe. It was up to his reason to make peace, to form alliances or to start raids with or against neighbouring groups and states. His decisions were highly respected by allied tribesmen.

The Islamisation of Kyrgyz tribesmen did not change the tribal order. Most scholars hold the view that the Islamisation of Kyrgyz tribesmen began in the second half of the seventeenth century, when Oirat pressure intensified relations with the Islamic population of the Ferghana valley and of Kashgar.⁷⁵ This process gradually occurred on the base of *eshon-murid* (Kyrgyz: *eshen-murut*) relations between esteemed Sufi-sheikhs and tribal leaders. Some of these *eshons* lived within the tribes, but most of them resided in towns like Kashgar or Namangan, and appointed various *khalfas* from educated members of the tribe as their representatives. These were *murids* who were more familiar with Islamic customs than their tribesman, and assisted as mullahs in family feasts like circumcisions, weddings and funerals. Orthodox Islam, however, remained unknown among the tribesmen, who continued to be committed to customary law.⁷⁶

Ėshon affiliations did not transcend the tribal divisions. As *eshons* did not recruit *murids* from different tribes or tribal confederacies, Kyrgyz tribes or tribal confederacies had their own *eshons*. This affiliation could also be changed.⁷⁷ Mambetaliev states that tribal leaders could change their *eshons* and forget them as quickly as they had become *murids*. From the perspective of the tribesmen, newly arrived mullahs became their new shamans (*bakshys*) who could be highly esteemed, if they also knew about folk medicine and healing.⁷⁸

We have mentioned that Kyrgyz tribesmen nomadised in tribal or sub-tribal groups, due to their belligerent character and their lack of efficient centralised authority. Thus they camped along the riversides in long, continuous rows of yurts during winter. In summer they nomadised along mountain ridges so that they could easily assemble an armed group for defensive or offensive reasons within a few hours.⁷⁹

From the 1840s there existed also Kyrgyz leaders who were called or called themselves *manaps*.⁸⁰ According to Abramzon, the term itself referred to a tribal group of the *Sary Bagysh* which called its tribal leader after its

founder Manap, who lived in the seventeenth century. As this group recruited the *Sary Bagysh*, leaders who tried to extend their influence also to neighbouring tribes, *manap* became a synonym for a strong ruler.⁸¹

The *Sary Bagysh* leader Ormon belonged to the first Kyrgyz to whom the title *manap* was linked. In the 1840s he convoked an assembly of the representatives of the *Sary Bagysh*, *Bugu*, *Saiak*, *Solto*, *Sary*, *Kushchu* and *Cherik*, and tried to convince them to form a confederacy under his leadership as khan. This was a quite unusual aim, since the Kyrgyz never acknowledged khans.⁸² Nevertheless, he was formally set up as khan, but he failed to politically unify the Kyrgyz. Ormon, whom the khan of Khokand granted the reputable title of a *parvonachi*, collected the *zakot* among neighbouring tribes and promised the Kyrgyz tribal leader that he would fight against the Khanate of Khokand, to destroy Khokandian fortresses in Kyrgyzstan and to restore the independence of Kyrgyz tribes. He failed to do so, however, and the *bīs* of other tribes ceased to accept him as their leader. As a result he once more became an ally of Khudayar Khan. Nevertheless, the title *manap* also became popular among other tribes subsequently.⁸³

The available evidence seems to suggest that there was not really a difference between leaders called *bīs* or *manaps*, because *manap* became used also for less influential leaders. Thus leaders who depended on an *aga manap* (senior *manap*) could be called *chala manaps* (minor *manaps*), as leader of *aiyls* might be called *cholok manap* (small *manap*).⁸⁴ Nevertheless, one should not be deceived by names. What has to be examined is the question of whether the political relations between Kyrgyz tribes could have changed in the nineteenth century. Due to the lack of source material, an answer will be hypothetical.

One of the controversially discussed questions is whether manapship was a hereditary or an elective office. Some contemporary observers underlined the elective character of leadership,⁸⁵ whereas most Soviet scholars emphasised its hereditary status.⁸⁶ Also, Khazanov states that both *manaps* and *bīs* were hereditary leaders, and he quotes the following Chinese source from the seventeenth century:

Each *biī* rules his own land and has his own followers. In might and power they are equal to one another and in no way does one submit to another. When a *biī* dies, his son and brother are set up as *biī*, others cannot occupy this place.⁸⁷

This observation is interesting for two reasons. First, it clearly emphasises that leadership passed from father to son and that other tribesmen were not able to become leaders. This source does not say, however, that this was so due to the hereditary character of leadership. Tribesmen usually elected rich and influential persons as their leaders, who also used their position to increase the wealth of their family. This happened, for example, when the *biī*

allocated the best migration routes and pastures to his own kinsmen.⁸⁸ These opportunities increased the influence and reputation of the leader's family, which makes it probable that one of the sons would follow his father as a leader.⁸⁹ Leadership was attributed to a person who was victorious, whose warnings were respected and whose commands were obeyed. Wealth was necessary in order to be influential and to command authority within and outside the sub-tribe. If the wealth and influence of a family were unchallenged, the election of the leader would turn out to be more of an acclamation. This might be the reason why some observers held Kyrgyz leadership to be hereditary, whereas others did not.⁹⁰

Second, the Chinese report also emphasised that tribes were of equal size in the seventeenth century, so that one tribe could not overrule others. This could not be said of the tribes of the nineteenth century. Strong tribes or tribal federations like the *Sary Bagysh*, *Bugu* or *Saruu* could easily dominate smaller tribes. The reported balance between tribes seems to have ceased to exist. Perhaps, from this perspective, it is possible to understand Valikhanov's evaluation of the appearance of *manaps* when he asserted the following:

The unchecked, almost despotic power of the *manaps* represents a later development; in a certain way it is an abuse of authority of the family head, the *biī*, as the *manaps* were called in former times. More recently *manaps* (according to native explanations, a strong inaccessible despot) emerged among the *Sary Bagysh* first. The *Sary Bagysh biī* with the name *Manap* was the first tyrant. The *biīs* of the other tribes liked *manapship*, and now *manap* is the title of the leaders of each confederacy of the horde. Nevertheless, the people were more influential in the *Bugu* tribal confederacy. Buranbay [he was the eldest *manap* of the *Bugu* confederacy who acknowledged tsarist authority in 1855] himself said to me that, strictly speaking, there did not exist *manaps* among them.⁹¹

Valikhanov, who was a tsarist military officer and Kazakh ethnographer,⁹² made three interesting points in his observation. First, he emphasised that *manapship* was a recent development which emerged first among the *Sary Bagysh*. Since Valikhanov is a fairly reliable observer, this source does not support views which antedate the emergence of *manapship* in the eighteenth or seventeenth century. This view is also confirmed by Kushner's *Sary Bagysh* informant from northern Kyrgyzstan.⁹³

Second, it is even more interesting to notice what a born tribesman who had received a Russian education said about the legitimacy of leadership. According to his judgement there was a big difference between *biī* and *manap* leadership. He states that *manap* leaders had abused their position of authority and that – according to the view of the concerned tribesman – he became an inaccessible usurper.⁹⁴ Kushner's *Sary Bagysh* informant also

held this view. The *manap* was originally a *batyr* who pillaged the Chu, Naryn and Issik Kol area with the help of followers (*jigits*) and who subdued the tribal population of the Ala Tau. There he arbitrarily disposed of people's life and property and transferred supreme rule over areas to followers.⁹⁵

This implies that tribesmen acknowledged the authority of their leader within their small-scale tribe. In such a unit they were committed to authority and politically obedient to their leaders who also cared for their interests. They would not voluntarily submit to the leader of a different tribe, however. Obviously, some of the Kyrgyz tribes had to submit to an alien leader, because they could no longer defend their tribal territory. Due to the lack of political community, leadership was perceived as despotic.⁹⁶

In former times only *batyrs* could be acknowledged as leaders by several tribes in order to start a raid or to defend tribal territories against outsiders. This inter-tribal authoritative position was only held during war time. When the tribesmen returned back home, the power of the *batyr* ceased to exist and the tribal leaders regained full command over their tribesmen. In contrast to the *batyrs* the *biīs*' authority was not mainly based on military skills, but on the tribal consent of the group.⁹⁷ There is some plausibility in Sokolov's argument, which asserts that the first *manaps* were originally *batyrs* who succeeded in the enduring appropriation of their tribal leaders' rights with military means.⁹⁸

Third, Valikhanov asserts that other tribal leaders also took over this title, although tribal leadership did not change its character. In this way the supreme tribal leader of the *Bugu* became a *manap*, although his leadership had little in common with the unchecked rule of *Sary Bagysh manaps*.⁹⁹ Kushner's second informant from Jalalabad in southern Kyrgyzstan also describes *manaps* as tribal leaders. On outlining the position of a *manap*, he describes him as a tribal leader who became one by initiating a large feast (*toī*) and making generous gifts to influential and esteemed guests. In this way he became a man of good reputation whom tribesmen contacted in cases of quarrels about *kalyngs* or *alamans*. When he was acknowledged as leader, he made final decisions in disputes. In big disputes he consulted other elders before he made his final decision.¹⁰⁰ In such cases *manap* was only a new name for a tribal leader who was called *bīī* in former times.

If these few sources are not misleading, we can conclude that there did not exist ruling endogamous hereditary lineages similar to those of the Kazakh khans and sultans, to which Krader's model of Central Asian tribal society could be applied. *Manaps* were not hereditary leaders.

If we are not mistaken, it is also possible to conclude that after the decline of the Jungarian Khanate Kyrgyz political order was based on relatively equally strong tribes which possessed delimited territories defended against neighbours and which were led by acknowledged tribal leaders. Due to the similar size of the tribes, it was impossible for one tribal group to

dominate neighbouring ones. In addition, the mountainous area made it also more difficult to invade than to defend one's own territory. Thus we get a relatively balanced order of tribal groups. This balance, as Valikhanov noticed, seemed to have declined by the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when powerful *manaps* succeeded in extending their influence also to neighbouring tribes. The increasing influence of the Khanate of Khokand on Kyrgyz tribesmen might have played an important role in this process. Since this extension of leadership did not conform to customary law, manapship was experienced as being illegitimately appropriated, especially among dominated tribes. As *manap* Ormon experienced in the 1840s, tribal leaders opposed the power ambitions of *manaps*, when this was possible.

Thus Kyrgyz tribal political order was cephalous, but relatively decentralised. It was rooted in a political community based on patriarchal authority and relied on the tribesmen's commitment to customary law which regulated the authoritative use of power. Therefore Kyrgyz tribesmen regarded military leaders who disregarded *nark* as usurpers to whom political obedience was not owed and whose orders they did not like to obey.

Kazakh hordes

Qasim Khan (ca 1509–1523) is usually regarded as the founder of a unified Kazakh khanate at the beginning of the sixteenth century.¹⁰¹ He expanded Kazakh control to the eastern pasture lands of the Kazakh Steppe, to the Sir Darya and Chu valley, and Yasi (Turkistan) became the headquarters of the khan. Qasim Khan succeeded in unifying tribes from other tribal federations like the *Qypshaq* from the *Nogai* group and the *Naïman* and *Arghyn* from the eastern branch of the *Chagatay*, so that his khanate could have included up to one million tribesmen. If the term *people* has been applied to the Kazakhs since then, it can only have referred to this loose political unification of various Turkic and Mongol tribal groups, as many other 'peoples' of the steppe were formed.¹⁰² Like the Uzbeks these allied tribesmen acknowledged Shaybanid Jochid Chingizid claims.

The political unity of this confederacy remained fragile, however, and the khanate split into three hordes within economically independent geographic zones soon after the death of Qasim Khan. As a result the *Kishi Zhüz* (junior part) emerged in the steppe north of the Aral and Caspian Sea, the *Orta Zhüz* (middle part) occupied the central steppe area, whereas the *Üly Zhüz* (senior part) nomadised in Semirechie. These confederacies became better known as the Small, the Middle and the Great Horde of the Kazakh Steppe. Up to the end of the 1720s, regular annual meetings took place at the hill of Martub near to Sayram in September, where sultans and tribal leaders met the khan and deliberated about migration routes and the defence of tribal territories.¹⁰³

PRE-TSARIST TRIBAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Table 2 Kazakh khans

	Qasim (ca. 1509–1523)	
	Tahir (1523–6)	
Ahmed Khan (1526–35) (Lower Sir Darya)	Tugun Khan (1526–37) (Middle Sir Darya)	Buidashe (1526–60) (Jeti Su)
	Haq Nazar (1538–80)	
	Sygay (1580–2)	
	Taulkel (1586–98)	
	Esim (1598–1628)	Tursyn (1616–27) (Tashkent)
	Jangir (1628–52)	
	Batyr (1652–80)	
	Tauke (1680–1715)	
<i>Kishī Zhüz (Small Horde)</i>	Kaip (1715–18)	
Abulkhayr (1718–48)	Bolat (1718–26)	Shah Muhammad (1719–34) (Turkistan)
Batyr (1748–86)	Abu'l Muhammad (1731–71)	Zholbarus (1720–39) (Tashkent)
Kaip (1786–90)	Ablay (1771–81)	
Ishim (1790–?)	Vali (1781–1819)	
Karatay (1806–16)	Bukey (1812–17)	
Arghyngazy (1816–21)	Gubaydulla (1820–4)	
	Kenisari (1841–44)	
<i>Khans acknowledged by tsarist authorities</i>		
<i>Kishī Zhüz (Small Horde)</i>		<i>Inner Horde</i>
Nurali (1748–86)	Ayshuak (1797–1805)	Bukey (1812–23)
Erali (1791–4)	Jan-Tore (1805–9)	Jangir (1823–45)
Ishim (1795–7)	Shir Ghazi (1812–24)	

Source: *Istoriia Kazakhskogo SSR c drevneshikh vremen do nashikh dne* 1975–81; Olcott 1987, pp. 3–12; Kuzembaūly and Abilev 1996, pp. 340–1.

The animistic *Weltanschauung* of the tribesmen tended to perceive the origin of the hordes as being founded by three sons, whose ancestor some Kazakhs held to be Alash, others to be Abulkhayr.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, the division of the hordes emerged from the tribesmen's political orientation to securing their winter and summer pastures. Thus all the three hordes nomadised within a natural geographic zone which included both winter (*qystau*) and summer pasture (*zhailay*)¹⁰⁵ (see Map 8).

As the Kazakh khanate was founded by a khan, so the Kazakh hordes were headed by Chingizid khans also. The commitment to political leadership of khans belonged to the Mongol political inheritance of the Kazakhs. Only a khan was expected to be a successful supreme political leader. This

expectation might have been considerably informed by the belief that only khans enjoyed the special protection of Chingiz Khan's powerful spirit.¹⁰⁶

Elective members for khanship were only the sultans (*töre*) who formed the noble estate of the *aq süiek* ('white bone') within Kazakh society. Commoners were called *qara süiek* ('black bone'). The 'white bones' were endogamous and traced their descent to Chingiz Khan. For this reason they are also called Chingizids. We do not think, like Krader,¹⁰⁷ that this noble estate was based on primogeniture. It rather constituted itself through endogamy and believed descent from Chingiz Khan. It is true that somebody belonged to the *aq süiek* by birth, but the affiliation was not rooted in an acknowledged birthright. Due to the commitment to seniority,¹⁰⁸ senior Chingizid lineages had some advantages in recruiting the khan, but nevertheless, they always had to carry through their claim against the opposed pretensions of rival nobles, as McChesney also noticed about Chingizids in Transoxiana (Mawaraunnahr).¹⁰⁹ Bodger analysed similar rivalries with regard to the power struggle between the *Osek* and *Zhadig* Chingizid branches at the beginning of the eighteenth century in the Kazakh Steppe¹¹⁰.

Depending on the authority of the khan, he could have rivals, or his leadership was generally acknowledged so that he was sometimes able to extent his influence also to neighbouring hordes. Powerful khans like Tauke (1680–1715) and Ablay (1774–81)¹¹¹ were rare, however, and owed their influence to the military threat caused by the Oirats and the need for centralised defence. Kazakh khans and sultans were usually weak. They differed from Chingiz Khan and the khans of the Golden Horde, as their political influence relied on their tribal followers. They could tax *Sart* populations who lived under their control in towns like Turkistan,¹¹² but they were not entitled to collect tributes or regular taxes among their tribesmen.¹¹³ This means that after the decline of the Golden Horde, tribal leaders regained the political control which Chingiz Khan and his followers had successfully appropriated 300 years earlier. Thus no imperial military nobility, but tribal leaders like *bis* and *batyrs* supported, elected or refused to back the khan.¹¹⁴

As Levshin reported, the sultans, *bis*, *batyrs* and other tribal leaders met at a fixed place in order to elect the khan. They settled down on white felt carpets according to their rank and influence, and held an assembly, which could last up to four days. Everybody had the right to speak. At the end they agreed to elect the most distinguished sultan as khan and raised him on a piece of white felt above their heads. This felt was torn to pieces afterwards, and everybody brought one fragment home as a sign of the consensual choice. After the election the new khan invited all assembled people to a great meal as a sign of his generosity. Leaders of the *aq* and *qara süiek* met annually to confirm the khan, to give advice and to receive orders.

At these meetings the annual migration routes, which could be up to 1,000 kilometres long, were fixed. This migrational coordination was important, since a lack of accorded migration routes or changes due to external or internal circumstances had very harmful consequences for pastoralism, consequences which tribal leaders tried to avoid. In times of war it was the khan who allocated pastures between tribes and tribal federations, since this decision depended on the military control of pasture land. Only during war could he command large armies and levy war contributions (see maps 8 and 9).

In times of peace he and other sultans lived separately among the commoners. They might have possessed slaves and maintained *töleñgits* (followers) who had lost tribal affiliations and joined them. Nevertheless, they lived as pastoralists, had their own pastures and looked after livestock.¹¹⁵ As pastoralists they also submitted to *adat* and would have to pay *qūn* if they caused harm to other tribesmen.¹¹⁶ They also used their own brands, which were different from those of their following tribesmen.¹¹⁷ Unlike Soviet and recent Kazakh scholarship,¹¹⁸ we must emphasise that the Kazakh hordes did not form states whose rulers could enforce commands among subjects. They, however, represented tribal confederacies whose leaders depended on tribal following.

Usually the khan was also the leader of the strongest tribal federation of the horde. If he was strong, he was able to appoint his close relatives as leaders (sultans) of other tribes, as Erofeeva asserts.¹¹⁹ Olcott's emphasis on the elective appointment of sultans as sub-khans of tribes seems to be correct in cases of weak khanship.¹²⁰

The reported judicial function of the settlement of disputes¹²¹ depended also on the authority of these notables, since the leaders of a weaker group would only bring a case before a judge if the latter had also real influence on the rival grouping to accept his judgement. Often members of influential sub-tribes did not want to submit a dispute to a *bi*. In this case the plaintiff could be authorised to enforce a judgement by the means of *barymta* against the livestock of the offender or his relatives.¹²²

But in addition, Kazakh political order was often not balanced, since stronger groups tended to push smaller groups from their territories.¹²³ They usually occupied the best winter pastures, ones which were most important for effective stock-breeding. Thereby the weaker group was always disadvantaged, as a Kazakh saying pointed out:

What are members of numerous families talking about?

They are talking about having wronged less numerous families.

What are members of less numerous families talking about?

They are talking about being wronged by numerous families.¹²⁴

This overreaching was not confined to villages and sub-tribal groupings, but could also be observed at tribal and confederative levels. Thus, for example, the *Ūsīn* tribal confederation dominated the Great Horde in the eighteenth century such that all members of the horde were called *Ūsīn*, whereas the *Alshyn* federation prevailed in the Small Horde.¹²⁵ In the Middle Horde it was the *Arghyn* which was the most numerous and principal tribal federation.¹²⁶ Thus hordes got their names from their dominant tribal confederacy, too.¹²⁷ In order to prevent infringements, tribesmen depended on close cooperation with neighbouring groups, and they always looked for further influential allies. Belonging to a strong tribe or tribal alliance was highly appreciated.¹²⁸ Thus Kazakhs formed changing alliances headed by leaders who were influential and enjoyed authority due to their wealth and generosity, their age and experience, their sense of justice and their prominence in a numerous family which supported them.¹²⁹

Cephalous tribal order as a result of the interpenetration of political orientations and communal commitment to patriarchal authority

What we can conclude is that Kazakh, Kara-Kalpak and Kyrgyz tribesmen formed cephalous tribal political orders. Their political orientations were oriented towards the maintenance of peace and the protection of one's economic resources. Whereas independent Kyrgyz tribesmen attempted to defend their tribal territory against neighbouring ones and did not usually acknowledge authority outside of the tribe, Kazakhs tend to join large tribal confederacies which protected huge ranges of pasture land against outsiders. Kazakh hordes included several such confederacies which were headed by an elected khan and his relatives, the sultans. These notables could be influential during wars and times of external threat, but normally depended on the support of tribal leaders and their followers.

Kara-Kalpak, Kazakh and Kyrgyz political order emerged from the interpenetration of political orientations and communal commitment towards patriarchal authority which also existed among adult males.¹³⁰ According to the situational differences (geographic preconditions, different kinds of migration patterns and pastures) political authority relations included larger groupings among the Kazakhs and smaller ones among the Kyrgyz. These authority relations were relations of piety and protection between associates, and could be extended to larger political groups. The establishment of a large political alliance, however, could not be fully accomplished arbitrarily, and faced limits when tribal leaders did not consider the interests of smaller groups, failed to protect their followers against invasions, or did not respect customary law. Thus the refusal of obedience and the loss of authority could take place under such circumstances.¹³¹ If mobility was limited to prevent the ambitions to power of leaders and their supporters, political

power rather began to be based on domination, and was perceived as usurpation, as Valikhanov evaluated Kyrgyz manapship. Ormon's failure to unite Kyrgyz tribes in the 1840s showed that independent tribes refused to acknowledge manapship which disrespected *düp*, if they could.

Notes

- 1 A brief version of this chapter was published as P. G. Geiss, 'Tribal Commitment and Political Order in Central Asia. A Reconsideration', in *Why not Central Asia? A Decade of Reforms, Centuries of Memories*, ed. Giampiero Bellingeri, Orientalia Venetiana, Fondazione G. Cini, Istituto Venezia e l'Oriente /L. Olschki: Firenze 2003.
- 2 For example: B. Baïbulatov, *Adamdardyn ang-sezimindegi ötköndün kaldyktaryn joiuu zhönündö*, Frunze 1957, pp. 7–25; V. M. Ploskikh, *Kirgizy i Kokandskoe khanstvo*, Frunze 1977, pp. 176–7; E. Gellner, 'Foreword', in Khazanov 1984, pp. ix–xxv.
- 3 For example: V. P. Viatkin, *Batyr Srym*, Moscow and Leningrad 1947; V. F. Shakhmatov, *Kazakhskaiia pastbishchno-kochevaia obshchina (voprosy obrazovaniia, èvolutsii i razlozheniia)*, Alma-Ata 1964.
- 4 Potapov 1955, pp. 22–3.
- 5 According to an estimate of Bregel, who corrected the data of Karpov, there existed 255,000 *Teke*, 179,000 *Iomut* (60,000 of them lived in northern Iran), 140,000 *Ärsary* (45,000 in northern Afghanistan), 35,000 *Salyr*, 46,000 *Gökleng* (25,000 in northern Iran) 34,000 *Saryk* and other tribesmen of smaller groupings in Turkmenistan. Overall there should have existed around 863,000 Turkmen in 1928; of these 85,000 resided in northern Iran and around 60,000 in Afghanistan (Bregel 1979, p. 139–42).
- 6 An earlier version of this section is published as P. G. Geiss, 'Turkman Tribalism', *CAS*, vol. 18, 1999/3, pp. 347–57.
- 7 Cf. Chapter 1, fifth section.
- 8 Mouraviev 1823a, pp. 17–8; Vámbéry 1865, p. 249. J. M. Trotter, *Central Asia – Section II. Part IV. A Contribution Towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnography, Resources and History of the Khanat of Bokhara*, Calcutta 1873, pp. 172, 177; Grodekov 1883, p. 65.
- 9 König 1962, pp. 74, 78–9; Mouraviev 1823a, pp. 17–18; Burnes 1834 (II), p. 251. Cf. Markov 1976, pp. 232–4; Bregel 1961, pp. 141–2, 164–8.
- 10 In case of defence against invaders, the participation of able-bodied men was probably less voluntary.
- 11 Marvin 1881, pp. 181–5; Grodekov 1883, p. 56; Jochelson 1928, p. 95; G. I. Karpov, 'Alamany', *Turkmenovedenie*, 1931/5–6, pp. 28–9; König 1962, pp. 141–4. Cf. Mouraviev 1823b, pp. 350–1; A. A. Rosliakov, 'Alammany', *SÉ*, 1955/2, pp. 41–53, 42–6. Cf. e.g. Munis-Agekhi, 'Firdaus-ul-'Ikbāl', *MITT II*, p. 400.
- 12 Vámbéry 1865, p. 249; Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, p.62; I. I. Geier, *Turkestan*, 2nd edn, Tashkent 1909, p. 50.
- 13 Lomakin 1897, p. 54; König 1962, p. 150.
- 14 On stating that Vámbéry asserted that the mullahs and *kadis* exercised greater influence on Turkman tribesmen in comparison with their own elders (*iashuly*), Bacon misinterpreted Vámbéry (Bacon 1966, p 54). The latter only wrote that some esteemed Sufī saints (*ishans*) enjoyed higher reputations than some *iashuly's* due to the 'superstition' of the Turkmen (Vámbéry 1865, pp. 249–50).
- 15 Bregel 1961, p. 173.

- 16 M. Demidov, *Turkmenskie ovliady*, Izdatel'stvo 'Ylym', Ashkhabad 1976, pp. 19–20; S. M. Demidov, 'Sufismus in Turkmenistan', *TF*, vol. 2, Hamburg 1988 (Russian: *Sufizm v Turkmenii - evolutsiia i perezhitki*, Ashkhabad 1978), pp. 123–4, 129. Cf. Lansdell 1885 (II), p. 479.
- 17 Grodekov 1883 (I), pp. 64–5; Lansdell 1885 (II), p. 480; O. Tumanovich, *Turkmenistan i Turkmeny (Materialy k izucheniiu istorii i étnografii)*, Ashgabat 1926, pp. 94–5; Saray 1982, p. 52.
- 18 König 1962, p. 74.
- 19 Grodekov 1883, p. 65.
- 20 Lomakin 1897, p. 89. Cf. Chapter 4, second section.
- 21 Bregel 1961, p. 144.
- 22 Nevertheless, petty leaders also could call themselves khans, as Mouraviev had already reported (Mouraviev 1823a, pp. 17–8, 40).
- 23 Saray 1982, p. 57; König 1962, p. 152.
- 24 Saray 1982, pp. 58–9.
- 25 Pis'mo tekinskikh khanov: 'Ovez Durdy-khana, Khanmamed-Atalyka. Aman Gel'dy Vani i Berdy-batyra nachal'niku Zakaspïnskogo voennogo otdela o polozhenii v Akhal-Teke, 1 dekabria 1876 g', in A. Iliasov (ed.) *Prisoedinenie Turkmenii k Rossii (sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov)*, Ashgabat 1960, p. 276.
- 26 Grodekov 1883, p. 65; Lansdell 1885 (II), pp. 481, 487–8. Recent Turkman historiographic scholarship holds the view that Turkman 'nobles' received the title of 'khan' from Bukharan or Khivan rulers in recognition of performed services. (A. Orazberdy, *Istoriia Turkmenistana XVIII veka*, Ashgabat 1996, p. 150. This is not very likely, as the Khan of Khiva would hardly gratify his followers by bestowing on them his own rank.
- 27 Moser 1885, p. 319; Skrine and Ross 1899, pp. 273–4. Thus Krader's view about the hereditary nature of khanship is wrong. He also does not analyse the different base of Turkman khanship in comparison to the Kazakh khans (Krader 1966, p. 161).
- 28 Saray 1982, pp. 53–4 (Saray omitted to quote the source of this letter).
- 29 G. Karpov, 'Turkmeniia i turkmeny', in *Turkmenovedenie*, 1929/10–11, p. 41; Bregel 1961, pp. 118–40. On analysing Western travel reports, Ruth I. Meserve similarly confirmed the lack of enduring authority relations among nineteenth-century Turkman tribesman (Ruth I. Meserve, 'A description of the position of Turkmen tribal leaders according to nineteenth century Western travellers', in *Altaica Berolinensia, Permanent International Altaistic Conference, 34th meeting, Berlin 21–26 July 1991: The concept of sovereignty in the Altaic World*, ed. B. Kellner-Heinkele, Berlin 1993, pp. 139–48).
- 30 Durkheim originally introduced the term 'segmentary society' in his classic study *On the Division of Labour* (Durkheim 1996, pp. 150–1) and it was Evans-Pritchard's study of the Nuer (E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer. A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*, Oxford 1947 [1940]), which opened a long debate about segmentary political systems and encouraged many empirical studies. For literature see: Ch. Sigrist, *Regulierte Anarchie. Unersuchungen zum Fehlen und zur Entstehung politischer Herrschaft in segmentären Gesellschaften*, Olten-Freiburg 1967; E. L. Peters, 'Some Structural Aspects of the Feud Among the Camel-Herding Bedouin of Cyrenaica', *Africa - Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. XXXVII, 1967/3, pp. 261–82; Khazanov 1984.
- 31 Segmentary political orders without dualistic bloc formation existed where a dry climate did not support concentration of pastoralists. See for example I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, New York 1982 (Oxford 1961).

- 32 Irons also did not mention this question.
- 33 Irons 1975.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 35 Political checkerboard orders existed in many other areas as well: cf. F. Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans*, London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 19, London 1959. F. Barth, 'Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization', *JRAI*, vol. 89, 1959. For further literature see Tapper 1983, p. 79.
- 36 Irons 1975, p. 60.
- 37 Jochelson 1928, p. 95.
- 38 Zhdanko 1950, pp. 82–93; Abramzon 1990, pp. 218–23.
- 39 *Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR I*, p. 433; König 1962, pp. 67–70; *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 175.
- 40 According to Tolstov, ten of twenty-four Turkman *plemias* were dualistically organised: three large confederacies (*Teke*, *Saryk* and *Iomut*) and seven smaller *plemia* (*Alili*, *Emrely*, *Ėski*, *Garadashly*, *Nokhurly*, *Murchaly* and *Magtym*). In addition Tolstov ascertains traces of a dual organisation among the large confederacies of the *Salyr*, *Gökleng* and *Ārsary* (Tolstov 1935, pp. 8–12. Cf. Karpov 1925, pp. 1–24; G. I. Karpov, *K istorii Turkmen-Sarykov*, Ashgabat 1945, pp. 1–13). Probably not all of these twenty-four *plemias* were tribal confederacies.
- 41 'TsGA TSSR, s/b, 95, Materialy Alikhanova o Merve', 1, 3–4, in Karryev 1957, pp. 34–5; Marvin 1881, pp. 81–3; V. V. Rusinov, *Vodozemel'nye otnosheniia i obshchina u Turkmen*, Tashkent 1918, pp. 18–26.
- 42 Cf. Lansdell 1885, II, pp. 477, 483–4. Lorenz 1987, pp. 134–6; B. Bouchet, 'Tribus d'autrefois, kolkhozes d'aujourd'hui', *ReMMM*, vol. 59–60, 1991/1–2, pp. 51–61 (O. Roy [ed.] *Des ethnies aux nations en Asie Centrale*, Aix-en-Provence).
- 43 Marvin 1881, pp. 83–4.
- 44 In his classic anthropological study *The Nuer*, Evans-Pritchard showed how – through lineage affiliation and assistance duties – tribal groupings opposed similar groups of the same lineages on different levels of segmentation independently of the initially involved groups, and how in this way opposed groupings balanced political order (Evans-Pritchard 1940, pp. 139–91). Similar structures were also reported from other African societies. Frederic Barth showed that segmentary opposition could also emerge among close collateral kinsmen of one descent group who competed for increase of land allotments (F. Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans*, London 1959; *Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization*, *JRAI*, vol. 89, 1959).
- 45 Karryev 1957, p. 31.
- 46 König 1962, pp. 124–5.
- 47 König 1962, footnote 291; Zhdanko 1950, p. 88. Cf. Tolstov 1935, p. 29. About the Oghuz see P. B. Golden, 'Die Migration der Oguzen', *TF*, vol. 10, Hamburg 1987, pp. 7–50.
- 48 Marvin 1881, p. 81. Karryev 1957, p. 34.
- 49 Bregel 1961, pp. 147–8. Smaller Turkman tribal confederacies like that of the *Nokhurli* formed similar territorial patterns. For example, in the nineteenth century the Nokhur valley was divided into the right and left riverbank irrigated by two separated main canals. On both sides there existed twelve strips: fourteen of them were owned by the pure *Nokhurli* subdivisions, six by *Zertli* and four by *Aikhvali* sub-tribes. These sub-tribes directly or indirectly sent an elder as representative to the council of elders (*ketkhudas*) who deliberated and decided on common affairs. The water of both canals accordingly was split into twenty-five shares: one for each sector and one share for the *Khoja* families who

PRE-TSARIST TRIBAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION

- cultivated their fields in between these sectors (Vasil'eva 1954, pp. 89–91, 180–3).
- 50 Salzman attempted to explain the establishment of political authority roles with reference to ecological factors like the predictability of climate and sufficient allocable resources. Such attempts must fail, however, as societies based on different commitment structures would adapt differently to similar environmental circumstances (P. C. Salzman, 'Political Organization among Nomadic Peoples', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. III, 1967/2, pp. 115–31).
 - 51 Irons 1979, pp. 361–74.
 - 52 *Ibid.*, p. 370.
 - 53 Fortes and Evans-Pritchard already underlined that political relations include utilitarian and 'moral' aspects which define rights and duties, privileges and obligations to which people are committed (M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 'Afrikanische politische Systeme – Einleitung'. In F. Kramer and Ch. Sigrist (eds) *Gesellschaften ohne Staat. Band 1: Gleichheit und Gegenseitigkeit*. Frankfurt 1978, pp. 169–72).
 - 54 In his comparative study of African segmentary societies Sigrist emphasised the importance of equality commitment for acephalous political order (Sigrist 1967, pp. 185–97).
 - 55 The *saklau* was an office offered to each *Iomut* tribe which authorised it to collect annual tribute from the sedentary Welayet villages south of the tribal territory in return for protection against raids. In this way the *saklau* should become a paramount tribal chief who was obliged to control his tribesmen. Next to the centre of Persian local administration, the *saklaus* were even supplied with mounted and armed retainers at the government's expense to police their tribes. Due to the *Iomut* aversion to chiefs and their mobility, *saklaus* were not very successful, however. Thus they could only distribute the tribute among their tribesmen for avoiding raids, or recompense the Welayet peasants for suffered losses of their plundered villages (Irons 1975, pp. 66–75).
 - 56 Krader 1966, p. 153.
 - 57 Cf. Krader 1955, pp. 67–92.
 - 58 Krader 1963, p. 326.
 - 59 Cf. Khazanov 1984, pp. 174–5.
 - 60 Khazanov similarly uses the term 'stratified segmentary system' to differentiate both Kazakh and Kyrgyz from the Turkman tribesmen, which formed 'segmentary systems' (*ibid.*, pp. 145–6, 175–6).
 - 61 Zhdanko 1950, p. 76. The acknowledgement of *bīis* as political leaders corresponded with the commitment to patriarchal authority between male adults. According to Zhdanko and Bekmuratova, the Kara-Kalpak head of the family decided in the extended family's affairs in an authoritative way. His orders could not be disrespected. This was also true for married sons, who had formed their own households. They could not live a life of their own, but had to comply with the decisions of their fathers. (T. A. Zhdanko, *Karakalpakī. (Osnovnye problemy étnicheskoi istorii i étnografii). Doklad po opublikovannym rabotam*, Moscow 1964, p. 34; A. T. Bekmuratova, *Semeino-bytovoī uklad karakalpakov v proshlom i zadacha preodoleniia ego vrednykh perezhitkov. Avtoref. diss.*, Moscow 1967, pp. 11. Both quoted by Kisliakov 1969, pp. 44–5).
 - 62 Zhdanko 1950, p. 39.
 - 63 Ivanov states for example: 'The Kara-Kalpaks of the nineteenth century represented an agglomeration of single separated confederacies (*plemia*) which were headed by various inimical chieftains (*bīis*)' (I. P. Ivanov, *Novye dannye o karakalpakakh. Sb. Sov. Vostokovedenie, T. III*, Leningrad and Moscow 1945, pp. 72–3, quoted in Zhdanko 1950, p. 74).

- 64 Siiuī chzhi ('Opisanie Zapadnykh zemel') rukop. 1763–1770 gg.- Gos. bibl. SSSR im. V. I. Lenina. Otdel rukopisei, fond 274, no. 287 (445), book 1, p. 20. Quoted in *Istoriia Kyrg. SSR I*, p. 433.
- 65 Lemerrier-Quellejey 1988, p. 161. If the term 'Kyrgyz' is used in this work, it refers to the tribes which joined this confederacy. The Kyrgyz as a nation is a much more recent phenomenon created by the Soviet nationality policy and the impact of centralised state institutions. Cf. Paul Georg Geiß: 'Staatenbildung und Nationenwerdung in Mittelasien', in E. Bruckmueller, S. Linhart and Ch. Maehrdel (eds) *Nationalismus – Wege zur Staatenbildung in der außereuropäischen Welt*, Vienna 1994, pp. 77–99; Geiß 1995.
- 66 The first written source about the *ong/sol* division is also from the sixteenth century: Seyf ad-din Akhsikenti mentioned this dual division and almost twenty tribal groups which still existed in the nineteenth century. Cf. Ploskikh 1977, p. 115.
- 67 Trotter 1873, p. 142; M. B. Dzhamgerchinov and A. M. Mokeev, 'Kirgizstan v XVI – pervoi polovine XVII v', in *Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR I*, p. 459; Dor and Naumann 1978, pp. 44–5. R. Dor, *Contribution à l'étude des Kirghiz du Pamir Afghan, (Cahiers Turcica I)*, Paris 1975, pp. 74–5. Tribes of the *Sol Kanat* were partly chased from their occupied Alai mountains and Karategin ranches to the Hissar and Kuliab region in the first half of the eighteenth century, whereas *Ong Kanat* tribes, who nomadised in the Kashgar area, were expelled from there at the end of the eighteenth century. They also moved to Hissar and Kuliab or sought protection in the Ferghana valley (Kozybaev 1993, pp. 90–3).
- 68 Due to the scarcity of sources, it is difficult to describe the tribal reshuffle after the Jungarian Khanate, as it is hardly possible to reconstruct the internal order of tribes at the end of the eighteenth century.
- 69 For the purpose of this study it does not matter how 'old' single tribes or ethnonyms are, whether they are of Mongol or Turkish origin and how many of them can be traced to the Yenisei Kyrgyz. What must be examined is the significance of political alliances and their territorial implications.
- 70 W. Schott, 'Über die echten Kirgisen', in *Abhandlungen der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Aus dem Jahre 1864*, Berlin 1865, pp. 429–75, 463; *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 175; Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985, p. 78–9; Dor and Naumann 1978, p. 49.
- 71 Dzhamgerchinov and Mokeev 1984, p. 466.
- 72 K. A. Sheremet'eva, *Russkie puteshestvenniki i issledovateli o Kirgizakh*, Frunze 1973, pp. 96–7; Abramzon 1990, p. 168; *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 465–6.
- 73 Ploskikh 1984, p. 513.
- 74 The same Chinese chroniclers confirmed these strict tribal territorial divisions, on writing: 'Pastures were specially divided and each tribe was named after the pastures and mountains. It was neither allowed to cross the border, nor to harm others on their own (tribal) land' (S. I. Il'iasov, *Zemel'nye otnosheniia Kirgizii v kontse XIX – nachale XX v.*, Frunze 1963, pp. 22–3. Quoted in Dzhamgerchinov and Mokeev 1984, p. 466.)
- 75 B. D. Dzhamgerchinov, *Prisoedinenie Kirgizii k Rossii*, Moscow 1959, p. 79; Sh. Akiner, *Islamic People of the Soviet Union (with an Appendix on the non-Muslim Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union)*, London 1983, p. 328; Abramzon 1990, p. 284.
- 76 S. Mambetaliev, *Perezhitki nekotorykh musul'manskikh techenii v Kirgizii i ikh istoriia*, Frunze 1969, pp. 21–8;
- 77 S. Mambetaliev, *Kyrgyzstandagy musulman sektalary*, Frunze 1966, p. 29 (Russian: *Musul'manskoe sektanstvo v Kirgizii*, Frunze 1968); Mambetaliev 1969, p. 26.

- 78 *Ibid.* 1969, pp. 24–5. Cf. V. N. Basilov, 'Chosen by the Spirits', in Balzer 1990, pp. 39–40.
- 79 Radloff 1884 (I), p. 527.
- 80 Some Soviet scholars also date the emergence of the *manap*-office to the seventeenth or eighteenth century, although it appeared first in sources in the 1840s. Cf. V. V. Bartol'd, 'Kirgizy. Istoricheskii ocherk', in *Sochineniia*, II, part I, Moscow 1963, p. 530.
- 81 Abramzon 1990, p. 169.
- 82 The acknowledgement of Kyrgyz khans among the Vakhan Kyrgyz is unusual and rather linked to the adaptation to closed borders and to the Afghan state (Shahrani 1979; *ibid.*, 'The Kirghiz Khans: Local Leadership in Central Asia', *CAS*, vol. 5, 1986/5, pp. 255–71).
- 83 Ploskikh 1977, pp. 127–30; 1984, p. 510.
- 84 P. I. Kushner (Knyshev), *Gornaia Kirgiziia – sotsiologicheskaiia razvedka*, Moscow 1929, pp. 84–5; Ploskikh 1977, p. 512; *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 171.
- 85 Radloff 1884a, p. 433; Trotter 1878, p. 144.
- 86 *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 171; Dzhamgerchinov and Mokeev 1984, p. 467; Abramzon 1990, p. 216.
- 87 Khazanov 1984, p. 175; Hsi-yü wen jianlu. *Buruty*, p. 8. Quoted in K. I Petrov, *Ocherki feodal'nykh otnoshenii u kirgizov v XV-XVIII vekakh*, Frunze 1961, p. 126.)
- 88 A. S. Bezkovic, 'Nomadenwirtschaft und Lebensweise der Kirgisen (19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts)', in L. Földes (ed.) *Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur*, Budapest 1969, p. 102; Ploskikh 1984, p. 528.
- 89 In the 1970s Dor and Naumann reported that the acknowledged leader of the Vakhan Kyrgyz came from a reputable family with a tradition of leadership. Although it seemed to be obvious that his son would become the next khan, one interviewed traditionalist emphasised that the assembly of the notables would have to decide (Dor and Naumann 1978, p. 52).
- 90 Cf. Dor 1975, pp. 83–5.
- 91 Valikhanov 1984 (II), p. 38.
- 92 The selected writings of Valikhanov were edited in five volumes in the 1960s and 1980s (Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, Alma-Ata 1961–8/1984–5). Numerous books were published about him and made him into one of the most well known native nineteenth-century researchers of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan (for example: I. Zabelin, *Chokan Valikhanov (Körünüktüü geograftar jana saiakatchylar)*, Frunze 1960).
- 93 Kushner 1929, p. 85.
- 94 Cf. M. Veniukov, *Puteshestvie po okrainam Russkoï Azii i zapiski o nikh*, St Petersburg 1868, p. 159. Quoted in Ploskikh 1977, p. 129; T. Koïchuev, V. Mokrynin and V. Ploskikh, *Kyrgyzy i ikh predki. Netraditsionnyi vzgliad na istoriiu i sovmennost'*, in Bishkek 1994, pp. 51–2.
- 95 Kushner 1929, p. 85–6.
- 96 Soviet authors did not make this differentiation, since every kind of authority was regarded to be exploitative and despotic.
- 97 Abramzon 1990, p. 178.
- 98 A. Sokolov, 'O kara-kirgizakh', *Semirechenskie oblastnye vedomosti*, 1910, nos. 53–58. Quoted by Abramzon 1990, pp. 178–9.
- 99 Cf. Kushner 1929, pp. 83–5.
- 100 Kushner 1929, pp. 86–7.
- 101 Lemerrier-Quellejay 1988, pp. 154–5; Akiner 1983, p. 288; Olcott 1987, p. 9.
- 102 R. Wenskus, *Stammesbildung und Verfassung*, Cologne 1961; Khazanov 1984.

- 103 About the political organisation of the Kazakh hordes, see: Levchine 1840, pp. 390–405; Hudson 1938, pp. 61–70; Viatkin 1947, pp. 84–143; Zimanov 1960, pp. 72–142; Krader 1963, pp. 189–209; Tolybekov 1971, pp. 233–94; Khazanov 1984, pp. 176–7.
- 104 See Chapter 1, fourth section.
- 105 Cf. *Narody Sredneĭ Azii II*, p. 326.
- 106 Valichanov 1904, p. 13; K. Hesse, *Abstammung, Weiderecht und Abgabe. Zum Problem der konsanguinal-politischen Organisation der Mongolen des 13. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1982, pp. 129–31.
- 107 Krader 1963, pp. 325–6; 1966, p. 153.
- 108 See Chapter 7, fourth section.
- 109 'As new generations of Chingizids matured and demanded their birth right within the boundaries of a static territory, internecine conflict intensified' (McChesney 1996, p. 136).
- 110 Bodger 1991, pp. 344–60. Cf. Viatkin 1947, pp. 95–6.
- 111 Ablai officially became khan in 1771, but he was already Kazakh leader from 1844, when his predecessor Khan Abul Muhammad retired from his political life in Turkestan. Cf. R. B. Suleĭmenov and V. A. Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka (o vneshneĭ i vnutrenneĭ politike Ablaiia)*, Alma-Ata 1988; K. Daniiarov, *Istoriia Ablai-khana – gosudarstvennogo deiatelia, polkovodtsa, diplomata, politika*, Almaty 1998.
- 112 A. K. Dobrosmyslov, *Goroda Syr-Dar'inskoĭ oblasti*. Kazalinsk, Petrovsk, Turkestan, Aulie-Ata i Chimkent, Tashkent 1912, p. 111.
- 113 K. K. Palen, *Nalogi i poshliny. Organy finansovogo upravleniia (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(d), pp. 5–6; V. G. Shakhmatov, 'The Basic Characteristics of the Kazakh Patriarchal Feudal State Organization', *CAR*, 1961/IX, pp. 131–2; Markov 1976, pp. 143–9; Morgan 1986(a), pp. 100, 142; Khazanov 1984, pp. 242–4, 262; Olcott 1987, p. 14; Suleĭmenov and Moiseev 1988, p. 137. The tax found in Khan Tauke's code was an extraordinary tax for the equipping of warriors during war.
- 114 Russian sources of the eighteenth century also reported on *tarkhans* as tribal leaders who could be as influential as khans and sultans. The origin and significance of this term are still unclear, however (cf. Viatkin 1947, p. 113; Shakhmatov 1961, pp. 130; Markov 1976, pp. 149–50; Poliakov 1980, p. 100).
- 115 Levchine 1840, pp. 374–5; Radloff 1884(I), p. 516; Rumiantsev 1910, p. 19. Thus sultans could not elect the khan only by themselves, as Akiner assumes (Akiner 1995, p. 16).
- 116 Markov 1976, p. 146.
- 117 J. Castagné, 'Les tamgas des Kirghizes', *ReMMM*, October 1923, p. 11.
- 118 For example: Zimanov 1960, pp. 29–71; R. B. Suleĭmenov and V. A. Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka (o vneshneĭ i vnutrenneĭ politike Ablaiia)*, Alma-Ata 1988; *Kuzembaiĭly*, Abilev 1996, pp. 139–201; Daniiarov 1998.
- 119 Meyendorf 1826, p. 47; Erofeeva 1993, p. 199.
- 120 Olcott 1987, p. 13.
- 121 *Narody Sredneĭ Azii II*, p. 328.
- 122 Levchine 1840, p. 400.
- 123 Zimanov 1958, p. 61; Kaufmann 1908, pp. 119–26; Tolybekov 1971, p. 404; Masanov 1995, pp. 158–9.
- 124 Radloff 1884a, p. 418. See also Iuzefovich 1880, p. 803.
- 125 Levchine 1840, pp. 301–2; Radloff 1884a, pp. 234–7; Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Kirgizskoe rodoslovie', in Valikhanov 1904, p. 289; Vostrov and Mukanov 1978, p. 23. According to Valikhanov, the *Ūisin*'s influence was based on their

PRE-TSARIST TRIBAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION

alliance with the Jungarian khanate, but after their decline the remaining parts of the federation became the *Sary Ūisin* subdivision of the *Dulat*.

126 Olcott 1987, p. 12; Erofeeva 1993, pp. 198-9.

127 For example: L. Chermak, 'Osedlye Kirgizy-semleled'tsy na r. Chu', *Zapiski Zapadno-Sibirskogo Otdela IRGO* (Omsk), 1900/XXVII, pp. 8-24.

128 Grodekov 1889, p. 16.

129 Levchine 1840, p. 397.

130 Whereas in Turkman tribes, sons became equal to the father when they reached adulthood and got involved in communal decisions, Kyrgyz and Kazakh sons had to be obedient to their fathers also as adults (cf. Chapter 1, fifth section).

131 A good example of disobedience is Abulkhayr's unauthorised oath of allegiance to tsarist authorities. The tribal leaders were furious when the tsarist-Tatar official Tevkelev turned up at the former's camp to administer the oath. The tribal leaders claimed that the khan had no authority to do anything without consulting them. As a result, although Abulkhayr formally submitted to tsarist rule, the Kazakh paid neither any tribute, nor spared Russian caravans and lives (cf. Bodger 1991, pp. 344-51).

DYNASTIC RULE IN THE RIVER OASES

Between tribalism and patrimonialism

In Central Asia dynastic rule faced serious problems by establishing political orders in the river oases. It was necessary to form and strengthen common political order between tribal semi-nomadic and non-tribal settled populations, which often maintained inimical relations to each other and supported different ways of life.¹ In his famous tract *Al-Muqaddima*, Ibn Khaldūn had already elaborated to some extent these different ways of life by opposing tribal political commitment (*asabiyya*) to political orientations based on submissiveness (*madhalla*) and docility (*inqiyd*).² Similarly, political commitments in Central Asia were either directed towards tribal political equality or tribal patriarchal authority, on the one hand, or it was oriented towards patrimonial authority, on the other.³

In contrast to patrimonial rulers, tribal leaders did not and could not control an administrative staff, as some Soviet scholars tried to find out.⁴ Their power depended on the acknowledgement of their authority which they gained among their tribal followers. No tribal leader could prevent his followers from moving away and joining other alliances and chieftains. Thus Levshin's perceived 'lack' of order in the steppe is widely informed by the circumstance that he expected to find subjects where only followers, who frequently changed their political affiliation, could be found.⁵

The political heritage of the river oases was nourished by two traditions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: on the one hand, there was still a strong Chingizid heritage which informed the commitment to Chingizids as supreme rulers. According to *yasa*, only a senior offspring of Chingiz Khan could become khan.⁶ In the sixteenth century there were Shaybanid khans who transferred various appanages (like Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Balkh, Shahr-i Sabz or Hissar) to different lineages who mutually competed for more influence. In the seventeenth century, Balkh and Bukhara became the basic appanages of the river oases which were led twice by brothers of the Janid ruling dynasty. Despite the increasing identification of Uzbek tribal elites with regions at the end of the seventeenth century, Chingizid rule remained intrinsic to legitimate leadership.⁷ The Chingizid inheritance was also visible in the ceremony of enthronement of the khan who was –

like the Kazakh khans – raised on a white felt by the heads of the four most influential Uzbek tribal confederacies.⁸

The other inheritance, which informed political life, referred to Islamic concepts of just and pious rulers, who obeyed the laws of Allah.⁹ Shaybani Khan's (1500–1510) submission also to Islamic justice and his insistence on his role as a supporter and promoter of Sharia were typical for such Islamic precepts of a just ruler.¹⁰ Islamic subjects were willing to acknowledge the authority of sovereigns, the more the latter were able to represent this ideal of an Islamic ruler and military leader.

These Chingizid and Islamic traditions caused tension in political authority relations, which did not only emerge from different normative claims of Chingizid *yasa* and Islamic *sharia*, but also from the different demands of tribal customary law. Thus every sovereign who tried to strengthen the position of *sharia* quickly found himself faced with a tribal problem, just as he would be faced with an Islamic problem should he try to deprive esteemed Muslim clerics of their influence.

Table 3 shows ruling dynasties and patrimonial rulers of Central Asia.

The Emirate of Bukhara

Political order in change

When Shah Murad (1785–1800) succeeded his father Daniyal Biy as ruler of Bukhara in 1785, the head of the *Manghit* dynasty was said to have assumed the title *amīr al-mu'minīn*, which became in Bukhara 'the title of the Manghit rulers *par excellence*'.¹¹ This Arab title contained religious meaning, since it was the traditional title of the caliph, the political and religious leader of the Islamic *umma*. In addition, the new dynasty also claimed descent from the prophet and put 'sayyid' in front of their lordly title as Shah Murad had married a princess with a Sayyid background. This also emphasised the Islamic base of the new rule.¹²

His family had already appropriated the highest office of the *otaliq* at the Bukharan court of the *Janid* Khanate¹³ for years and had ruled the country. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century political reasoning had still demanded that Chingizids remained formally in office as supreme sovereigns of the khanate.¹⁴ The shift from a Chingizid to an Islamic legitimacy did not fully imply the end of the khanate because the successors of Shah Murad and his son continued to claim the Khan title, but it led to a more Islamic emirate. Being a member of a Naqshbandiya brotherhood, the emir disregarded *yasa*, by disposing of the last Chingizid. Instead, he kept some of the Sufis' customs as a Naqshbandiya adept and wore Sufi clothes also as ruler. Shah Murad asserted that he did not acknowledge any other law than *sharia* and that he wanted to collect only taxes which were prescribed by Islam.¹⁵

Table 3 Ruling dynasties and patrimonial rulers of Central Asia

<i>Manghit</i> (<i>Bukhara</i>)		<i>Qunghiro</i> (<i>Khiva</i>)	
Muhammad	1756–1759	Ish Muhammad	1716–1741
Rahim Khan		Biy	
Muhammad	1759–1785	Amin Inoq	1765–1791
Daniyal Biy		Muhammad	
Shah Murad	1785–1800	Avaz Inoq	1791–1804
Sayyid Amir	1800–1826	Iltuzar Khan	1804–1806
Haydar			
Husayn	1826	Muhammad	1806–1825
		Rahim I	
Umar	1826	Allah Quli Khan	1825–1842
Sayyid Amir	1827–1860	Rahim Quli	1843–1846
Nasrullah Khan		Khan	
Sayyid Amir	1860–1885	Muhammad	1846–1855
Muzaffaraddin Khan		Amin Khan	
Sayyid Amir	1885–1910	Sayyid Abdallah	1855
Abdalahad			
Khan			
Sayyid Amir	1910–1920	Qutluq Murad	1855–1856
Alim Khan		Khan	
		Sayyid	1856–1864
		Muhammad	
		Khan	
		Sayyid	1864–1910
		Muhammad	
		Rahim II Khan	
		Sayyid Asfandiyar	1910–1918
		Khan	
		Sayyid Abdullah	1918–1920
<i>Ming (Khokand)</i>			
Shahrulkh	c.1710–1721	Shir Ali Khan	1842–1845
Abdalrahim	1721–1734	Khudayar Khan	1845–1858
		(1st reign)	
Abdalkarim	1734–1750	Malla Khan	1858–1862
Irdana Biy	1751–c. 1769	Shah Murad	1862
Narbota Biy	c.1770–c.1798	Khudayar Khan	1862–1863
		(2nd reign)	
Alim Khan	c.1798–1810	Sayyid Sultan	1863–1865
Umar Khan	c.1810–1823	Khudayar Khan	1865–1875
		(3rd reign)	
Muhammad Ali	1823–1842	Nasiraddin Khan	1875–1876
Khan			

Note: Uzbek rulers who first claimed khanship are indicated in bold type.

Source: Bregel, in Munis and Agahi 1999, pp. vii–lxv; Besiembiev 1987, pp. 11–27; Bregel 1991, pp. 418–19; 2000; von Kügelgen 2002, pp. 68–87.

Shah Murad carried out administrative, financial and judicial reforms which strengthened central authorities.¹⁶ His land reform in the eastern part of the emirate enabled more efficient tax collection and diminished the influence of local tribal leaders.¹⁷ Nevertheless, his rule did not discard the former, since his military troops and his administrative staff relied on them. Military troops were still irregular ones. Their commanders were tribal leaders (*begs*), the warriors (*nukers*) were tribesmen and the military units were based on tribal subdivisions. In times of peace, most of these troops lived on estates (*tankhos*), which were granted to their tribal leader. There, or in nearby towns, they lived from the taxation of peasants. In times of war they joined the army of the emir under the command of their *begs*.¹⁸ Despite the strengthening of *sharia* norms and the control of the provinces by loyal followers, he did not lose all support of Uzbek and Turkman tribesmen, with the help of whom he destroyed the Persian Merv oasis in 1789–90 and deported its inhabitants to Bukhara. During his and his successor's rule, large irrigation projects like those in the Zarafshan valley delivered the material base for more Islamic ways of life.¹⁹

Haydar Amir (1800–26), the son of Shah Murad, was enthroned according to *yasa* on a white felt, but he did not officially take the title of a khan but that of an *amīr al-mu'minīn*. Being a *pir* himself, he continued the Islamic policy of his father and supported Sufi brotherhoods and orthodox Islam in the emirate. During his rule the increasing central control of tribal confederacies was seriously challenged by the uprising of the *Ktaīs* and *Qipchoqs*. Up to that time Uzbek tribes and tribal confederacies still formed political and administrative units which were headed by tribal leaders, called *biīs*. These leaders were influential as they collected taxes for the emir on the one hand, and distributed pastures and water rights among their tribesmen. In case of the decline of central government after the death of an emir, they tried to regain their independence from the capital. Thus Haydar had to win the support of the most influential *biīs* by granting influential offices to influential leaders or imposing *begs* as governors from the outside. The uprising of the *Ktaīs* and *Qipchoqs* (1821–5), which the the *Keneges* of the Shahr-i Sabz *beklik* supported, was another attempt of Uzbek tribal confederacies to diminish the political supremacy of the *Manghits*.²⁰

In a way, Amir Nasrullah (1827–60) continued Shah Murad's centralisation policy of restraining the tribal elements from administration and the army. He deprived the Uzbek tribal leaders of their military power by strengthening a regular army. In the 1830s he established an infantry consisting of 2,000 farmers, craftsmen and slaves who lived with their families outside the towns in special villages and were called *sarboz*. These troops were trained with firearms and were personally loyal to the khan.²¹ With the help of the Turkman Rahim Birdi, Naib Abul Samat from Tabriz and these *sarboz*, he started a campaign against Uzbek military elites and highest officials of the emirate, whom he killed or exiled.²² As a result, he tightened

control over the provinces and preferred to patrimonially recruit men from his own court to high offices in provinces, mostly Tajiks and foreigners. Every official depended on his favour. His reputation as a cruel and 'despotic' ruler killing thousands of opponents at the beginning of his reign arose from his quite unchecked rule where no one could be sure of his life due to suspicion and an established espionage network.²³ On the other hand, Europeans like Ignat'ev, who personally met the emir, described him also as 'personable with impressive looks' and as an 'intelligent' ruler, who 'handled himself with great dignity'.²⁴ Nevertheless, his power remained limited, since provinces like Shahr-i Sabz, where many exiled Uzbeks took refuge, successfully resisted Nasrullah's control until 1855-6.²⁵ Provinces like Qunduz or Balkh on the left bank of the Amu-Darya also broke away from the emirate.²⁶

Patrimonial administration

The political order of the emirate was a hereditary patrimonial autocracy. Thus the rule of the emir was absolute with regard to his subjects, but bound to Muslim religious laws and customs. It was patrimonial due to the fact that authority relations were based on relations of piety of the subjects (*fuqaros*) towards the rulers, and that the ruler recruited his administrative staff from servants and followers of his domain.²⁷ The staff of authority operated outside of his domain and was split into administrative, military, judicial, tax and police officials. The division between private and state sphere did not exist. All state property and means of administration were owned personally by the ruler.²⁸ As is typical for patrimonialism, there were no precise instructions about offices, titles and delimitation of competencies. Thus the jurisdiction and power of offices shifted constantly according to the favour of the emir. Therefore the following overview cannot be more precise.²⁹

Basically, the political hierarchy consisted of three different levels of offices and dignities which were not always separated from each other. On the highest level existed the most influential offices of the central administration. The chief minister of the emir was called *qushbegi*³⁰ and sometimes also held the title of an *otaliq*, which was the highest honorary title in the emirate.³¹ He was the governor of both Bukhara and the Bukharan domain of the emir, and headed hakims and *begs* of the provinces. The *mukhtor* was the second-ranked official.³² He was the steward of the emir's household and in charge of the treasury. The *zakotchi kalon* was responsible for the collection of the *zakot*, a tax on moveable property like merchandise and cattle.³³

The *shaikhulislom Islam* was the highest spiritual advisor of the emir, and sat on the left side of the ruler as head of the *ulema* at audiences. The *khoja kalon* sat on the right side and was the highest judge at the emir's court. He headed the court which dealt with disputes among the ruling class. The *qozi kalon* was the highest judge of the ruled and supervised the *rais*' surveillance of Islamic orthodoxy and morals. For this purpose, he relied on the *eshon-*

rais, who was the highest *rais* in Bukhara and headed the *rais* of districts and provinces. Besides this, there existed many other clerical ranks and offices.³⁴

The *tūpchi Boshi*,³⁵ the commander of the artillery, was the leader of the regular army. At the end of the century this position was held by the *askar-boshi*.³⁶ The emir could award the dignity of a *devonbegi* or of a *parvonachi* to all these functionaries. Only the former title gave the right to join the *devon* (council) of the emir, when the ruler convoked it. All these officials were appointed by the emir and were directly responsible to him.³⁷

The *mirshab* of Bukhara was the supreme police officer who headed all *mirshabs* of other towns. He was in charge of the night watch, after all eleven doors of the capital had been closed, and he handed over the keys to the *qushbegi*.³⁸

The emirate consisted of a fluctuating number of more and less dependent smaller and larger provinces which were called *bekliks* or *viloiat*s.³⁹ The emir appointed begs (hakims) as supreme governors of provinces who had full jurisdiction over the population, except in cases of life and death, which had to be referred to the emir. In the eastern provinces like Kuliab or Karategin these governors were also known as *mirs*. The governors were usually close relatives or favourites of the emir, and could hold the dignities of a *devonbegi* or *parvonachi*. The emir's sons often ruled the more important *bekliks*. The heir-apparent customarily resided in Kermine.⁴⁰

The beg or halim was entitled to collect taxes from taxable *mulk* property for his own treasury.⁴¹ In exchange, he had to maintain order in the province, deliver troops for the khan during war time, support the court of the visiting emir and make large gifts to the latter.

In each province there was a superior *rais* who supervised the moral conduct and public order of the province and who had sometimes also some judicial influence in religious affairs. In addition, he had to control the right use of weights and linear measures.⁴²

The provincial kadi (Uzb. *qozi*) was the highest authority in judicial and notarial matters, whereas the provincial *zakotchi* was responsible for the prompt collection of the *zakot*. In tightly controlled provinces, these officers were only responsible to the corresponding central functionaries and were expected to control each other in their official acts. In this way the power of local begs could be checked, as central officials hoped.⁴³

Bekliks (Tajik: *viloiat*) could be divided in *tumans*.⁴⁴ On the lowest level there existed tax districts which were called *kents*. Depending on the seize, a *beklik* could consist of 3–24 tax districts which were administered by *amlokdors* or *sarkors*.⁴⁵ The *amlokdor* was the emir's tax collector on the state land (*amlok*) formally owned by the emir, which included more than one half of the emirate's land.⁴⁶ The yields would only go into the emir's treasury.⁴⁷ Each tax district had its own kadis, *rais* and *zakotchis*, which were responsible to the superior provincial officials. Thus the emir's basic income was from *amlok* and *zakot* yields.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, central authority was often not fully able to control the provinces, especially the more distant ones, where provincial officers cooperated to increase their mutual profit, by hiding information, reporting wrong statistics and keeping tax transfers as low as possible. Some eastern provinces paid only a tribute, others only nominally acknowledged the emir.⁴⁹

Radloff described the Bukharan begs of the Zarafshan valley as fully authorised governors. They were military leaders, who commanded local garrisons, suppressed any rebellion, insured the prescribed tax transfer to Bukhara and maintained the sovereignty of the emir.⁵⁰ Logofet delivered some evidence that administrative division of power was not strong everywhere. It was the designated beg himself who appointed his assistants. In contrast to Schuyler, Logofet asserts that the beg could also install *amlokdors* from among his relatives and confidants.⁵¹ The minor functionaries, like the *amlokdor*, did the same with their aides. In more distant provinces like Tashkent he also appointed the kadis.⁵² In this way the beg controlled wide parts of the provincial administration.⁵³

This influence became most obvious in judicial affairs. In contrast to the requirements of *sharia*,⁵⁴ the beg presided over severe criminal offences.⁵⁵ Only in more complicated matters were the kadi and the *rais* consulted. Even in these cases the latter's involvement was only advisory, and it was up to the beg to judge. In addition, death sentences had to be confirmed by the emir or the *qushbegi*. Thus the kadi's authority was often limited to the civil matters linked to Islamic hereditary or contractual law.⁵⁶ Where central control or the influence of the beg was small in more Islamised provinces, the kadi could also supervise the execution of death sentences without official confirmation.⁵⁷

If maintenance of order failed and central troops had to intervene, the rebels were not the only ones who faced punishment. Often the involved functionaries would be dismissed from their positions and their property confiscated.⁵⁸ As a result, the political survival of the beg depended on his ability to control his officials. The emir knew about the power of his begs, who could easily get involved in raids with others or turn against him himself. This made the emir careful in his choice of his governors, as Radloff noticed. He chose them from his inner circle and ordered them back to his court after a time, in order to prevent them from becoming too influential.⁵⁹

With regard to irrigation, the *mirob* was the supreme official to supervise the irrigation network of the oasis of Bukhara. He was appointed by the khan and had full authority over the distribution of water and maintenance of the main channels. He was assisted by *panjbegis*, who distributed water over a certain territory and sold surplus water at a fixed price. The *arbohs* (Uzbek: *oqsoqols*) were subordinated to the latter and supervised irrigation in the villages.⁶⁰ In smaller oases, *ariq oqsoqolis* often administrated the maintenance of canals and the allocation of water. They could call out the

villagers for help to repair common canals.⁶¹ Sometimes local and low-ranking water officials were called *mirobs* as well.⁶²

The *amin* was another local official who was elected and who headed several villages. He usually held a title which officially confirmed his office and was the middleman between the administration and the local population. He assisted the *amlokdor* as defender of local interests, when the latter fixed the tax yields of villages. Sometimes *amins* were involved in the supervision of irrigation channels and performed duties similar to those of *mirobs*. In tribal territories it was the *elbegi* who was responsible for the collection of taxes and who supervised water channels.⁶³

It is important to note that all higher offices were unsalaried. At the Bukharan court high officials lived on gifts, official revenues and were granted tax free estates. Provincial *begs* also maintained their own courts in the *bekliks'* capitals. All the fines, fees and taxes which went beyond the annual tax liability to the emir or *beg* belonged to the provincial officials. Due to the inherent prosperity of the offices, the emir or *qushbegi* also sold the offices of *kadi*, *rais*, *amlokdor* or *beg* for cash and yields in advance.⁶⁴ As the interpretation of customary norms about tax duties were elastic, whole districts could become dependent on the favour of functionaries like the *zakotchi* or *amlokdor*.⁶⁵

In this context, universal corruption within the administration cannot properly be asserted,⁶⁶ as holders of offices were entitled to collect revenues also for their own purpose. If they collected more than they were customarily entitled to, they could be called unscrupulous, but not corrupt. Only lower officials like the *iasovul* and *iasovulboshi*, who did police jobs, the *mirzas* (writers) or the *arizachis* (specially authorised officers) received regular salaries, and were usually the aides and relatives of *begs* or *amlokdors*.⁶⁷

Impacts on communal commitment

So far we have sketched the administrative order of the Bukharan Emirate, which was overlaid across the indigenous units of communal commitment like the *mahallahs* and tribal groupings. This relation between patrimonial state structures and local solidarity groups was highly problematic, since political institutions of the emirate were only partly based on the units of communal commitment. Before the reforms of Shah Murad, the Bukharan khanate had a stronger tribal bias. Nevertheless, despite of the strengthening of *sharia* norms, Uzbek tribal leaders remained also dominant after Murad's reform, since police and military force depended on tribal *nukers*. *Mingboshi*, *iuzboshi*, *ëllikboshi* and *onboshi* were the military ranks for tribal leaders with strong indigenous support who could head up to a thousand, a hundred, fifty or ten warriors respectively. Until Nasrullah's reign the ruler's power depended rather on his abilities to arrange tribal alliances. After Nasrullah had chased out some of the Uzbek leaders, he was able to rule

some provinces without tribal support, with the help of devoted servants and regular troops which he recruited from the *Sart* population. The latter consisted of non-tribal rural and urban settlers who were strongly influenced by school Islam and *sharia*. However, the emir still recruited some of his administrative staff from loyal Uzbek leaders. Since he was more easily able to replace them, these tribal leaders became more dependent on the emir.

The interesting question is whether local leaders also were recruited as officials of their local administration or whether strangers instead became the local governors.

Logofet makes some interesting remarks by way of analysing the local administration of the emirate and emphasising that elected local leaders usually stayed in office when appointed *begs* and their aides faced dismissal:

When the *beg* retreated, all *amlokdors*, their aides and others also left office. But the *oqsoqol*, the *ming boshi* and the *élbegi*, who seemed to be elected by the people, remained in their positions for their whole life. They were only replaced when cases of complaint about abuse increased within the population.⁶⁸

With regard to the irrigation network, Olufsen noted that the *mirob* of Bukhara was appointed by the emir. The former recruited his assistants (*panjbegi*) from his friends and relatives. Only the *arbob* (*oqsoqol*) was a local man elected by the villagers.⁶⁹ Both observations seem to confirm the view that local administration was often run by outsiders who were perceived as strangers by the population.⁷⁰ This was especially the case among Uzbek tribal groups like the *Tuiaklys* and *Türks* whose members never became Bukharan officials, nor did they become Bukharan *nukers*. In contrast, tribal groups like the *Qataghans*, *Mings* and *Manghits* were more likely to be ruled by one of them, since many *begs* and other officials were recruited from among them. This privileged access to power, however, did not prevent *Ming begs* from opposing the emir, promoting their independence and supporting uprisings in times of weak central government.⁷¹

The rift between the local communities headed by *oqsoqols* (*arbobs*) and governmental officials could be quite tense. Grebenkin reports that *Ktaïs* and *Qipchoqs* hated the emir and his administration, and that this hate was deeply rooted in the mind of these tribesmen. When asked for the reason for their malevolence and for regarding the emir as their *dushman* (enemy), they said:

The emirs always oppressed us, taxed us more than other Uzbeks, killed our elders and sent us *Sarts* and Iranians as tax collectors.⁷²

The same is true for the *Keneges* and the *Mings* in the Zarafshan valley, who opposed the emir and frequently supported revolts.⁷³ This rift was not less distinct in the eastern provinces of Bukhara, where Uzbek *begs* could

rule over Farsi-speaking populations with no tribal origin. This rule impeded the formation of sharing political community structures.⁷⁴

It has to be noted that Uzbek tribalism was far more widespread in the border areas of the river oases than is usually assumed. Khanykov, who travelled through the emirate in 1841–2 for eight months, asserted that there were twenty-eight main tribal (descent) groups in the emirate. He collected more detailed information about fifteen of them, of which only two had fully settled down at that time. Uzbek tribes like the *Ktaï*, *Naïman*, *Saroï*, *Araliat* and *Buzachi* were still nomadic, as *Qunghirot* or *Manghit* tribesmen nomadised between Karshi and Shahr-i Sabz and around Karshi. Many of the latter tribesmen had also settled down in the town of Karshi itself. Only two of these thirteen tribal groups were fully settled.⁷⁵ According to Khanykov they lived like the Kazakhs in yurts, bred mainly sheep, had their tribal leaders which were, according to their rank in the army of the emir, called *iuzboshi* or *iasovulboshi* at that time. The observed disrespect of daily prayers (*namoz*) indicates that school Islam and *sharia* had not penetrated these rural areas. But Khanykov also asserts that raids and *barymtas* were not practised any longer among them, as these offences were severely punished by the khan's aides.⁷⁶

Many provinces were only nominally subordinated to the khan. Provinces like Shahr-i Sabz were strong oppositional bastions to Bukharan rule. Although Bukharan troops occupied these territories from time to time, the emir was not able to dismiss local elites who had strong support among the population and formed political alliances with neighbouring *bekliks* like Kuliab, Karategin or Hissar.⁷⁷ In such provinces, the *beg* was an indigenous leader whose leadership emerged from his military success, from his wealth and generosity, from his ability as a just mediator and from his numerous relatives who acknowledged his authority and assisted him during conflicts within the *beklik*.⁷⁸

We should not assume, however, that tribal leaders like the *Keneges* begs of Shahr-i Sabz headed tribal confederacies against the emir of which all members could trace *Keneges* descent, as Karmysheva correctly remarks. Like other tribal confederacies, the *Keneges* formed a political alliance of various tribal groups and opponents of the emir. Including *Keneges* tribesmen as an influential segment, it was named after them.⁷⁹

In provinces with a tribal background, customary law remained especially important in family matters, in spite of the existing kadis.⁸⁰ Other eastern provinces like Hissar and Kuliab were also only nominally subordinated to the emir.⁸¹ These provinces included districts which were headed by elected leaders who were called (*shohs*). These rulers were from local esteemed families, and had to care for the interests of the people, since the people could depose them in case of discontent.⁸² Such districts formed bastions of rebellion against central rule, and seemed to have formed much tighter political communities, though on a small scale.

Under circumstances of centralised administration, obedience based on submissiveness rather occurred, when people also acknowledged the emir as a religious leader, as was the case during the reign of Amir Shah Murad. Sometimes Amir Haydar was also perceived as such a pious, just ruler.⁸³

The fragility of the emirate's political order also became obvious after the death of the emir. Whenever the emir died, times of political turmoil began and provinces tried to break off from Bukhara. After the death of Shah Murad, Amir Haydar (1800–25) had to fight against Merv Turkmen and *Ārsary* tribes. When he himself died, Shahr-i Sabz and many other provinces broke away from the emirate and resisted central control. Thus the most powerful Bukharan emir, Nasrullah, took twenty-five years to recapture Shahr-i Sabz, which became once more independent after the death of this mighty emir. Despite Russian support, Amir Abdalahad (1885–1910) also faced rebellions in his first three years in office.⁸⁴

Newly enthroned emirs did not only fight against defected *bekliks*. They also regarded male relatives of their own family as dangerous opponents. Thus it often happened that they would try to depose them or keep them under strict control.⁸⁵ Amir Haydar ordered the killing of his brother, who had opposed his enthronement.⁸⁶ When Nasrullah became emir, one of his older brothers had been poisoned and the second one exiled. It was said that Nasrullah did not only order the imprisonment, but also the killing, of his three younger brothers.⁸⁷ Abdalahad removed two of his brothers as begs of Hissar and Charjuy, married off the pretender's childless wives, and put the other two wives with their children into prison.⁸⁸

There is some evidence to conclude that the integration of local leadership rooted in tribalism and residential communities remained highly problematic in the Emirate of Bukhara. As local communal commitments and political orientations emerging from centralised government did not interpenetrate in a significant way, enduring political order remained weak in the area. This was due to the serious rift between the population headed by *oqsoqols* and *élbegis* and the centrally appointed non-indigenous officials who could enrich themselves on a grand scale at the expense of the taxed population without bearing the burden of responsibility of indigenous leaders or officials recruited from their own provinces.⁸⁹

Some degree of political community emerged where the emir was acknowledged as an Islamic ruler, and *sharia* became the basis of his rule and the people's communal commitment. Bukharan Amir Shah Murad (1785–1800) represented such an Islamic ruler. He enjoyed high admiration due to his reputation as a holy man, which he acquired through religious demonstrations as a youth at the Kalan mosque.⁹⁰ In this way charismatic leadership could assure and strengthen political commitment to the *umma* of believers within the emirate, and intensify action orientations towards *sharia*. But emirs like Shah Murad also faced limits in their endeavours to Islamise society, due to the tribal affiliations of the emirate's dominant

Uzbek political elite. On the other hand, political order could have more easily emerged within *bekliks* like Shahr-i Sabz, where Uzbek tribal customary law remained highly valued and could have promoted the extension of patriarchal communal commitment into the political sphere.

The Khanate of Khiva

Political order in change

The Khanate of Khiva differed from the Emirate of Bukhara in two basic respects. Unlike the emirate, it did not consist of relatively autonomous principalities which continuously challenged central authority. The Khivan oasis was geographically quite compact and easily surveyed by the khan. Only the *Qunghirot* area on the western edge of the Amu-Darya delta was more autonomous and ruled by tribal leaders.⁹¹

Khiva differed from Bukhara also in its greater dependence on tribalism: this brought political unrest and could seriously endanger the political order of the khanate. Khiva's population included a high number of tribesmen. The oases were surrounded by semi-nomadic or nomadic Kazakhs, Kara-Kalpaks and Turkmen tribal confederacies. As a result, the security of the oasis depended on good relations with neighbouring tribal federations, and on the balance of power between these different groups. The tribal bias of the khanate was also visible in the settlement structures of Uzbek tribes. In contrast to Bukhara, where Uzbek tribal groups became settled in smaller units, Khivan Uzbeks settled down in relatively large tribal groups, so that towns like Qunghirot (Russian: Kungrad), Nukus (Kara-Kalpak: Nökis), Manghit or Qipchoq (Russian: Kipchak) came to be named after the influential tribal confederacies which resided there.⁹²

The Uzbeks and the Turkmen represented the dominant military groups, and khans relied on some of these groupings to maintain power. Thus the Ashtarkhanid Khan and famous historian Abul Ghazi Bahodur (1645–1663) was able temporarily to subdue Turkman tribesmen, after he had administratively reorganised Uzbek tribal groups in four territorial parts (*tūpas*). In this way he created the four districts of the *Uīghur-Nāīman*, the *Qunghirot-Qīiat*, the *Nukus-Manghit* and the *Qanghli-Qipchoq* headed by *otaliqs*.⁹³ This new administrative order seemed to have neutralised rival Uzbek tribal groups and secured Uzbek support for the khan, although Abul Ghazi neglected tribal customs during his reign.⁹⁴

After Nadir Shah's rule (1736–1747) Khorezm was divided among the main Uzbek tribal groups, whose tribal leaders headed their confederacies and ruled over the *Sart* population.⁹⁵ These Uzbek tribes and tribal confederacies were territorial and administrative units. Land and water rights were tribally owned. *Biīs*, begs and *oqsoqols* regulated the access to these basic resources.⁹⁶

As political reasoning was still based on Chingizid legitimacy, Uzbek tribal leaders continued to enthrone Kazakh sultans as khans of Khiva. Mir Abdul Kerim Bukhary called these enthronements 'playing at khans', because the elected were politically powerless and dependent on Uzbek support.⁹⁷ In the second half of the eighteenth century several Uzbek tribal groups competed for political influence in the khanate. Up to the 1760s the *Manghit* were politically dominant. Subsequently Muhammad Amin, the *Qunghiro*t tribal leader, grew in influence and founded the *inoq* council which consisted of the tribal military leaders (*inoqs*), the first minister (*qush-begi*) and a commander-in-chief (*otaliqs*).⁹⁸

Muhammad Amin (1765–1791) himself was the *inoq* of the *Qunghiro*t confederacy and strengthened his authority by keeping close ties with influential *Sart* families.⁹⁹ When Uzbek troops under his leadership inflicted a serious defeat on the *Iomut*, who had frequently pillaged parts of the oasis in 1770, Muhammad Amin not only strengthened the political position of the khanate, but also consolidated the *Qunghiro*t as the dominant force within the khanate. But formally he and his son Avaz Inoq (1799–1804) still remained followers of ephemeral Khivan khans of Kazakh origin.¹⁰⁰

Iltuzar (1804–1806) was the first *Qunghiro*t ruler who assumed the title of khan. This was a bold political claim, as only Chingizids could legitimately claim this supreme position of authority. Up to this time all Uzbek tribal leaders acknowledged the Chingizid political heritage and respected the fact that they could not take the khan's place, even if they were more powerful than the latter.¹⁰¹ It is little wonder that his claim fuelled hostilities between Uzbek tribes. Mir Abdul-Kerim precisely described this commitment in his *History of Central Asia*, when he narrated the speech of the *otaliq*, Bek-Pulad, the head of the *Uighur* confederacy, at the ceremony of enthronement:

'You hardly deserve this project', he says. 'Continue the leadership of your father and that of your ancestors. Be faithful to God [and realise] that you are not able to put a good end to such a serious matter. ... It is my conception of the good which directs my speech. I neither put claims, nor have personal interests in this matter'.¹⁰²

As a result, Iltuzar killed the most influential Bek-Pulad, who had advised Iltuzar not to become khan of Khiva. Most of Bek-Pulad's relatives fled to Bukhara. Iltuzar faced also the severe opposition of other Uzbek leaders, and died prematurely on a campaign against Bukhara.¹⁰³ His brother Muhammad Rahim (1806–1825) also took the title of khan and continued to suppress the resistance of Uzbek leaders who opposed the *Qunghiro*t's disrespect for old customs. Like Nasrullah in Bukhara some years later, he was quite successful in reducing the influence of Uzbek tribal leaders. However, the khan's policy also faced opposition among his own tribal followers. Thus he eliminated ten of his most influential tribesmen and

killed two of his brothers who had escaped to Qunghirot where they had found many allies.¹⁰⁴

Muhammad Rahim attempted to carry out administrative reforms by establishing regular taxation on land. He also advanced the monetisation of the oasis' economy, promoted the minting of gold coins¹⁰⁵ and introduced the collection of tariffs on livestock and merchandise (*zakot*).¹⁰⁶ He increasingly recruited officials from Khivan *Sarts*, the sedentary non-tribal inhabitants of the oasis.¹⁰⁷ This attitude secured *Sart* support for his rule, but increased Uzbek resentment against these newcomers to politics.¹⁰⁸ The Khanate of Khiva was less successful in eroding tribal structures, however, and patrimonial state structures remained weak.

Muhammad Rahim undertook several campaigns against Turkman and Kazakh tribal confederacies, the emir of Bukhara and the shah of Persia, and he was able to increase the influence of the khanate on neighbouring areas. In 1809 and 1810 he defeated the *Chovdur* who had pillaged Khivan-Russian trade on the Mangishlak peninsula.¹⁰⁹ In 1811 he subdued the Kara-Kalpaks in the Amu Darya delta.¹¹⁰ In 1812, 1816 and 1819 he entered upon campaigns against Khorasan. These were also directed towards the independent Akhal *Teke* and the *Gökleng* of the Gurgan plain. The Akhal *Teke* had to submit to the khan in the 1820s, and the Murghab oasis came under Khivan influence in 1822. In the same year Muhammad Rahim was able to subdue the Charjuy area on the middle Amu-Darya, where the *Ärsary*, *Sakar*, *Chovdur*, *Ëski* and other tribes had settled.¹¹¹ From 1815 to 1820 the khan increased Khivan influence in the lower Sir Darya region and started to collect the *zakot* among the Kazakhs of Shir Ghazi Khan (1812–24).¹¹²

The limited influence of Uzbek tribal leaders was balanced by an increasing involvement of Turkmen in the Khivan army, however. The first *Qunghirot* khan, Iltuzar, already relied on *Iomut* tribesmen. After the successful campaign against the *Chovdur*, some *Chovdur* tribesmen entered into the service of the Khivan army. The same is true for the Akhal *Teke*, after they were compelled to acknowledge Khivan supremacy.¹¹³ Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that all these Turkmen became Khivan subjects by formal submission to the Khan after military defeat.¹¹⁴ Defeated Turkman tribesmen who could not be commanded instead became political allies of the khan. Thus the khan had rather to request their support during campaigns and wars. Military support could also be refused if Turkman tribal councils decided so. For this reason the khan was frequently promised Turkman troops which did not join him on campaigns. Turkman support was more probable when the tribesmen could easily get rich booty.

During the rule of Allah Quli (1825–42), Rahim Quli (1843–6) and Muhammad Amin (1846–55), campaigns against Bukhara, the Murghab oasis and Khorasan were repeatedly undertaken with only partial and temporary success. According to the relative strength of Persia, Bukhara and Khiva, Turkman tribal confederacies would either declare allegiance to

one of these powers or perhaps successfully defend their independence. Although Khivan troops were not always successful in their campaigns, *Qunghiro*t khans maintained their position without being seriously challenged as rulers of the khanate.¹¹⁵

Nevertheless, the relations between Khivan Turkmen and Uzbeks became precarious in 1855, when the military leader of the Serakhs *Teke*, Kushid Khan, defeated Khivan troops and killed khan Muhammad Amin. At the same time Khivan Turkmen, who had been cut off from water supplies in response to raids into Khivan territories, rebelled. The khan's successor Sayyid Abdallah (1855) tried to take harsh action against these Turkmen. This only increased tension between Uzbek and Turkman elements within the Khivan forces, however. This attitude soon cost him his life in a campaign against the *Iomut*, as *Chovdur* and *Emrely* units turned against their former Uzbek companions, defeated the army and killed the khan.¹¹⁶ His brother Qutluq Murad (1855–6) tried to contain the *Iomut* uprising with the help of influential *eshons* (Turkman: *ishans*) and called for *Teke* and *Saryk* troops from the Akhal and Merv oases respectively. In the end he too was killed during an audience.¹¹⁷

Sayyid Muhammad (1856–64) faced several Turkman insurrections during his rule. In 1856 he also called for Akhal *Teke* and Merv *Saryk* tribesmen, and inflicted defeats on the most hostile *Iomut* with the help of *Chovdur* and *Gökleng* troops. In addition, he increased pressure on the Khivan *Iomut* by cutting off water supplies to fields and pasture land. He also forbade any corn trade with insurgent Turkmen and closed the Khivan markets to them. In this way he wanted to force them to submit to his authority. But the situation eased only after the *Iomut* replaced the *Chovdur* as the backbone of the Khivan army in 1860. This shift of alliance occurred after the *beklik* *Qunghiro*t had split away from Khiva and the *Chovdur* had revolted against the khan.¹¹⁸

When Muhammad Rahim II (1864–1910) became Khivan khan, he faced a similar Turkman problem. In 1866 and 1867 *Iomut* tribesmen once more began widespread revolts. Like his predecessors, Rahim tried to starve out *Iomut* opposition by cutting off their water supplies and excluding them from the corn trade. In addition he tried to win over some influential tribal leaders by granting them privileges, whereas defeated *Iomut* had to pay tributes, give hostages, and were additionally charged an annual yurt tax. On the eve of the tsarist conquest, Khiva's security continued to rely on Turkman military forces.¹¹⁹

Patrimonial administration

In the Khanate of Khiva, offices were of different kind and not equally important to all population groups of the khanate, since tribesmen retained their own judicial and political structures. First of all, there was the office of

the khan, which was appropriated by close relatives of the predecessor. He was the head of the *divan*, the council of state. Next there were several offices of tribal origin: the *inoq*, the *biī* and the *otaliq* belonged to this group.

The *inoq* was the title of one of the four tribal leaders of the Uzbek confederacies. Muhammad Amin strengthened his positions by influencing the designation of the holders of this title and by formally retaining their offices within the new administrative order.¹²⁰ Subsequently they joined the khan's council as tribal leaders, but held only limited political influence.¹²¹ At the time of Vámbéry's visit to Khiva, *inoqs* were appointed from among close relatives and tribesmen of the khan. Some of them could also be governors (*hokims*) of provinces. The *biī* was a military officer who escorted the khan during campaigns. The *otaliqs* were the military commanders of the Khivan army. Only Uzbeks could hold any of these positions.¹²²

In contrast to these Uzbek offices, the khan patrimonially recruited the *qushbegi*, the *mukhtor*, the *iasovulboshi*, the *devonbegi* and the *mahram* from among his personal adherents. In the 1860s the *qushbegi* was the holder of the most influential office. He was the first official at court, recruited the army and superintended the excavation of canals.¹²³ He and the *mukhtor* ('the authorised') were in charge of the collection of the annual land tax (*salgyt*) on *mulk* property, which they supervised while travelling through the provinces.¹²⁴ Whereas the *qushbegi* was usually an Uzbek, the *mukhtor* was habitually recruited from the *Sart* elites. Thus the *qushbegi* was responsible for the northern provinces of the khanate, where Uzbek, Turkman and Karakalpak tribesmen lived. In contrast the *mukhtor* collected taxes in the southern provinces inhabited by the *Sart* population.¹²⁵ He was also the main treasurer of the khanate and supervised the income and expenses of the khan. He also received and maintained foreign ambassadors.

The *mahram* was holder of the third high patrimonial office, which could even be held by former slaves. He was in charge of the collection of the *zakot*, a tax on moveable property like livestock or merchandise.

These were the khan's three most important officials. As loyal and obedient servants, they were trusted by the khan and could exert considerable influence on his decisions. They each maintained secretaries (*mirzas*) and secondary officials who could be used as aides or messengers to ambassadors. These patrimonial officials were formally salaried, but had sources of additive income as tax collectors and recipients of gifts.¹²⁶

The two *iasovulboshs* were the heads of the khan's life-guards (*iasovuls*). Some of them assisted the public courts of the khan, others had to disperse crowds independent of rank and estate, and to clear the way for the khan. The four *pashebs* were the responsible watchmen of the town who guarded its gates. Their auxiliary helpers had to stride around the mahallahs and arrest anyone they saw abroad after midnight. They were also the hangmen of Khiva. All these officials received salaries as well.¹²⁷

The *naqib* was the spiritual head of the ulema. He was always a sayyid who was regarded to be a descendant of the prophet's family. He supervised the supreme kadi (*qozi kalon*), who was responsible for the entire Islamic jurisdiction within the khanate, the military kadi (*qozi ordu*), who joined the khan during campaigns and the high-ranking ulema. Some of the high-ranking ulema were chiefs of each five *muftis*, as Islamic judges were called in Khiva. On becoming supreme members of the ulema, the khan endowed them abundantly on entering office.

The Mufti, the *rais*, the kadi and the *okhun* represented the lower ranks of the ulema, and were maintained from income raised through local *vaqf* donations. Muftis were kadis who resided in towns and who were obliged to hold daily public audiences, either in the mosque or in their private residence. As in the emirate, they had no executive power. The *rais* – as I have already mentioned – supervised the observance of religious law, whereas the *okhuns* were esteemed scholars and teachers in the madrassahs.¹²⁸

No regular military offices existed in the khanate. Troops were mainly recruited from among the Uzbek and Turkman tribal allies of the khan. Allied tribesmen elected three different kinds of commander: *Onboshis* were commanders of ten, *iuzboshis* of a hundred and *mingboshis* of a thousand warriors. Among Turkmen these warriors were called *nökers*. These warriors were not regularly paid, but had two main sources of income. One was pillage and plunder on campaigns, the other was tax-free land, which the khan granted to them. Turkman tribesmen who had become allies of the khan received parcels of the irrigated borderlands of the oasis, which they used as pastures and tilled land. This land was called *atlyk*.¹²⁹

The provinces were usually governed by hakims, whom the khan patrimonially appointed from his loyal adherents and whom he could also remove. These governors, however, ruled only over *Sart* and some Uzbek populations of the provinces. They were assisted by *iuzboshis* and their troops.¹³⁰ In provinces where Uzbek tribalism was strong, the khan appointed tribal leaders as governors, who were called *noibs* ('deputies'). Their authority was, however, applied only to tribesmen.¹³¹

Impacts on communal commitment

Like the Emirate of Bukhara, the Khanate of Khiva was a hereditary patrimonial autocracy. Patrimonial structures were weaker-established and often did not replace tribal institutions. Thus administrative structures were weak in tribal territories, where Khivan Kara-Kalpaks, Kazakhs and Turkmen were ruled by their tribal leaders or tribal councils respectively.¹³²

Khivan Kara-Kalpaks were not ruled by Uzbek governors (*hokims*). When Muhammad Amin subdued them, he appointed commanders-in-chief (*otaliqs*) for each of the greater tribal federations. Hitherto Kara-Kalpaks had only acknowledged their tribal leaders (*bïis*) as supreme leaders, who

dealt with internal conflicts, fixed compensations in cases of casualties and formed political alliances. Military leaders (*batyrs*) were only occasionally appointed, but this office seemed to have lost its military importance, after Kara-Kalpak tribes had formally acknowledged the supreme authority of the Khivan khan in 1811.¹³³

The khan of Khiva recruited *otaliqs* to whom he granted special privileges in order to strengthen his control over the Kara-Kalpak tribes. He expected them to prevent Kara-Kalpaks from pillaging his subjects, and he used them occasionally to supervise the *bīs*' collection of taxes for the khan. The khan also recruited Kara-Kalpak tribesmen for his troops. To this end Kara-Kalpak tribes were divided into *atlyks*, which represented the smallest tax units and comprised twelve households. Every unit had to equip and maintain a warrior. Tribes could have around forty, sixty or eighty *atlyks*. This implied that they had to contribute the corresponding number of warriors to the Khivan army during wartime.¹³⁴

Kara-Kalpaks also had their own kadis who resided in Chimbay. These dealt, however, only with disputes between members of different tribes who usually resided in different areas in accordance with *sharia*.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, it is probable that involved *bīs* occasionally also settled these disputes according to *adat* in order to avoid the severe punishment of accused tribesmen.

Despite all the centralising efforts of the khan, the tribes remained the units of communal commitment among the Kara-Kalpaks. Whereas previously independent tribal leaders had tried to form advantageous alliances to secure their access to resources, they now started to compete for the influential offices of the *otaliqs*, as access and protection of resources started to depend also on good relations with Khivan officials.¹³⁶ This was especially true for the *beklarbegi*, who was the Khivan official who supervised the *otaliqs*.¹³⁷

It was no less problematic to encourage Turkman tribesmen to become loyal subjects of the khan. Politically independent Turkmen did not acknowledge authority relations and were proud of their political equality. For this reason they were little inclined to acknowledge the authority of an autocratic ruler who wished to command them as subjects. If they acknowledged authority, they would do so voluntarily and temporarily. This was the case during raids, when they submitted fully to the will of their *serdar*. This relation of obedience ended with the end of the raid, however.

In the nineteenth century Turkman tribal confederacies were often defeated and forced to declare their submission. In most cases it was just a formal declaration, and a promise which could soon be withdrawn. When they became more tightly linked to the shah of Persia or the khan of Khiva, they became military allies of these rulers. The latter might have had the impression that such allied Turkman confederacies had submitted to their rule and become their devoted subjects, but this was doubtless not true.

Turkmen regarded this kind of military arrangement rather as a welcome opportunity to join a campaign under the leadership of a *serdar* and to get rich booty. These military alliances worked particularly well when the khan or shah directed a campaign against inimical tribal federations. Thus *Iomut* supported campaigns against the *Teke*, and *Teke* tribesmen subscribed campaigns on *Iomut* territories. These campaigns were also perceived in different ways: whereas Turkmen tribesmen regarded such raids as *alamans* to get booty, Khivan khans held these raids to be military service in their rule.¹³⁸

The situation changed when Turkmen were forced to move into the Khivan oasis, as happened to the *Gökleng* in 1816, or when the climatic changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries drove some of them to the oasis to gain access to water, where they settled. Under strong Khivan rule they faced high taxes and punitive action when they tried to revolt. Under these circumstances Turkman commitment to political equality could be challenged.

The first *Qunghirot* khan, Iltuzar, made his point clear before starting a punitive expedition against revolting Khivan Turkmen. According to Abdul Kerim, he should have sent the following demand to the Turkmen:

If you will give up your raids, your disobedience and pillages, and if you will live like the other subjects paying your taxes in sheep, camels and agricultural wares, it is good. But if the opposite is true, leave our state!¹³⁹

Having just the choice between leaving the oasis and genuine submission, many tribesmen left Khiva and went to Astrabad. Some, apparently more settled, Turkmen decided to stay, however, and accepted the proposed terms of the khan, admitting:

We cannot leave the country of our ancestors, and how should we be able to live in a foreign country?¹⁴⁰

Being committed to their ancestors and not abandoning their land, Turkmen could give up some of their freedom. Under these circumstances commitment structures could gradually change and promote authority relations. In this respect dependent and independent Turkmen could have had quite different commitment structures, and this makes it difficult to generalise about communal commitment of the Turkmen.¹⁴¹

Nevertheless, it was still rare for such relatively subservient Turkmen to become good subjects of the khan and lose their tribal affiliations. Turkmen who stayed at the borders of the oasis only occasionally paid the *zakot*, when they faced the khan's military expeditions. Those Turkmen who received irrigated land annually paid the *zakot* and *ushr*, which was a tax on

state land amounting to one tenth of the yield. These taxes were not collected by appointed officials of the khan, but by the tribal elders of settled Turkmen themselves.¹⁴² Bregel, however, cannot find any source evidence that Khivan Turkmen paid the monetary tax on *mulk* property (*salgyt*).¹⁴³ This would also indicate that the administrative integration of Turkmen in the khanate had a limited influence on tribalism, which remained strong among the Khivan Turkmen.

According to Bregel, there does not even exist enough source evidence for claiming that enduring tribal following developed among the Khivan Turkmen in the nineteenth century.¹⁴⁴ If this is correct, Turkman tribalism did not lose all of its acephalous features after tribesmen had formally acknowledged the authority of the khan. It would also explain why *Qunghirot* khans failed to cut a deal with Turkmen in order to secure the safety of the oasis.

The loss of tribal affiliation would have been linked to the development of urban and rural mahallahs whose communal life had been based on Islamic law. *Sharia* did not really replace customary law, however. Although the Khivan khan appointed Turkman *kadis* to judge disputes according to Islamic law, their influence was quite limited. Bregel ascertains that there existed almost no *kadis* among the Khivan Turkmen, so that *ishans* frequently took over the duties of judges or mediators in disputes between rival groups. *Sharia* norms solely played a role in matrimonial and hereditary affairs, however.¹⁴⁵ Islamic judges only became active when both litigating parties had submitted their case to them. No Turkman could be forced to accept a judgement if he disliked it or regarded it as unjust. Khivan patrimonial administrative and religious bodies were often not prepared to execute legal titles. Thus members of wealthy and strong tribal groups could easily disregard disadvantageous decisions.¹⁴⁶ Involved *maslakhats* could rather fix binding decisions on their tribesmen. In return, Turkman tribes were usually collectively responsible and faced retaliation if some of their tribesmen should pillage Khivan subjects or allies.

Sarts and Uzbek tribesmen on the other hand, were likely to become subjects of the khan and be prosecuted by him. Before Muhammad Amin's centralisation policy, material compensations were usual among Uzbeks, as Murav'ev mentioned.¹⁴⁷ Thus *Bii* and other tribal leaders fixed fines to restore peaceful relations between involved descent groups according to customary law. It was Muhammad Amin who diminished the political influence of Uzbek tribal leaders in the khanate and who created parallel judicial structures.¹⁴⁸ Disregarding *adat*, Muhammad Amin introduced personal responsibility and severely punished Uzbeks who pillaged his subjects or allies.¹⁴⁹ This strengthened *Sart* support of his rule. As *Sarts* could usually not defend themselves against tribal raids, they depended on the khan's officials to guarantee their security, which often failed in the task. Subsequently, *Sarts* usually brought an action against a malefactor at the hakim's or khan's

court.¹⁵⁰ According to Vámbéry, both hakims and khan would have spent up to four hours a day for public hearings.¹⁵¹ But it has to be assumed that some Uzbek groups also settled many of their internal affairs by themselves according to customary law. This assumption is based on the fact that tribal descent groups (*qavms*) remained influential in Khorezm. Thus Uzbeks often settled disputes according to *adat* and rather acknowledged kadis in the sphere of personal and hereditary law.¹⁵²

We can conclude that the khanate was not based on a community of law which all Khivan inhabitants shared. Tribal groups had their own judicial structures which often informed the internal settlement of disputes and the regulation of conflict. The hakims and the khan could take judicial action only to a limited extent. As result they often sent troops to punish the tribal groups of wrongdoers. Due to the weakness of state structures, sharia did not become an unchallenged judicial foundation of the khanate. If the different legal traditions, the low institutionalisation of personalised state authority and the rift between local communities and state structures are taken into consideration, we have evidence to conclude that the khanate formed a weak normative order, which relied more on symbolic representations of authority than the shared legal and political orientations of all inhabitants. One of these representations was khanship itself. Khans like Muhammad Rahim resided their whole life in a yurt, although they maintained a harem in brick-built palaces. Thus when Murav'ev was received in Khiva in 1819, he found the khan dressed in silk clothes in the third court of the *ark* sitting in the middle of a yurt.¹⁵³ Although the khan retained some tribal customs, he was no longer a tribal leader, but rather a patrimonial ruler who tried to strengthen central authority and aimed at transforming tribesmen into subjects. The numerous revolts and the frequently changing alliances showed that he was not very successful in doing so. The *Sarts* were the only fully loyal subjects of the khan, and correspondingly, they expected the khan's protection from the infringements of tribesmen. The political order of the khanate remained fragile, however, and the fate of the khan depended on his temporary success in forming alliances with tribal confederacies.

The Khanate of Khokand

Political order in change

When Alim Khan (1798–1810) took over the khan title as first *Ming* ruler at the turn of the eighteenth century, he formally founded the Khanate of Khokand.¹⁵⁴ The established khanate, however, rudely broke with the Chingizid political inheritance which had informed the previous political consent of Uzbek tribal elites. It became a khanate without Chingizid khans.

Alim Khan's claim was ambivalent. It emphasised political independence from Bukhara and the sovereignty of *Ming* rule in the Ferghana valley, and aimed at strengthening the position of the ruler with respect to his followers and subjects. This claim had hardly any political addressees, however. The emir of Bukhara had abandoned Chingizid legacy, and Uzbek tribal leaders had neither acknowledged nor claimed non-Chingizid khan dignity up to that time. Similarly *Qipchoq* tribesmen¹⁵⁵ did not necessarily support Uzbek Chingizid claims due to their Kazakh origin. Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpaks had never acknowledged khans, and Kazakhs confirmed only their own Chingizids as khans. Last but not least, the *Sart* non-tribal, settled population had instead Islamic political orientations.

When Alim Khan established the khanate of Khokand, *Ming* leaders had been ruling in the Ferghana valley for a century. The first *Ming* ruler was Shahrukh (c.1710–21) who seized power from a ruling *khoja* family in Ferghana. His successor Abdalrahim (1721–34) took advantage of the weakened Khanate of Bukhara ruined by invading Kazakh and Kara-Kalpak tribes who escaped from the more superior Buddhist Oirats into the river oases.¹⁵⁶ He founded Khokand, established a loose alliance between the *bekliks* of Khojand, Marghilan and Andijan, and himself resided in Khokand, whereas his two brothers were begs in Khojand and Marghilan. One of them, Abdalkarim (1734–50) succeeded him in his office and formed a successful alliance with Kyrgyz tribes and confederacies against the Jungarian threat. His nephew Irdana Biy (1751–70) continued this policy. He formed an alliance with Kubat Biy, the leader of the huge Kyrgyz *Kushchu* tribal confederacy which operated in the Ferghana valley, in Tian Shan and Eastern Turkestan. This alliance was also directed against the beg of Ura Tube. At the end of the 1750s Khaji Biy, the leader of the Kyrgyz *Adigine* confederacy, formed an alliance with the *Ichkilik* confederacy. This alliance controlled the Alai mountains and the area around Osh. In 1762 Irdana took advantage of hostilities between these two alliances, seized Osh and incorporated the fortress, with its surrounding land, into his domain. He also faced temporary pressure from Chinese troops, after China had finally destroyed the Jungarian Khanate in 1757 and integrated East Turkestan as Sinkiang ('New province') into its empire. During his reign Narbota Biy (c.1770–c.1798) made alliance with individual *Qipchoq* and Kyrgyz tribal leaders and subdued most of the southern Kyrgyz. In order to maintain influence he established fortresses in tribal territories at strategic locations along trade and migration routes. There, garrisons were in charge of collecting *zakot* on merchandise and Kyrgyz livestock.¹⁵⁷

When Alim (c.1798–1810) took over *Ming* rule, he continued Khokandian expansionism. From 1808 to 1810 he occupied Khojand, seized Tashkent and defeated the surrounding Kazakh tribes. He headed campaigns against the *bekliks* of Jizzakh and Ura Tube, subdued the begs of Isfara, Kanibadam and Chust and increased central control within the khanate.

Despite his military success the internal order of the khanate remained fragile. High taxation on financing the campaigns and frequent conscription of craftsmen and peasants, who had to neglect their fields, fuelled resistance. In addition, members of the *ulema*, whose rights and earnings from *vaqf* estates had been diminished, also began to oppose the khan. The same is true for *begs* who had to deliver a part of their tax yields to the khan. Knowing about this opposition, the khan relied more and more on non-local mercenaries from Shugnan, Darvaz and Karategin.¹⁵⁸ But they also turned out to be not always reliable. When he went on a campaign to subdue revolting Kazakhs during the winter of 1809/10 and renew his authority in Tashkent, his uncle and influential military commanders proclaimed his brother Umar as new khan of Khokand. When Alim Khan left Tashkent for the capital, he had no longer the support of all his troops, who were discontented due to the harsh conditions of the winter campaign, and he was killed on the way back to the Ferghana valley. Having been khan for only a few years, Alim Khan experienced the increasingly dispositional character of khanship, which cost him his life.¹⁵⁹

Although Umar Khan (c.1810–23) is supposed to have ‘earned tremendous public approval for his conciliatory style of rule’¹⁶⁰ and probably had a more balanced character than his brother, he seems to have had little choice when he ordered the killing of his nephew and other relatives who might claim his throne and might cause political turmoil within the khanate.¹⁶¹ However, he continued the expansionist policy of his brother. Having established friendly terms with Muhammad Rahim Khan of Khiva, he resumed war against Amir Haydar to get Ura Tube and Jizzakh on his side. He undertook a successful campaign against revolting Kazakhs, and his military commander of Tashkent occupied Turkistan, which formerly belonged to Bukhara’s sphere of influence. He even subdued Kazakhs along the Sir Darya up to the Aral Sea, and founded the fortress Ak-Mechet (the tsarist Perovsk and Soviet Qyzyl Orda) in 1817. In addition, he extended the khanate’s influence up to Jetti Su. He seized Chimkent and Sayram, submitted Kazakhs of the Middle Horde which nomadised northern to Chimkent, and founded Aulie-Ata (Jambil) in 1822. There he started campaigns against Kyrgyz tribes in the Talas and Chu valleys. At the same time he increased his influence in the Ferghana valley by sending the Kyrgyz hakim of Kasan (Kasansay) and his followers against the *Sary Bagysh* confederacy which nomadised between Osh and Kashgar. In a similar way the khan ordered the hakim of Namangan to subdue the *Bagysh* and *Saiak* tribes in the Ketmen Tube valley. Both campaigns were successful and inflicted high losses on the resisting Kyrgyz tribes.¹⁶²

In contrast to his brother, Umar Khan was able to carry out administrative reforms which aimed at strengthening patrimonial state structures. He introduced a more differentiated system of rank and offices, which was similar to that of Bukhara.¹⁶³ In order to tighten up central control he intro-

duced the office of the *mingboshi*, whose holder became the most important official of the khanate. Besides this, there existed the *askarboshi* as head of the army and the *dasturkhonchi*, who was the khanate's treasurer. He also had high Muslim officials at his court. Whereas the *Ming* ruler had to rely more on allied local and regional notables, Umar Khan promoted more of his own relatives and close followers, and appointed them as begs or hakims in towns and provinces.¹⁶⁴

Unlike his predecessors, the khan was a well educated ruler. He patronised scholars, poets and artists, maintained an 'elegant literate culture' around his court, and was a patron of Muslim scholars. During his reign *sharia* was strengthened and the main mosque of Khokand was finished.¹⁶⁵ Thus he was also acknowledged as a Muslim ruler who respected Islamic law. His official title referred to the Islamic tradition of a just and pious ruler. It was *Amīr al-mu'minīn Muhammad Umar bahodurkhan*.¹⁶⁶ In this way he was not only called 'Great Khan' but also 'Emir of all Believers', a title which claimed the Emirate of Bukhara at the same time.

Muhammad Ali (1823–42) continued his father's expansionist policy, and the khanate reached its largest territorial expanse under his rule. Under the influence of the leading Appaq *khoja*-family from Khokand, he initiated several campaigns into East Turkestan and temporarily was acknowledged as supreme ruler of Kashgar. The khan subdued indigenous people of Shughnon, Rushan and Vakhān, where his authority was at least nominally acknowledged. Karategin became dependent on the khanate, as the *beklik* Kuliab and Darvaz temporarily acknowledged the khan's supremacy in 1834.

In northern Kyrgyzstan, Pishpek (Bishkek) was founded as a fortress in 1825, after parts of the *Solto* and *Sary Bagysh* had been forced to pay the *zakot*. Muhammad Ali's governor of Tashkent advanced along the Chu valley up to the Issik Kol and defeated the powerful *Bugu* confederacy in 1831. The bravely resisting *Saiak* and *Cherik* of the Naryn valley also had to submit to the khan. In order to strengthen the khan's authority in the conquered territories, several new fortresses were built: Kurtka and Toguz-Toro in the middle Naryn valley, Ketmen Tube in the Jungal valley, Boston Terek and Tash Korgon in the Pamir or Qarakol, and Barskoon at the Issik Kol.¹⁶⁷

Muhammad Ali failed to use his military success to promote the administrative centralisation of the khanate, however. On the contrary, due to the enormous expansion of the khanate, the khan was not able to keep control of all his provinces, whereas patrimonial officials and local leaders tried to increase their influence and independence. Tribesmen opposed the khan because of the collection of *zakot*, and *Sart* people became discontent about increasing tax burdens. Most fatal was that he lost the support of the *ulema*, who accused him of having disrespected *sharia* when he married two sisters

and his mother-in-law.¹⁶⁸ Conspirators, who did not dare to take open action against the khan, addressed the emir of Bukhara in this affair. As *amīr al-mu'minīn* he sent an accusing letter to the khan, who flew into a rage and began a campaign against the emir. Muhammad Ali was defeated and had to make peace, however. As a result he had to cede Khojand to the emirate and to declare himself the emir's vassal. This weakening of the khan encouraged open revolt in the Ferghana valley. On taking this opportunity, emir Nasrullah occupied Khokand in 1842 and allowed his troops to plunder the capital. Muhammad Ali, his brother and his eldest son were killed. Tashkent was occupied as well.¹⁶⁹

The inhabitants of the khanate seriously opposed the new *Manghit* governor, whom Nasrullah had installed to maintain the latter's authority and who had introduced new taxes. When he had ruled for a mere three months, an alliance of Khokandian *Sarts*, Kyrgyz and *Qipchoq* tribesmen chased the governor, his troops and Bukharan officials and invested Shir Ali (1842–5) as khan, who was the cousin of Alim Khan and had lived anonymously among Kyrgyz in the Talas valley. The alliance was led by Sayyid Ali Beg, a Kyrgyz leader from Talas, and by the Kyrgyz Iusuf, who had been temporarily *mingboshi* at Muhammad Ali's court. Due to their influence, the khan granted them the highest offices of the *lashkarboshi* and *mingboshi*. Their influence decreased, however, after they and their followers had left Khokand for Talas, the Alai mountains and other Kyrgyz provinces. Correspondingly, the khan tried to get some support from among the settled *Sart* population, and it was Shady, the hakim of Marghilan, who became *mingboshi* at the khan's court. This caused the open opposition of the *Qipchoqs*, whose leader Musulmankul defeated Shady's troops, occupied the capital in 1844 and seized *de facto* power there. The khan had little choice but to make him his new *mingboshi*.

The *Qipchoqs'* usurpation led to the concentrated opposition of *Sart* notables and Muslim notables against the khan, which had also some Kyrgyz support. As a result Shir Ali was killed in 1845, when Musulmankul was away from the capital. However, their proclaimed *Ming* khan, Murad, a son of Alim Khan, ruled for only ten days and was killed by Musulmankul, after he had returned to Khokand.¹⁷⁰

The *Qipchoq* leader installed Shir Ali's infant son Khudayar (1845–58, 1862–3, 1865–75) as khan, killed several of his brothers and continued to rule the khanate as *mingboshi*. The second *Qipchoq* seizure of Khokand was a traumatic event, as the *Qipchoq* tribesmen killed all *Sart*, Uzbek and Kyrgyz court officials whom they could get hold of. They also did not spare prominent Muslim leaders like the *shaikh ulislom* Suleyman Khoja, who was the highest-ranking Muslim official of the khanate. In order to consolidate his position in the capital, Musulmankul initiated the mass removal of his tribesmen to the land around Khokand. Thus *Qipchoq* tribesmen appropriated fertile state land, chased residents from their houses, demolished streets

to build their shelter and married *Sart* women without paying bride money. Musulmankul himself had been brought up among Talas Kyrgyz and had been married with a Kyrgyz from Ketmen Tube, and his influence relied also on changing alliances with Kyrgyz tribes. The *Qipchoq* intermezzo endured only seven years.¹⁷¹

After Musulmankul suffered defeats in his campaigns against the begs of Khojand, Ura Tube and Tashkent, the now-adult khan dismissed the *Qipchoq* leader and started a pogrom among the *Qipchoq* in October 1852, with the help of Tashkent troops: Musulmankul was finally defeated, and he and all his captured followers were killed. In addition the khan did not only confiscate all *Qipchoq* land, but also ordered the liquidation of all male tribesmen. According to Schuyler, thousands of *Qipchoq* tribesmen were killed during this pogrom.¹⁷²

Khudayar's rule, which relied on *Sart* support, did not remain unchallenged, however. His eldest brother Malla, who had escaped in 1845, claimed the throne, occupied Khokand with the help of Khasan Biy, an influential Kyrgyz leader in the Alai mountains, and became khan. Khudayar escaped to Bukhara. Under the rule of Malla Khan (1858–62), Alymbek-Dodkhoh, another Alai Kyrgyz leader, became governor of the Andijan *viloiat*. After tsarist troops, under the Kyrgyz leader, had defeated the Khokandian troops in 1860, Alymbek fell into disgrace and changed his political affiliation. Subsequently he formed an alliance with Kyrgyz, *Qipchoq* and other leaders, killed the khan and set up Khudayar's nephew Shah Murad (1862) as the new khan. Alymbek became the new *mingboshi*, but soon was defeated by the *Qipchoq* chief Alymkul,¹⁷³ who took power in Khokand. In the same year the emir of Bukhara took advantage of internal turmoil and led his army against Khokand. When he and his protégé Khudayar Khan approached the capital, both the khan and his *mingboshi* ordered their Kyrgyz and *Qipchoq* troops to retreat to the east of the Ferghana valley. Khudayar Khan became khan for the second time. But one year later, when Khudayar's troops were defeated near Asaka (Leninsk), the begs of Andijan, Marghilan and Namangan joined the resisting *Qipchoq* and Kyrgyz alliance, which installed another nephew of Khudayar, Sayyid Sultan (1863–5) as supreme ruler. The new khan was also an infant, who depended on Alymkul, his *mingboshi*. When the latter was mortally wounded in a battle against Russian troops who had advanced to Tashkent in 1865, Sayyid Sultan called on the emir of Bukhara for help. Muzaffaraddin ordered his assassination, however, and promoted Khudayar's third term of office as khan of Khokand, upon which he became a vassal of the emir.¹⁷⁴

In May 1866 Russian troops entered the khanate's territory and took Khojand by storm, where more than 2,500 Khokandian defenders were killed. Realising that further resistance was useless, Khudayar Khan acknowledged tsarist authority, became a vassal of the Russian Empire and

agreed to the tsarist conquest of Tashkent, Khojand and other former Khokandian territories. He also agreed to pay a war indemnity and promised to protect Russian trade throughout the khanate. In this way the Khanate of Khokand became the first Russian protectorate in Central Asia, although it only existed for ten years.¹⁷⁵ Other defeated military commanders fled to Kashgar, where they joined the troops of Yakub Beg, a talented former Khokandian military commander who ruled in Sinkiang from 1865 until his death in 1877.¹⁷⁶

Impressed by tsarist support of the khan, many Kyrgyz and *Qipchoq* leaders decided to make peace. Kurbanjan, the wife of Alymbek, was one of them. Being the acknowledged leader of the Alai Kyrgyz, she appeared at the khan's court and was granted the title of *dodkhoh*, which her husband had held previously. Nevertheless, peace remained fragile in the khanate, and the insurrection of Kyrgyz in mountainous areas threatened the position of the khan. The uprising of the Kyrgyz mullah who had relatives among the *Boston* Kyrgyz in the Alai mountains became the most challenging. Iskhak Asan-uulu tried to persuade Pulat, a grandson of Alim khan who lived in Samarkand, to become khan and to fight against Khudayar Khan. As the latter refused, the mullah declared himself Pulat in 1873. Two years later the uprising spread throughout the khanate and forced Khudayar Khan to leave the capital and seek tsarist protection.

Tsarist authorities approved his son Nasiraddin (1875–6) as new khan. In contrast, the insurgents acknowledged Iskhak as Pulat Khan, who proclaimed jihad against the tsar. In August 1875 Governor General von Kaufman started a punitive campaign and defeated the Khokandian troops at the fortress of Makhram. Having taken Khokand without resistance, Cossacks under the command of Colonel Skobelev, later to be conqueror of Transcaspia, pursued fugitives along the banks of the Sir Darya for several miles and killed more than 1,000 warriors. Skobelev's troops brought the remaining provinces under tsarist control and seized Iskhak and other leaders in the mountains. Iskhak was hanged. Khudayar Khan and his son were sent as pensioners to Russia. On 19 February 1876 the khanate was annexed and became the Ferghana *Oblast* of the Guberniya Turkestan.¹⁷⁷

The political history of the khanate delivers some evidence to conclude that Khokandian political elites accepted *Ming* khanship and acknowledged the necessity that access to power necessitated a *Ming* khan. It was no longer the same type of khanship which had existed in Central Asia up to the eighteenth century, however. The khan was no longer sacrosanct to the political elites, as was the case among Shaybanid and Janid khans who became life-long leaders.¹⁷⁸

This loss of sacrosanctity changed political orientations considerably. *Ming* khans became objects of political disputes. Powerful leaders put *Ming* khans on the throne, as others promoted their overthrow. No khan could be sure of his life. Every new khan was anxious for his security and knew that

his enemies might try to kill him in order to make one of their relatives khan. Thus political stability depended on the killing of possible heirs-apparent. Such assassinations did not necessarily result from any wickedness or moral defects of the new khan, but from political orientations towards stability of rule.

The results of political killings were ambivalent, however. Escaped relatives organised resistance against the ruling khan and threatened political stability. Thus Khudayar Khan escaped twice to Bukhara in order to lead Bukharan troops against his rivals. Other relatives escaped to Kyrgyz allies who helped them reconquer the capital. Shir Ali lived for decades among Kyrgyz tribesmen before he became khan, and Khudayar's brother Malla escaped his would-be assassins, hid among Kyrgyz in Osh and in the Alai mountains, and chased Khudayar from Khokand with the help of Kyrgyz tribesmen. However, both of them were killed. In the end the khanate had nine different khans and eleven terms of office until its tsarist annexation 1876. Only Umar Khan was not killed, chased away or forced to abdicate, but seems to have died a natural death in office.¹⁷⁹

In the long term, every assassinated khan decreased the khan's reputation as sovereign of the people and diminished the discontents' scruples about murdering the khan if the latter should not support their case adequately. But khanship still sufficiently informed the political orientations such that even more Islamically oriented opponents like Iskhak Asan-uulu used the 'khan' title to initiate a campaign against the ruling khan and to declare jihad against tsarist troops.

Patrimonial administration

Some scholars hold the view that the administrative system of the Khanate of Khokand differed little from that of the emirate.¹⁸⁰ This is not entirely true, however. In the middle of the nineteenth century the khanate was less centralised and monetised than the emirate¹⁸¹ and faced a tribal problem similar to that of Khiva. Like the latter, the Khanate of Khokand was surrounded by tribes and tribal confederacies. Kyrgyz, *Qipchoq* and Uzbek tribal groups were far more influential than the *Sart* population. Like the Khivan khan and the Bukharan emir, the khan of Khokand was an autocratic ruler who was supreme judge and political leader. But *Ming* khanship was sacrosanct no longer, and many *Ming* khans became tools in the hands of the leaders of rival tribal and non-tribal groups. Thus tribal leaders like Yusuf Beg, Musulmankul and Alymbek were temporarily the *de facto* rulers of the khanate.

The khan's court resided in Khokand and was headed by the *mingboshi*, who was the highest civil official of the court. This was no hereditary title, but was only given to the presiding first minister of the khan.¹⁸² The *parvonachi* or the *askarboshi* was the supreme military commander of the

khan's troops. Sometimes the *mingboshi* could also take over the charge of this military commander. As in the emirate of Bukhara, the *khoja kalon* was the highest spiritual advisor of the khan's court, whereas the *qozi kalon* supervised the kadis of Khokand and other towns. They all were members of the khan's council.¹⁸³

Since the rule of Irdana Biy there had existed the four main provinces of Khokand, Marghilan, Andijan and Namangan. The *viloiat* Khokand became the domain of the khan, and its tax yields directly supported the khan's court. It had a large *Sart* population, which the khan could rely on. As Islam was strong there and *sharia* was highly respected, the khan had to present himself as an Islamic ruler when he wanted to assure the support of influential Muslim scholars. If the khan was mighty, he would have received an annual tax payment in cash from the governors of the other provinces who bought the right to rule and to tax in this way.¹⁸⁴ In this way the khan obtained some financial means to maintain a regular army.

The governors of provinces were usually called *qushbegis*, and were also military commanders. In some reports they are also called hakims.¹⁸⁵ Tashkent became the fifth province, whose governor held the title of a *beklarbegi*, which put him in a privileged position with respect to surrounding smaller *bekliks*. *Bekliks* were smaller provinces which were ruled by begs, or *dodkhohs*. These resided in the provincial capitals and exercised authority over the population. Only in cases of the death penalty were the begs formally obliged to consult the khan. They could directly submit themselves to the khan, or could be vassals of the *qushbegis*. Nevertheless, they had to appear at the khan's court once or twice a year to report on their affairs. On these occasions they were expected to present gifts to the khan and the highest court officials.¹⁸⁶

Some of these provinces were closely linked to Uzbek and *Qipchoq* tribal confederacies. *Iuz* Uzbeks ruled Ura Tube, *Türks* were influential in Marghilan and Osh, whereas *Qipchoqs* had a strong hold in Namangan.¹⁸⁷

A *beklik* usually included several smaller districts which had a military commander (*iuzboshi*) and a chief tax collector (*sarkor*). These organised the collection of taxes and supervised the tax inspectors who collected taxes in the villages and towns.¹⁸⁸ Unlike the emir of Bukhara, the khan of Khokand had no tax officials who could collect taxes outside his domain of Khokand. Provinces usually were given on lease to the governors, who paid a fixed sum of money to the khan and – in return – ruled and collected taxes at their own expense.¹⁸⁹ According to Abdul Madzhid, there existed seventy-six of these smaller administrative units.¹⁹⁰

The administrative structure was much more fluctuating than in Bukhara. The khan created new *bekliks* for relatives or favourites, just as he could abolish them. This was especially the case when a new khan tried to strengthen his position within the khanate. Thus he dismissed many officials of the previous khan, often pursued the followers of the latter, and installed

his protégés. These changes were most serious when *Qipchoq* or Kyrgyz tribesmen set up an infant khan and appropriated the highest offices at the court. For example, when Khudayar became khan, he abolished many offices, and installed Kyrgyz and *Qipchoq* leaders as *mingboshi* and *qushbegis*.¹⁹¹ At the time of the tsarist protectorate, Schuyler asserts, the *otaliq* was the highest official of the khanate and was regent in Khokand whenever Khudayar sojourned in distant provinces.¹⁹²

Newly appointed *qushbegis* or begs were no different in this respect. They appointed their tribesmen, relatives or followers as subordinate officials who did the same. Frequently changing power constellations impeded the functioning of regular administrative structures in Khokand.¹⁹³

Higher administrative staff were usually not salaried. Thus patrimonial state structures were estate-like, since leading officials like begs and hakims were granted the right of taxation of land in exchange for their services: they had to maintain troops (*sarboz*), cover all expenses of the district administration and were expected to entertain the khan and his court when they visited the provinces. The right of taxation was often sold to a tax tenant, who paid an annual tax yield in advance and obtained exclusive taxation rights for that district.¹⁹⁴ Officials usually collected far more taxes than they had to pay to the khan. Thus access to power was always regarded as a chance to increase one's wealth and influence.¹⁹⁵ The infantry (*sarboz*) and lower officials were salaried and received money, clothes and cereals as remuneration.¹⁹⁶

Khokandian military force was predominantly irregular and decentralised. According to some sources, the army included up to 40,000 warriors (*sipoh*) in war-time at the beginning of the 1860s. The regular troops probably never consisted of much more than 10,000 infantrymen, however.¹⁹⁷ Some sources give only 1,500 as the number of the regular troops of Khokand at that time.¹⁹⁸ Khudayar Khan increased the regular army to some extent in the last years of his reign.¹⁹⁹ The khan used this infantry as a personal bodyguard and to garrison fortresses. The governors of *viloats* and *bekliks* maintained their own troops which stood under their own and not the khan's command. Most troops existed only during war-time, however. Allied Kyrgyz, Kazakh and *Qipchoq* tribesmen (*sipoh*) made up the largest element of this army.²⁰⁰

Four different types of land existed in the khanate: *amlök*, *mulk*, *zamini jamoat* and *vaqf*.²⁰¹ *Amlök* was the basic type of land. All conquered land which was used for irrigated agriculture was so called. It was state land and formally belonged to the khan. As state land it was liable for taxation and its yields belonged to the district's and the domain's treasuries respectively. Land which the khan personally owned was called *khaslyk*. Its yields funded the khan's treasury.²⁰² If the khan temporarily granted state land for service, officials were only entitled to receive temporary rents from the people who worked on it.

When the khan sold the land or granted it to officials or followers as reward for their services, it became *mulk* which could be sold, bought or inherited according to *sharia*. People who worked on the land could owe *mulk* themselves, as they could rent it from large landowners. In all these cases *mulk* owners possessed certificates (*iorliqs*) which confirmed their ownership or similar temporary rights.

Zamini jamoat was communal land which was collectively owned by tribes or villages. It mostly was not suitable for agriculture, was not irrigated and was used as pasture by nomadic and semi-nomadic people. As in Bukhara, *vaqf* was the tax-free land of religious foundations.²⁰³

Administrative structures remained weak in the conquered tribal territories. The khan lacked an administrative staff which could enforce his claims towards tribesmen there. When the latter submitted to the khan, they did so because they were militarily defeated and were not able to defend their tribal territories. This submission always implied the annual payment of *zakot*. As tribesmen usually did not pay any taxes, they only paid the *zakot* when the khan was militarily strong in their territories.²⁰⁴ Some tribal groups were exempted from taxation if they performed special services for the khan, such as the protection of border roads.²⁰⁵

On the one hand, the khan initiated the establishment of fortresses at strategic points and maintained garrisons to maintain his authority and to put through his tax claims there. On the other hand, the khan would try to increase his influence on tribesmen by forming alliances with their tribal leaders. In this way tribesmen formally acknowledged the khan's authority, whereas the khan granted them Khokandian military ranks like that of a *dodkhoh*. Both arrangements often turned out to be ineffective, however. If the khan was weak, tribesmen refused to pay *zakot*. The Khan's alliances with tribal leaders were more effective if they were directed towards inimical tribes and not against allied tribesmen.

Impacts on communal commitment

The territorial expansion of the Khanate of Khokand, together with the centralisation of administrative structures in the first half of the nineteenth century, seriously affected commitment structures. During this period of expansion many tribesmen were no longer able to defend their tribal territories, but had to submit to the khan's authority and acknowledge the khan as the supreme owner of land. Others did not acknowledge the khan nor send gifts to him. These latter groups frequently waged war against the khan and faced punitive expeditions of troops loyal to the khan.²⁰⁶

It was Umar Khan who began the selling of irrigated state land as *mulk* property for the benefit of his treasury to tribesmen. In most cases mountainous summer pastures which could not be irrigated remained communal tribal land, however. Although the greater part of the irrigated land might

have become *mulk* property in this way, it would be wrong to assume that *sharia* norms, which normally regulated the disposition of *mulk* titles, spread in the same way. Many Kyrgyz tribes and sub-tribes collectively bought their irrigable tribal territories, which they used as winter pastures and where more impoverished tribesmen undertook agriculture. Sometimes the purchased land was divided among tribesmen according to their financial contributions.²⁰⁷

Pure private ownership of *mulk* remained limited, however. *Mulk* was bought and sold both by private owners and tribal groups. Collective land seems to have prevailed in tribal territories. At the time of the Russian conquest, a commission under the leadership of Gomzin came to the conclusion that

the most widespread form of land use was the communal one. It occurred most purely among Kyrgyz. Probably modified by the interests of the rich, it was of limited occurrence and inhibited by division into lots among *Sarts* who lived in large towns.²⁰⁸

The commission emphasised that communal use of land was most common among Kyrgyz and less customary among *Sarts*. It did not say that it appeared the least frequent among Uzbeks. Although Soviet historiography endeavours to present the Uzbeks as settled farmers who taught agriculture to the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, this assertion is anachronistic, because many so-called Uzbeks still upheld nomadic or semi-nomadic ways of life. Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd, a Hungarian scholar who travelled through Central Asia in the middle of the 1870s as a member of a French scientific expedition, described the Ferghana Uzbeks as people with a pastoral-nomadic rather than agricultural background. He asserted that few Uzbeks were fully nomadic, but that most lived as semi-nomads in tents in their gardens, although they had houses which they used as store-rooms, and possessed orchards and fields.²⁰⁹ Schuyler also confirms the importance of Uzbek pastoral-nomadism.²¹⁰

Soviet scholars could only claim the agricultural role for the Uzbeks because they applied this term also to the Turkish-speaking *Sart* population. This is partly an ahistorical usage of the term 'Uzbek', however. As I have already mentioned, Uzbek tribesmen called themselves 'Uzbeks' or were called so up to the nineteenth century because they acknowledged Shaybanid Jochid and later Tuqayid Jochid Chingizid claims of political supremacy. The so-called Tūrks of the Ferghana valley were regarded as a separate group due to their acknowledgment of the pre-Shaybanid Chagatay polity.²¹¹ This political commitment ended once non-Chingizids had appropriated khanship in Khiva and Khokand, and once the ruler in Bukhara had started to claim an Islamic base of legitimacy. As a result the term 'Uzbek' came to be used in different ways. Sometimes it was used with regard to the

nomadic or semi-nomadic tribesmen of former Uzbek tribes; sometimes it was linked to the settled mode of life and people were called '*Sart* Uzbek'. In contrast Vámbéry mentions that Kyrgyz, *Qipchoq* or Kalmyk tribesmen also tended to call themselves 'Uzbeks' after they had left their tribal communities and settled down in towns. They did so because being an Uzbek had more favourable connotations and privileges with regard to culture and education than their previous tribal affiliation.²¹²

There is no use in arguing about the precise meaning of terms which were used differently by different groups. If the distinction between Uzbeks of tribal origin and non-tribal *Sarts* is preferred to other usages of these terms, it is due to its proper reference to two different modes of communal commitment.²¹³

In the discussion about the meaning of *Sart*, it is often assumed that Uzbeks and *Sarts*, who were sometimes also called Tajiks, were ascriptive groups. This is not fully correct. An Uzbek who left his tribal group and settled down in urban areas or built a house in a settled district became a *Sart*, as settled *Qipchoq* were called '*Sart Qipchoq*'.²¹⁴ A Uzbek who married a Tajik farmer could say that she was a Uzbek but became a Tajik after her marriage.²¹⁵ When Khokandian rulers like Umar Khan and Khudayar Khan promoted the settlement of tribesmen and the spread of *mulk* property, they encouraged the transformation of tribal communal commitment towards forms of residential communal commitment. As in the Emirate of Bukhara, this process of change often occurred by way of Islamic acculturation. Only orthodox Islam was able to change tribal communal commitment based on customary law. Thus Kyrgyz or Uzbek tribesmen could be Islamised much earlier without losing their commitment to customary tribal law.

Before the Russian conquest, *Sart* people predominantly lived in and around towns, where many madrassahs and mosques existed and school Islam was firmly established. There people lived in mahallahs and formed ward communities headed by *oqsoqols* who decided on residents' contributions to the common tax burden according to their means.²¹⁶ However, tribal communal commitment remained intact across large parts of the countryside, which the central administration started to control. Despite efforts to spread concepts of orthodox Islam, *sharia* norms replaced tribal customary law in a very limited and selective way. In many rural areas the majority of the population consisted of *Qipchoq*, Kyrgyz, Kara-Kalpaks²¹⁷ and Uzbeks who retained their tribal heritage.²¹⁸

Thus it is not astonishing that, during his visit to the Ferghana valley, Schuyler met a khan who was surrounded by praying mullahs and who forbade all amusements like games, dancing, magicians or comic performances at his court. At the same time most of the Uzbek and *Qipchoq* troops who joined the khan were less pious, and Schuyler could not, during his stay in Uch Kurgan, observe (with one exception) anybody performing

his religious duties.²¹⁹ As Khanykov mentioned, tribesmen were used to performing their daily prayers only when they visited the towns.²²⁰

Conclusion

We can conclude that the political integration of tribesmen and of the non-tribal settled population in Central Asia was based on different types of authority relations. Turkman confederacies formed acephalous tribal orders, whereas Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpaks formed cephalous ones. This is an important difference, since the latter acknowledged authority relations whereas the former did not. Independent Turkmen solved the problem of political integration by forming tribal alliances which established segmentary balanced political orders. These impeded the unchecked escalation of violence within and between confederacies. In contrast, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpaks acknowledged leadership, but they did so in different ways. Whereas Kazakhs acknowledged khans on the basis of Shaybanid-Jochid Chingizid claims of political supremacy, Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpaks did not adhere to khans at all.

Uzbek and *Qipchoq* tribesmen, who formally acknowledged Jochid and Chaghatayid claims of supremacy, respectively, no longer formed independent tribal political orders in the nineteenth century, but their political integration depended more and more on their relations with the patrimonial states of Bukhara, Khokand and Khiva. In this way it becomes clear that all of these 'ethnonymic' terms have to be referred to the political affiliation of tribesmen and to the claims to political supremacy which they acknowledged or denied.

Our theoretical approach is also able to explain why some tribesmen commonly accepted leaders, whereas others did not. As political community results from the interpenetration of communal and political action orientations, Turkman commitment to political equality is rooted in both egalitarian communal relations between male adults and political orientations towards peace and the securing of resources. In contrast, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpaks were obedient to their political leaders due to patriarchal communal commitment and their political orientations.

Kazakhs differed from both Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpak tribesmen in their commitment to Chingizid political heritage. Kazakh tribesmen formed large tribal confederacies under the leadership of khans and sultans in order to secure their access to distant summer and winter pastures and to coordinate migration routes. This was highly important for successful stock-breeding in the steppe. Kyrgyz tribesmen usually nomadised in smaller units, however. As their summer camps in higher mountain ranges were not far away from their winter pastures, Kyrgyz occupied clearly defined, often inaccessible tribal territories, which were easier to defend against outsiders than territories in open steppe zones. Nevertheless, there existed a tendency towards

larger tribal confederacies which tribesmen did not always join voluntarily in the nineteenth century. Kara-Kalpak political orientations were directed towards the establishment of tribal alliances which secured the balance of power between rivalling groups in the Amu Darya delta and Ferghana valley.

Dynastic rule based on patrimonialism faced serious problems in its attempts to establish political order in the river oases, where inimical tribal semi-nomadic and non-tribal settled populations resided. Up to the 1750s Uzbek political elites adhered to the Chingizid political heritage.

It was the *Manghit* Muhammad Rahim who first broke with this tradition by claiming khanship as an Uzbek tribal leader. As non-Chingizids started to claim supreme rule over the river oases and disrespected *yasa*, later *Manghit* rulers tried to shift authority relations from a Chingizid to a more Islamic base in Bukhara at the turn of the eighteenth century. In contrast, *Ming* Alim Khan and *Qunghiro*t Iltuzar Khan were less aware of this legitimacy problem. They rudely broke with Chingizid political inheritance – without abandoning it – by becoming non-Chingizid khans. This disrespect of old customs changed the nature of khanship in the nineteenth century. The khan ceased to be sacrosanct to the political elites, as it was the case among Shaybanid and Janid khans, who became leaders for life in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In this way the khan became an object of political dispute.

It was a difficult task for dynastic rulers to establish enduring political order in the river oases. Whereas tribal political commitment was either directed towards political equality or towards patriarchal authority, the political commitment of the non-tribal population was oriented towards patrimonialism. Consequently, supreme political leaders had to choose to become either patrimonial rulers who were more and more able to dispose of an administrative staff, or to remain tribal leaders who depended on the support of tribal followers. In the latter case, the khanates would represent tribal confederacies rather than patrimonial states.

As khans often received an Islamic education in urban Islamic centres, they became much more committed to concepts of Islamic rule rooted in Islamic law than did their tribal followers. However, their political power depended on the support of tribal followers who did not respect *sharia* and had only vague ideas about orthodox principles of Islam. Rulers like Shah Murad, who were able to regard themselves as Islamic rulers without fully losing tribal support, were the exception rather than the rule in the river oases.

The khanates of Khokand and Khiva were weak patrimonial states whose security depended on successful alliances with tribal confederacies. As *Ming* khans of Khokand were enthroned and displaced by Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and *Qipchoq* tribal leaders, the *Qunghiro*t khans of Khiva depended militarily on Turkman tribal support. It occurred frequently that tribesmen swore oaths of allegiance after they had been defeated by the khan's army. These oaths, however, often did not lead to the submission of these

tribesmen, who rather took them to establish temporary alliances in times of distress. This oath-taking was often also linked to the collection of taxes. Nevertheless, tribesmen often changed their alliances, especially when their allies tried to collect taxes. The emir of Bukhara was most successful in tying Uzbek tribesmen to their tribal lands and in establishing a more centralised patrimonial administration.

The political integration of local tribal and non-tribal populations within patrimonial states was problematic. Whereas local leaders were responsible to the population whose representatives elected them, patrimonially recruited officials were rather responsible to the begs, khans or emir who had appointed them. Both types of office afforded opportunities to accumulate wealth. This wealth, however, was used in different ways. Whereas local leaders had to be generous to the population, to grant material aid and to initiate feasts with free food, patrimonial officials were generous to the begs and khans who had appointed them. Due to the lack of regulation, officials could collect many more taxes than they were authorised to. If they made the tax load too heavy, revolts could occur which might endanger the stability of a province and lead to the dismissal of the begs and *amlokdors* involved. As they themselves usually appointed their relatives and friends to lower offices, the entire administration of a province could be changed and their property confiscated on such occasions. The rift between the local population and the patrimonial administration was less when the patrimonial administration was more deeply committed to *sharia*.

When Islamic rulers like Shah Murad, Amir Haydar, Umar Khan or Khudayar Khan promoted the settlement of tribesmen and the spread of *mulk* property, they encouraged the transformation of tribal communal commitment towards residential communal commitment. This process of change occurred by way of Islamic acculturation. Only orthodox Islam, however, was able to change tribal commitment. Although Sufi ishans and muslim saints might have Islamised Kyrgyz, Turkman or Uzbek tribesmen much earlier, only school Islam was able to replace tribal customary law. This change of legal conception informs the change from political community based on political equality or patriarchal authority, to forms of political community based on patrimonial authority, which remained weak.

Last but not least, it has to be noted that tribal forms of political community established relatively strong normative orders within tribal confederacies, due to the tribesmen's commitment to customary law. Both cephalous and acephalous tribal confederacies maintained binding legal cultures which regulated access to resources, the struggle for political power and the settlement of conflicts. In contrast, the political order of the patrimonial states was problematic and characterised by huge rifts between the patrimonial administration and the local population. Only if khans or emirs were acknowledged as devoted Islamic rulers, could this rift be lessened.

Notes

- 1 Whereas non-tribally organised peoples were always settled agriculturalists, craftsmen or traders, tribal people could be nomadic, semi-nomadic or settled. There sometimes existed also mixed tribes with more settled or more nomadic elements, of which the latter were involved in agriculture. Even nomadic tribesmen could occasionally do extensive agriculture, when life circumstances afforded it. Cf. Bregel 1989, pp. 134–6.
- 2 Ibn Khaldūn, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle, Al-Muqaddima, vol. 1, Traduction nouvelle, préface et notes par Vincent Monteil*, Paris and Bayreuth 1967–8, pp. 241–367, 254–8, 279–83.
- 3 In contrast to tribal gerontocracy and patriarchalism, patrimonialism is a type of piety-based authority relation which included rulers and subjects and where the rulers could dispose an administrative staff to enforce their commands without being dependent on the cooperation of subjects. Pure patrimonialism occurs when the staff of authority is the personal staff of the ruler and supplied by him, whereas in estate-type patrimonialism members of the staff possess the means of administration themselves (cf. Weber 1978, pp. 231–5).
- 4 For example Zimanov 1960, pp. 110–17.
- 5 Cf. Introduction.
- 6 This rule was not always applied, since Chingiz Khan had already appointed his third son Ögödei as his successor. Cf. V. V. Bartol'd, 'Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni Turkestana (1927)', in *Sochineniia, tom IIIchast' 1*, Moscow 1963(a), p. 270.
- 7 McChesney 1996, pp. 135–9.
- 8 Mirza Shams Bukhari, *O nekotorykh sobytiakh v Bukhare, Khokande i Kashgare. Zapiski Mirzy-Shemsa Bukhari, Izdaniia v tekste, s perevodom i primechaniiami*, ed. V. V. Grigorev, Kazan 1861, pp. 2–3; Barthol'd 1963(a), p. 279; A. Burton, *The Bukharans. A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History (1550–1702)*, Richmond 1997.
- 9 Cf. E. A. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks. From the Fourteenth Century to the Present. A Cultural History*, Stanford 1990, pp. 44–62. L. Sykiäinen, 'Shari'ah and Muslim-Law Culture', in L. Jonson and M. Esenov (eds) *Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia (The Swedish Institute of International Affairs – Conference Papers 24)*, Stockholm 1999, p. 85; A. von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie in den Werken ihrer Historiker (18. – 19. Jahrhundert) (Türkische Welten, vol. 9/ Beirut Texte und Studien, vol. 86)*, Würzburg, 2002, pp. 187–380.
- 10 *Ibid.*, pp. 37–8.
- 11 Y. Bregel, 'Atalik', in *IE*, supplement, fascicules 1–2, Leiden 1980, p. 97. According to recent historian scholarship it is not proved whether Shah Murad himself claimed this Islamic title. The title is not found on coins or on his grave-stone, and only mentioned in later historiographies. Thus it is also possible that Haydar Tora justified his political claim by attributing it to Shah Murad, who had been acknowledged as a religious ruler who obeyed *sharia* (Kügelgen, 2002, pp. 76–80, 281–7).
- 12 Bartol'd 1963, pp. 279–80; A. A. Semenov, *Ocherk ustroistva tsentral'nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo khanstva pozdneishego vremeni*, Stalinabad 1954, pp. 20–1. Soviet scholars and pre-revolutionary Russian writers continued solely to refer to a Khanate of Bukhara, as all emirs except Shah Murad and Amir Haydar claimed the title of a khan as well (for example: Khanykov 1843; N. O. Katanov, *Ėtnograficheskiĭ obzor turetsko-tatarskikh plemen*, Kazan 1894, p. 13; Logofet 1911, cf. Kügelgen 2002, pp. 293–5).

- 13 Due to the provenance of the Janid dynasty from Astrakhan, they were also called Ashtarkhanids. Cf. B. Spuler, 'Djānids', *EI* (II), p. 446. Another name was Tugay Timurids, as the Janids claimed descent from Shayban's brother Tugay Timur, who both were grandson's of the Chingiz Chan and sons of Jochi.
- 14 Muhammed Rahim was the first Manghit ruler to take over the khan title. From 1747–56 he served as chief councillor (*otaliq*) at the Ashtarkhanid court in Bukhara. In 1756 he was the first Uzbek leader to be enthroned as khan.
- 15 Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary 1970, pp. 129–30, 144; H. Vámbéry, *Geschichte Bochara's oder Transoxaniens von den frühesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart. Nach orientalischen benützten und unbenützten handschriftlichen Geschichtsquellen*, Stuttgart 1872, pp. 147–9; Bartol'd 1963, p. 274.
- 16 Russian and Soviet scholars repeatedly described these reforms, although – according to Bregel – their sources can be traced back to J. Malcolm. *The History of Persia from the Most Early Period to the Present Time*, London 1829 [1815]. The latter was Governor of Bombay and used two Persian manuscripts written by visitors to Bukhara. Being accounts based on hearsay. Russian and Central Asian writing on administrative reforms is based on problematic sources. The only evidence consists of oral information gathered by tsarist officials after the conquest (Bregel 2000, pp. 17–18).
- 17 *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol I, ed. R. Kh. Amonova *et al.*, Tashkent 1967, pp. 653–5.
- 18 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 642–3; *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 540; O. A. Sukhareva, *Bukhara v XIX – nachale XX veka*, Moscow 1966, pp. 273–5.
- 19 Cf. Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand). Depuis les dernières années du règne de Nadir Chh (1153), jusqu'en 1233 de L'Hégire (1740–1818)*, trans. and ed. Ch. Schefer, Paris 1876, pp. 129–42; P. P. Ivanov, *Ocherki po istorii Srednei Azii (XVI – ser. XIX v.)*, Moscow 1958, p. 123; Kügelgen 2002, pp. 352–9. In a similar way Dost Muhammad of the Pushtu Durrani confederacy discarded the Iranian title shah and took over the Mulim title emir in a time of threats to the faith, when Pushtu-controlled Peshawar became threatened by Sikhs under the lead of Ranjit Singh. His appearance as mujaheddin who waged jihad against infidels became an important element of political legitimacy (McChesney 1996, pp. 142–3; Christine Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-century Afghanistan. The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan [1826–1863]*, Richmond 1997).
- 20 Mirza Shamsa Bukhari 1861, pp. 6–8; P. P. Ivanov, *Vosstanie Kitai-Kipchakov v Bukharskom Khanstve, 1821–1825. Istochniki i opyt ikh issledovaniia*, Moscow and Leningrad 1937, pp. 26–8; *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR I*, pp. 655–8. Cf. Kügelgen 2002, pp. 81–7, 367–78.
- 21 *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR I*, p. 643.
- 22 Semenov 1954, p. 4.
- 23 Mirza Shams Bukhari 1861, p. 32; Trotter 1873, p. 64; Hambly 1988, p. 193; Allworth 1990, p. 111; Kügelgen 2002, pp. 381–4.
- 24 N. Ignat'ev, *Mission of N. P. Ignat'ev to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858*, edited with notes, introduction and translation by J. L. Evans, Newtonville 1984, p. 111 (Russian: *Missiia v Khivu i Bukharu v 1858 gody*, St Petersburg 1897).
- 25 Logofet 1911 (I), p. 31; Schuyler 1966, p. 53; Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Zapiska o Kokanskom khanstve', in Valikhanov 1985 (III), p. 320; Y. Bregel, 'Mangits', in *EI* (VI) 1991, pp. 418–19.
- 26 B. Hayit, *Turkestan zwischen Rußland und China*, Amsterdam 1971, p. 29; Ivanov 1958, pp. 117–46.
- 27 Logofet 1911 (I), p. 259.
- 28 Cf. Logofet 1909, p. 43.

- 29 The following list of offices is not and cannot be complete due to these shifts. I will just mention the most important positions. A description of important offices and ranks around 1800 with its varying competences is given by: Bregel 2000; Kügelgen 2002, pp. 89–101.
- 30 Up to the seventeenth century the *qushbegi* did not play a prominent role in the khanate of Bukhara. With the decline of the *Janids* the *qushbegi* became the head of administration, which he also remained under the *Manghits*. Cf. Y. Bregel, 'qosh-Begi', *EI* (V) 1986, pp. 18–19; Kügelgen 2002, pp. 93–4.
- 31 *Otaliqs* originally were Uzbek tribal leaders who assisted the khan as military commander (*amīr al-umarā*) and chief councillors at the Janid court. The first Manghit khan Muhammad Rahim was one of them. His uncle and successor Daniyal Bū ruled himself as an *otaliq*, and there were no other *otaliqs* under him. For the reign of Shah Murad no *otaliq is* mentioned in sources. After the rule of Haydar, *otaliq* became a merely honorary title of esteemed officials (Y. Bregel, in *EI*, supplement, fascicules 1–2, Leiden 1980, pp. 96–8. Cf. A. A. Semenov, 'Bukharskiĭ traktat o chinakh i zvaniakh i ob obiazannostiakh nositelei ikh v srednevekovoi Bukare', *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie V*, Moscow 1948, p. 137; Bregel 2000, pp. 13–15; Kügelgen 2002, pp. 88–93).
- 32 Later he was also called *divanbegi*. Logofet 1911 (I), pp. 231–62. In sources, ranks and offices are often intermingled and their use changed. Thus our overview cannot be more precise in this respect (cf. Kisliakov 1962, pp. 35–7).
- 33 Khanykov 1843, p. 185; Vámbéry 1865, p. 297–9; I. I. Kryl'tsov, 'Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i sud v Sredne-Aziatskikh khanstvakh nakanune zavoevaniia Turkestana tsarskoĭ Rossiei', *Uchenye zapiski Sverdl. iuridich. instituta, t. II*, 1947, pp. 44–5.
- 34 Khanykov 1843, pp. 190–5. Mir 'Izzatullāh 'Masīr-i Bukhārā', Bibliothéque nationale de Paris, Suppl. Persan 1346, fol. 52a–53a, quoted by Maria Szuppe, 'En quête de chevaux turkmènes. Le journal de voyage de Mir 'Izzatullāh de Delhi à Boukhara en 1812–1813', in *L'institut français d'Études sur l'Asie centrale (IFEAC), Inde-Asie centrale. Route du commerce et des idées (Cahiers d'Asie centrale, 1996/1–2)*, Tashkent and Aix-en-Provence 1996, p. 93–8. Cf. Logofet 1911 (I), pp. 8, 14–15; Kryl'tsov 1947, pp. 45–51; Semenov 1948, pp. 139–40; Kügelgen 2002, pp. 95–7.
- 35 Logofet 1911(I), p. 253.
- 36 Radloff 1884b, p. 479.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 298; Trotter 1873, pp. 16–17; Logofet 1909.
- 38 Khanykov 1844, pp. 348–50; Kryl'tsov 1947, p. 47; Kisliakov 1962, p. 47.
- 39 In 1834 Burnes reported eight provinces, whereas Vámbéry ascertained twelve in 1863. After the consolidation of the emir's power in Eastern Bukhara, Logofet confirmed twenty-five provinces in 1909 and twenty-seven in 1911 (Burnes 1834, p. 155. Quoted in Trotter 1873; Vámbéry 1865, p. 299; Logofet 1909, p. 31; 1911 [I], pp. 247–51).
- 40 Khanykov 1843, p. 185; Vámbéry 1865, p. 299; Curtis 1909, p. 120; Logofet 1909, p. 31; V. I. Iskandarov, *Vostochnaia Bukhara i Pamir vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. chast' 1*, Dushanbe 1962–3, pp. 122–3.
- 41 There existed three different types of *mulk* property whose transfer from old to new owners was regulated by *sharia*. *Mulki ushr* was tithe land which was originally divided among Arab conquerors and taxed at one tenth of its yields. *Mulki hiroj* was land used as garden lands or orchards and was taxed at one seventh to one half of its gatherings. As the unit of land-measure became the *tanop* – this unit varied in size from two fifths of an acre to one and a quarter – it was also called *tanop* tax. Tax-free property was called *mulki huriiat*. *Tankhoh* owners often claimed to possess *mulk* property in order to

- make their property rights definitive and inheritable (Logofet 1911 [II], pp. 46–7; Semenov 1928, pp. 3–54; Schuyler 1966, pp. 152–4; Krader 1966, p. 94. Cf. Carrère d'Encausse 1981, pp. 38–9; I. Murray Matley, 'Agricultural Development', in Allworth 1994, pp. 277–81).
- 42 According to Vámbéry, the office of the *rais* was introduced by Shah Murad (Vámbéry 1872, p. 160).
- 43 Logofet 1909, pp. 32–3; Becker 1968, p. 8.
- 44 Trotter 1873, p. 19; Burnes 1834, p. 155. According to the *Istoriia Uzbekistana*, the *viloiats* of Bukhara and Samarkand included *tumans* as administrative subdivisions (*Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, pp. 636–7).
- 45 Trotter 1873, p. 3; Logofet 1909, p. 31. Cf. Wheeler 1964, p. 43.
- 46 *Amlok* was a tax of around 40 per cent of the yield, which owners of state land had to pay directly to the emir's treasury. This land titles could not be transferred without the ruler's authorisation. Due to the high taxation and its limited disposal, *amlok* land was the cheapest on the market and cost just one tenth of the price of tax-free *mulk* property (*mulki hurri-kholis*). When the emir turned *amlok* land into *tanho* land to remunerate for services, the land was no longer submitted to taxation. However, the *tanho* holder could freely collect his share of the land's yield. In this way whole villages were owned by leading state officials who supplied men in their service with food (cf. Trotter 1873, pp. 19–20; Logofet 1911 [I], p. 244; A. A. Semenov, *Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroïstva Bukharskogo khanstva (Trudy Sredne-Aziatskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Seriiia II. Orientalia, vyp. 1)*, Tashkent 1928, pp. 30–5; M. Rakhimov, 'Ob institute "tankho" v Darvaze', in *Akademiia nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR - Izvestiia otdeleniia obshchestvennykh nauk* 4, Stalinabad 1953, pp. 129–38; Carrère d'Encausse 1981, pp. 35–7; Murray Matley 1994, p. 278).
- 47 Schuyler 1966, p. 153; Murray Matley 1994, pp. 277–81.
- 48 According to *Istoriia Uzbekistana*, *mulki hurri-kholis* included 10.2 per cent of the emirate's irrigated land. *Mulki hiroj* comprised 15.2 per cent, *vaqf* property 24.6 per cent and *amlok* land 50 per cent (*Istoriia Uzb. I* 1967, p. 96). This estimation does not mention the tithe land (*mulki ushr*), it does not give any information about the amount of *amlok* land which was only temporarily given as *tankho* to begs and other officials, and it does not make clear how these shares referred to the more independent *bekliks*. Cf. Semenov 1928; Kisiakov 1962, pp. 67–100; Sh. Iusupov, *Ocherki istorii Kabadianskogo bekstva v kontse XIX - nachale XX. v.*, Dushambe 1986, pp. 98–102.
- 49 P. B. Lord, 'A memoir on the Uzbek State of Kundooz, and the Power of its Present Ruler Mahomed Murad Beg', in A. Burnes, L. Leech, P. B. Lord and L. Wood, *Reports and Papers, Political, Geographical and Commercial. Submitted to Government, Employed on Mission in the Years 1835–36–37 in Scinde, Afghanistan, and Adjacent Countries*, Calcutta 1839, pp. 104–6; Logofet 1911 (I), pp. 152–3; Ivanov 1958, pp. 118–19; Poliakov 1980, p. 89.
- 50 Radloff 1884 (I), pp. 477–9.
- 51 This is also confirmed by N. A. Kisiakov in *Narody Srednei Azii* II, p. 539. Cf. Logofet 1911 (I), p. 240.
- 52 Schuyler 1966, p. 95.
- 53 Trotter 1873, p. 15; Logofet 1909, p. 34; Logofet 1911 (I), p. 235. Cf. Kisiakov 1962, pp. 52–6; Becker 1968, pp. 9–10; Sh. Iusupov, *Ocherki istorii Kuliabskogo bekstva v kontse XIX - nachale XX veka*, Dushambe 1964, pp. 40–1.
- 54 Cf Chapter 2, second section.

- 55 According to Logofet, the *amlokdor* could also decide about complaints (Logofet 1909, p. 59; 1911 [I], p. 327). Cf. A. Madzhlisov, *Karategin nakanune ustanovleniia sovetскої vlasti*, Stalinabad 1959, p. 30.
- 56 Logofet 1909, pp. 59–60; 1911 (I), pp. 327–30; Kisliakov 1962, pp. 48, 52–3; Schuyler 1966, p. 95. Sometimes the *beg* could even come from a family of *kadis* and hold both offices, as Ujfalvy reports regarding the upper Zarafshan valley in the seventeenth century (Ch. E. de Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kovesd, *Le Kohistan, le Ferghanah & Kouldja avec appendice sur la Kachgharie*, Paris 1878, p. 28).
- 57 Pierce 1960, p. 76.
- 58 Logofet 1909, pp. 50, 64.
- 59 Radloff 1884 (II), p. 478; Iusupov 1964, p. 34.
- 60 In Tajik villages *arbobs* were also the elected elders (cf. Logofet 1911 [I], p. 241).
- 61 Olufsen 1911, pp. 489–92.
- 62 *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 539.
- 63 Kisliakov 1962, pp. 58–64.
- 64 Olufsen 1911, p. 578; *Istoriia Uzb. SSR II*, p. 93; Poliakov 1980, p. 90.
- 65 Logofet 1909, pp. 47–8; Radloff 1884 (II), p. 483; Becker 1967, p. 9; *Istoriia Uzb. SSR II* 1968, p. 94.
- 66 G. Meyendorff, *Voyage d'Orenburg à Boukhara*, Paris 1826. Quoted in Trotter 1873, p. 15.
- 67 Logofet 1909, pp. 34–5.
- 68 Logofet 1909, p. 34. Cf. Logofet 1911 (I), p. 335.
- 69 Olufsen 1911, pp. 491–2. Cf. *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 539.
- 70 Further research is necessary to find out how representative Logofet's observation was.
- 71 A. D. Grebenkin, 'Uzbeki', in Trotskiĭ 1872, pp. 69–78; B. Kh. Karmysheva, *O nekotorykh drevnikh tiurkskikh plemenakh v sostave uzbekov (po étnograficheskim dannym) (XXV Mezhdunarodnyiĭ kongress vostkovedov. Doklady delegatsii SSSR)*, Moscow 1960, pp. 1–10.
- 72 Grebenkin 1872, pp. 56–7.
- 73 Grebenkin 1872, pp. 69–78; V. L. Viatkin, 'Karshinskiĭ okrug, organizatsiia v nem voiska i sobytiia v period 1215–1217 (1800–1803) godov', in *Izvestiia Sredne-Aziatskogo otdela gosudarstvennogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, tom XVII, 1928, pp. 12–13.
- 74 Cf. Logofet 1911 (II), p. 264; *Narody Srednei Azii I*, pp. 537–8; G. Gafurov, *Istoriia tadzhikskogo naroda v kratkom izlozhenii -- S drevneishikh vremen do Velikoĭ Oktiabr'skoĭ sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii 1917 g. (izd. 2)*, vol. 2, Moscow 1952, p. 397.
- 75 Khanykov 1843, pp. 63–4;
- 76 *Ibid.*, pp. 68–70. Cf. Logofet 1911 (I), pp. 153–7; Ch. E. de Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd, *Le Syr-daria – le Zérafchâne. Le pays des sept-rivières et la Sibérie-occidentale*, Paris 1879, p. 31; *Materialy po musul'manstvu, vypusk I (Kratkiĭ obzor)*, Tashkent 1898, p. 11. About the Kazakhs in the Emirate of Bukhara, see Zh. M. Tulibaeva, *Kazakhstan i Bukharskoe khanstvo v XVIII–pervoĭ polovine XIX v.*, Almaty 2001.
- 77 Lansdell 1885, p. 32; Logofet 1911 (I), p. 31.
- 78 About local Uzbek political leadership, see: Rasuly-Paleczek 1993, pp. 89–105; 1994, pp. 11–28. Rasuly-Paleczek analysed features of Uzbek leadership by doing field research among the Chechka Uzbeks of Qunduz in North Afghanistan. See also about Kyrgyz local leadership: Shahrani 1986, pp. 255–71.
- 79 Karmysheva 1960(a), pp. 50–1 (footnote 5).
- 80 Schuyler 1966, p. 95.

- 81 Trotter 1873, p. 16; Becker 1968, p. 5.
- 82 Logofet 1911 (I), p. 241; Cf. *Narody Srednei Azii I*, pp. 537–8.
- 83 Fazil Khan 1981, p. 42; Vámbéry 1872, pp. 162–4.
- 84 Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd 1878, p. 29; Semenov 1954, p. 14–5; Vámbéry 1872, p. 197.
- 85 Sukhareva 1966, pp. 266–8.
- 86 Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary 1970, pp. 154–6.
- 87 Trotter 1873, p. 63.
- 88 Schuyler 1966, p. 95; Becker 1968, p. 129.
- 89 Cf. Kisiakov 1962, p. 50.
- 90 Trotter 1873, pp. 62–3; Hambly 1988, pp. 191, 196; Allworth 1990, p. 108; Kügelgen 2002, pp. 281–7, 337–53.
- 91 Holdsworth 1959, pp. 21–2. Cf. W. Barthold and M. L. Brill, 'Khiwa', *EI* (V) 1986, pp. 23–5.
- 92 Bartol'd 1963, p. 274.
- 93 *Narody Srednei Azii I*, p. 174; *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 594; Bregel 1980, pp. 96–8.
- 94 As Munis and Agahi mentioned, this tribal order still shaped the military divisions which Iltuzar commanded at the besieged town of Qunqirot in 1805 (Munis and Agahi 1999, pp. 209–10).
- 95 About the Khivan *Sarts* see Bregel 1978, pp. 120–51.
- 96 Ivanov 1958, pp. 149, 159.
- 97 Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary 1970, pp. 178–80. Cf. Bartol'd 1963, p. 283; N. Beselovskii, *Ocherk istoriko-geograficheskikh svedenii o Khivinskom khanstve*, St Petersburg 1877, p. 247. Quoted in Kryl'tsov 1947, pp. 54–5.
- 98 Hayit 1971, p. 27. Cf. Bregel 1980, pp. 96–8.
- 99 Bregel 1978, pp. 135–6.
- 100 Bartol'd 1963, p. 284.
- 101 Y. Bregel, 'Tribal Tradition and Dynastic History: The Early Rulers of the Qongrats according to Munis', *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 16, 1982, pp. 381–5. Cf. McChesney 1996, pp. 124–41; B. F. Manz and Beatrice Forbes, 'The Development and Meaning of Chaghatay Identity', in Jo-Ann Gross (ed.) *Muslims of Central Asia. Expressions of Identity and Change*, Durham NC and London 1992, pp. 27–45. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century Uzbeks were called Uzbeks because they supported the Shaybanid claims of Chingizid political supremacy which trace descent to Chingiz Khan through Jochi and his son Shayban. This claim was already problematic, as the Janid dynasty was only maternally linked to the Shaybanids. Kazakhs, however, were so called due to their continued support of Shaybanid-Jochid claim of superiority. Other tribes who supported similar claims of the Chaghatayid Chingizids were called Moghuls. These 'ethnonymic' terms only referred to the political affiliations of tribesmen and to their acknowledgement of legitimate political claims of political supremacy. Thus Iltuzar's claim must have been unacceptable for Uzbek tribesmen, whereas it did not make a difference to the non-tribal settled population (cf. Kügelgen 2002, pp. 69–86, 273–81, 321–37).
- 102 Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary 1970, pp. 183–4.
- 103 Munis and Agahi, the dynastic historiographers of the *Qunqhirots*, are silent on this Uzbek dissent and emphasise the 'consensus of the nobles' which should have backed the *Qunqhirot* enthronement (Munis and Agahi 1999, pp. 203–4). Nevertheless, Uzbek resistance to the usurpation is mentioned several times. It is referred to as the reason for the defection of Uzbek tribes in the final battle with Bukharan troops which led to the khan's defeat and death (Munis and Agahi 1999, pp. 214–19, 224–8).
- 104 Mouraviev 1823(b), pp. 276–8.

- 105 Bartol'd 1963, p. 284; Holdsworth 1959, p. 22.
- 106 Mouraviev 1823(b), p. 279.
- 107 Bregel 1978, pp. 136–7. In Khiva this socio-cultural group was mostly Turkish-speaking, as Vámbéry observed (1865, p. 279. Cf. Mouraviev 1823(b), pp. 55–6). According to Bregel, a part of them was bilingual and also spoke Persian.
- 108 Mouraviev 1823(b), p. 306.
- 109 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, p. 67–8.
- 110 Akiner 1983, p. 339.
- 111 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, pp. 70–8.
- 112 Mouraviev 1823(b), pp. 280–1; Olcott 1987, p. 52.
- 113 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, pp. 67, 69, 76.
- 114 Becker is inexact by calling the Khivan *Iomut* 'subjects' of the khan (Becker 1868, pp. 74, 229).
- 115 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, pp. 78–88.
- 116 Markov 1961, pp. 98–9; *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, p. 88.
- 117 Cf. P. Lerch, *Khiva oder Kharezm. Seine historischen und geographischen Verhältnisse*, St Petersburg 1873, p. 51.
- 118 Markov 1961, pp. 100–3.
- 119 Markov 1961, pp. 104–7. Cf. Ivanov 1958, pp. 148–77.
- 120 Mouraviev 1823(b), pp. 276–8. As a result only tribal leaders who did not oppose his reforms became *inoqs* of Uzbek confederacies. *Inoq* of the *Qunghirot-Qiiat* remained a weak brother of the khan.
- 121 H. Collett, *Central Asia, Section I – Part IV. A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnography, Resources and History of the Khanate of Khiva*, Calcutta 1873, p. 20.
- 122 Vámbéry 1865, p. 268. Cf. Collett 1873, p. 20; Hayit 1971 p. 27.
- 123 After the execution of the *mukhtor* Muhammad Ya'qub by Sayyid Muhammad (1856–64), *Sart mukhtors* lost their previous position as first officials in the khanate. Cf. Bregel 1978, pp. 135–8.
- 124 In the Khanate of Khiva there existed two types of *mulk* property which were differently taxed. *Iorliqli mulk* was owned by persons who held land titles (*iorliqs*) and who paid a tithe tax (*ushr*). Owners of *otafsji mulki*, however, paid a household tax according to three different tax brackets. Besides *mulk*, there also existed *vaqf* and state property which was called *podsholik* land in Khiva. Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 33–7. Cf. P. P. Ivanov, *Arkhiv khivinskikh khanov XIX v.: Issledovanie i opisanie dokumentov s istoricheskim vvedeniem*, Leningrad 1940, pp. 27–30; Bregel 1961, p. 95; Pogorel'skiï 1968, pp. 28–9.
- 125 Bregel 1978, pp. 134–5. Cf. Bregel 1986, pp. 18–19.
- 126 Mouraviev 1823b, pp. 297–301; Colonel G. I. Danilevskiï, 'Opisanie Khivinskogo khanstva', *IRGO, Zapiski V (1851)*, pp. 133–5; Vámbéry 1865, pp. 268–70; Collett 1873, pp. 20–1; Girshfeld and Galkin 1903, p. 21. Cf. Pogorel'skiï 1968, pp. 38–9; *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 637.
- 127 Vámbéry 1865, p. 267.
- 128 Vámbéry 1867, p. 269; Collett 1873, p. 21.
- 129 Poliakov 1980, p. 86; *Narody Sredneï Azii II*, p. 22.
- 130 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 639. Cf. *Istoriia Turkm. SSR I*, pp. 192–3.
- 131 *Istoriia Karakalpakskoï ASSR*, p. 126; Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, p. 23; V. Lobachevskiï, *Khivinskiï raion. Voенно-statisticheskoe opisanie Turkestanskogo voennogo okruga*, Tashkent, 1912, pp. 36–7.
- 132 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 639; *Istoriia Turkm. SSR I*, pp. 192; Becker 1968, p. 11.
- 133 Zhdanko 1950, p. 74; *Narody Sredneï Azii I*, pp. 491–2.
- 134 Zhdanko 1950, p. 77; *Istoriia Karakalpakskoï ASSR.*, pp. 76–7. Cf. Samoïlovich 1935, pp. 126–7.

- 135 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 641.
- 136 Zhdanko 1950, pp. 75–6.
- 137 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 639.
- 138 Bregel 1961, p. 182; G. E. Markov, 'K voprosy o formirovanii turkmenskogo naseleniia Khorezmskogo oazisa', *SE*, 1953/4, pp. 43–5.
- 139 Mir Abdul'-Kerim, 'Istoriia Srednei Azii', in *MITT II*, Moscow and Leningrad 1938, p. 202. See also Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary 1970, p. 185.
- 140 *Ibid.*, p. 203. See also Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary 1970, p. 185.
- 141 Bregel is right when he emphasises the danger of false generalisations about 'the Turkmen', as they could be quite different. Cf. Bregel 1989, p. 137.
- 142 Bregel 1961, p. 153.
- 143 Bregel 1961, pp. 188.
- 144 Bregel 1961, p. 150.
- 145 Bregel 1961, pp. 172–3. Cf. 'Zametki o turkmenskom dukhovenstve', *Turkmenovedenie*, 1928/3–4 (7–8), p. 18.
- 146 Lomakin 1897, pp. 55–8.
- 147 Mouraviev 1823b, p. 313.
- 148 According to Mouraviev these were still the confederacies of the *Uġgur-Naiġman*, the *Qunghirov-Qiiat*, the *Nukus-Manghit* and the *Qanghli-Qipchoq*, which were headed by four *inoqs* (Mouraviev 1823(b), p. 269).
- 149 Mouraviev 1823(b), p. 279.
- 150 Cf. Danilevskii 1851, p. 91.
- 151 Vámbéry 1865, p. 271. The *Sarts'* affairs were dealt by *kadis* according to *sharia*.
- 152 Cf. Dzhabbarov 1996, pp. 61, 68–72.
- 153 Mouraviev 1823(b), p. 173.
- 154 Dzhamgerchinov dates this event to 1808 (B. Dzhamgerchinov, *Ocherk politicheskoi istorii Kirgizii XIX veka (pervaia polovina)*, Frunze 1966, p. 40), whereas Anglo-American scholarship asserts 1798 as the beginning of the khanate (Wheeler 1964, p. 44; Holdsworth 1959, p. 5; McChesney 1996, p. 140). Kyrgyz scholarship usually dates Alim Khan's term of office from 1800 to 1809, which makes 1798 impossible (T. Koichuev *et al.* [eds] *Istoriia Kirgizov i Kirgizstana*, Bishkek 1996, p. 106; *Istoriia Kirg. SSR* 1984, p. 494; Ploskikh 1977, p. 69). Allworth's compilation of *Ming, Manghit* and *Qunghirov* dynasties refers to a twelve-year term from 1798 to 1810 (Allworth 1990, p. 234). Most scholars only mention that Alim took over the title of khan during his term of office, without giving a precise date. Cf. W. Barthold and C. E. Bosworth, 'Khokand', *EI* (V) 1985, pp. 29–31).
- 155 About the *Qipchoqs*, see K. Shaniiazov, *K étnicheskoi istorii uzbekskogo naroda (istoriko-tnograficheskoe issledovanie na materialakh kipchakskogo komponenta)*, Tashkent 1974.
- 156 Beisembiev 1987, p. 7.
- 157 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, pp. 659–60; *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 490–4; Ploskikh 1977, pp. 69–78, 88–94; Koichuev 1996, pp. 104–6;
- 158 Beisembiev 1987, p. 15.
- 159 Dzhamgerchinov 1966, pp. 40–3; *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, pp. 660–2; Beisembiev 1987, pp. 16–17. Cf. Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary 1970, pp. 207–24; V. V. Bartol'd 1963, pp. 289–9.
- 160 Allworth 1990, p. 108.
- 161 Cf. Mir Abdoul Derim Boukhary 1970, pp. 225–30.
- 162 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 494–6, 48; *Kyrgyzstandyn tarykhy I*, pp. 212–13; Ivanov 1958, 197–201; Dzhamgerchinov 1966, pp. 43–4, 48; Ploskikh 1977, pp. 96–7, 101.

- 163 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 662; Holdsworth 1958, p. 6.
- 164 Dzhamgerchinov 1966, p. 45.
- 165 Dzhamgerchinov 1966, p. 44; Beïsembiev 1987, p. 71.
- 166 Ploskikh 1977, p. 99. Cf. J. L. Bacqué-Grammont, 'Tûrân, une description du khanat de Khokand vers 1832 d'après un document ottoman', *CdMRS*, vol. XIII, 1972/2, p. 223.
- 167 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, pp. 662–3; *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 496–8; Dzhamgerchinov 1966, pp. 48–51.
- 168 Cf. Bacqué-Grammont 1972, p. 224.
- 169 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, pp. 663; Dzhamgerchinov 1966, p. 67. Cf. *Obozrenie Kokandskogo khanstva* 1849, p. 197; Landsdell 1885 (I), pp. 505–6.
- 170 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, p. 515; Dzhamgerchinov 1966, p. 69.
- 171 P. V. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia kokandskogo khanstva*, Kazan 1886, p. 163; *Istoriia Uzb. SSR I*, p. 665; *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, p. 516; Dzhamgerchinov 1966, pp. 69–70.
- 172 Schuyler 1966, p. 205. Cf. Landsdell 1885 (I), p. 509.
- 173 In contrast to Musulmankul, Alymkul belonged to the *Qipchoq* tribesmen who resided in the Alai valley and in the area around Jalalabad and Batken and were loosely allied to the Kyrgyz *Ichkilik* confederacy.
- 174 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 518–19.
- 175 Pierce 1960, pp. 24–5. The American ambassador Eugene Schuyler gave a good description of the khanate as tsarist protectorate after he visited it in June 1872 (E. Schuyler, *Turkestan. Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkestan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, ed. G. Wheeler, London 1966 (1876, 2 vols.), pp. 169–205. Cf. A. P. Fedchenko, *Puteshestvie v Turkestan, vypusk 7, tom I, chast' II – V Kokanskom khanstve*, St Petersburg and Moscow 1875).
- 176 T. Yuan: 'Yakub Bek (1820–1877) and the Moslem Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan', *CAJ*, 1961/6.
- 177 Koïchuev 1996, pp. 117–21; Pierce 1960, pp. 34–7.
- 178 McChesney remarks that only three of twelve sixteenth-century Shaybanid khans and one of the seventeenth-century Janid khans died a violent death, whereas two of these latter were killed in battle (McChesney 1996, p. 177, footnote 27).
- 179 At least there is no source evidence which indicates a violent death.
- 180 Holdsworth 1959, pp. 9–10; Wheeler 1964, pp. 44–5.
- 181 Bartol'd 1963a, p. 290.
- 182 In Bukhara, *mingboshi* was the rank of influential military commanders.
- 183 *Obozrenie Kokandskogo khanstva* 1849, pp. 176–216.
- 184 Ploskikh 1977, p. 111.
- 185 For example: *Obozrenie Kokanskogo khanstva* 1849, p. 200; Beïsembiev 1987, p. 70.
- 186 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 500–1.
- 187 Valikhanov 1985 (III), p. 315. Cf. S.S. Gubaeva, *Étnicheskiï sostav naseleniia Fergany v kontse XIX – nachale XX v.*, Tashkent 1983, pp. 36–9.
- 188 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 546; Bartol'd 1963, p. 368.
- 189 I. I. Kryl'tsov 1947, pp. 51–2.
- 190 Abdol Madzhid, *Report of a Journey to Kokan. In Letter N 83, dated nineteenth October 1861, from Commissioner and Superintendent Peshawur Division to Secretary to Government Punjab (Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Foreign Department), N XXXIX*, Calcutta 1863, quoted in Ploskikh 1977, p. 112.
- 191 Nalivkin 1886, p. 37–9; A. Nurekin, 'Ocherk istorii Kokana s 1841 po 1864 god', *TV*, 1871/35. Quoted in Ploskikh 1977, p. 109.

- 192 Schuyler 1966, p. 175. When Fedchenko was in Khokand in 1869 and 1870 he mentioned the *mukhtor* as being the highest official in the khanate. Cf. A. P. Fedchenko, *Puteshestvie v Turkketane* (reprint of *V Kokandskom khanstve*, St Petersburg and Moscow 1875) Moscow 1950, p. 195
- 193 Ploskikh 1977, pp. 109–12.
- 194 Troitskaia 1969, pp. 38–41.
- 195 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, p. 548; Ploskikh 1977, p. 182.
- 196 Nalivkin 1886, p. 208; Ploskikh 1977, p. 113; *Obozrenie Kokanskogo khanstva* 1849, pp. 202–3.
- 197 Bacqué-Grammont 1972, p. 215.
- 198 Abdul Madzhid, *Report of a Journey to Kokan. Letter N 83, dated nineteenth Oct. 1861*, quoted in *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, p. 501.
- 199 Schuyler estimates the troops to have numbered 12,000 men at the beginning of the 1870s. E. Schuyler, *Turkestan. Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkestan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, vol. 2, London 1876, p. 15.
- 200 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 501–2
- 201 V. M. Ploskikh, *Ocherki patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnoshenii v iuzhnoï Kirgizii (50–70-e gody XIX v.)*, Frunze 1968, pp. 42–79; *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, p. 540.
- 202 Nalivkin 1886, p. 209; A. L. Troitskaia, *Materialy po istorii Kokanskogo Khanstva XIX v. po dokumentam arkhiva Kokanskikh khanov*, Moscow 1969, pp. 3–15.
- 203 *Istoriia Kirg. SSR I*, pp. 531–41; Ivanov 1958, p. 187; Ploskikh 1977, pp. 175–209.
- 204 P. P. Ivanov, 'Kazakhi i Kokanskoe khanstvo (K istorii ikh vzaimootnoshenii v nachale XIX v.)', *ZIVAN*, vol. 7, 1939, pp. 118–21.
- 205 K. U. Usenbaev, *Obshestvenno-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia kirgizov v period gospodstva Kokanskogo khanstva (XIX vek – do prisoedineniia Kirgizii k Rossii)*, Frunze 1961, pp. 29.
- 206 Kushner 1929, pp. 85, 87.
- 207 V. Nalivkin 1886, p. 36; Ploskikh 1977, p. 187.
- 208 *Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Uz. SSR, f. i. 1., op. 22, d. 3, l. 93*, quoted in Ploskikh 1977, p. 207.
- 209 Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd 1878, p. 61.
- 210 Schuyler 1966, p. 53. Cf. Nalivkin 1886, pp. 17–9.
- 211 Cf. *Obozrenie Kokanskogo khanstva* 1849, p. 190.
- 212 Vámbéry 1865, pp. 302–3.
- 213 Akbarzadeh is right to emphasise that non-language-based identities prevailed in the Khanate of Khokand, and that place of residence and political affiliation were important reference points of collective identity. However, his argument would have been clearer had he analysed the implications of *sharia* and *adat* for communal and political identity (Sh. Akbarzadeh, 'A Note on Shifting Identities in the Ferghana Valley', *CAS*, vol. 16, 1997/1, pp. 65–8).
- 214 Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd 1878, pp. 59–61.
- 215 Nalivkin 1886, pp. 31–5; Bronnikova 1993, p. 157.
- 216 Cf. *Obozrenie Kokanskogo khanstva 1849*, p. 209.
- 217 Cf. Tolstova 1959, pp. 43–9; Tolstova 1961, p. 46; Tolstova 1963, pp. 38, 44.
- 218 Usenbaev 1961, p. 31; Kostenko 1880, p. 328–9.
- 219 Schuyler 1966, pp. 188–9. Cf. Fedchenko 1950, p. 195.
- 220 Khanykov 1843, p. 70.

THE TSARIST ADMINISTRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON COMMUNAL COMMITMENT

In contrast to other European powers, Russia was continuously involved with tribal populations on its borderlands. Since these often endangered Russia's southern borders, tsarist statesmanship tried to influence and shape mutual relations and aspired to find a *modus vivendi*. Under these circumstances political agency was much more reconciling towards Muslim nomadic populations than the old Russian view about the empire's tsar as the representative of *pravda* interpreted from the standpoint of Russian Orthodoxy was supposed to approve.¹ As a result it was possible for Tatar aristocrats to become equal members of the imperial elite after the destruction of the Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan and Sibir in the sixteenth century, without being forced to give up their faith as Muslim believers. Muslim serving nobility even was allowed to have jurisdiction over Orthodox peasants on their estates. The anti-Islamic policy of Peter the Great (1689–1725), which deprived Muslim aristocrats of their privileges in cases of their refusal to convert to Orthodoxy, was just the kind of episode now being superseded. Catherine II (1762–96) had already rehabilitated the Tatars and enabled a renaissance of Islamic-Tatar culture.²

With regard to Muslim Central Asia, Russia pursued a less integrative and more defensive policy up to the end of the eighteenth century. From the Caspian Sea to the Altai mountains, Cossack colonies and fortified towns like Orenburg, Petropavlovsk, Omsk, Semipalatinsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk were built along a military line in order to protect the southern border of the tsarist empire and to prevent neighbouring tribesmen from encroaching on the Volga area and on western Siberia. Despite the nominal acknowledgement of tsarist authority by the Small, Middle and (to some extent) Great Horde, the border areas remained unsafe.

In the nineteenth century, however, the Central Asian territories were gradually incorporated into the tsarist state. This is not the place to analyse to what extent the security of Russia's southern border, her need for raw materials to service an expanding industrialisation, and the increasing rivalry between Russia and Britain for political spheres of influence had a bearing on Russia's conquest of the area, nor is it necessary to

discuss the different stages of the conquest and the administrative shifts during colonial rule³ (see Map 11).

We only want to hint that the integration of Central Asia with the tsarist state was regarded as highly problematic by the Russian government. As a result Central Asian people did not become full or direct subjects of the empire, but gained only the status of *inorodtsy* (aliens). This juridical term, which was originally applied to Siberian peoples in 1822, was not uniformly handled within imperial legislation. Nomadism and the recent settlement of indigenous people were used as decisive criteria for its application, but administrative usage was in the end linked more to religious affiliation than to any degree of 'civilisation', since both tribal and settled peoples of Central Asia were regarded as *inorodtsy*.⁴ Due to their exemption from military service and the maintenance of local legal community structures based on *sharia* or *adat*, Central Asians became only indirect subjects of the empire. They acknowledged the tsarist administrative order, but retained their self-administration according to their customs and the right to elect their own local authorities; this materiality enabled the continuity of communal commitment in Central Asia during tsarist rule.

After the reporting-back of the Steppe Commission headed by Privy Councillor F. K. Girs, and the tsarist occupation of Tashkent in 1865, the main administrative division between the Governor-generalship of Turkestan and the steppe *oblasti*, which initially belonged to the *guberniya* of West Siberia and of Orenburg, was established. These *guberniyas* consisted of regions (*oblasti*), which were divided into counties (*uezds*) and districts (*volosti*). The latter would include several villages. Although four steppe *oblasti* were formed in 1868, only Semipalatinsk and Akmolinsk finally belonged to the Governor-generalship of the Steppe, which was created in 1882 and headed by the Governor-general of Omsk. Semirechie only temporarily was part of the Governor-generalship of the Steppe, from 1882 to 1898. The western steppe *oblasti* of Uralsk and Turgay remained directly subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior.

The Governor-generalship of Turkestan continued to be subordinated to the Ministry of War, however. In 1867 it only included the Sir Darya and the Semirechie Oblasti. Corresponding to the tsarist advance and the annexation of further areas, the Governor-generalship of Turkestan incorporated the *oblasti* of Zarafshan (the later Samarkand Oblast') and Ferghana (after the destruction of the Khanate of Khokand in 1876) which, nevertheless, were governed by different provisional regulations drawn up by General von Kaufman, up to 1886. After the temporary occupation of Khiva in 1873, the right bank of the oasis became the Amu-Dar'insky Okrug, which was renamed Amu-Darya Otdel one year later. In 1887 it became part of the Sir Darya Oblast'. Transcaspia, which was conquered after the tsarist victory over the *Teke* federation at Gok Tepe in 1881 and fully occupied by the surrender of Merv in 1884, became part of Turkestan only in 1898.

The Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva survived as diminished political entities and became tsarist protectorates (see Map 14).

Imperial Russia combined both civil and military administration under the control of governors-general, who were high-ranking military officials directly responsible to the tsar. They exerted their authority through a chancellery (*kantseliariia*) which consisted of secretaries and officials and which was headed by an office director (*upravliaiushchiĭ kantseliarii*). Ministerial officials responsible to St Petersburg also worked in the regional administrations and were consulted in general meetings, but the governor-general was not bound to their advice. He was the supreme commander of the military troops and their officers. This structure also existed at the *oblast'* level of tsarist administration, where the military governor (*voennyĭ gubernator*) headed both military troops and the regional board (*oblastnoe pravlenie*) which coordinated and directed the execution of judicial sentences, law enforcement, construction, communication and health projects. The *oblast'* was subdivided in several *uezds* headed by commanders who were responsible for both civil and military concerns. The *uchastok* was the smallest administrative unit, and was directed by a police officer (*pristav*).⁵

The military character of administration was particularly strong in the Governor-generalship of Turkestan. Most of the higher-ranking administrators, such as the *oblast'* governor and *uezd* commanders, were military officers, but only a few of them, like General von Kaufman, General Kolpakovsky and General Grodekov, were interested in the country they ruled and in civil administration, had some understanding of the native population and were qualified administrators.

In contrast to Bukharan officials, who were entitled to collect taxes for their own living, tsarist civil and military officials were salaried. Bribery and corruption were widespread among them for several reasons, however.⁶ Not all officials were committed to the rule of law but rather acted like petty princes in their domains. Second, many unqualified officials were transferred from European to Asiatic areas of administration. Third, officers commanding regular troops received lower salaries than those working in the administration; this tended to favour intrigue, bribe-taking and conspiracy amongst officials. Fourth, some officials, for example *uezd* commanders, were faced with the considerable expenses of hosting and entertaining distinguished travellers and their companions, expenses not included in their salaries. The additional taxes levied to meet these not only defrayed the costs, but also enabled more luxurious lifestyles.⁷

The various tsarist advances into the Kazakh Steppe, Transcaspia, the Tian Shan and Alai Mountains, and the concomitant establishment of administrative structures, did not occur simultaneously, and faced different forms of tribalism and varying compactness of patrimonial state structures. Thus the political adjustments and the impacts of tsarist rule were not uniform in these areas. This is why we must discuss those impacts separately

with regard to the Kazakh Steppe, Transcaspia and the Governor-generalship of Turkestan.

The Kazakh Steppe

Tsarist political order

Kazakh tribal federations along the Russian border

According to Soviet historiography, Abulkhayr's (1718–48) oath of allegiance to the tsarist empire in 1732 should have initiated the 'voluntary association' (*dobrovol'noe prisoedinenie*) of the Kazakhs with Russia.⁸ The khan of the Middle Horde, Abu'l Muhammad Khan (1734–71) and Sultan Ablay, who was khan from 1771 to 1781, took similar oaths in 1840.⁹ At the same time, some parts of the Great Horde under Khan Zholbarus (1720–39) had also sworn loyalty to the tsar. The conditions of these oaths included Kazakh protection of Russian caravans and merchants, the prevention of raids against the Bashkir and Volga Kalmyks, and tsarist assistance in the protection of Kazakh territories. It was also often said that Kazakh tribesmen became subjects of the tsar on taking these oaths.¹⁰

But although khans like Abulkhayr requested the status of tsarist subservience (*poddanstvo*), and Empress Anna Ivanovna offered such a status,¹¹ it is hardly possible to state that Kazakhs also became subjects of the tsarist state, as Soviet scholars have argued.¹² The opposing interests of both sides did not favour such relations. At that time tsarist elites were not prepared to protect Kazakh territories. They were more interested in securing the fortified line along the Ural and Irtysh rivers in order to prevent Kazakh tribes from crossing this line and to inhibit raids on Bashkir or Kalmyk territories. Neither did the empress attempt to collect the tribute which Abulkhayr had formally agreed to pay.

Kazakh khans and sultans frequently renewed these oaths in order to strengthen their positions within the hordes at the expense of tribal leaders and other sultans, or to balance the influence of the neighbouring powers of China and Russia. Thus Sultan Ablay's oath of allegiance to tsarist rule, which was also given by 128 tribal elders in 1740,¹³ did not prevent him from accepting supreme Chinese authority in exchange for pastures in Jungaria. In contrast to Abulkhayr and his son Nurali Khan (1748–86) of the Small Horde, Ablay, being sultan and later khan of the Middle Horde, remained independent from Russia and retained his influence on tribal leaders. His son Vali (1781–1819) soon lost his father's power base and was able to rule only the northern parts of the horde with tsarist help.¹⁴

After the fall of the Jungarian Khanate in 1757, tribal groups of the Great Horde formed alliances with tsarist, Chinese or Khokandian authorities or – like the tribes of the eastern Semirechie region – were able to retain their

independence. Some tribal groups had to choose between an alliance with Khokand or Russia, however. In this way, for example, the ruling Sultan Suiuk, a son of Khan Ablay, 'submitted' to Russian authority.

Nevertheless, Russian-sponsored khanship was extremely unpopular among tribesmen. Khan Abulkhayr faced such hostility from tribal leaders when the latter heard about the khan's wish to submit the Small Horde to tsarist rule. They were insulted by his submission, since he had disrespected customary law and not consulted the tribal leaders concerning such an important decision.¹⁵ Due to popular opposition, the promised obligations were also not fulfilled: Russian caravans and merchants remained unsafe in the steppe, Bashkirs and Kalmyks, who had submitted to tsarist authority and enjoyed its protection, were raided, and promised tributes were not paid. Even Abulkhayr occasionally disregarded his promises by attacking Kalmyks or Ural Cossacks.¹⁶

Whereas Kazakh political reasoning about alliances with Russia gained some plausibility in view of the Jungarian threat in the first half of the eighteenth century, tsarist-backed khanship continued to decline rapidly in the following years. This was especially the case within the Small Horde, where opposing tribal federations headed by rival sultans caused turmoil and unrest. The authority and prestige of khanship declined when tribal leaders started to oppose this office and regarded 'black-bone' leadership to be a more efficient way of restoring the independence of the tribesmen. Sirim Batir, tribal leader of the *Baïbaqty*, was one of the most prominent leaders to oppose khanship. He seriously threatened the position of Nurali Khan and attacked Russian settlements and Kazakh tribesmen loyal to the khan.¹⁷ In the winter of 1785 most of the tribal leaders of the Small Horde turned up at an assembly and expressed their opposition to Nurali by disclaiming him as their khan. There existed mainly two reasons for this opposition. On the one hand, Kazakh tribesmen faced periodic raids by Ural Cossacks into their territories, which caused casualties, the destruction of homesteads and the loss of livestock. On the other hand, due to a shortage of pasture land, they needed access to the abundant grasslands on the 'inner side' beyond the Ural river, access which was only granted to the khan's followers. In addition, opposition increased, when the khan tried to collect taxes after harsh winters had caused severe loss of livestock (*zhūt*) and had impoverished many tribesmen. Nurali's brother Erali Khan (1791-4) and his son Ishim Khan (1795-7) also faced antagonisms which led to the killing of the latter by Sirim's followers. Neither were Ayshuak (1797-1805), Jan-Tore (1805-9), who was killed by a sultan, nor Shir Ghazi (1812-24) effective khans.¹⁸

The formation of the Inner Horde in 1801 was initially a state-sponsored tribal alliance within tsarist territory.¹⁹ Whereas tsarist alliances with parts of Kazakh hordes did not establish the security of tribal border areas, the establishment of the Inner Horde was aimed at securing the inner lands between the Volga and the Ural which were part of the empire. After tsarist

authorities had agreed to the request of Sultan Bukey (1801-23), another son of Nurali, to occupy the inner lands, he became khan of a new tribal federation in the disputed area. In 1801 more than 5,000 households crossed the Ural and formed this horde. The number of tribesmen gradually increased to 30,000 households by 1845. The khan of the Bukey Horde was relatively independent from the governor of Orenburg and Astrakhan, and was expected to keep peace within the horde. He also collected a yurt tax for the tsarist empire. In return he obtained exclusive pasture rights in some western areas between the Volga and the Ural (see Map 10). The mobility and migration routes were limited to its granted territories, however, and members of the horde were not allowed to cross the Ural.²⁰

As Cossack settlements formed a fortification line along the Ural and Irtysh rivers, the territories of the Inner Horde were separated from the Small Horde. In this way tsarist authorities protected the inner lands, and Kazakhs of the Inner Horde obtained pasture land in return for their submission. Thus their status as tsarist subjects obtained some real basis.

Tsarist indirect rule (1820s-1860s)

At the beginning of the 1820s the tsarist authorities decided to strengthen their position in the Kazakh Steppe by introducing new administrative divisions and offices.²¹ In the military districts of Orenburg and Omsk, two different regulations came into effect. In 1822 the 'Rules for the Siberian Kyrgyz' were applied to the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde who were administered from Omsk. The 'Rules for the Orenburg Kyrgyz', which were formally enacted only in 1844, introduced a new administrative order within the Small Horde in 1824. Both statutes formally abolished the status of khan and hordes as political unities, but differed considerably in their content.

SULTAN ADMINISTRATION AMONG TRIBESMEN OF THE
FORMER SMALL HORDE

The 'Rules for the Orenburg Kyrgyz' corresponded to the actual balance of power within the Small Horde and provided for its division into three regional areas based on sultan administration. Temir Erali became sultan-administrator in the central region east of the Tobol river; Kratai Nurali received the western area between the Aral Sea and the Ilek river, and Juma Kudaimeni headed the eastern area up to the junction between Kala and Sir Darya (see Map 10).

Seven years later these three administrative units were further divided into fifty-four 'range districts'. A range district (*uchastok distantzii*) was primarily a territorial unit between two points of fortification and was headed by the local range commander (*distanochnyi nachal'nik*). These

THE TSARIST ADMINISTRATION

districts included several villages. Since range commanders and *aksakals* had to be appointed by the Governor-general of Orenburg, not all of them were officially acknowledged. Thus only two thirds of the *bis* were officially recognised within the new administrative framework.²² Due to the relatively small size of the range districts, sub-tribal rather than tribal leaders remained influential. The range districts were also tax districts for the collection of the annual yurt tax.²³

Thus Chingizid sultan administrators became quasi-tsarist officials, and received houses and salaries for their services as tax collectors and keepers of the peace. Detachments of 100–200 Cossacks under tsarist command, Tatar scribes, assistants and a staff of messengers backed up their work. Tsarist military courts were established and were supposed to deal with criminal offences, in contrast to the Kazakh courts, which were allowed to deal only with minor civil matters.²⁴

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS WITHIN THE INNER HORDE

In the Inner Horde, the position of khan was not abolished. On the contrary, Khan Jangir (1823–45) succeeded in strengthening his position and undertook administrative reforms. Being educated in the house of the governor of Astrakhan, and pursuing civilising plans as tsarist official with the rank of a general-major, he actively supported the settlement of tribesmen, allocated winter quarters and farmsteads, encouraged haymaking and forestation, and promoted trade and Islamic schooling. Having never been a stockbreeder himself, he established his headquarters (*khanskaia stavka*) at a fixed place as the administrative centre of the khanate. The khan had ten representatives (*deputy*) who were sultans and who directed the tribal and sub-tribal groups on their pastures. In matters of disputes with Russians, these sultans secured the interests of the involved Kazakhs and were entitled to arrest people or to collect taxes. In addition there existed the khan's council, consisting of twelve *bis*, who were the leaders of the twelve main tribal groups. In contrast to the other hordes, these leaders and their families lived permanently at the khan's headquarters. There were also bazaar sultans and twelve *esauls* who supervised the bazaars, collected tariffs on merchandise and performed police duties. Khan Jangir's reforms did not remain unchallenged, however.²⁵

PRIKAZ ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE FORMER MIDDLE HORDE

After the death of Khan Vali (1781–1819), the tsarist authorities did not acknowledge a new khan. They instead abolished the Middle Horde by introducing the 'Rules for the Siberian Kyrgyz', which provided a different form of administration to the former horde in the Omsk *Oblast*, in 1822.²⁶

The Governor-general of Siberia, Michael M. Speransky²⁷ became responsible for these new regulations which organised the eastern part of the Kazakh Steppe in *okrugs* (counties), *volosti* (districts) and *auls* (villages). The smallest administrative unit was the village, which was headed by an *aksakal* elected for three years and longer. It consisted of fifty to seventy households. A *volost* included between ten and twelve villages and was ruled by a *bis*. The *volost*, however, also chose a sultan, who had to be confirmed by the Governor-general of Omsk. The office of sultan remained hereditary. The *okrug* entailed between twenty and forty *volosti* and was ruled by a senior sultan. He was elected by the *volost*' sultans for three years and confirmed by the governor. At the time of the administrative changes, eighty-seven *volosts* and four *okrugs* were formed. In 1844, four additional *okrugs* were introduced (Map 10).²⁸

The reform tried to establish balanced power relations between Russian authorities, the hereditary estate of sultans and tribal leaders such as *bis* and *aqsaqals*. The county authority (*okruzhnoi prikaz*) was supposed to provide a forum for this balancing of opposing interests. It consisted of two tsarist officials appointed by the *oblast*' administration, two tribal leaders elected by the *bis* and *aqsaqals* for two years, and of the senior sultan who was the chairman of this council. All these offices were salaried. The *prikaz* was the highest office within the *okrug* and was expected to restore or keep peace, to protect trade, to prevent raids and to collect the annual 1 per cent tax on all livestock except camels. At the same time the *prikaz* was also a judicial court to which all cases of homicide, pillage, *barymta* and resistance to state authorities had to be submitted. Due to the ineffectiveness of the *prikaz* as judicial courts, however, imperial military courts had taken over these cases by the 1840s. There was also a troop of Cossacks under Russian command which assisted the sultan as a police force. In addition, hospitals, schools and storage houses were built in the *okrug* centres.²⁹

The basic idea of the Speransky reform was to pacify the steppe by encouraging the settlement of nomads. Thus Article 171 of the 'Rules' provided 15 dessiatines of land to each nomad who wanted to start farming or establish a settled homestead. Both Kazakh and tsarist administrative officials obtained also land and rights of usufruct during their service as administrative officials. Thus the serving senior sultan administrator received between 550 and 770 dessiatines of official estate land around his residence. The other Kazakh members of the council received 220, and the tsarist representatives 110 dessiatines.³⁰ In addition, the 'Rules' outlawed the nomads' crossing of *okrug*-borders without permission of the county authorities. From the perspective of tsarist rule, this arrangement would prohibit uncontrolled migrations and lessen disorder in the steppe.³¹

OPPOSITION TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Having faced the weakness of the khans at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, tsarist authorities tried to base a new administrative order on the estate of sultans by abolishing the position of khan and the political unit of the horde. Tsarist authorities divided the main part of the dissolved Small Horde into three areas. These were headed by the three most powerful sultans of the horde, who received well endowed positions within the newly established administration. The *prikaz* administration, which prescribed the election of sultans as middlemen of tsarist indirect rule, was another attempt to build a new administrative order on the estate of sultans.

Tsarist policy also included the newly established Inner Horde. Being no longer a horde comparable to the former Kazakh ones, the Inner Horde became rather a clearly defined administrative unit of the tsarist empire, headed by a sultan who received pasture rights in return for keeping peace and protecting Russian trade. In this way the sultan became a tsarist official and middleman between tsarist authorities and Kazakh tribesmen rather than a tribal leader. Khan Jangir was also no longer a stockbreeder.

But the executed reforms did not fulfil Russian hopes of 'civilising' the steppe. Whereas the authority of sultans rapidly declined, turmoil and unrest increased. In the 1820s, Sultan Qayip Ali caused turmoil on several occasions, when he tried to move with more than 1,800 households to the eastern bank of the Ural. In the Inner Horde, discontented nomads began to oppose the khan, as the allocation of pastures and land favoured close kinsmen and owners of large herds like those of the sultans. In 1836-7 the uprising of Isatay Tayman, the head of the *Berish* tribe, and of the *aqyn* Muhammad Utemis, was the most prominent example of this opposition. At the same time minor uprisings also occurred within the territory of the former Small Horde. The uprising of the *Shekti* leader Iset Kutebar against the sultan administrator of the middle section was another instance of decisive action against the new administration and its representatives. It took place between 1853 and 1858. At the same time, Jan Khoja Nurmuhammad organised a resistance movement along the lower course of the Sir Darya.³²

In the Middle Horde, around 1,000 followers of Sarzhan Qasim-uli, a grandson of Khan Ablay, launched attacks on both Cossack detachments and Kazakhs who supported the new administrative order. After Qasim-uli was defeated and escaped to the Khanate of Khokand, it was his half-brother Kenisari Qasim-uli (1841-4) who continued opposition against the new order, which was regarded as an unjust and illegitimate form of rule. Thus he demanded the restoration of the rule of the khan. In 1841 he was also elected khan at an assembly of tribal leaders and sultans. Supported by 20,000 armed tribesmen, he became the unchallenged leader of considerable parts of the former Middle Horde from 1841 to 1844, when tsarist troops defeated him and he fled to Kyrgyzstan. There he was killed in a battle.³³

Tsarist civil-military administration

The successful campaign of General Cherniaev which led to the occupation of Turkistan (1864) and Tashkent (1865) increased the pressure on tsarist authorities for administrative reform in the Kazakh Steppe. Thus the imperial Ministry of Internal Affairs appointed Colonel F. K. Girs as chairman of the so-called Steppe Commission, which examined the social and political situation of the steppe region and was supposed to give recommendations. The Girs Report of 1867 once more asserted the ineffectiveness of the hitherto existing different forms of administration. It emphasised the complete insufficiency of the sultan administration, but ascertained some usefulness of Speransky's *prikaz* legislation with respect to tsarist administrative interests, after it had been revised in some major points to eliminate its shortcomings.³⁴ On the basis of this report, the *Provisional Statute on the Administration of the Semirechie and Sir Darya Oblast'* and the *Provisional Statute on the Administration of the Turgay, Akmolinsk, Uralsk, and Semipalatinsk Oblast'* came into effect in July 1867 and October 1868 respectively.³⁵ These statutes were revised several times and finally replaced by the *Statute on the Administration of the Turkestan Region* in July 1886, and the *Statute on the Administration of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechie, Uralsk and Turgay Oblast'* in March 1891.³⁶

The *Provisional Steppe Statute* abolished both sultan and *prikaz* administrations, and established the four *oblasti* of Uralsk, Turgay, Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk as new administrative units. As both previous administrative structures relied on the Chingizid estate whose authority had declined and were not able to maintain order, the sultans' *okrug* administration was replaced by *uezds*.³⁷ In contrast to the dissolved *okrugs*, the new units were headed by tsarist *uezd* commanders who had full command in the county and headed the tsarist troops. Whereas the Speransky reform still based the territorial *volost* divisions on sub-tribal groups, the *Provisional Steppe Statute* emphasised the strict territoriality of the *volosti*. The number of villages remained approximately the same within the *volosti*, though the number of households of one *aul* doubled on average compared with the *prikaz* administration.³⁸

Indigenous influence at *uezd* level was restricted to the position of junior assistant of the *uezd* commander, which could be held by both influential tribesmen or sultans. Nevertheless, *volost'* and *aul* leadership remained purely sub-tribal offices which wealthy and influential tribesmen competed for. Chingizids were excluded from these offices.³⁹ Holders of both positions were elected for three years by the *volost'* assembly and village meeting (*volostnoi s'ezd* and *aul'nyi skhod*) respectively, lived from local revenues fixed by these assemblies, and had to be confirmed by the *oblast'* governor or *uezd* commanders. The positions included policing functions like the arrest of people for up to three days, the imposition of fines, and tax collection on behalf of the *uezd* or *oblast'* authorities. More severe offences like

homicide, robbery or *barymta* (Russian: *baranta*) had to be punished according to imperial criminal law. The *Provisional Statute* preserved the role of the military courts and retained their jurisdiction on state matters like mail services, telegraph links or assaults on state property.⁴⁰

In 1882 the Governor-generalship of the Steppe was created, replacing the *Guberniya* of West Siberia, and G. A. Kolpakovsky (1882–9) became its first Governor-general. It included originally the *oblasti* Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Semirechie. Sixteen years later, however, it was reduced to just Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk. This was due to the reintegration of Semirechie in the Governor-generalship of Turkestan. Uralsk and Turgay remained under the direct rule of the Ministry of the Interior. This administrative order lasted until 1917 (see Table 4 and Map 14).

The *Steppe Statute* strengthened the position of the tsarist administration by emphasising the right of the Ministry of the Interior to appoint *aul aksakals* and *volost'* leaders also without local elections in Turgay and Uralsk. The same was true for the governor-general of the Steppe *Guberniya*.⁴¹ Whole *volost'* assemblies (*volostnoi s'ezd*) were abolished and their agendas transferred to the jurisdiction of native courts, because tsarist authority hoped to diminish the unjust settlement of land disputes by assemblies which were dominated by single descent groups.⁴² In addition, the statute declared all land to be the property of Russia, and Kazakhs were only granted rights of use. It also provided the institution of chancellery (*kantseliaria*) at *guberniya* and *oblast'* level. One of the main points of the reform referred to the abolition of military courts and the establishment of imperial courts responsible to the Ministry of Justice which dealt with criminal and civil affairs. Thus the tsarist peace courts (*mirovoi sud*) was subordinated to the *oblast* court (*okruzhnyi sud*), which was responsible to the judicial chamber (*sudebnaia palata*) as the highest judicial institution of appeal in Tashkent.⁴³

The native court (*narodnyi sud*) remained the exclusive institution of judicature in minor civil matters between Kazakhs of the same *volost'*. In contrast, extraordinary native courts (*chrezvychainyi s'ezd*) were convoked by military commanders in order to settle disputes between people of

Table 4 Governors-general of the Steppe

Inf. Gen. G. A. Kolpakovsky	1882–1889
Lt. Gen. Baron M. A. Taube	1889–1901
Gen. N. N. Sukhotin	1901–1906
Lt. Gen. Sakharov	1906–1907
Lt. Gen. Nadarov	1907–1909
Cav. Gen. E. O. Shmitt	1909–1914
Lt. Gen. N. A. Sukhomlinov	1914–1917

Source: Pierce 1960, p. 307.

different *oblasti* or *uezds*. Extraordinary courts included both appointed and native-chosen judges, and their sessions took place in the presence of the commander or an authorised official.⁴⁴

Tsarist authorities tried to win Kazakh support for their rule and to turn them into loyal subjects by promoting Russian-Kazakh schooling. Up to middle of the century there were Tatar mullahs who endeavoured to spread literacy among Kazakhs, and who made them more familiar with Islam and *sharia*. At that time tsarist officials began to regard this considerable Tatar cultural influence as being not in the interests of the empire, and took the opportunity to acculturate Kazakhs to Russian culture by spreading more Western- and Russian-oriented schooling. Thus Russian-Kazakh secondary schools were established in the *uezd* centres where Russian and Kazakh children were enrolled in two classes for four years. Mobile *aul* schools aimed at spreading more elementary literacy and some familiarity of the Russian language in rural areas. In 1915 there should have existed 267 *aul* schools and 157 Russian-native schools in the territory of the later Kazakhstan. Most efforts were made in the Turgay *oblast'*, where Ibrahim Altynsarin (1841–89) served as *oblast* inspector of schools. Under the lead of Il'minsky, he also wrote the first Kazakh grammar and the first Kazakh-Russian dictionary.⁴⁵ The spread of bilingual journals like the *Kirgizskaia stepnaia gazeta* was also supposed to help make Kazakhs more familiar with the tsarist authorities and their political agenda.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, tsarist endeavours to integrate the local population within the empire faced limits. As Kazakhs kept their local self-government, so did the Cossacks, who were organised in two *voiskos* and many settlements (*stanitsas*) headed by appointed *hetmans* and elected *atamans* respectively. In 1900 the Ural *voisko* consisted of 166 settlements, whereas the Siberian Cossacks had 208. Depending on their size, these settlements included up to four Cossack villages, which were engaged in agriculture, stockbreeding and fishing along the Ural, Ishim and Irtysh. Both *voiskos* settled along the Ural-Irtysh line and received administrative autonomy and free titles on land in return for defending the empire's borders against Kazakh tribesmen (see Map 12).⁴⁷

Other European peasants, mostly Russians, also had their own local administration and were territorially separated from Kazakhs and Cossacks. Russian peasants established village communities (*sel'skoe obshchestvo*) which formed a *volost'* headed by a *volost'* elder (*volostnoi starshina*). The *volost* meeting (*volostnoi skhod*) elected the members of the *volost'* court and its chairman, who also took part in the superior rural court (*verchnyi sel'skiĭ sud*) of the police district (*uchastok*). It was part of the difficult task of the civil-military administration to keep the peace and to settle disputes between these rival populations. Due to the lack of shared political and legal commitments, territorial separation seemed to be the only way to maintain a fragile peace.

*Impacts on political orientation and communal commitment**Loss of indigenous political orientations*

Soviet scholars described the oaths of allegiance as the beginning of the Kazakhs' voluntary association (*dobvol'noe prisoedinenie*) with or submission (*poddanstvo*) to Russia. From the Kazakh perspective, these oaths rather established temporary alliances with tsarist authority against the invading Kalmyks (Oirats) from Jungaria.⁴⁸ Some sultans also formed such alliances in order to strengthen their position against rivals. The decline of khanship within the Small Horde caused by Khan Abulkhayr and his successors' political orientation towards Russia illustrates the negative result of alliances with Russia on authority relations within the Kazakh hordes.

As the tsarist empire endeavoured to safeguard its southern borders with the help of a fortified line along the Ural and Irtysh rivers, this policy might have politically stabilised some border provinces in the eighteenth century, but had unintended negative effects on the political order in the neighbouring Kazakh Steppe. This was so for several reasons.

In former times, independent Kazakh khans were acknowledged mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, the khans were expected to organise the defence of tribal territories within the hordes against outsiders. On the other hand, they had to coordinate migration routes between tribal groups. Such coordination was highly necessary for livestock-breeding in the steppe due to the scarcity of abundant pastures and the damage caused by un-coordinated migration routes. Successful candidates were elected as khans by tribal leaders due to their influence, wealth, strength and sense of justice. Tsarist imperial political elites, however, supported khans whom they held to be able to secure tsarist borders and to keep control in neighbouring tribal territories. As Russia had claimed the right to confirm or grant the patent of khanship since the first oaths of allegiance, its candidates were often not those of the tribal leaders. This fact caused friction and turmoil within Kazakh political elites. As a result, tsarist-backed khans soon lost their authority beyond the group of their immediate adherents, to whom Russia granted privileges like the temporary crossing to and use of necessary summer pastures on the 'inner side'.

Second, political turmoil led to the declining coordination of migration routes, which was also a major reason for civil unrest, the frequency of *barymta* and the impoverishment of Kazakh pastoralists. This increased social pressure, and political disorder deepened.

Third, the tsarist fortification line and the establishment of Cossack settlements along this line cut off the Kazakhs from some of their customary migration routes. The loss of a considerable range of abundant summer pastures beyond this line was a further reason why Kazakh stockbreeding declined and why raids on the population of tsarist border areas increased. In addition, Kazakhs lost also control over the winter pastures along the Sir

Darya due to the territorial expansion of the Khanate of Khokand and the Emirate of Bukhara at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus many tribesmen moved away, while others remained and had to pay tributes to the conquerors. Due to the political prudence and authority of Ablay, this decline of khanship began some decades later in the Middle Horde.⁴⁹

It was also Kazakh military inferiority with respect to tsarist military force which since the eighteenth century had prevented efficient khanship. Some notables and tribal leaders, who experienced tsarist military superiority, formed alliances with the tsarist power in order to secure their homesteads. This caused the opposition of other leaders who refused tsarist alliances and disdained to acknowledge sultans as khans created by tsarist patents. The result of such antagonism was several alliances competing for access to summer pastures and winter quarters and continuing mutual hostile relations.

Sultan Bukey and his followers' submission to tsarist authority and the establishment of the Inner Horde within the borders of the empire was one way to escape such turmoil and antagonism. The other option was to accept the delimitation of territories proposed by tsarist officials and supported by tsarist troops, in order to secure access to resources and to keep rivals at a distance. In the 1820s both *prikaz* and sultan administrations provided such delimitation and protection of territories. Both regulations, however, turned some sultans and tribal leaders into tsarist officials with privileged access to the best pastures. Nevertheless, such privileged status implied unpopular actions such as the collection of a yurt tax from 1837 and the requisition of animals on behalf of tsarist authorities. It also increased the disadvantaged access to resources of less privileged tribal groups. As a result, deprived or disadvantaged tribesmen, like those of Iset Kutebar or Kenisari Qasim-uli, opposed tsarist-backed sultan administration and caused political unrest.

The provisional and final statutes on the administration of Turkestan and of the steppe once more diminished the political relevance of tribalism and limited it to the *volost* units of the newly established *uezds*. The revolt of Kenisari's son Sultan Sadyk of the Middle Horde, and insurrections by *Adai* Kazakhs of the Mangishlak peninsula could not stop this process of detribalisation, as both were defeated by tsarist troops in the 1860s.

The uprising of 30,000 *Kypchak*, *Naïman* and *Arghyn* tribesmen against tsarist orders to recruit Kazakhs for labour work at the World War I battle-front in 1916 was still informed by tribal political orientations. Kazakhs of former tribal confederacies temporarily settled their long-standing differences, elected khans and besieged Turgay for several weeks. This uprising, however, was soon suppressed by a tsarist relief force.⁵⁰

Due to Russian domination, tribalism lost its integrative capacity to establish political order. This loss implied severe changes in economic habits and communal commitment structures.⁵¹

Migration and settlement

The political orientations of tribal pastoralists are different from those of political elites in agricultural states. Whereas nomadic pastoralists formed political alliances to secure their access to abundant and vast pastures which could enclose distances of more than 1,000 miles, settled agriculturists were interested in the protection of their fields and in preserving borders.

In the eighteenth century, that of the 'Great Calamity' (*aqtaban-shūbryndy*), Kazakh tribesmen were already experiencing the weak position of their political orientations, and some of them formed alliances with unequal neighbouring powers like China and Russia to secure access to pastures. But these alliances already implied constraints on mobility and customary migration routes. The tsarist administrative reforms of the nineteenth century aggravated the decline of nomadic-pastoral politics on the steppe. What was designed to pacify the steppe did not in the least lead to pacification. Thus the Speransky reform of 1822 provided for a ban on unauthorised migration across *okrug* borders.⁵² This rule, which was designed to promote peace, endangered the basic needs of nomadic pastoralists. It implied that all Kazakhs should accept limited migration to summer pastures within the *okrug* borders of their more permanent winter quarters. Implementation of this rule, however, was hardly possible, as summer and winter pastures were not located within the same *okrug*. The Kazakhs of the former Middle Horde customarily wintered on the lower course of the Sir Darya and migrated up to 1,000 kilometres northwards in spring to reach their summer pastures in the areas around the Tobol, Ishim and Sarysu rivers. In autumn they returned to the Sir Darya. This migration route had been used for a long time and was well approved for its proper adaptation to seasonal changes and the raising of abundant herds. Proper migration routes were necessary for pastoral wealth (see Map 19).⁵³

The reform, however, strictly limited available pastures, and thus split the tribesmen into two groups. One group realised that tsarist administration was unavoidable, decided to cooperate and remained at the summer pastures in the northern areas of the steppe. On doing so, they secured exclusive access to the best pastures and fixed their winter quarters there. The other group disregarded the newly established administrative borders and retained their traditional routes of migration. Since sustainable summer pastures existed mainly in northern steppe areas, they had to migrate northwards if they wanted to go on living as pastoralists. As a result, conflicts between northern and southern Kazakhs over pastures were intrinsic to the Speransky reform.

The tsarist civil-military administration introduced in 1867 and 1868 formally extended the 'assault' on the nomadic economy by establishing *uezds* in all territories of the Kazakh Steppe under its rule. Conflict increased between Kazakhs who had permanently occupied summer pastures and those nomads who sought summer pastures in more northern areas. The declaration of all land as property of the tsarist state and the

allocation of winter and summer pastures by authorised *uezd* and *volost'* administrations did not lessen this increasing land problem. Hence these unreconciled interests fuelled the enduring hostilities between tribesmen who tried to retain their former pasture rights and those who adapted to the new administrative framework. It is not surprising that until the great wave of Russian colonisation in the 1890s, many Kazakhs maintained their traditional migration routes and disregarded *uezd* borders.⁵⁴

Permanent occupation of summer pastures implied also some concessions with regard to livestock breeding. The climate of the northern areas of the steppe was harsh so that livestock usually starved due to the impenetrable snow or ice cover during winter. Therefore permanent winter quarters afforded sufficient hay-making to feed the animals during winter. Kaufmann noticed that this was also widely practised in the northern parts of the steppe. But hay-making remained mainly pastoral, as it was needed for stockbreeding, and should not be mistaken as some kind of agricultural activity. In contrast to the southerners, Kazakhs of the northern *uezds* could be allocated summer pastures within the administrative borders. Thus adjustment to new administrative units was possible only for the latter, who became hay-makers and who reduced their migration routes to 150 kilometres and less within the *uezd* borders.⁵⁵

In contrast to Turkman tribesmen, Kazakhs had been mainly nomadic pastoralists before their submission to tsarist administration. They felt superior to settled farmers, and were deeply committed to their nomadic way of life. Prior to tsarist rule, only impoverished tribesmen who had lost their livestock turned to agriculture on the southern edges of the steppe.⁵⁶ Hay-making became more widespread at the end of the eighteenth- and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when some Kazakhs adapted to the tsarist presence along the northern border of the steppe. Due to the Kazakhs' commitment to nomadic pastoralism, up to the middle of the nineteenth century tsarist imperial politics were not very successful in spreading agriculture. Thus only around 5 per cent of Kazakhs of the former Small Horde were involved in agricultural activities, despite the hardships suffered by pastoralists at that time. Agriculture was also almost non-existent in the Sir Darya and Semirechie areas, which had supported agricultural populations in former times.⁵⁷

In the second half of the nineteenth century, some Kazakhs who had occupied summer pastures in the northern steppe zones began farming and raising cattle for sale to Russian markets. Access to these new markets could increase wealth and enable them to become employers of hired labour. This was not the usual case, however. Poverty and weakness often encouraged tribal groups to settle down and seek tsarist protection merely to survive.⁵⁸ In general the nineteenth century was one of pastoral decline and the impoverishment of the Kazakhs, as Valikhanov has stated. Radloff is certainly right in asserting that

the wealth of the people proportionally decreased by the establishment of [Russian] order. The Inner Horde. ... which is fully pacified, is the most ruined one, whereas the wealth of the people increases, the more one approaches the Great Horde. In this way it is possible to observe the fact, that these parts of the Kazakh Horde which were or still are submitted to China, are incomparably richer than those Kazakhs subjected to Russia.⁵⁹

Winters of famine and total losses of livestock (*zhūr*) happened frequently.⁶⁰ When Kazakhs became semi-sedentary or sedentary farmers, it was most often the loss of their livestock and pastures which gave rise to their settlement. Harsh winters like that of 1879–80, or droughts, caused the death of hundreds of thousands of horses, sheep and cattle, and turned thousands of pastoralists into farmers. When almost 3,000,000 European settlers occupied pastures on the Kazakh Steppe from the 1890s up to 1917, the decline of the nomadic economy accelerated (see Map 13). A quarter of the Kazakh population still depended exclusively on livestock breeding, however.⁶¹

Territorial reorientation and leadership

We have already discussed how the gradual establishment of the tsarist administration displaced the independent political orientations of Kazakh tribesmen. When the hordes were substantially broken up at the beginning of the nineteenth century, tribal federations were already declining as well. The so-called 'revolts' and 'rebellions' of Sirim Batir, Sultan Qayip Ali, Isatay Tayman, Iset Kutebar, Sarzhan Qasim-uli and Kenisari Qasim-uli and their followers against tsarist-supported khans, sultans and other leaders, were the result rather of newly formed tribal alliances attempting to defend their access to summer and winter pastures.⁶² All these tribal confederacies experienced their military inferiority in a similar way. They were not able to secure their access to pastures against tsarist military forces. As a result, more and more tribesmen had to acknowledge the bitter truth that their survival no longer depended on khans, sultans and strong tribal leaders, but on their relations with tsarist officials in the new administrative units. Although the new administrative borders severely harmed the pastoral economy, tribesmen had only the option of occupying pastures which were still available within the borders of local administrative units.

Civil unrest and political disorder were inevitable, as two opposing orders simultaneously determined political action orientations among Kazakhs. Both orders were not equal, however. Whereas the tsarist administrative order aimed at self-sufficiency within the established territorial units, Kazakh tribal order could not exist on a local scale due to long migration routes, winter pastures in the southern steppe, and summer pastures in the

northern steppe. Northerners experienced the southerners' customary migration routes as injurious to their newly acquired pasture rights, and started *barymta* to get compensation from their suffered losses. In contrast, the southerners regarded the permanent occupation of summer pastures as a violation of the old right of free access to pastures. Economic pressure on southerners trying to retain access to their summer pastures increased also due to the Khokandian, Bukharan and Khivan conquest of the Sir Darya area, where a large proportion of southern Kazakhs had their winter pastures. These patrimonial states imposed taxes on them, which caused additional economic burdens. This increased their need for access to summer pastures in the northern steppe areas, and made them intransigent in their claims for free access to summer pastures. Thus raids and counter-attacks necessarily emerged from these conflicting legal conceptions and caused disorder in the steppe, highly visible to tsarist observers.

From the tsarist perspective, however, order had to be established and 'belligerent' nomads had to be 'pacified'. Consequently, 'pacification' of the steppe was identified with the destruction of the tribal political order. Due to the military superiority of Russia and the deprivation of the pastoral economy's base, tsarist policy successfully imposed its new political order.

As a result, Kazakhs began to compete for better access to pastures within the new administrative units. Usually tribesmen permanently occupied pastures in tribal or sub-tribal groups. In this way different tribal groups rivalled for influence and pastures within *okrugs* and *uezds*. It was often the most numerous group which over-ruled members of weaker tribal groups and kept them away from the best pastures. This was so due to the majority vote of the indigenous *volosti* headmen (Sg.: *upravitel'*), who could influence the allocation of summer and winter pastures. Thus tribesmen preferred to take pastures in *volost'* where their tribesmen had gained a dominant position. In this way sub-tribal groups reorganised themselves within the imposed administrative units.⁶³

Tribal federations and large tribal groups split into smaller sub-tribal units which became independent from each other. This division was also linked to the change of the yurt order, as tribesmen began to nomadise in smaller units. Since pastures were allocated and secured by the administration, large migrational collectives were no longer formed on the steppe. Another reason for the breaking-up of tribes was the fact that only smaller groups could get some pasture rights in *okrugs* and the later *uezds*, which were already occupied by other tribal groups. Generally speaking, tribesmen attempted to get pasture rights in the *volosti* of their kinsmen in order to avoid being wronged by other tribal groups. That is the reason why tribal groups often occupied whole *volost'* territories.⁶⁴

Due to the establishment of tsarist administration, indigenous leadership increasingly depended on the acknowledgement of tsarist officials, and became only possible within the new administrative order. The *aul'nyi*

starshina became an elected salaried official like the *volost'* headman according to the *Provisional Statutes*. Apparently due to the additional leveling of income, the *Steppe Statute* prescribed that their expense allowances had to be paid by the Kazakhs themselves, and that it was up to the local assemblies to fix this sum themselves. The village elder was elected by the village assembly for three years, and had to be confirmed by the *uezd* commander. He arranged local meetings for the election of officials, compiled tax surveys and collected the yurt tax. Groups of fifty householders elected a deputy who met annually to divide tax duties and who elected the *volost'* headman (*upravitel'*) and the judges, whom Kazakhs continued to call *bis*. The latter also had to be confirmed by the *oblast'* commander. The *volost'* headman was in charge of the enforcement of judicial sentences and the collection of fines and taxes. For this purpose he had to keep a list of all inhabitants. As chief of the *volost'* he also influenced the allocation of summer and winter pastures.⁶⁵

Mostly wealthy and influential tribal leaders were elected to these offices, which they regarded as legitimate sources of enrichment. Such leaders, who were also called *atqaminers*,⁶⁶ allocated the best and largest pastures to their families and had additional incomes as collectors of the annual yurt tax. In some *volosti* where strong tribal structures prevailed, the allotment of winter pastures was more equally divided between households. In other *volosti*, tribal solidarity disappeared and wealthy stockbreeders influenced the allocation of winter pastures to the effect that allotments were granted according to the size of stock.⁶⁷ Consequently they also used their wealth to maintain their influence.

Leaders frequently entertained guests and initiated feasts where they offered sheep and kumiss (*qymyz*) to a large number of people. This required considerable wealth.⁶⁸ As the military commander of the Semipalatinsk *uezd* reported, candidates for official duties spent up to 15,000 roubles in order to give presents to their most influential supporters and to organise feasts and banquets for their electorate.⁶⁹ Becoming an official was consequently not only a matter of personal enrichment, but also of good reputation and high generosity. Sometimes weak leaders could become *volost'* headsman due to their good relations with the tsarist officials who could influence their election. These leaders also had less influence among their people.⁷⁰ When they cooperated too closely with tsarist authorities – as some did under government pressure – and prepared lists for the recruitment of labour troops at the front in 1916, they could even become targets for attacks by their own tribesmen.⁷¹

Law and liabilities

We have already mentioned that *bis* had been tribal and sub-tribal leaders, before tsarist administration was introduced in the Kazakh Steppe. As leaders they were also judges who settled disputes among their tribesmen.

They did not automatically become tribal leaders, however. Leadership always depended also on the personal qualities of a *bi*, on his authority, his sense of justice and his generosity. Thus there existed tribes with one acknowledged leader and others where several *bis* competed for influence. The latter had little authority and were only acknowledged by the immediate adherents of smaller sub-tribal divisions. Tribesmen rather preferred to join a strong and influential *bi* of another sub-tribal group than accept the authority of a closely related, but weak and unjust, leader.

This element of choice existed in a similar way in judicial matters. In disputes involving different tribal or sub-tribal groups, both the plaintiff and the defendant had the right to nominate additional independent *bis* as members of the judicial council. On doing so they chose the most experienced and reputable *bis* for that purpose. This guaranteed the upholding of justice based on customary law and limited the actual right of the strongest within the steppe. The free choice of judges in cases of arbitration was an important balancing element between weaker and stronger groupings within the tribal political order.⁷²

With the establishment of tsarist administration, *bis* lost their political influence as tribal leaders and became mainly arbitrators in disputes between different *auyls*. Tsarist rule prescribed that only an authorised *bi* could become a judge within an *auyl*, as was the case among tsarist lay magistrates (Sg.: *mirovoī sud'ia*). This regulation did not decrease, but rather increased disorder on the steppe. Valikhanov had already criticised this regulation and revealed its shortcomings by giving several reasons for it. Many elected judges defended only the interests of the wealthy stockbreeders and their own relatives. They secured their election through gifts, intrigues and good relations with tsarist officials. Once in office, they easily abused their position by taking the side of their relatives and of rich stockbreeders who could offer them generous gifts. In contrast to former tribal *bis*, they often lacked any authority to command obedience to their decisions and the prompt payment of fines. This too strengthened civil unrest on the steppe.⁷³

The *Provisional Steppe Statute* changed the judicial position of the plaintiff insofar as he became entitled to choose a *bi* also from among non-authorised judges, when the respondent agreed to it. If the latter did not acknowledge the proposed arbitrator, however, the respondent had only the right to reject the first two of the four-to-eight authorised *bis* of the respondent's *volost'* proposed by the plaintiff.⁷⁴ This rule might have improved the situation of plaintiffs of the same *volost'*, but probably less of plaintiffs who resided in different districts and counties and were regarded as strangers.

Tsarist administration also tried to change the units of liability. *Auyls* became units of taxation, and their members were collectively responsible for the prompt payment of the yurt tax.⁷⁵ Basically Kazakhs became individually responsible for offences caused. When they were not able to pay

compensation, it was their village community which had to pay. In this way liabilities of situationally defined *qundas* groups, which had formerly been based on descent affiliation, became those of village members, whether they were relatives or not. This was not a uniform process in different parts of the steppe. Thus there still existed a few areas where blood revenge was common, whereas in other regions many Kazakhs disagreed about who had to pay *qūn*.⁷⁶ Different conceptions of law mirrored the breaking-up of the hordes and the uneven social and political changes on the steppe.

In addition, the Islamisation of settled or semi-nomadic Kazakhs could change communal commitment. Islamisation occurred for two reasons on the northern and southern edges of the steppe. Up to the 1860s, tsarist authorities tried to pacify Kazakh tribesmen by spreading Islam among them with the help of Tatar mullahs who became scribes of the sultan administrator and of the *prikaz* administration. They established religious schools (*meqteps*) in *okrug* centres, and became teachers in *auyls* where they taught the villagers the scriptures and *sharia*. Although this instruction remained highly superficial and incomprehensible for animistic tribesmen, Islamic judicial concepts partly informed customary law. As a result some Kazakhs started also to acknowledge the hereditary claims of women and the partition of estates between sons and daughters.⁷⁷ The submission of Kazakhs to the Khanate of Khokand and the Emirate of Bukhara increased this Islamic influence, especially among more settled Kazakhs. Thus the *kadi* became an alternative judicial authority in some parts of the Sir Darya *Oblast'*. Grodekov observed that especially wealthy and reputable people acknowledged the judicial authority of the Muslim judges.⁷⁸

The Turkmen in Transcaspia

After the fall of Gok Tepe and the tsarist occupation of the Akhal oasis, the Transcaspian *Oblast'* was formed in July 1882. At the beginning the *oblast'* included the Mangishlak, Krasnovodsk and Akhal-Teke *Pristavs*, which became the Mangishlak, Krasnovodsk and Askhabad *Uezds* eight years later. At that time the border with Persia had already been fixed at the conference of Teheran in January 1882. In addition tsarist authorities established the Merv and Tejen *Okrugs* (the later Merv and Tejen *Uezds*), after the non-violent surrender of the oases in 1884. In May 1893, at a second conference, the Russian-Persian border was finally drawn up as far as Afghanistan. Having originally been part of the Caucasian military district and subject directly to the imperial war ministry from 1890 to 1897, the Transcaspian *Oblast* became one of the five *oblasts* of the Governor-generalship of Turkestan.⁷⁹

This formal subordination did not end the particular status of the *oblast'*, however. There was no military governor and *oblast'* administrative board; their functions were performed by an *oblast'* commander and his personal

staff. In this way General A. N. Kuropatkin ruled the *oblast'* like a viceroy in the 1890s, and continued to keep direct control over the province even after he had returned to St Petersburg and had become the imperial Minister of War. Only when Kuropatkin resigned from his office at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 did the Governor-general of Turkestan gain full control over Transcaspia.

The delimitation of the Russian-Afghan border in 1887 and the establishment of the Atrak river as the Russian-Persian border submitted the greater part of the Turkman tribal confederacies to tsarist jurisdiction. Only the Gurgan *Iomut* and *Gökleng* were included in Persia, whereas a smaller number of Turkmen of various confederacies became part of Afghanistan. Both borders could not be fully controlled, which enabled tribal migration up to the 1930s. Other *Iomut* and *Chovdur* tribesmen who stayed on the lower course of the Amu-Darya continued to belong to the Khanate of Khiva, whereas parts of the *Ärsary* confederacy remained within the borders of the Emirate of Bukhara.⁸⁰

Civil-military administration

As in other parts of tsarist Central Asia, the established civil-military administration was based on *uezd* units headed by military commanders. *Uezd* territories could include police districts (*pristavstvos*) which were led by Russian police officers (*pristavs*).⁸¹ The *volost'* headman and the *aul'nyi starshina (oba iashuly)* became members of a local administration whose representatives were elected by the corresponding *maslakhats* for three years. As Russian troops were concentrated along the borders and at strategically important points, tsarist authorities also formed a Turkman mounted militia which was commanded by tsarist officers. These militiamen were salaried, but provided their own food supplies and horses.⁸²

Tsarist authorities wanted to control raids and vendettas and tried to integrate *däp* within a new judicial order. As on the Kazakh Steppe, they established native courts at district, county and regional levels. According to the *Provisional Statute on the Administration of the Transcaspian Oblast*, the district court (*uchastkovyi narodnyi sud*) consisted of around five salaried judges who decided in a definitive way on minor civil and criminal affairs.⁸³ Every village had the right to nominate two experienced and acknowledged judges who were confirmed and ranked on a list by the military *uezd* commander. If their ranking permitted, they could serve as district judges. The conference (*s'ezd*) of native judges represented the second judicial level and could fix sentences up to three months of arrest and deal with matters in dispute of up to 500 roubles in value. In contrast to the district courts, conferences were headed by an authorised representative of the *uezd* administration and could be held in every district. Candidates for the position of judge and district judges not involved in the first instance formed the quora of these

conferences. It was up to the *oblast'* commander to determine the composition and time of extraordinary conferences (sg.: *chrezvychainyĭ s'ezd*) which dealt with disputes between members of different regions. This represented the second level of appeal and often dealt with conflicts over water and pasture rights between inhabitants of far-distanced *uezds*.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, all crimes and offences against Russian subjects and the tsarist state could not be handled by native courts and had to be submitted to imperial ones. Assaults against state property, civil servants and public order belonged to these offences in the same way as the neglect of hygienic regulations did.⁸⁵

Imperial taxation was mainly based on two sources. Each household was obliged to pay a cart tax, which was fixed at 6 roubles in 1892. One third of the tax yield was used for local concerns. The second source of local funding was supplied by rentals from former *mülk* and *sanashik* land which was rented to poor and landless tribesmen, and which Russian authorities expropriated after the conquest. According to Palen this should have been around 65,000 hectares. These rentals made up the main source of income of the local administration.⁸⁶

Impact on communal commitment

By establishing the *oba* as the tax unit, the tsarist administration conserved the village community as the basic cell of local administration. The elected official village elders became personally responsible for the prompt payment of the yurt tax to the *uezd* treasury.⁸⁷ The expropriation of all leased *mülk* and *sanashik* land levelled economic differences in areas where *mülk* property and rents were more widespread. Economic differences were not abolished, however, since leaseholders still had to bear the double burden of yurt taxes and rents.

The establishment of colonial order and the decreased necessity to secure the defence of the *oba* implied that *sanashik* allotments of *chomry obas* were no longer granted to all able-bodied sons of village inhabitants, but started to be conferred on the married sons only. This change of *däp* implied that the number of *suv* (water) holders decreased because many of the mature male inhabitants could not immediately afford to pay the bride money. On the other hand, rich families usually could secure more *suv* rights by marrying their minor sons. In addition, bride price became higher as well. The increasing demand for women among *chomrys* raised the payable bride money up to five times. This increased the economic inequality within the *oba*, since only rich people could secure additional water rights in this way. *Mülk* property became more widespread among *chomrys* during Russian rule.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, this change of the *däp* did not erode communal commitment on the *oba* level. When an elder was chosen as the official head of the *oba* (*aul'nyĭ starshina*),⁸⁹ he was merely the speaker for the residence group rather than a powerful leader who could make binding decisions for the

whole village. As he was elected by the *maslakhat*, he relied on the consent of the group. If Skrine and Ross mentioned that tax duties could be unequally divided between rich and poor villagers, this was less due to the authoritative influence of the village head than to the consent of the *maslakhat*.⁹⁰ In the case of mixed *obas*, elders of the *maslakhats* of the different descent groups formed the village council. Heads of the most influential descent groups became the spokesmen of the village. The village *maslakhat* also nominated two of its most honourable and experienced members as candidates for the position of native judge.

The position of the *volost* headman (*volostnoi upravitel'*) was more problematic. He was elected by the *maslakhat* of several *obas*.⁹¹ From the Turkman point of view, he was just a representative of his descent group who had to defend his group's interests. Tsarist authorities, however, urged him to perform police duties, to collect taxes or to arrest sentenced offenders. This could be quite difficult. No *iashuly* would have liked to arrest his relatives or other tribesmen who were not regarded as being liable, after compensation had been paid.

Native district judges were in no easier a position. Tsarist authorities expected them to judge offences according to *däp*. Despite their appointment by tsarist authorities they were probably able to fulfil this task, although the tsarist-designated native court was no longer a *maslakhat*. In former times a regional *maslakhat* was always a meeting of representatives of involved descent groups, which tried to settle a dispute or to restore peaceful relations after a dispute or a homicide by agreeing on payable indemnities. In contrast, tsarist native judges dealt with cases independent of the descent affiliation of offender and offended. Some district courts might have included judges from all main descent groups, others not. As long as the court represented the *däp*, decisions could still have been authoritative.

In the first years district judges also passed fines according to the *däp*. In this way, they prescribed material compensations also in cases of homicides, fights, pillages or rapes. However, as tsarist police officers or *uzed* commanders confirmed all fines, they often commuted fines to sentences and prescribed imprisonment and forced labour in cases defined to be 'criminal' by imperial law. Lomakin admits that thousands of Turkmen were sent to Siberia in this way in the first years of tsarist rule because they lived in compliance with their customs and did not differentiate between civil and criminal offences.⁹² Only the fact that Turkmen could not avoid such severe punishments by the tsarist authorities gradually changed the attitudes of judges towards punishment, and some of them started to fix sentences, as well.⁹³ This change implied that imperially imposed personal punishment was added to the compensations which the offender's descent group had to pay according to *däp*.

On the one hand, the native courts did not work well if there were no judges close to the involved groupings appealing to the court. This was espe-

cially the case at *uezd* conferences of judges and extraordinary conferences on the *oblast'* level. On the other hand, offences which involved people of the same or neighbouring *obas*, were often not officially brought to native courts, but disputes were customarily settled without getting any tsarist authorities involved. In this way tsarist punishment could be avoided in case of putative criminal offences.⁹⁴

On a regional level there existed the problem that disputes had to be settled also between hitherto inimical tribes and tribal confederacies. Lomakin clearly realised this problem when he remarked:

In the extraordinary conference [*chrezvychaĭnyĭ s''ezd*] native judges of the different Turkman tribal federations [*plemia*] were appointed, since at that time Turkmen had not yet accepted any other idea of the court which differed from their *maslakhats* except that of the *kadi*. As the *maslakhats* was a court of arbitration, it was necessary that judges be chosen from both litigious parties. From the perspective of a Turkman, courts could only be regarded as being rightfully formed, if at least one judge of his confederacy was a member of the court. As far as Turkmen were concerned, judges of the same tribal affiliation always protected their own interests and did not allow other judges to adjudicate their affairs in a biased way.⁹⁵

Russian authorities had to take into consideration this fact, and increased the quorum of the extraordinary conference from five to seven in order to have representatives of all tribal confederacies there. In this way the court could settle disputes more authoritatively between members of different confederacies.

Despite all these problems of imposing Russian rule on acephalous tribesmen and of integrating *dāp* within the imperial order, tsarist policy was successful in restraining vendetta. As tsarist authorities severely punished offences against persons, Turkmen more and more renounced immediate blood vengeance and preferred instead to negotiate for claims of material indemnity (*khun*) in the *maslakhats* of the concerned descent groups.⁹⁶ As a result, imperial order limited vendetta in Turkmenistan, although tsarist authorities often did not get directly involved in this. It was this fact that nourished the Russian view of the 'pacification' of the Turkman deserts.

When General Skobelev besieged Gok Tepe, where the whole population of the Akhal oasis took refuge, he caused a massacre by commanding his men to take no prisoners. Thus 6,500 Turkmen died during the defence of the fortress and 8,000 of them were killed while being pursued by the tsarist cavalry. Many women and children were among the victims. Skobelev's political deliberation was that enduring peace could only be established if the *Teke* was hit as hard as possible and as long as complete submission was reached.⁹⁷

The fall of Gok Tepe was a traumatic experience for *Teke* tribesmen, which also influenced the relations of other tribal confederacies to tsarist rule. Due to their military inferiority, Turkman survival became possible only through submission to tsarist authority. Turkmen who escaped from Gok Tepe and who worried about the fate of the women and children left behind had no other choice than to accept Skobelev's call to return and to submit to tsarist authority. This was not an easy decision. Makhtum Kuli Khan expressed this deep Turkman aversion to authority after he had involuntarily offered his submission in September 1882:

I am driven to offer my submission to the Russian government in spite of every desire to the contrary on my part. I find no other course open to me.⁹⁸

It has been noted that Turkman tribesmen became relatively obedient to Russian authority.⁹⁹

The decline of tribalism and the further settlement of Turkmen promoted both a strengthened Islam and private property rights among Turkmen.¹⁰⁰ According to Bregel, the private ownership of wells developed only after the introduction of tsarist administration.¹⁰¹ The tsarist promotion of cotton cultivation for Russian markets also fuelled the spread of property rights on cotton fields, as high investment of labour and facilities was needed to begin the planting of cotton. Russian compilations of Turkman customary law also referred to some *sharia* norms.¹⁰² The increasing importance of Islam became visible in the establishment of new mosques. Whereas only 161 mosques and 205 mullahs were mentioned in official reports on the Transcaspia *Oblast* in 1896, the number of mosques had increased to 481 by 1911.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, school Islam and residential communal commitment remained weak among Turkmen.

The Governor-generalship of Turkestan

The Russian conquest of Semirechie, Tashkent and the Sir Darya areas established full tsarist control within a few years, and had not been preceded by a period of Russian influence and administrative experiments, as was the case in the Kazakh Steppe. There were, furthermore, no immigrations of poor European peasants who would seize land before tsarist troops arrived, as had occurred in East Siberia. This lack of previous involvement might explain the tsarist authorities' profound ignorance of the area at the time of the conquest. Consequently, experienced administrative staff who knew how to deal with the local population were scarce. Thus the tsarist legislators had not much more to rely on than the recommendations of the Steppe Commission in order to draft the *Provisional Statute of 1867*. According to Palen, the commission advised the

establishment of the Governor-generalship of Turkestan with Semirechie and Sir Darya as its two main regions.¹⁰⁴

The introduction of civil-military administration faced difficulties which were different from those found on the Kazakh Steppe. In contrast to the population of Turkestan, Kazakh tribesmen participated in a normative political order based on customary law and the acknowledgement of khan-ship. It was Russia's 'civilising' mission into the steppe which caused the friction between Kazakhs adhering to the old Kazakh political order and those favouring the newly established tsarist administration. The inhabitants of Turkestan did not share a common normative political order at the time of the Russian conquest, but were polarised as adherents of autonomous, Chingizid or Islamic political orientation. In addition, tsarist authorities introduced a form of political order different from those rival forms of political commitment. Tsarist military governors differed from tribal leaders and muslim patrimonial rulers in their ability to use superior military force to achieve the obedience of both tribesmen and non-tribal residents. Thus this kind of obedience remained opportunistic and could easily turn into disobedience if this had any chance of success. It is not surprising that tsarist authorities were concerned about upholding 'Russian prestige' in the area. This was a euphemistic expression, often conjured up when native people resisted tsarist orders, and which was used to depict the preparedness of tsarist authorities to respond to any disobedience or uprising with force and deterrence. Only ignorance about the importance of the normative order could have led to the Russian prejudice that 'native people only valued force (*sila*) in authority relations (*vlast'*)'.¹⁰⁵

Civil-military administration

Administrative partition of native and European inhabitants

The establishment of the Governor-generalship of Turkestan is closely linked to the unremitting endeavours of General von Kaufman, who was Governor-general from 1867 until his death in 1882.¹⁰⁶ Not only did he appear as the organiser of further tsarist conquests which led to the annexation of the Zarafshan valley in 1868, the submission of the emir of Bukhara (1868), the submission of the khan of Khiva (1873) and the incorporation of the remaining Khanate of Khokand into the tsarist empire, but he also organised the administration of the conquered territories. Thus he was responsible for the elaboration of the *Provisional Statute for the Zarafshan Oblast*, the *Russo-Bukharan Commercial Convention* of 1868, the *Russo-Khivan Peace Treaty* of 1873 and the *Ferghana Measures* proposed in the same year. According to the revised report of Senator K. K. Palen in 1910, Kaufman was the only Governor-general who had a clear programme for his administrative actions.¹⁰⁷ Table 5 lists the successive Governors-generals of Turkestan.

THE TSARIST ADMINISTRATION

Table 5 Governors-general of Turkestan

Adj. Gen. K. P. von Kaufman	(14 July 1867–3 May 1882)
Lt. Gen. M. G. Cherniaev	(25 May 1882–21 Feb. 1884)
Adj. Gen. N. O. Rosenbach	(21 Feb. 1884–28 Oct. 1889)
Lt. Gen. Baron A. B. Vrevsky	(28 Oct. 1889–17 March 1898)
Lt. Gen. S. M. Dukhovskiy	(28 March 1898–1 Jan. 1901)
Lt. Gen. N. A. Ivanov	(23 Jan. 1901–18 May 1904)
Cav. Gen. N. N. Teviashov	(22 June 1904–24 Nov. 1905)
Lt. Gen. D. I. Subotich	(28 Nov. 1905–15 Aug. 1906)
Inf. Gen. N. I. Grodekov	(15 Dec. 1906–8 March 1908)
Adj. Gen. P. I. Mishchenko	(2 May 1908–17 March 1909)
Inf. Gen. A. V. Samsonov	(17 March 1909–Aug. 1914)
Gen. F. V. von Martson	(Aug. 1914–June 1916)
Adj. Gen. A. N. Kuropatkin	(21 July 1916–31 March 1917)

Source: Pierce 1960, p. 307.

General von Kaufman's term of office also set the tone for urban development in Central Asia. Concerned with representing power and 'Russian prestige', he ordered that an elaborate plan should be drawn up for Russian Tashkent as a European-style city. In this way, broad avenues, magnificent public buildings and numerous trees were set up in the immediate proximity of the walled native town. Thus Tashkent became a model for urban development in Central Asia. For hygienic and security reasons tsarist officials settled down in separate new urban districts in other towns as well.

The establishment of a *duma* in Tashkent with native and European members did not overcome the administrative division. Although Europeans represented a minority in Tashkent, they were allotted two thirds of the seventy-two seats. Being a minority in the *duma*, natives could not use this forum to improve their situation in old Tashkent, as Palen concluded.¹⁰⁸

Only within European urban areas did residential partition not exist. Whereas no Europeans lived in native settlement areas, some natives lived in European parts of towns, where they ran shops and even built mosques. Thus one third of the civil population was Muslim in European Tashkent, and in 1913 there existed sixteen mosques in the new town.¹⁰⁹

Residential partition was fully established in rural areas. Cossacks, who were first brought to Semirechie for military reasons, got their own districts, where they built houses and settlements. Later, Europeans came and settled in newly founded villages on former pasture land which had sufficient water resources (see Map 13). This circumstance strengthened the partition of the European and native population and promoted a residential separation which still remained significant during the Soviet period. Europeans did not learn local languages, gained little experience and understanding of local customs, and regarded themselves as a superior race who were bringing 'culture' and 'civilisation' to Central Asia.

Various forms of local administration and judicial system corresponded to this residential partition. Cossacks, who originally belonged to the Siberian Cossack army (*voisko*), formed the Semirechie Cossack *voisko* and were headed by a *hetman*, appointed by the tsar. This *voisko* was subdivided into twenty-eight settlements (*stanitsas*) headed by elected *atamans*. These settlements included a few Cossack villages which were mainly involved in agriculture. Semirechie Cossacks received administrative autonomy and free titles on land for their military service in defending the border areas and providing troops for the regular army.¹¹⁰

The basic unit of Russian peasants was the village community (*sel'skoe obshchestvo*) which resided in one village (*selo*). The householders elected one elder (*starosta*) who headed the village and judged minor offences. A *volost'* included several villages and was led by a *volost'* head (*volostnoi starshina*), elected by representatives from every ten households, who formed the *volost'* meeting (*volostnoi skhod*). The *volost'* head presided over the district board (*volostnoe pravlenie*), which consisted of all village elders and performed some judicial function by imposing light sentences on minor offenders. The *volost'* meeting also elected a chairman and members of the *volost'* court which held jurisdiction over all members of a *volost'*. One could appeal against decisions to a superior rural court (*verkhniĭ sel'skiĭ sud*), formed by the *volost'* chairmen of each *uchastok*. It has to be emphasised that not all decisions were based on the statutory imperial legislation. Some of them were also based on local Russian customary law.¹¹¹

Only urban European inhabitants were directly subject to imperial law, and lay magistrates (sg.: *mirovoi sud'ia*) dealt with their cases. They alone were directly subject to the Russian *politseimeister* or *politseiskii pristav* and their staff.

Oblast' and *uezd* administrations were in charge of maintaining order between these different native and European population groups, and they regulated conflicts arising from rivalry for scarce resources. Their administrative staff and the imperial courts dealt with most cases in which members of these different groups were involved. Given the small number of administrative staff, it was no easy job to balance conflicting interests and to keep peace in the Governor-generalship of Turkestan.

Local administration and native judges

TRIBAL POPULATION

With regard to the tribal population, the administrative system of the Governor-generalship of Turkestan was similar to that of the Steppe *oblasti*. Local leaders like the village elder and *upravitel'* were only influential within villages and *volosti*. At first, village elders had been elected by voters appointed from the heads of ten households.¹¹² After the introduction of

the *Turkestan statute*, they were elected by the *auyl* meeting (*aul'skiĭ skhod*), which consisted of all owners of yurts and which also fixed the elders' revenues from local taxes. In reality the new statute did not change local customs of appointing the *aksakal*. This remained a prerogative of the elders.¹¹³ The *volost upravitel* was voted by electors of ten to fifty households (Russian: *piatidesiatnik*; Uzbek: *ëllikboshi*), which formed the *volost' s'ezd* (assembly), and received revenues from local taxes fixed by the assembly.¹¹⁴

The election and authorisation of native judges corresponded to those of the *bis* in the Steppe regions. However, the *Turkestan Statute* no longer referred to them as *bis*, but labelled each native judge as *narodnyi sud'ia*. *Biīs* were elected by the *volost'* assemblies. Their position depended on the support of the majority groupings of the *volost'*, and was open to biased judgements in disputes between majority and minority groupings. Each district had at least three *biīs*, but was not allowed to have more *biīs* than there were villages.¹¹⁵ Matters which involved different villages were settled in conferences (*s'ezds*) of the *volost' biīs* in the presence of the *volost'* headmen. Those matters which involved residents from different districts or counties were settled by extraordinary conferences (*chrezvychainyi s'ezd*) of the involved districts. These latter meetings were not only scheduled by the *uezd* commander, but also held in his presence.¹¹⁶

Districts and villages became also units of tax liability. Although the yurt tax was a personal tax on each owner of a yurt, tax burdens were often divided within the village and the *volost'* according to the financial means of households and villages.¹¹⁷

SART POPULATION

Tsarist administration of Turkestan differed from that of the steppe regions by its inclusion of a considerable settled non-tribal population, to which the *Provisional Turkestan Statute* referred as *Sarts*.¹¹⁸ Heads of *Sart* villages and urban wards were called *aksakals* (Uzbek: *oqsoqols*; Tajik: *arbobs*), who were first elected by voters appointed from the heads of ten households,¹¹⁹ and who were expected to do the same policing jobs, like the *volost'* headmen of nomadic or semi-nomadic villages. Since 1886 *aksakals* were required to be directly elected by an assembly of all house-owners of rural and urban mahallahs.¹²⁰

Elders usually lived from revenues raised from the inhabitants, which the mahallah meeting awarded them according to the local customs.¹²¹ In smaller *Sart* villages the mahallah also formed the village meeting (*sel'skiĭ skhod*). In bigger villages, residents of more than one mahallah formed the meeting which elected a village *aksakal*.¹²² Although all house-owners were entitled to take part in such meetings, only the elders would usually decide in these matters.¹²³ The mahallah also became collectively responsible for the collection and payment of taxes.¹²⁴

The *Turkestan Statute* introduced a second level of local offices among the *Sart* population of Turkestan. In urban areas the chief elder (*starshii aksakal*) became the highest native official and commanded the native police patrols. He was appointed by the military governor and received a salary from local taxes, as did subordinate native police officers.¹²⁵

In rural *Sart* areas *volosti* were established in the same way as among the tribal population. These administrative units included several villages and were headed by a *volost' upravitel'*, who was elected by representatives of each fifty households for a three-year term. *Sart* district heads had some regular income, whose amount was defined by the *volost' s"ezd* (assembly) and paid for by residents if they received no income from local *vaqf* donations. It was the duty of the chief elder to enforce tsarist and Islamic jurisdiction, to compile a list of the number of households and inhabitants, to supervise the prompt payment of taxes and to maintain order.¹²⁶

As among leaders in districts of a tribal population, *Sart* leaders were elected as *volost'* headmen, by showing generosity to their electorate. Thus *volost'* leaders could spend up to 50,000 roubles for feasts and gifts to secure their election.¹²⁷

In addition, the revised statute also included regulations concerning two further local offices. *Aryk aksakals* were salaried officials whom the military governor appointed to supervise the main irrigation channels. In contrast, *mirabs* (Tajik, Uzbek: *mirobs*) were locally funded and subordinate officials who surveyed smaller channels and who controlled the allocation of water in villages. Only the *mirab* was elected by the village assembly and could be deposed by it. He supervised repair work of villagers, had to implement orders of the *aryk aksakal* and could make complaints about the latter to the *uezd* commander.¹²⁸

The *Provisional Turkestan Statute* correctly confirmed that *Sart* people acknowledged kadis as judges (§214) and provided a separate regulation for the jurisdiction of kadis and local representatives. In contrast to their former appointment by the ruler, kadis became elected officials like *aksakals*, and held office for three years. Tsarist authorities introduced the rule that each kadi should head his own judicial district (*uchastok*), which included one or more *volosti*.¹²⁹ Thus *Sart* inhabitants could no longer choose their judges, but had to submit their case to the kadi of their *volost'*. As kadis were elected by the *volost'* assembly, his staying in office depended on the majority group of the assembly. For this reason the kadi's settlement of disputes between minority and majority groupings was often biased.¹³⁰

The regulations also provided instruments of appeal to tsarist judges and commanders. Matters involving more than 100 roubles of value in dispute, criminal offences which were not required to be submitted to imperial courts and matters involving residents from different districts were dealt by conferences (sg.: *s"ezd*) of kadis. In an extraordinary conference (*chrezvychnyi s"ezd*) kadis dealt with matters which involved residents of different counties.

These conferences could also include *biīs*, if *uezds* or *volosts* with tribal residents were involved. The most serious offences like robbery, plunder and homicide could only be dealt by Russian courts. In this way, the statute abolished severe sharia punishments like whippings, the cutting-off of hands and feet or the death penalty. Instead, Russian judges and commanders levied fines, inflicted arrests, and imposed deportation to Siberia to punish severe offences. For this purpose prisons had to be built at local expense in all *uezd* towns.¹³¹

Land and tax reform

On declaring all land to be the property of the empire, tsarist rule conformed to former *Sart* usage which regarded the khan or emir as the supreme owner of land, to whom taxes had to be paid. However, tsarist authorities did not simply replace the emir, khan or beg as the supreme owner of land and as collector of taxes, but initiated far-reaching land and tax reforms -- which they did not dare carry out until the October Revolution in European Russia. With the exception of *vaqf* property, all land, along with its plantations and buildings, was declared to be the private property of the people who worked on or used it. This land reform disowned *Sart* landowners and serving nobility. Having been deprived of political power by the tsarist conquest, this reform also diminished their economic influence. They could only maintain some influence if they were elected as *volost'* headmen or members of the economic councils which were initially authorised to collect taxes. The same was true if they could secure their appointment as *aryk aksakals* in rural areas or *starshii aksakals* in towns. All other more influential administrative positions were no longer open to natives.¹³²

In addition, General von Kaufman changed and simplified taxation. He abolished the division between state land (*amlök*) and private land (*mulki*) and evened out the different tax burdens of the latter. Thus tithe land (*mulki ushr*), harvest land (*mulki hiroj*) and tax-free land (*mulki hurri*) were treated equally and their holders had to pay the same amount of tax. This administrative measure implied considerable interference in property rights and assets, as state land had the value of just one tenth of tax-free land. On the other hand, owners of tax-free land had to pay taxes from that time on as well.

The *Provisional Turkestan Statute* prescribed only two types of land tax, called *kheradz* (Tajik: *hiroj*) and *tanapnyi sbor* (Tajik, Uzbek: *tanop*). Ironically, both terms referred to the same taxation of former *mulki hiroj*, but tsarist authorities transformed it into a harvest tax in kind of one tenth of the yields and into a moneyed land tax.¹³³ Nevertheless, Kaufman soon realised that his authorisation of elected tax officials (*sarkors*) to collect taxes and retain 5–10 per cent of the levied tax encouraged abuse and illegal tax levying by the inspectors. Thus he replaced both *kheradz* and *tanap* taxes

by a land tax (*pozemel'naia podat'*) in 1870, which each *volost'* had to pay itself. Theoretically this new tax was also a land tax of 10 per cent of the yield,¹³⁴ but it was administered according to the *kheradzh* and *tanap* collection of 1869, which was a good harvest year. Kaufman left it to the *volost'* assemblies to divide the tax burden among themselves. This new tax system reduced administrative costs and tax burdens of the local population. The *zakot* (Russian: *ziaket*) continued to be imposed on merchandise of one fortieth of its value until 1875. Only Islamic *vaqf* property, whose yields were used to support schools, mosques and other charitable institutions, remained tax-free during tsarist rule.¹³⁵

The pastures of nomadising tribesmen remained state property. Nomadic or semi-nomadic tribesmen had to pay a yurt tax, which was 4 roubles in 1886.¹³⁶ However, only well-to-do tribesmen were expected to pay the taxes prescribed for villages and nomadising camps.¹³⁷

Tsarist authorities did not only use economic and political means to strengthen their new administrative order. They were also concerned about how the local population could be better culturally integrated within the empire. Thus the rapprochement (*sblizhenie*) of the local population was already a political issue among tsarist elites.

Tsarist efforts at rapprochement in Central Asia

Carrère d'Encausse gives the following assessment about the constants of tsarist policy in Central Asia:

During the period between the conquest and the revolution of 1905, Russian policy toward Central Asia might appear to have been uncertain and confused. Nevertheless, rather definite principles guided it, and certain constants can be found. In the first place, in southern Central Asia as in the Kazakh plain, Russia did not seek to integrate the conquered people, but simply to keep them in hand. They were not Russian subjects, and as aliens (*inorodtsy*) they were exempt from military service; in other words, mixing them with the Russian population was not attempted, even temporarily. Legislation and administration, at least on the local level, remained in local hands and for all practical purposes in the control of traditional authorities.¹³⁸

This assessment imputes to tsarist policy that it did not aim at integrating natives in the tsarist state and that a more integrative tsarist policy would have been possible which granted full citizenship to Central Asians, recruited them for military service, promoted mixed residential areas and introduced common legislation for natives and Europeans. The first point is not correct and the second is quite questionable.

The Girs Commission had already pointed to the disintegrative effects of separate administrations for natives and Cossacks, which led to the partition of peoples (*raz"edinenie narodnostei*), and it recommended their submission to vigorous Russian governors, who should punish any act of resistance and disobedience. This system of governors was established by the civil-military administration. Nevertheless, the commission emphasised that the submission of natives like the Kazakhs to imperial courts was not possible at that time.¹³⁹

Nevertheless, various endeavours aimed at drawing Central Asians closer to tsarist rule and of 'making both Orthodox and Moslems into useful citizens of Russia' by educating native and Russian pupils together in schools, which Kaufman already endeavoured to establish.¹⁴⁰ Primary education was established, with boarding school facilities for native pupils in Russian schools. Two grammar schools, for boys and girls respectively, were founded in Tashkent in 1879. Five years later, the first Russian elementary school for natives was set up in Tashkent. Up to 1908, ninety-eight Russian native schools were established in the Governor-generalship of Turkestan, when 3,077 native pupils were school, almost of half of them in the *Sir Darya Oblast*.¹⁴¹ In these schools natives attended Russian classes held by Russian teachers who used the Il'minsky system of bilingual teaching, where each phrase of the lesson was first given in the native language and afterwards in Russian. In the afternoon, the pupils received an elementary Muslim education from a mullah who taught them the Arab alphabet and Islamic law.¹⁴²

General von Kaufman also ordered the publication of the *Turkestanskaia tuzemnaia gazeta*, which was published in Chaghatay and Russian. This paper, edited by N. P. Ostroumov, spread useful information about geography and history, and aimed to make native officials familiar with the laws and orders of tsarist administration. For many years it was the only paper in the language of one of Russia's Muslim populations.¹⁴³

With regard to judicial legislation, Count Palen stated that the declared Russian principle had to be that of 'preserving the native courts with the changes necessary for the good of the people and the lessening of their fanaticism, a process that would lead to the removal of barriers to their rapprochement (*sbli-zhenie*) to the Russians'.¹⁴⁴ Palen, who was authorised to investigate and prosecute corruption in Turkestan in 1908, believed that administrative reforms could promote the natives' integration in the tsarist state, an aim which had not been reached at all. Thus he recommended the introduction of civil administration and of local councils (*zemstvo*) in order to prevent further administrative abuses.

These three examples show that the integration of natives in the tsarist state was an objective of colonial policy. However, experienced administrators like General von Kaufman knew that such a process could only be initiated slowly and carefully, if opposition was not to escalate. The establishment of

Russian-native schools among the *Sart* population, for example, indicated the difficulties involved. The schooling of native children encountered the full distrust and despair of children and parents, who were often forced to enrol their sons in newly established schools. Only high regard for native sensibilities and respect of local customs could relieve initial hostility and distrust to some extent.¹⁴⁵

The cholera epidemic of 1892 in Tashkent supplies a further example of how even goodwill actions could escalate into open revolt due to the ignorance and disrespect of local customs. After a cholera riot had particularly shaken the old town of Tashkent, tsarist authorities ordered sanitary inspections in affected native houses. These inspections faced severe opposition, as *Sart* men did not allow any man to examine their wives. In addition, the authorities also forbade burial of the dead in the nearby old cemeteries for security reasons. Since the deceased had to be buried according to sharia, this order caused despair among natives. Thus stricken families decided to hold clandestine funerals. The arrest of those who had organised these ceremonies caused an uprising in Tashkent, which could only be stopped by the vigorous action of General Grodekov.¹⁴⁶

The best known uprising is that of 1916, which occurred after tsarist authorities had been ordered to recruit men aged between nineteen and forty-five for labour duties in the rear of the battlefield, although natives had been exempt from military service up to that time. In all, the uprising caused thousands of European and native deaths and became the most visible proof that the tsarist government had not won the trust and goodwill of local people.

The numerous local revolts indicate that peace and order were fragile and that tsarist authorities did not succeed in establishing a normative political order to which native people were also committed. Due to different political and communal commitments common normative order was also difficult to achieve. Tsarist use of military force was the only way to keep order, which was always fragile. Thus A. V. Krivoshein's argument for his rejection of Count Palen's recommendations, which the head of the Agricultural Administration had made after a visit in Turkestan, had some plausibility:

When one has seen the universal predominance of the natives in Turkestan, one cannot but feel that this is still a Russian military camp, a temporary halting place during the victorious march of Russia into Central Asia. The Russian military might speak a more comprehensible and impressive language to the subject mass of the natives than the civil administration.¹⁴⁷

*Impacts on political orientation and communal commitment**Loss of indigenous political orientations*

The tsarist conquest and the establishment of the Governor-generalship of Turkestan implied a radical encroachment on native politics. Unlike on the Kazakh Steppe, where tsarist authorities slowly changed indigenous political orientations and gradually reduced the influence of political elites, indigenous political submission was brought about within a few years in Turkestan. Tsarist rule did not aim at forming alliances with Russophile indigenous elites to enable these to hold power according to the principle of *divide et impera*, as was the case in British India or in other parts of the tsarist empire.¹⁴⁸ On establishing *oblast'*, *uezd* and *pristav* administration run by tsarist civil and military officials, the imperial authorities politically deprived many indigenous leaders. In addition, tax and land reform undermined their economic influence. Keeping peace and protecting access to resources against outsiders were no longer mainly managed by native political elites, but by Russian commanders and governors and their administrative and military staff. Thus every removal of a village to another area had to be authorised by tsarist officials.

Indigenous leadership became territorially constrained to *volosti* and neighbourhood quarters, which did not normally consist of more than a few thousand households. In former times tribal people might have conserved links to other tribes due to political alliances, but these links lost their significance. Whereas numerous tribal groups had secured pastures in former times, majority groupings started to dominate the districts and deprived minority groupings of their rights. Thus good relations with *uezd* commanders who initially united and separated various tribal subgroups into *volosti* became important. These relations influenced which tribal group could form a majority in a district. It followed that good relations with tsarist officials became important in order to reach advantageous territorial delimitations between *volosti*. As *uezd* commanders could not fully control migration between district, neighbouring *auls* could try to change their *volost'* affiliation in order to influence the *volost'* majority. Thus borders could not definitely be fixed in steppe areas. More than thirty years after the introduction of the new administrative order, the territorial question remained acute among tribesmen.¹⁴⁹

Another possible method of influencing the *volost'* majority was to gain additive *piatidesiatniks* in *volost'* assemblies. This could be done in two ways. Due to the fact that an additional elector of fifty households could be sent to the assembly, if a seventy-fifth household was established, power relations could be influenced by the marrying of grown-up and minor sons. This could be decisive in districts where two large groupings of the same size competed for the majority. Otherwise it was possible to divide villages of a

specific size. This was advantageous in cases where an *aul* included around 225 yurts. Whereas fifty households were necessary to get a sixth elector, only twenty-five would have been necessary if *auls* were split into two groupings. The party of the district headman usually succeeded in securing the majority, often by making gifts for support. As the *upravitel'* was in charge of holding and updating the list of residents, he had extra opportunities of influencing the number of acknowledged electors.¹⁵⁰

This new order also implied that groups of tribesmen, who in former times had made alliances in order to occupy pastures of weaker confederacies, now became rivals in the struggle for resources within *volost'* boundaries. Local leadership remained important for access to water and winter pastures only at this level.¹⁵¹

In Kyrgyzstan the territorial delimitation was easier, as small-scale tribes often had clearly defined territories with summer and winter pastures. In this way tribal leaders were better able to adapt former tribal borders to the new administrative order and to keep their influence on resources. In his ethnographic survey, Kushner emphasises that Kyrgyz tribes ceased to be territorial groups after the introduction of the tsarist *volost'* administration. Tribes split into smaller groups which competed for control of territories within the districts. These groups tried to recruit the *volost'* headman from among them and to keep their contribution to the tax burden as low as possible.¹⁵² According to a Kyrgyz informant from Jalalabad, the tribal leaders (*manaps*) continued to control access to pastures. Whereas their tribesmen freely used them, members of other tribal groups had to pay for pasture rights. The *manaps* also received gifts for the settlement of disputes. Some of these revenues were kept by the *manaps*, others divided among their tribesmen. Thus each tribal group tried to extend their pasture rights within the *volost'* and faced the competition of other groupings. In this way hostilities could increase between inhabitants of districts, and motivated the removal of minority groupings to districts dominated by closer relatives, if possible.

Nevertheless, tribal leadership could remain influential on the local level. From the perspective of Kushner's informant from Jalalabad, *manaps* still remained the most important leaders in tsarist *volosti*. Being asked about the relation of *manaps* to state authority, he said:

Then the Russians came. All disputes are settled by the *manap*: the place of the summer and winter pastures, the migration routes. The people could not live without the *manap*. He is like the shepherd of the flock.¹⁵³

On this view, Kyrgyz leaders were still regarded as the masters of the pastures, although their influence began to depend heavily on good relations with tsarist officials.

Nevertheless, beyond the *volost'* borders, both Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribal leaders lost their political influence. This political dissipation of the local population represented a major reason why uprisings against tsarist rule remained disorganised and locally constrained. Such uprisings were quickly dispersed by tsarist troops. Tsarist authorities feared Islam as a uniting factor against their rule.

The rise of Islam

While Russian military commanders were conquering Turkestan, they initially presented themselves as protectors of Islam and confirmed the highest Islamic dignitaries in their offices. In contrast to the Kazakh Steppe, they supported Islam as a stabilising conservative element to secure the obedience of native people. Thus General M. G. Cherniaev confirmed both Hokim Khoja and Ay Khoja in their offices as *qozi kalon* and *shaikhulislom* of Tashkent: the former appointed all *kadis*, muftis, *rais* and imams, and the latter presided over all *mutavallis* of *vaqf* donations.¹⁵⁴ When General von Kaufman initiated his tax reform, he appeared to be a protector of Islam because he reduced the *hiroj* tax to exactly one tenth of the harvest and *zakot* to one fortieth of the value of merchandise, in accordance with *sharia*.¹⁵⁵ On the other hand, this conciliatory approach did not prevent him from abolishing the office of the *rais*.¹⁵⁶

Kaufman's political attitude towards Islam was to neglect it. He was convinced that any direct attacks on Islam would only push natives closer to Islamic authorities and would increase opposition to tsarist rule. The general thought that the best means of weakening Islam was to withdraw state support from Islamic institutions. He strictly opposed the extension of the Ufa ecclesiastical administration to Turkestan, which might have brought too much Tatar influence into the area. In addition, he forbade all kinds of Orthodox missionary work among natives and prevented the establishment of an Orthodox bishopric in Tashkent to avoid any stiffening of Muslim opposition. Thus he wrote that

we [the Russians] must introduce Christian civilisation in Turkestan, but we must not try to propound the Orthodox faith to the native population.¹⁵⁷

His alleged indifference to Islam did not prevent him from confirming or dismissing Islamic dignitaries. He came to an understanding with Hokim Khoja and confirmed him in his office, whereas he did not do so with regard to Khoja's son, and abolished the office of the *qozi kalon* in Tashkent in 1877. In contrast, the Governor-general gave Kemal ad-din, the *qozi kalon* of Samarkand, a silver medal for his readiness to cooperate with tsarist authorities and confirmed him in his office. He was less forthcoming with

the *qozi kalon* and the *shaikhulislom* of Khokand, whom he exiled to the *Guberniya* of Vologodsk.¹⁵⁸ Thus Kaufman was not fully indifferent to Islam, but he seemed to have had some political instinct for assessing the limits of possible tsarist interference, if imperial rule were not to risk open revolt.

Kaufman's successors increasingly faced signs of local resistance, and were alarmed about it. General Rosenbach (1884–89) heavily criticised Kaufman's 'soft' attitude towards Islam and declared the latter's policy towards it to have failed to draw natives closer to Russia. Moreover, he ascertained increasing Islamisation among Kazakhs, a fact which was also confirmed by contemporary ethnographic reports.¹⁵⁹ Sporadic revolts with religious motivations indicated the increasing tension between Islam and the tsarist authorities.

The uprising of 1898 in Andijan was the most visible of revolts headed by Islamic leaders. An *eshon* of the Sufi brotherhood of the Naqshbandiya, Muhammad Ali, led the uprising, which he declared to be a holy war against the Russians. The *eshon* was acknowledged for his holiness and charity, and motivated his *murids* to participate in the uprising by promising them that the toothpicks he distributed for them to hide in their skullcaps would make them invulnerable to iron and bullets. The uprising was planned as a simultaneous attack on tsarist barracks in Marghilan, Osh and Andijan, but led only to an attack on the barracks at Andijan, where the insurgents killed twenty-two sleeping Russian soldiers and wounded another nineteen. On the way from the *eshon's* village to Andijan, some Cossack and Russian civilians were also killed. The uprising was immediately dispersed, however, and the *eshon* was captured on the following day. He and five of his commanders were hanged. The *eshon's* village of Min-Tube was destroyed, native families removed, and Russian settlers allotted well irrigated land there, where they planted cotton. In addition, an indemnity of 1,000,000 roubles was imposed on the population of the Ferghana valley.¹⁶⁰

The tsar immediately recalled General Vrevsky (1889–98) and appointed General Dukhovskiy (1898–1909) as new Governor-general. The latter initiated an administrative reform in order to strengthen tsarist military force. Tsarist authorities increasingly appointed local officials and better armed Russian settlers.¹⁶¹ This is another example of the difficulties faced by tsarist rule in establishing normative political order instead of relying on force and military deterrence.

In practice, the policy of non-interference in Islamic affairs had, from the tsarist view, negative effects, for three reasons. To begin with, the restraining of tribalism and the abolition of khanship and *bekliks* left Islamic dignitaries as indigenous leaders. Tsarist preservation of tax-free *vaqf* property also ensured an economic base that allowed them to increase their influence on the oases' population.¹⁶²

Second, the tsarist civil-military administration eliminated or diminished the power of former political elites, which had balanced the kadis' influence.

In pre-tsarist times the kadi was appointed by the khan, emir or beg, who, directly or indirectly, constrained or removed the judicial rights of kadis. In addition, tsarist legislation decreed the kadis' electivity and abolished patrimonial officials, who sometimes had also some tribal background and favoured customary law.

Third, tsarist policy favoured the settlement of nomadic people. In this way they promoted a way of life which was more openly exposed to Islamisation by orthodox Islam, and which provided Muslim missionaries with new areas for their work. Thus when Uzbeks, Kazakhs or Kyrgyz left their tribal communities and settled down in towns or mixed villages, they became *Sarts* and took up Islamic precepts of life taught by school Islam.¹⁶³ This step occurred easily, since most nomads were already Muslim tribesmen, although they had remained ignorant about Islamic orthodoxy and had retained much of their animist heritage. When they converted to a *Sart* way of life, they could preserve their personal and collective identity as Muslims, although this was interpreted in a new way. This might also have been one reason why Russian cultural influence remained weak in the region.

Some Russian cultural influence could be observed among particular Central Asian intellectuals, who initiated a cultural reform movement responsive to the challenges of the Russian conquest. This movement regarded traditional forms of Islamic schooling as the main reason for the inferiority of Muslim civilisation, relied on the power of education to reform Islam, and took up many ideas published by the Crimean Tatar reformer Gasprinsky in the newspaper *Terjüman*. Due to their new phonetic method of teaching, the adherents of these ideas were called Jadids and their movement Jadidism.¹⁶⁴ Jadids like Behbudi (1874–1919) in Samarkand, Munawwar Qari (1878–1931) in Tashkent, or Hamza (1889–1929) from Khokand might have found a number of disciples and few local notables and used their access to the new print media to spread their ideas; however, they neither gained influence as middlemen of tsarist authorities, who suspected them of promoting pan-Turkism, nor did they become spokesmen of the local population, who continued to adhere to orthodox mullahs. Despite some of his interpretations, Khalid gives enough evidence to assert that the Jadids remained a marginalised, heterogeneous group of urban intellectuals who had little influence on their societies up to the revolution.¹⁶⁵

Impacts on tribal and residential communal commitment

As mentioned above, the introduction of civil-military administration intensified the process of the settlement of tribespeople. It was usually impoverishment caused by the loss of their herds which led to these people becoming sedentary. There existed different ways of settling down, however.

The majority of settling tribesmen remained at their winter quarters, built homesteads and increasingly took up agriculture. Many of them continued to raise livestock, which grazed on closer pasture lands. These villages were often comprised of people of one descent group, had common water and pasture rights, and their inhabitants elected elders to decide on disputes and other affairs. Despite tsarist legislation on property rights, pastures remained communally held and did not become hereditary. Such settled villages could be found among Kazakhs in the Sir Darya *Oblast* or in the Chu valley, as was typical for Kyrgyz in northern and central Kyrgyzstan.¹⁶⁶

This manner of settlement was not linked to Russian acculturation or the *Sart* customs of the river oases, but rather represented an adaptation to economic changes. Tribal *adat* remained dominant, although tribalism lost its political significance due to the civil-military administration. Kadis and school Islam remained without influence among these settlers, and thus did not alter their particular Muslim identity. Tribal communal commitment remained influential on a local scale.¹⁶⁷

Some anthropologists have described this process in terms of transformation of group solidarity based on genealogical ties to patronymic sibs in which members share the same group name. Thus Krader asserts that Kyrgyz and Kazakh tribesmen became members of patronymic sibs, after they had settled down and become agriculturists within an imperial state.¹⁶⁸ Barfield analysis similar processes among the Central Asian Arabs in the process of detribalisation.¹⁶⁹ Like Barfield, we do not think that tribal descent groups were replaced by patronymic sibs, as Krader assumes by analytically opposing sibs and clans (i.e. 'tribes' in our terminology).¹⁷⁰ As tribal political order no longer influenced and transformed genealogical conceptualisations, membership of a particular patronymic local grouping might have gained a privileged significance. Nevertheless, members of detribalised societies like the Turkmen, the Kazakhs or the Kyrgyz continued to trace their descent to groupings of different levels of genealogical segmentation.

Settlement showed different results when it was linked to cultural assimilation through orthodox Islam. In this case tribesmen formed or joined mixed villages. Sedentariness was encouraged by the fact that the erection of fixed homesteads enabled claims on private property (*mulk*) which could be inherited or sold. Kadis and imams became influential in those villages which had at least one mosque. In the arrangement of marriages, tribal exogamy was no longer of importance. Women began to wear veils, avoided their husbands' guests at home and took up other *Sart* customs. Such processes of settlement were observed among the Kara-Kalpaks of the Ferghana valley, and they led to changes from tribal to more residential forms of communal commitment.¹⁷¹ Some of these features could be observed among some southern Kyrgyz and Kazakhs in the Sir Darya valley.¹⁷²

THE TSARIST ADMINISTRATION

The most radical change from tribal to residential commitment occurred when tribesmen left their relatives and bought or built houses in mahallahs. Prescriptions of *sharia* and school Islam were strictly observed there, and every inhabitant of the neighbourhood quarter was expected to take over the *Sart* way of life. It often happened that Kyrgyz, *Qipchoq* or Kalmyk tribesmen concealed their tribal origins to facilitate adaptation to the new way of life.¹⁷³

Thus we cannot fully agree with H el ene Carr ere d'Encausse's assertion that tsarist colonial administration was based on the principle 'manage the population without interfering in its affairs'.¹⁷⁴ Tsarist authorities profoundly interfered in local affairs. In the steppe they destroyed the nomadic economy of the Kazakhs and abolished khanship and the political role of sultans. They restrained the political influence of the *bis* to the *volost'* area, promoted the detribalisation and the settlement of nomads, introduced personal responsibility, established villages as units of liability and founded Russian-Kazakh schools. In Transcaspia, tsarist rule destroyed acephalous tribalism, abolished blood revenge and introduced personal liability for offences judged to be criminal by imperial law. Tsarist authorities forced independent Turkman tribesmen, who had previously not acknowledged any enduring authority relations, to submit to the tsar's rule. In the Governor-generalship of Turkestan, the introduction of civil-military administration and the implementation of land and tax reforms deprived all except Islamic elites of their economic and political influence, and enabled thousands of landless peasants to become landowners.¹⁷⁵ This and other forms of interference, such as the increase in trade, the capitalisation of economy and the spread of new agricultural technologies, changed the life of many Central Asians.

Nevertheless, tsarist authorities did not succeed in establishing significant elements of political community structures which could have encouraged native obedience towards tsarist authority. Thus mainly military force was used to maintain order, due to the lack of shared political commitments between imperial elites and Central Asian leaders. As a result, political order remained fragile.

At first, tsarist military strength had impressed Central Asians and led to some acknowledgement of tsarist authority among the conquered. This respect soon vanished, however, when tsarist rule rudely disregarded local customs and habits and endangered the indigenous material basis of life, at first through the uncontrolled spread of European settlement and later through the planned imperial colonisation policy. In addition, the partial division of administrative power which left judicial, financial, revisionary, postal and telegraphic agencies outside of the Governor-general's control, was interpreted by natives as a weakness of the tsarist regime.¹⁷⁶ Already in the 1880s and 1890s, tsarist officials were becoming upset about the increasing indigenous disrespect for imperial rule. The widespread uprisings of 1916 once more demonstrated the fragility of political order in tsarist Central Asia.

Notes

- 1 A classic study of Russian political commitment is: E. Sarkisyanz, *Russland und der Messianismus des Orients. Sendungsbewusstsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens*, Tübingen 1955, pp. 25–63.
- 2 Cf. A. Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung – Geschichte – Zerfall*, Munich 1993 (1992), pp. 25–56; 'Die zaristische Politik gegenüber den Muslimen des Russischen Reiches', in Kappeler *et al.* 1989, pp. 117–21.
- 3 See: D. Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus. Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860–1914*, Göttingen 1977; R. A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia 1867–1917. A Study in Colonial Rule*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1960, pp. 1–94; A. Bennigsen, 'Die Türken unter Zaren- und Sowjetherrschaft', in Hambly 1988, pp. 197–216; R. Pierce, 'Die russische Eroberung und Verwaltung Turkestan (bis 1917)', in Hambly 1988, pp. 217–36; H. Carrère d'Encausse, 'Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884', pp. 131–50; 'Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories', pp. 151–71', both in Allworth 1994; G. J. Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896–1916*, Bloomington and The Hague 1969.
- 4 Ch. Schmidt, 'Stände', in Bauer *et al.* 1991(a), p. 418. Cf. Kappeler 1993, pp. 140–1, 166. *Tuzemtsy* was another term for the settled indigenous population which came into use in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was a similar judicial category for the native population to whom full citizenship was not granted.
- 5 Pierce 1960, pp. 64–6.
- 6 Whereas Bukharan officials could hardly be called corrupt due to the lack of a corresponding code of honour, commitment to such a code of proper official agency existed among tsarist officials. Kaufman's 'scrupulous honest' (Pierce) administration of his office is a good example of such action orientations. Such commitments, however, remained limited to some tsarist officials and could lead to unbearable hardships. For example, after Kaufman had died, his wife had not even enough money to pay for a ticket for her departure from Tashkent.
- 7 Pierce 1960, pp. 77–81. Cf. K. K. Palen, *Oblastnoe upravlenie (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(g), pp. 182–8.
- 8 Tolybekov 1971, pp. 166–132; *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR c drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei III*, ed. A. N. Nusupbekov, Alma-Ata 1979, p. 37.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- 10 I. Kraft, 'Prinatie kirgizami russkogo poddanstva', in I. I. Kraft (ed.) *Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh*, Orenburg 1898, pp. 1–57; Rumiantsev 1910, pp. 20–1; *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 333; *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, p. 37.
- 11 Cf. *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana, tom I*, Alma-Ata 1960, pp. 9–18.
- 12 See for example: Markov 1976, pp. 136–7.
- 13 *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, p. 38.
- 14 Cf. Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Ablai', in Valikhanov 1904, pp. 1–7; *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 77–82.
- 15 Levchine 1840, pp. 169–171.
- 16 Rumiantsev 1910, p. 15; Bodger 1991, pp. 344–59; Olcott 1987, pp. 39–53.
- 17 Cf. Viatkin 1947, pp. 288–357.
- 18 From 1787 to 1790 the Igel'strom Reform which abolished khanship and divided the Small Horde into three divisions headed by a council of elders was in effect, but could not be enforced despite of the strong support of Batir Sirim. Some leaders of major tribal federations did not back it, as they only opposed

- Nurali as khan and not khanship itself. Cf. *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 114–27; Olcott 1987, pp. 44–7; *Kuzembaïūly*, Abilev 1996, pp. 192–5.
- 19 About the Inner Horde see: Krader 1963, pp. 253–72; *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 128–52.
 - 20 Ia. V. Khanykov, 'Ocherk costoianiiia vnutrennei Kirgizskoi ordy v 1841 godu', in *Zapiski RGO, 1847 knizhka II*, pp. 27–60; M. Ivanin, 'Vnutrenniaia ili Bukeevskaia Kirgizskaia Orda', in *Epokha, 1864, vypusk XII*, pp. 4–8; *Narody Srednei Azii II*, p. 334.
 - 21 Here is no place to discuss all administrative changes in the Kazakh Steppe during the nineteenth century. See Olcott for an overview: Olcott 1987, pp. 57–125.
 - 22 According to the Orenburg Border Commission, 241 official tribal leaders were opposed by 107 non-official ones.
 - 23 Meier 1865, pp. 291; cf. 'Report of the Girs Commission', in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, pp. 258–60.
 - 24 *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 162–6; Olcott 1987, pp. 60–1.
 - 25 Ivanin 1864, p. 8. Tolybekov 1971, pp. 384–8; *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 137–51.
 - 26 In 1822 Siberia was divided in Western and Eastern Siberia, with the administrative centres in Irkutsk and Tobolsk. Western Siberia consisted of the *oblasts* Tobolsk, Tomsk and Omsk, to which only the new rules referred. In 1838 Omsk became part of the Tobol *Guberniia* and the border commission overtook the agency of the *oblast* administration.
 - 27 About the Russian statesman M. M. Speransky, see: M. Raeff, *M. Speransky*, 2nd edn, The Hague 1969; *Siberia and the Reforms of 1822*, Seattle 1956; G. Stökl, *Russische Geschichte. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Stuttgart 1990 (1963), pp. 456–63.
 - 28 Cf. Levchine 1840, pp. 467–74; Radloff 1884a, pp. 518–19. The following *okrugs* were established: Uch-Bulak (the later Kokchetov) Kush-Murun and Karkaraly in 1824, Aman-Karagay (the later Akmolinsk) in 1832, Baianaul in 1833, Aiaguz (the later Sergiopol) in 1837, Kokpektin in 1844 and Atbasar in 1848. Later Kopal and Vernyi (Almaty) were added and all *okrugs* were submitted to the Omsk or Semipalatinsk *oblasti*'.
 - 29 Levchine 1840, pp. 470, 495; Radloff 1884(I), pp. 518–20; *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 156–62; Olcott 1987, pp. 58–60.
 - 30 Levchine 1840, pp. 488–9; Tolybekov 1971, p. 381.
 - 31 Levchine 1840, p. 468.
 - 32 Ivanin 1864, pp. 17–21. Cf. Olcott 1987, p. 64.
 - 33 Cf. *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 169–75; *Kyrgyzstandyn Tarykhy I*, pp. 224–7.
 - 34 'Vypiska iz ob"iasnitel'noi komissii k proektu polozheniia ob upravlenii v Kazakhskikh stepiakh', in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, pp. 262–3.
 - 35 'Proekt polozheniia ob upravlenii Semirechenskoï i Syr-Dar'inskoï *oblastei* (1867)'; 'Vremennoe polozhenie ob upravlenii v Ural'skoï, Turgai'skoï, Akmolinskoï i Semipalatinskoï *oblasti*akh (1868)', both in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, pp. 282–316, 323–40.
 - 36 'Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestantskogo kraia (1886)'; 'Polozhenie ob upravlenii Akmolinskoï, Semipalatinskoï, Ural'skoï i Turgai'skoï *oblasti*ami (1891)', both in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, pp. 352–79, 387–99.
 - 37 The Uralsk and Turgay *Oblasti* consisted each of four *uezds*: the Uralsk, Gur'ev, Kalmykov, Embensk (Temirsk) and Ilets (Aktiubinsk), Nikolaev

- (Kustanay), Irgiz and Turgay respectively. The Akmolinsk *Oblast'* (Akmolinsk, Kokchetov, Omsk, Petropavlovsk and Atbasar) and the Semipalatinsk *Oblast'* (Semipalatinsk, Kokpektinsk, Zaisan, Baianaul' and Ust-Kamenogorsk) each included five *uezds*.
- 38 *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 226–8.
- 39 Markov 1976, p. 195.
- 40 Cf. §§93 and 95 of the *Steppe Statute*. Cf. N. E. Bekmakhanova, *Mnogonatsional'noe naselenie Kazakhstana i Kirgizii v epokhu kapitalizma (60-e gody XIX v. – 1917g)*, Moscow 1986, pp. 73–4.
- 41 §63 of the *Steppe Statute*.
- 42 V. Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe. The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century*, London 2001, p. 131.
- 43 K. K. Palen, *Sudebnye uchrezhdeniia deistvuiushchiiia v Turkestane na osnovanii sudebnykh ustavov Imperatora Aleksandra II. (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(a), pp. 3–144.
- 44 Iusefovich 1880, p. 829; Tolybekov 1971, p. 434; *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, pp. 234–6.
- 45 Cf. Pierce 1960, pp. 205–11, 219–20; Olcott 1987, 106–7; I. Kreindler, 'Ibrahim Altynsarin, Nikolai II'minskii and the Kazakh National Awakening', *CAS*, 1983/3. About documents on Altynsarin's activities as inspector of schools, see I. Altynsarin, *Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh, tom II*, Alma-Ata 1976.
- 46 *Dala ualaiatynyng gazeti'*. Adam, Kogham, Tabighat (1888–1902) – 'Kirgizskaia stepnaia gazeta'. *Chelovek, obshchestvo, priroda (1888–1902)*, ed. U. Subkhanberdina, Almaty 1994.
- 47 Demko 1969, pp. 40–9.
- 48 Cf. Kappeler 1993, pp. 42, 54.
- 49 Daniyarov 1998, pp. 8–9.
- 50 S. D. Asfendiarov, *Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe vosstanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane*, Alma-Ata 1936, p. 85. Quoted in Pierce 1960, p. 291.
- 51 In her analysis of Kazakh tribalism, Esenova does not sufficiently take into consideration that Kazakh tribalism had already declined by the middle of the nineteenth century due to the establishment of the tsarist civil-military administration. Her essay also suffers from the imprecise use of concepts like 'tribe', 'clan', 'state', 'traditionality' and 'modernity', which she avoids defining. Her dichotomous perception of societal change as process from community to society is rather misleading than helpful in describing social change in the Kazakh Steppe. In addition, she seems to overlook the fact that Hourani's three-area scheme is abstracted from regions where independent tribal confederacies were often acephalous, and cephalous tribesmen formed political alliances with rulers of patrimonial states. In the case of Kazakh tribal confederacies, tribesmen acknowledged khans and sultans up to the nineteenth century, although they were not controlled by patrimonial states, as she rightly notes. Therefore the scheme is hardly applicable to the case of the Kazakhs. It is a methodological *faux pas* to confuse generalised descriptions of various specific tribal structures with a general theory of tribalism (Esenova 1998, pp. 443–62, see particularly pp. 454–5).
- 52 Article 9 of the 'Regulation on the Siberian Kyrgyz'. See Levchine 1840, p. 468.
- 53 Cf. Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'O kochevkakh Kirgiz', in Valikhanov 1904, pp. 321–6.
- 54 Kaufman 1903, p. 153. When Demko discusses the impacts of the Russian colonisation on the Kazakh Steppe at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, he only analyses some economic implications of the Russian influx. He is less interested in analysing how the colonisation

- completed the destruction of the Kazakh tribal political order (Demko 1969, pp. 189–92).
- 55 Kaufmann 1908, pp. 225–241 (129–139); Tolybekov 1971, pp. 403–5; A. E. Brehm, *Reise zu den Kirgisen. Aus dem Sibirienbuch 1876*, Leipzig 1982, pp. 155, 164–8.
- 56 Fazil Khan 1981, p. 32; Markov 1976, p. 139.
- 57 Tolybekov 1971, pp. 413–15.
- 58 G. Chirkin, 'Zemleustroïstvo kirgiz v sviazi s kolonizatsieï stepi', *VK*, 1907/2, pp. 54–5.
- 59 Radloff 1884a, pp. 521–2.
- 60 Valikhanov 1904, p. 322.
- 61 Tolybekov 1971, pp. 495–7; Olcott 1987, pp. 89–96; K. Nishiyama, 'Russian Colonization in Central Asia: A case of Semirechye, 1867–1922', in Komatsu *et al.* 2000, pp. 65–84.
- 62 Cf. A. Kenisarin, *Sultany Kenisary i Syzdyk. Obrabotano dlia pechati i snabsheno primechaniiami E. T. Smirnova*, Alma-Ata 1992 (Tashkent 1889), pp. 15–28; E. B. Bekmakhanov, *Vosstanie khana Kenesary (1837–1847)*, Alma-Ata 1992 (1943), pp. 5–47.
- 63 P. Khvorostanskii, 'Kirgizskii vopros v sviazi s kolonizatsieï stepi', *VK*, 1907/1, pp. 65–75; Kaufmann 1908, pp. 118–21 (67–9), 148 (85); Markov 1976, p. 169; Martin 2001, pp. 114–27.
- 64 Grodekov 1889, pp. 14, 17–20.
- 65 Cf. the corresponding paragraphs of the *Provisional Statutes*, the *Steppe Statute* and the *Statute of Turkestan*, in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, pp. 289–92, 327–9; 361–2, 391–3.
- 66 Tolybekov 1971, p. 433; Grodekov 1889, p. 17.
- 67 Markov 1976, p. 182. The allocation of winter pastures according to the size of stock fully corresponded to §213 of the *Provisional Steppe Statute* and §122 of the *Steppe Statute*, which prescribed this form of allocation in cases of dispute.
- 68 Kaufmann 1908, pp. 127 (72), 284–5 (166–7).
- 69 'Vypiska iz otcheta Semipalatinskogo gubernatora', in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, p. 267. Cf. *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR III*, p. 233; Tolybekov 1971, pp. 433–38; 'Report of the Girs Commision', in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, p. 421.
- 70 Pierce 1960, p. 77; Shahrani and Dor made similar observations about the acknowledgement of local leadership among the Vakhan Kyrgyz in northern Afghanistan (cf. Shahrani 1979; 1986, pp. 263–70; Dor 1975, 83–90).
- 71 Pierce 1960, p. 290.
- 72 Cf. §§10, 13, 17, 18 of *Sobranie Kirgizskikh zakonov (1825)*; L. Balliuzek, 'Narodnye obychai imevshie, a otchasti i nyne imeiushchie, v maloï kirgizskoi orde sily zakona', in *Materialy po Kazakhskomy obychnomy pravy*, p. 218.
- 73 Valikhanov 1904, pp. 164–72; Lansdell 1885 (I), p. 310. Cf. I. V. Anichkov, *Pristiaga Kirgiz pered russkim sudom*, Tashkent 1899, pp. 19–22; Bartol'd 1963, p. 381; Martin 1999, pp. 87–113.
- 74 Cf. §§135, 142–3 of the *Provisional Steppe Statute*.
- 75 Grodekov 1889, p. 14. Cf. D. S. M. Williams, 'Taxation in Tsarist Central Asia', *CAR*, 1968/1, pp. 51–3.
- 76 Grodekov 1889, pp. 234–5; Kryl'tsov 1947, p. 58.
- 77 Koslow 1882, pp. 470–1.
- 78 Grodekov 1889, pp. 23–4; U. Kh. Shalekenov, *Kazahki nizov'ev Amudar'i – k istorii vzaimootnoshenii narodov Karakalpakii v XVIII–XX vv.*, Tashkent 1966, p. 238.

- 79 K. K. Palen, *Oblastnoe upravlenie (Otchet po revizii Turkestarskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(g), pp. 156–7; *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, pp. 140–1; *Istoriia Uzbekskoï SSR II*, pp. 44–5.
- 80 About the administration of Transcaspia, see also Pierce 1960, pp. 85–9.
- 81 The Merv *Uezd* included the police districts of Pendinsk and Iolotansk, the Tejen *Uezd* those of Serakhs and Atrak. The Durun district was in the Ashkhabad *Uezd*, whereas Krasnovodsk had the two police districts of Chikishliar and Karakalin.
- 82 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, pp. 142–3; Curtis 1909, pp. 44–5.
- 83 This provisional statute was not uniformly applied in all Transcaspian *uezds*. According to Palen, jurisdiction differed from district to district, which led to a great variety of courts in Transcaspia (K. K. Palen, *Narodnye sudy Turkestarskogo kraia, (Otchet po revizii Turkestarskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910, p. 137. Quoted by D. S. M. Williams, 'Native Courts in Tsarist Central Asia', *CAR*, 1966, p. 17). A revised statute was never enacted. The following account can only give a rough overview.
- 84 Lomakin 1897, pp. 9–18 (appendix).
- 85 P. S. Vasil'ev, *Akhal-Tekinskiï oasis, ego proshloe i nastoiashchee. (Istoriiko-geograficheskie i oro-geologicheskie ocherki Zakaspiïskoï oblasti)*, St Petersburg 1888, pp. 36–41; Lomakin 1897, pp. 2–3 (appendix); Andreev 1900, p. 528.
- 86 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, pp. 149, 164; Lomakin 1897, p. 143.
- 87 Skrine and Ross 1899, p. 336.
- 88 Lomakin 1897, p. 119; *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, p. 150; Vasil'eva 1954, p. 184; König 1962, p. 126 (König assumes that this change had already taken place before the Russian conquest, which is not very probable. Contemporary reports like that of Grodekov do not mention this new principle of allocation (Grodekov 1883, p. 72).
- 89 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, p. 143.
- 90 Skrine and Ross 1899, p. 336.
- 91 *Istoriia Turkmenskoï SSR I*, p. 143.
- 92 Lomakin 1897, p. 59. Cf. A. P. Andreev, 'Turkmenskii sud', *IV*, vol. 81, 1900, pp. 524–55, 549–50.
- 93 Lomakin 1897, p. 61.
- 94 Durdyev 1969, pp. 22–3; *Zametki o turkmenskom dukhovenstve 1928*, p. 18. Cf. Bregel 1961, p. 81.
- 95 Lomakin 1897, p. 73.
- 96 Andreev 1900, pp. 548–9; Logofet 1911 (I), pp. 330–1; Kryl'tsov 1947, p. 59.
- 97 G. N. Curzon, *The Russians in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question*, London 1889, pp. 85–6. Quoted in Saray 1982, p. 215; Skrine and Ross 1899, p. 296.
- 98 From Dereghes Correspondent, 5 November 1882, enclosure in *Thomson's*, no. 76 of 1882. 'Secret Letters and Enclosures from Persia, P. and S. Memoranda 9/138', quoted in Saray 1982, p. 225.
- 99 Demidov 1988, p. 104.
- 100 Rusinov 1918, pp. 23–5.
- 101 Bregel 1961, pp. 78–9.
- 102 For example: Lomakin 1897.
- 103 *Obzor Zakaspiïskoï oblasti za 1890-1896gg.*, Ashkhabad 1897, p. 39; *Obzor Zakaspiïskoï oblasti za 1911 g.*, Ashkhabad 1915, p. 101. Both quoted in Demirov 1988, p. 107.
- 104 Palen 1910(e), p. 7.
- 105 Bartol'd 1963(a), p. 376. In his 1864 memorandum to Russian missions in Europe, Foreign Minister A. M. Gorchakov also argued that Central Asians

- 'respect[ed] nothing but visible and palpable force' (Great Britain, Parliament, Central Asia, No. 2 (1873): Correspondence Respecting Central Asia, C. 704 (London 1873), p. 75. Quoted in Khalid 1998, p. 51.
- 106 Our discussion of administrative change cannot elaborate all administrative shifts in the Governor-generalship of Turkestan. Thus we basically focus our analysis on the impacts of the *Provisional Turkestan and Steppe Statutes* of 1867 and 1868 respectively and of the *Turkestan and Steppe Statutes* of 1886 and 1882.
- 107 Palen 1910(e), p. 99. See also *Proekt vsepoddannejšhogo otcheta Gen.-Ad''iutanta K. P. von Kaufmana po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu i ustroistvy v oblastiakh Turkestanskogo general'-gubernatorstva. (7 noiabria 1867–25 marta 1881 g.)*, St Petersburg 1885; P. R. Girs, *Otchet revizuiushchogo po vysochaishemyu povelenniu, Turkestanskii kraï, Taïnogo Sovetnika Girsã*, St Petersburg 1884.
- 108 Palen 1910(f), pp. 48–52, 382.
- 109 A. I. Dmitriev-Mamonov (ed.) *Putevoditel' po Turkestanu i Sredne-Aziatskoï zheleznoi doroge*, St Petersburg 1903, p. 352; *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 2, St Petersburg 1914, p. 320. Both quoted in Khalid 1998, p. 75.
- 110 Cf. Pierce 1960, pp. 107–11; Demko 1969, pp. 42–9.
- 111 *Ibid.*, pp. 74–5.
- 112 Palen 1910(i), pp. 8–9. Cf. §91 of the *Provisional Turkestan Statute*.
- 113 Palen 1910(i), p. 96.
- 114 Cf. §102 of *Provisional Turkestan Statute* and §91 of the *Turkestan Statute*.
- 115 Palen 1910(i), p. 101. Cf. §222 of *Turkestan Statute*.
- 116 Palen 1910(j), pp. 43–4; Girs 1884, pp. 324–5. Cf. §247 of the *Turkestan Statute*.
- 117 Palen 1910(d), p. 16.
- 118 In contrast to later tsarist endeavours to promote a Turkic-speaking *Sart* nationality, the term *Sart* still referred to both Turkic- and Persian-speaking non-tribal populations at the time of the statute's enforcement.
- 119 Cf. §§116–27 of the *Provisional Turkestan Statute*.
- 120 Cf. §§71 and 93 of the *Turkestan Statute*.
- 121 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 3–5; Bartol'd 1963, p. 367; K. U. Usenbaev, *Obshchestvenno-ëkonomicheskie otnosheniia kirgizov vtoraia polovina XIX–nachalo XX vv.*, Frunze 1980, pp. 32–3.
- 122 §74 of the *Turkestan Statute*. Cf. Palen 1910(c), pp. 174–5.
- 123 Palen 1910(i), p. 96.
- 124 Palen 1910(f), pp. 85–6.
- 125 Palen 1910(h), pp. 11–2; 1910(i), p. 11.
- 126 Cf. §§71–106 of the *Turkestan Statute*.
- 127 Palen 1910(i), p. 101.
- 128 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, p. 5; Palen 1910(c), pp. 172–3. Cf. §107 of the *Turkestan Statute*.
- 129 §222 of the *Turkestan Statute*.
- 130 Dobrosmyslov 1912, pp. 107–9; Palen 1910(i), p. 101.
- 131 I. I. Geïer, *Turkestan*, Tashkent 1909, pp. 21–4. Cf. §§129–33, 214–33 of the *Provisional Turkestan Statute*.
- 132 Cf. Wheeler 1964, pp. 72–3.
- 133 Cf. §§279–282 of the *Provisional Turkestan Statute*.
- 134 Cf. §287 of the *Turkestan Statute*.
- 135 Bartol'd 1963, pp. 367–70; Pierce 1960, pp. 147–52; A. A. Sapelkin, *K istorii feodalizma v Kirgizii v kontse XIX – nachale XX vv. (administrativnoe ustroistvo i nalogovaia sistema)*, Frunze 1968, pp. 28–30.
- 136 Palen 1910(d), p. 13. Cf. §300 of the *Turkestan Statute*. Cf. §270 of the *Turkestan Statute*. Cf. Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, p. 14.

- 137 Palen 1910(i), p. 84.
- 138 Carrère d'Encausse 1994, p. 159. A similar view is held by Fierman (W. Fierman, 'The Soviet "Transformation" of Central Asia', in H. Carrère d'Encausse (ed.) *Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation*, Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford 1991, p. 13.
- 139 'The Girs Report', in *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana I*, pp. 262–5.
- 140 S. M. Gramenitskiĭ, *Polozhenie inorodcheskogo obrazovaniia v Syr-Dar'inskoĭ oblasti*, Tashkent 1916, p. 11. Quoted in Pierce 1960, p. 214.
- 141 Palen 1910(b), p. 97.
- 142 Palen 1910(b), pp. 92–105; Pierce 1960, pp. 214–18; I. Baldauf, *Schriftreform und Schriftwechsel bei den muslimischen Rußland- und Sowjettürken (1850–1937)*, Budapest 1993, pp. 33–4.
- 143 Pierce 1960, p. 101.
- 144 Palen 1910, p. 6. Quoted in D. S. M. Williams, 'Native Courts in Tsarist Central Asia', *CAR*, 1966, p. 19.
- 145 Pierce 1960, pp. 216–17.
- 146 V. Zykin, *Vosstanie v Tashkente v 1892 g.*, Tashkent 1934; Carrère d'Encausse 1994, p. 165.
- 147 A. I. Dobromyslov, *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoiashchem. Istoricheskiĭ ocherk*, Tashkent 1911–12, p. 107. Quoted in Pierce 1960, p. 90.
- 148 Cf. Kappeler 1993, pp. 58–160.
- 149 Palen 1910(i), pp. 86–90.
- 150 *Ibid.*, pp. 97–102.
- 151 Cf. Grodekov 1889, p. 14; Palen 1910(i), pp. 78–81.
- 152 Kushner 1929, p. 79.
- 153 *Ibid.*, 1929, p. 87.
- 154 Bartol'd 1963(a), pp. 351–2.
- 155 *Ibid.*, pp. 358–9.
- 156 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, p. 91.
- 157 S. M. Gramenitskiĭ, *Polozhenie inorodcheskogo obrazovaniia v Syr-Dar'inskoĭ oblasti*, Tashkent 1916, p. 5. Quoted in Pierce 1960, p. 214.
- 158 Bartol'd 1963, pp. 359–61.
- 159 See for example Grodekov 1889, pp. 23–4.
- 160 *Materialy po musul'manstvu, vypusk II (Dervishizm v Turkestane)*, Tashkent 1898, pp. 1–24.; Pierce 1960, pp. 226–33. Cf. U. Halbach, "'Heiliger Krieg" gegen den Zarismus. Zur Verbindung von Sufismus und Djihad im antikolonialen islamischen Widerstand gegen Rußland im 19. Jahrhundert', in Kappeler *et al.* 989, pp. 227–9.
- 161 Carrère d'Encausse 1994, pp. 169–71.
- 162 Cf. V. P. Nalivkin, 'Polozhenie vakufnogo dela v Turkestanskom krae do i posle zavoevania', in *Ezhgodnik Ferganskoĭ oblasti, tom III*, Novyi-Margelan 1904, pp. 1–56.
- 163 Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd 1879, p. 31; Grodekov 1889, p. 23; Bartol'd 1963(a), p. 381.
- 164 Cf. Carrère d'Encausse 1981. In his book *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, Adeeb Khalid presents a brilliant study of Central Asian Jadidism, although he partly overestimates the social influence of Jadids in pre-Soviet times. For example, he writes:

Between the establishment of the governorate-general of Turkestan in 1867 and the Russian revolutions of 1917, Central Asia became increasingly intertwined with imperial (and hence global) economic networks; its social

THE TSARIST ADMINISTRATION

order was drastically reshaped, with the extinction of old elites and the emergence of new ones. Its political order was, of course, reconstituted. New groups, such as the Jadids, adopted and appropriated new forms of communication and sociability in their attempts to reform, creating, in the process, radically new understandings of tradition, religion, and the world.

(Khalid 1998, p. 2)

Nevertheless, during the tsarist rule the Jadids did not replace the old elites, and the social order was less drastically reshaped than Khalid seems to believe.

- 165 Khalid 1998, pp. 10, 13. Cf. William L. Hanaway, 'Fārsī, the Vatan and the Millat in Bukhara', in E. Allworth (ed.) *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*, New York and London 1973, pp. 149–50.
- 166 Grodekov 1889, pp. 14–20, 102; L. Chermak, 'Osedlye Kirgizy-semledeľ'tsy na r. Chu', in *Zapiski Zapadno-Sibirskogo otdela IRGO (Omsk)*, XXVII, 1900, pp. 8–24.
- 167 Palen 1910(i), p. 82.
- 168 Krader 1963, pp. 205–6, 369–70.
- 169 Thomas J. Barfield, *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan. Pastoral Nomads in Transition*, Austin 1981, pp. 59–62.
- 170 Krader generalised from his research on the Monguors of Kansu. There he found territorially located sibs among recently settled tribesmen who had lost tribal affiliations and kept exogamy within groupings sharing common patronymics (*ibid.*, pp. 289–93). He might not have sufficiently taken into consideration that it was the Chinese empire whose basic groups of communal commitments were sibs and which acculturated tribesmen on its borderlands (about Chinese sibs and villages, see M. Granet, *Die chinesische Zivilisation. Familie – Gesellschaft – Herrschaft. Von den Anfängen bis zur Kaiserzeit*, Frankfurt 1988 [1929], pp. 19–40). As Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribesmen had to submit to Islamic states, commitment groups changed in different ways.
- 171 Tolstova 1961, pp. 46–9.
- 172 Abramzon 1951, p. 141.
- 173 Vámbéry 1865, pp. 302–3.
- 174 Carrère d'Encausse 1994, p. 159.
- 175 Thus we also do not think that changes initiated by tsarist authority 'were mostly in the socio-economic sphere and were almost absent in the political sphere' (A. I. Yakovlev and S. A. Panarin, 'The conditions of reforms in Arabia and Turkestan', in V. Naumkin (ed.) *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia. A Post-Soviet Critique*, Reading 1993, p. 82).
- 176 Palen 1910(e), pp. 100–20.

TSARIST PROTECTORATES

The Emirate of Bukhara

Political order in change

After the tsarist conquest of Tashkent, Russo-Bukharan relations deteriorated. For security reasons tsarist troops occupied the Trans-Chirchik district in September 1865. In May of the following year, tsarist armed forces defeated the Bukharan army at Irdjar and took over Khojand for strategic reasons. Amir Muzaffaraddin Khan (1860–85), still hoping to be able to resist tsarist troops, levied war taxes and assembled new troops. Recalling his defeat in 1866, he hesitated to start a new campaign, however. Pressed by the Muslim *ulema*, Muzaffaraddin finally proclaimed a holy war against Russia. In the hostilities which followed, General von Kaufman defeated the emir's army and occupied Samarkand in May 1868. This enabled Kaufman to increase pressure on the emirate, since it was possible to control Bukhara's water supply of the Zarafshan from Samarkand.

As a result Muzaffaraddin decided to make peace and signed the *Russo-Bukharan Commercial Convention* in June 1868. This convention was only a commercial treaty which did not formally limit the sovereignty of the emir. It only aimed at protecting Russo-Bukharan trade on a bilateral basis and granted Russian and Bukharan merchants the liberty to travel and to maintain caravanserais and commercial agents in Russian and Bukharan towns.¹

The *Friendship Treaty* of 1873 was more far-reaching, although it also did not formally turn the emirate into a tsarist protectorate. In addition to the regulations of the *Commercial Convention*, it granted free navigation to Russian and Bukharan ships along the Amu Darya. It stipulated that the emir must protect wharves and warehouses on the Bukharan banks of the river, and that his government could admit only those persons from Russia who held passports and exit visas into the emirate's territory. Tsarist striving for political influence became most visible in Articles 16 and 17 of the Treaty. The former granted the right to the imperial government to have a permanent representative in Bukhara, whereas the latter decreed the abolishment of 'the shameful trade in human beings'.² However, both articles were

not implemented at once. Slaves continued to be sold in Bukhara, as Schuyler observed during his stay in the capital,³ and a Russian political agency was not established in Bukhara until 1885. Thus tsarist political influence remained weak in the first years of 'Russo-Bukharan friendship'.

The emir won a very mighty ally by making peace with the tsar. Muzaffaraddin's surrender to tsarist troops diminished his authority among the population, however, and rendered the Muslim *ulema* hostile towards his rule. In contrast, his eldest son, Abdul Malik, strengthened his position within the emirate by showing implacable hostility to Russia. On taking refuge in Shahr-i Sabz and forming alliances with Uzbek, Turkman and Kazakh leaders, he became a serious threat to the rule of the emir. When Muzaffaraddin appealed for tsarist assistance, it was General A. K. Abramov, the commander of the Zarafshan *Okrug*, who defeated the crown prince, occupied Karshi in October 1868, and handed over the town to the emir. Muzaffaraddin was pleased by this support in defeating the rebellious towns. He even requested that tsarist troops capture Shahr-i Sabz for him and promised to pay the military expenses of the siege. This request was granted two years later, after a detachment of Cossacks from Samarkand had been attacked by unknown raiders. Subsequently General von Kaufman ordered the capture of Shahr-i Sabz, where the raiders were suspected to have taken refuge. On 14 August 1870, General Abramov took over the twin cities of Shahr-i Sabz and Kitab, and handed them over to the emir.

In the meantime, Muzaffaraddin's troops had conquered Hissar and Kuliab, and he and the Khan of Khokand competed for political influence in Karategin. After the tsarist annexation of Khokand, the emir invaded Karategin and replaced its *mir*. In December 1877 and spring 1878, the emir's troops also occupied Darvaz. Although Muzaffaraddin's conquest of Kuliab and Hissar was not authorised by General von Kaufman, the latter supported Bukharan control of Karategin and Darvaz, and acknowledged the emir's sovereignty over these newly gained territories of Eastern Bukhara.⁴

The position of the emir was also strengthened by the fact that the Russian-British delimitation of spheres of influence resulted in the establishment of fixed borders between Afghanistan and the Emirate of Bukhara. In this way the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1873 established the Amu-Darya/Panj line as the southern border of the emirate, which also was to become the southern border of the Soviet Union. In 1886, permanent tsarist garrisons were stationed for the protection of this border in Charjuy and Karki. In addition, the *Pamir Boundary Settlement* of 1895 acknowledged Shughnon, Rushan and northern Vakhān, which had been occupied by tsarist troops, as the Shughnon-Rushan *beklik* of the emirate. Only southern Darvaz was ceded to Afghanistan.

The acknowledgement of borders was a new phenomenon in the emirate, which had always been involved in border disputes up to that time and which had undertaken great military endeavours to defend or acquire territories of

neighbouring rulers. Instead, Russia supported stable borders and assisted the emir in taking control of independent *bekliks*, which had effectively resisted the emirs' centralisation policy up to that time. In this way the emir extended more centralised *beklik* administration to Eastern Bukhara and increased tax yields for his own treasury.

Up to the 1880s, Russian influence had remained weak in the emirate. It was the decision of the tsarist government to build the Central Asian Railway, which ended the isolation of Bukhara and initiated the tsarist presence in the emirate. In June 1885, N. V. Charykov, the diplomatic attaché to the Governor-general of Turkestan, arrived in Bukhara and negotiated a railway convention with the emir. Although Muzaffaraddin opposed this project, Charykov succeeded in signing a protocol in which the emir promised to donate the necessary public lands and his cooperation in the acquisition of building materials and the hiring of a labour force. One year later, the railway had already reached Charjuy; it traversed Bukhara and reached Samarkand in May 1888. Ten years later it was also extended to Tashkent.

The construction of the railroad raised many new questions, with the result that a permanent political agency was established in January 1886 in Bukhara. The tsarist agent was directly responsible to the foreign ministry of the empire, although the Governor-general of Turkestan did not lose jurisdiction over Bukharan affairs. The duties of the political agent were far-reaching, and included assistance to the emir in his formal correspondence with the tsar, the protection of Russian trade interests and the jurisdiction over tsarist subjects in European settlements. As the number of Europeans increased, so did his administrative staff .

Charjuy and New Bukhara became the first European settlements in the emirate, and developed next to the railway stations. As in the Governor-generalship of Turkestan, Europeans were settled in separate areas in order to avoid clashes with the local population. At the end of the 1880s, a third settlement was founded in Karki, where 5,000 Europeans lived in 1910, including the garrison troops. In 1897 a Russian garrison was established in Termez, where a fortress and a settlement were built three years later.

In the emirate, tsarist municipal administration only existed in Bukhara. It was headed by a civil governor, who was appointed by the Governor-general of Turkestan. He was assisted by an advisory council which consisted of a local Russian resident, the municipal architect and a representative of the Bukharan government. A separate chief of police was appointed as well. In Charjuy, however, the military commander both headed the advisory council and supervised the police. Similarly the garrison commandants directed the municipal administration in Karki and Termez.

Initially, the political agent was endowed only with criminal jurisdiction over tsarist subjects in Bukhara, and civil cases were negotiated in Bukharan courts. Two years later, he also gained the jurisdiction of civil cases between Europeans. As the political agent became overworked by judicial matters

and Europeans were not fairly treated in native courts, Russian justices of the peace were established, and civil cases between Europeans and Bukharans were removed from Bukharan jurisdiction. By 1909 there existed two justices in New Bukhara, one justice in Charjuy and one in Karki, who also served Termez. The decisions of their courts could be appealed against to the Samarkand *Oblast* court, which held sessions twice a year in Charjuy and New Bukhara and annually in Karki and Termez. Only civil and criminal offences which involved Bukharan defendants remained under the jurisdiction of the political agent.⁵

In several aspects the position of the political agent was comparable to that of an *oblast* commander. He administered a separate territorial unit, acted as an arbitrator in disputes between Europeans and natives and was also responsible to the Governor-general. Due to the lack of any political and legal community, he was in charge of maintaining peace between hostile populations, who could easily become involved in armed conflicts.

When Russia's customs frontier was shifted from the Turkestan-Bukharan border to the Amu Darya in January 1895, the emirate became a full tsarist protectorate. Russian custom houses and frontier posts were established along the right bank of the river from Karki to the western border of Darvaz, and the frontiers were protected by tsarist troops. From that time on, the defence of the Amu Darya border depended on tsarist military forces, and the emir's army played only a secondary role in the khanate. By that time the emir had already lost all opportunities of maintaining foreign relations with powers other than Russia.

Impacts on communal and political commitment

In comparison to the Governor-generalship of Turkestan, the establishment of the Bukharan protectorate had little impact on native communal commitment. It conserved the influence of both *ulema* and native ruling elites, on which the emir based his power and influence. However, tsarist military assistance helped the emir to overcome his rivals and to occupy formerly independent territories, whose rulers had resisted Bukharan centralisation policies for centuries or had only formally acknowledged Bukharan or Khokandian supremacy. Thus the emir succeeded in monopolising military power within the emirate, although the external defence of his state relied more and more on tsarist troops. The relations between the patrimonially appointed begs and their aids, on the one hand, and the local population and its leaders, on the other hand, were particularly strained in the recently occupied provinces of Eastern Bukhara, where the emir replaced local leaders like *mirs* and *shohs* with his officials.⁶

Nevertheless, the administrative centralisation of the emirate increased the emir's domination rather than his authority among his subjects. The conclusion of peace alienated the Muslim population and its spiritual

leaders, who started to oppose the emir.⁷ Olufsen reports that the emir was 'absolutely forbidden to make his appearance in the capital', that most Bukharans were against the emir, and that the sovereign had not dared to enter his capital for years. Thus the emir resided in Kermine and moved only to Charjuy, Karshi, Hissar and Kitab during summer. For the same reason he entered and left his Bukharan residence only at night.⁸ Vámbéry similarly noticed the emir's loss of authority. During his stay in Bukhara, he had witnessed native respect for the emir, who was regarded as an invincible sovereign and a protector of the faith. Due to the emir's failure to resist the tsarist advance, the people started to call him a coward, whose precipitate flight had caused his troops' defeat by the Russians and who had formed a secret political alliance with the infidel 'white tsar'.⁹

Opposition to the emir's rule continued even after tsarist troops helped him to defeat his military opponents and to take control of Eastern-Bukharan provinces. From 1875 to 1890, there were several uprisings in Hissar and other eastern provinces. In 1900, several mutinies occurred in the Kelif *beklik*. One year later, people revolted against Bukharan officials in the Denau *beklik*. In 1902 the emir faced insurrections in Kurgan Tube. In 1909 revolts took place in Kuliab.¹⁰ In January 1910 the *qushbegi's* preference for Shi'ite Persians for government positions gave rise to unrest between Shi'ites and Sunnis, which led to 500 dead and wounded inhabitants within the capital.¹¹ The rising number of revolts indicated to some extent the declining authority of the emir. In addition, the centralisation of government, which increased the tax burden of the population and enabled Bukharan officials to augment the tax burdens for their own benefits, often gave inhabitants further reason for resistance. As a result, tax officials frequently became the first victims of revolts.¹²

However, the establishment of the protectorate seems to have had little additional impact on communal commitment structures. Due to the strengthening of the patrimonial administration, the trend from tribal to residential commitment continued.

The Khanate of Khiva

Political order in change

In 1869 and 1870, General von Kaufman wrote three letters to Muhammad Rahim Khan (1865–1910), in which he protested against Turkman attacks on Russian caravans, demanded the punishment of the raiders and warned the khan that he must choose between friendship or enmity towards Russia.¹³ However, even if the khan had not encouraged the Kazakh *Adaī* tribal confederacy in its revolt against tsarist rule in the area between the Caspian and Aral Seas, and had decided to cooperate with tsarist authorities, Russian trade would not have been any more safe, as the khan was not able to control all Khivan tribesmen.

When Kaufman occupied Khiva in May 1873 and forced the khan to surrender, he initiated the establishment of a *devon*, which consisted of four tsarist officials, the new *devonbegi*, the *mukhtor* and the khan who headed it.¹⁴ This court met regularly during the tsarist occupation until August of the same year. Its decisions had to be approved by Kaufman. Due to the latter's insistence, the khan dismissed his anti-Russian officials, like the powerful *devonbegi* Muhammad Murad, and decreed the abolition of slavery. As a result, 30,000 predominantly Persian slaves were freed. More than five thousand of them were repatriated to Persia. Tsarist troops also took harsh actions against Khivan Turkmen, imposed a fine of 600,000 roubles on them and inflicted heavy losses among *Iomut* tribesmen, livestock and crops.¹⁵

On 12 August 1873, General von Kaufman and Muhammad Rahim signed the Russo-Khivan Peace Treaty,¹⁶ which ended the formal independence of the khanate, but preserved the khanate as an internally autonomous political entity. In contrast to the Russo-Bukharan Friendship Treaty of the same year, the former transformed Khiva into a Russian protectorate. Thus the khan had to renounce all rights to maintain direct or indirect diplomatic relations with foreign rulers or to conclude commercial treaties, unless approved by tsarist authorities. The Treaty, which included eighteen articles, ceded the whole right bank of the Amu Darya to tsarist control (Art. 2). It unilaterally granted commercial, civil and residential rights to Russian merchants within the khanate (Arts 7–15), ensured their protection and granted exclusive navigation rights on the Amu Darya to Russians (Art. 5). It also stipulated the return of persons who had left tsarist territory without exit permission (Art. 16), confirmed the khan's proclamation of the emancipation of all slaves (Art. 17) and imposed an indemnity of 2.2 million roubles upon the khanate (Art. 18).¹⁷

Khiva's surrender and the consequent Treaty were much more humiliating than Bukhara's capitulation. The khan had to declare himself to be the 'obedient servant' of the Russian emperor, renounce all the rights of a sovereign and face the removal of his throne and his royal archives to Moscow and St. Petersburg. In addition, he had to accept that tsarist officials directly control his government for two and a half months, and was obliged to proclaim their decisions. Having accepted Kaufman's offer to preserve his rule, he knew that he was not able to ensure the security of the khanate and to fulfil the obligations emerging from the Treaty. That is why he demanded the stationing of tsarist troops either in a nearby fortress or even in the capital itself. Following instructions from St Petersburg, Kaufman granted only the first request, by separating the right bank of the Amu Darya from Khiva and establishing the Amu Darya Otdel with Petro-Aleksandrovsk as its centre. There a tsarist garrison was stationed.¹⁸

These demonstrations of Russian military power did not impress all Turkmen, and did not ease government in Khiva. Soon after Kaufman had

withdrawn his troops from the khanate, *Iomut* tribesmen plundered several Uzbek and *Sart* districts in order to compensate for losses suffered at the hands of Russian Cossacks. Neither Kaufman's offer to remit indemnities for obedience to the khan, nor several military expeditions into Khiva by local garrisons, could end Turkman revolt against the increased tax load.

Due to the diminution of the khanate and the high war indemnities imposed, the khan introduced new taxes. Previously, many of the more nomadic Turkmen, like most parts of the Khivan *Iomut*, had not paid any taxes, but had occasionally performed military service. Instead of this service the khan introduced a new land tax. According to the 2,250 Turkman *atlyks* which included 67,000 *tanop* (27,000 hectares), 2,250 warriors had to pay annually 24,750 tillas (around 89,100 gold roubles).¹⁹ The khan also imposed additional taxes on Kara-Kalpaks and Kazakhs, who had to pay a yurt tax and a tax for the use of state pastures. These parts of the population, which had not enough land and water at the edge of the oases, were deeply hit by the new taxes. In addition, they faced tax collectors who also collected taxes for their own use. Due to this high taxation, many Khivans migrated into the Amu-Darya *Otdel*.²⁰

Khan Muhammad Rahim became more and more frightened by the increasing revolts in the khanate and admitted his powerlessness to maintain order and ensure obedience among Turkmen at a meeting with N. A. Ivanov, the commander of the local garrison in Petro-Aleksandrovsk, in August 1876. He complained about his lack of money and troops to keep order and demanded the stationing of a Russian garrison in Khiva and financial support to hire additional troops. The khan was even prepared to abdicate and to accept the annexation of Khiva, and wanted to know how much he and his family would receive as a state pension after abdication. On the other hand, Turkman representatives arrived at Petro-Aleksandrovsk, and complained about the khan's government.

In order to avoid the deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations, officials in St Petersburg forbade any action which could lead to the interference of tsarist troops or the annexation of further territories. Thus the local commander did not begin a third campaign against rebellious Turkmen until February 1877, and forbade non-authorized immigration to the right bank of the Amu Darya. In this way, any loss of Khivan taxpayers was to be stopped.²¹

In the 1880s and 1890s Turkman revolts caused by disputes over water rights and their opposition to tax collection continued to endanger the security of the khanate. Despite his dismissal by Kaufman, Muhammad Murad, the *devonbegi*, continued to remain the most influential official in the Khivan government until his death in 1901.²² Unlike Amir Abdalhad, Muhammad Rahim Khan only travelled to Russia very occasionally. He also was not treated as a foreign ruler, like the emir. Hostilities between the khanate and the emirate remained. Thus when both travelled to Russia in

1894 to take part as heirs-apparent in the coronation ceremony of Nicholas II, Muhammad Rahim refused to be the guest of the emir at the railway station of Charjuy, and remained in the steamship that had brought him there.

When Muhammad Rahim died of a heart attack in 1910, his fourth son Asfandiyar (1910–18) became the new khan. Like his father, he left the government to the members of the *devon*, which was split into two parties. Islam-Khoja, who was also said to have been educated in Paris, headed the reform party. He was the grandson of Muhammad Rahim and was the *divanbegi* of the khanate. Tsarist authorities pressed the new khan to make reforms to improve the tax system, put all officials on salary, establish communication and medical facilities and better the poor condition of the irrigation network. In January 1911, the khan finally proclaimed his support for a broad range of reforms. Few reforms, however, were actually implemented. Islam-Khoja only succeeded in building a school and a hospital in the capital, in reforming a madrassah and in encouraging 'new-method' (*jadid*) schools.²³

At that time, Sheikh Nazar-Beg, one of the influential sons of the former *devonbegi* Muhammad Murad, was the war minister and headed the second group of the *devon*. He was an opponent of any reconciliatory attitude towards the Turkmen, and advocated their destruction by force. When Islam-Khoja tried to introduce a proportional land tax in the framework of his reforms, he increased the opposition of the Turkmen, as the reform implied the doubling or tripling of taxes. After the killing of a rich Turkman, Shammi-Kel headed a group of 300–500 Turkmen who in December 1912 plundered a caravan and raided Uzbek settlements. Nazar-Beg began a punitive expedition against these Turkmen. Due to tsarist backing of this project, Shammi-Kel decided to make peace, and the khan agreed to abandon the new taxes, in exchange for which he would levy a fine of 110,000 tillas (around 200,000 roubles). The rebel leader voluntarily became a hostage of the khan until the fine was paid.²⁴

Due to the successful suppression of the revolt, the war party gained the favour of the khan, who ordered the assassination of his *devonbegi* Islam-Khoja, who was killed in August 1913. The khan, however, continued to indulge the Turkmen and set free his hostage after a year, probably for fear of further uprisings.

From 1914 to 1916, tsarist officials extorted 250,000 roubles from Khiva under the guise of contributions to the war effort. On taking this money as bribes, the General-governor von Martson and Colonel Kolosovsky from Petro-Aleksandrovsk promised the khan that this money would secure arms and high tsarist favour. For this purpose Asfandiyar once more imposed new taxes, which led to fresh Turkman uprisings.

In January 1915 the khan sent another punitive expedition against Turkmen, and imposed a fine of 611,000 tillas. After he had ordered the

arrest of *Iomut* leader Bakhshi Shah Murad in March, open rebellion began. The *Iomut serdar* Djunaid Khan attacked the capital. Martson intervened and ordered the release of the *Iomut* leader. This encouraged and renewed the rebellion. When the khan requested either weapons or tsarist troops to suppress the revolt, the Minister of War V. A. Sukhomlinov, who was also involved in bribe-taking, sent 2,000 rifles and ammunition. Martson, however, disregarded his instructions. He withheld the arms from the khan, while urging 'justice' for the Turkmen in St Petersburg. Finally, Major Geppener, a special commissioner from Tashkent, arranged a peace agreement between the revolting *Iomut* and the khan by promising that Russia would remove the causes of Turkman discontent. Subsequently, a small Russian garrison was stationed in Khiva at the khan's expense. This was supposed to defend the khan against his enemies.²⁵

In January 1916 discontented Uzbeks turned against the khan as well. The *hokim* of Khodjeili, Ovez-Khoja, joined with Djunaid-Khan and formed an alliance in order to overthrow the khan and his *devonbegi* Muhammad Vafa Bakalov. The *hokim* and around 500 Uzbeks marched against Khiva. They were joined by men from Manghit, Qipchoq, Shah-Abat, Urganch, Manak and Gurlen. The rebels demanded an audience with the *devonbegi*, but the Russian garrison soon dispersed the demonstration.

In early February Djunaid-Khan declared himself khan of Khiva, defeated Asfandiyar's tsarist garrison, seized the capital, overthrew the khan and plundered the town for three days. Three of the *devon's* members were killed, Vafa Bakalov included. Asfandiyar Khan escaped by paying 60,000 roubles as ransom. It was only Lieutenant-general A. S. Galkin, governor of Sir Darya Oblast, who was able to expel the Turkmen from Khiva; he subsequently devastated Turkman lands, restored the rule of the khan and imposed a high indemnity on the Turkmen.

In the last year before the fall of the Russian empire, Governor-general A.N. Kuropatkin (1816–17) uncovered the bribe-taking practised since 1914. In response to this, his intention was to establish a military commissar in Khiva, who would supervise the khan's government and send frequent reports to St Petersburg. However, one month after the signing of an agreement between the General and the khan, the tsar's empire ceased to exist.²⁶

Impacts on communal and political commitment

The establishment of the tsarist protectorate accelerated the process of detribalisation and promoted to some degree the development of residential communal commitment in the khanate. This process occurred among various groups of population in different ways.

Although there existed some settled Kazakhs who increasingly neglected tribal customs and led a more sharia-based life, Kazakhs continued to be

regarded as 'bad Muslims' and usually remained more committed to animistic religious views. Kazakh tribal divisions remained administrative units, and tribesmen of one descent group most often formed *auyls*. Only a rather small proportion of all Khivan Kazakhs were purely nomadic.²⁷

Turkman tribesmen remained relatively independent of the patrimonial administration of the khan. The khan regarded disputes between Turkmen as their own internal affairs, and only interfered when non-Turkman subjects were involved. In this way there still existed vendetta among the Khivan Turkmen at the beginning of the twentieth century.²⁸ According to Lobachevsky there probably existed only around 1,000 yurts of purely nomadic Kazakhs and Turkmen in 1912.²⁹

Girshfel'd and Galkin state that Uzbeks whose ancestors were tribesmen in former times, could only vaguely memorise tribal genealogies and rather tended to identify former tribal divisions with towns like Qunghirot, Manghit or Qipchoq. Only *Qunghirot* Uzbeks still knew their tribal divisions very well, although their tribal leaders (*biīs*) had lost some of their political influence, as they had to acknowledge the *hokims* as rulers appointed by the Khivan khan.³⁰

It seems to be true that Kazakhs, Turkmen and Kara-Kalpaks usually remained committed to customary law, even after their political integration increasingly depended on their relations with the patrimonial administration of the khanate. Having become settled in houses, they usually kept their yurts in their gardens, where they lived and cooked.³¹ By contrast, *Sarts* and Uzbeks were or became committed to more orthodox forms of Islam, and adapted their habits to the requirements of sharia. Thus Uzbek women increasingly wore the chuddar and lived secluded in houses.³² By the beginning of the twentieth century, like the *Sarts*, Uzbeks usually lived in urban or rural mahallahs.³³

Nevertheless, Uzbeks were still conscious of their tribal origins, as they continued to be offended when somebody regarded them as *Sarts*. As Uzbeks did not like *Sarts*, marriages rarely occurred between these groups.³⁴ According to Girshfel'd and Galkin, disputes between different populations were settled according to sharia. In these cases, all inhabitants except the Turkmen increasingly brought their cases to kadis.

Russian influence remained weak in the khanate, however. Tsarist authorities neither established extraterritorial courts, nor did they set up customs and frontier posts. Native life was also not affected by any railroad, and there did not exist any Russian enclaves. Russian merchants formed only an unofficial colony at Urganch, but they had no separate administration, no schools, churches or hotels. There was only a colony of German Mennonite settlers, who moved from Saratov into the Khanate to avoid tsarist military service.³⁵ Due to lack of land, they became craftsmen and maintained some schools. Tsarist subjects who lived in Khivan territory were liable to two lay magistrates of the Amu Darya Otdel, however.³⁶

Nevertheless, the khan of Khiva became militarily dependent on tsarist assistance. His political alliance with Russia accelerated the decline of the khan's authority over his subjects. As he was no longer able to secure enduring political alliances with Turkman tribal confederacies, raiding Turkmen continuously endangered the khanate. War contributions levied by tsarist troops, together with illegal bribe-taking, increased the tax burden of the population and fuelled uprisings among those inhabitants who in former times had been exempted from taxation due to their military service. As in the Emirate of Bukhara, the maintenance of political order became more and more dependant on military force rather than on the political commitment of the ruled.

Conclusion

The integration of Central Asia into Russia and the establishment of tsarist administrative structures occurred gradually, and considerably changed the political orientations of indigenous political elites. In the eighteenth century, tsarist influence was limited to Kazakh tribes along the northern edges of the Kazakh Steppe, who were supposed to secure Russia's southern border. Nevertheless, the oaths of allegiance frequently renewed by khans, sultans and tribal leaders did not encourage Kazakh tribes to become tsarist subjects, but established only temporary political alliances. The tsarist state, on the other hand, was not yet prepared to protect the territories of its Kazakh allies.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the tsarist government started to incorporate Kazakh political elites into the empire by establishing various forms of indirect rule. The Small and the Middle Hordes were broken up and the office of the khan was abolished. Kazakh tribal confederacies were replaced by the sultan administration among tribesmen of the former Small Horde, and by the *prikaz* administration within the territory of the former Middle Horde. The Inner Horde, which was established in 1801 to secure the inner steppe lands between the Volga and Ural rivers, represented another form of tsarist indirect rule.

The cooption of indigenous elites into the nobility of the empire was stopped in the second half of the nineteenth century by the introduction of a civil-military administration based on *oblasti* and *uezds*. This new order did not only marginalise the estate of the Chingizids (sultans), but also deprived tribal leaders and patrimonial rulers of their political power. Native political elites only kept their influence in the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva, which became tsarist protectorates.

Tsarist military superiority and the continuing conquest of Central Asian territories led to political reorientation among indigenous elites. Whereas in the eighteenth century Kazakh tribesmen secured their access to pastures by following khans who had temporarily allied with Russia, in the first half of the nineteenth century they began to adhere to sultans, who became more or

less tsarist officials. By the 1860s at the latest, tribesmen and *Sart* populations had to acknowledge the bitter truth that their survival increasingly depended on good relations with tsarist officials. In the Kazakh Steppe this process of political reorientation was particularly painful, since the establishment of the tsarist administration destroyed the base of the nomadic economy, and Kazakh herdsmen started to compete for summer and winter pastures within the new territorial units. Uprisings like those of Isatay Tayman, Jan Khoja Nurmuhhammad or Kenisari Qasim-uli indicated the opposition to the new order.

The establishment of tsarist political order was linked to the problem of integrating the local population into a uniform administrative order. The civil-military administration tried to solve this problem by acknowledging indigenous leaders as village elders and *volost'* heads, who were elected for three years. Most of these offices were not salaried, but their holders were entitled to collect taxes for their own use among the population. These leaders were expected to enforce local customary law or sharia, imperial laws and administrative orders of *uezd* governors or *oblast* commanders. Due to conflicting legal conceptions and juridical consequences, local leaders faced the dilemma of losing either the support of the local population or that of tsarist officials. In this situation they often tried to settle local disputes without contacting imperial authorities.

The integration of local legal traditions remained problematic. Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribesmen submitted their disputes only to civil courts of arbitration whose members were freely chosen. Tsarist legislation, however, established native courts based on territoriality. The same was true for *Sarts*, who could only bring a case to the authorised *kadis* of their district. Whereas tribal arbitration settled disputes by defining payable compensations, imperial laws demanded punishment for offences regarded as criminal. As Turkmen were used to accepting only the decisions of *maslakhats* of their involved descent groups, decisions of native courts became less authoritative due to the fact that authorised native judges decided also in matters not linked to their descent affiliation. Disrespect or ignorance of local customs often did little to reduce the rift between the local population and the tsarist administration.

This rift between tsarist elites and the local population increased, however. In the mid-nineteenth century Russian officials increasingly experienced the disintegrating effects of the spread of Islamic orientations, and started to prohibit Tatar missions on the steppe. Nevertheless, their policy unwittingly strengthened Islam. The indigenous political elites' declining influence strengthened mullahs as native leaders, who continued to dispose of great material means due to the exemption of *vaqf* property from land reform. In addition, tsarist support for the settlement of tribesmen drove the latter towards more Islamic orientations and favoured more orthodox forms of Islam.

Political alliance with Russia was not very popular in the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. It is true that the emirs Muzaffar addin and Abdalahad won the support of a powerful ally who enabled them to defeat militarily their opponents in distant *bekliks*, to conquer the provinces of Eastern Bukhara and to centralise the administrative structures of the patrimonial state. Nevertheless, the administrative centralisation of the emirate tended to promote the emir's domination rather than his authority among his subjects. The peace treaty alienated the *Sart* population, and its spiritual leaders began to oppose the emir. As a result the emir lost native respect as well as his reputation of being an invincible sovereign and a protector of the faith.

The political alliance with Russia also did not strengthen *Qunghiroi* authority in the Khanate of Khiva. In contrast to the emirate, tsarist political alliance did even not strengthen the military power of the khan, who had lost his nimbus of invincibility in 1855, when *Teke* tribesmen defeated Khivan troops under the leadership of the *serdar* Kushid Khan, and killed the Khivan khan Muhammad Amin. Ever since, and even after the tsarist occupation of Khiva, Turkman tribesmen frequently raided Khorezm and endangered the military security of the river oasis. The march of the *hokim* of Khodjeili and his Uzbek supporters against Khiva in January 1916, and the Turkmen's plundering of the capital under the leadership of Djunaid Khan in February, marked the peak of resistance against the khan and his government.

With regard to communal commitment structures, the establishment of the protectorates and of the civil-military administration promoted the change from tribal to residential communal commitment in some areas. There existed different ways of detribalisation and settlement, as we shall sum up below.

The majority of settling tribesmen remained at their winter quarters, built homesteads and became increasingly involved in agriculture. These villages, which often included people of a single descent group, held common water and pasture rights, and their inhabitants elected elders who decided in disputes and other affairs. Despite tsarist legislation on property rights, pastures remained communally held and did not become hereditary. This way of settling arguments was less linked to any acculturation to Russian or Islamic customs, and customary law remained influential among many Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen.

Settlement showed different results when it was linked to cultural assimilation through orthodox Islam. In these cases tribesmen formed or joined mixed villages where private property (*mulk*) was acknowledged. Due to processes of acculturation, tribesmen became devoted Muslims, and their women lived in a more secluded way. The most radical change from tribal to residential commitment occurred when tribesmen left their relatives and bought or built houses in mahallahs. As the prescriptions of sharia and

school Islam were strictly observed there, some former Kyrgyz, *Qipchoq* or Kalmyk tribesmen concealed their tribal origins to facilitate adaptation to their new way of life.

Overall, tsarist authorities did not succeed in establishing any significant elements of political community which might have assured enduring native obedience towards tsarist authority. Due to the lack of shared political commitments, superior military force became the basic means of maintaining political order in Central Asia. Furthermore, neither did any all-embracing legal community exist. On the contrary, Central Asia included populations which adhered to five different legal communities and which usually lived in separate areas: *Sart* people lived in villages and mahallahs and acknowledged *kadis* who settled their disputes according to *sharia*. Tribal people lived in nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled villages and were committed to customary law. Their disputes were dealt with by judges called *bīs* or village councils (*maslakhats*). Russian peasants brought their cases to village elders and *volost'* courts (*sel'skiĭ sud*) and could appeal to superior rural courts (sg.: *verkhniĭ sel'skiĭ sud*). Jurisdiction, however, was based on both statutory imperial legislation and Russian customary law. Cossacks formed *voĭskos* which were divided in *stanitsas* and villages and formed autonomous administrative organisations. Last but not least, only urban Europeans were directly subject to imperial law, and their disputes were settled by lay magistrates (sg.: *mirovoĭ sud'ia*). Due to this lack of shared legal community, authority relations remained problematic in tsarist Central Asia.

Oblast' and *uezd* administrations were the only integrating force among these different native and European populations. They regulated conflicts in which members of these different groups were involved. However, due to the lack of a common normative order, imperial rule was rather based on domination than on authority relations.

In several aspects the position of the political agent in the Emirate of Bukhara resembled the position of *oblast'* governors in the Governor-generalship of Turkestan. He administered a separate territorial unit and acted as an arbitrator in disputes between Europeans and subjects of the emir. Due to the lack of political and legal community, he was in charge of maintaining peace between hostile populations who could easily get involved in armed conflicts. Such an agent did not exist in Khiva, as few Russians lived in the khanate.

Notes

- 1 §§1–4 of the *Commercial Convention*. *PV*, 31 October–12 November 1872. For an English translation see: Becker 1968, p. 313.
- 2 §§1–17 of the *Friendship Treaty*. *PV*, 18–30 December 1873. Cf. Becker 1968, pp. 319–21.
- 3 Schuyler 1966, pp. 237–47.
- 4 Cf. Logofet 1911, pp. 29–34; Becker 1968, pp. 45–58, 85–92; B. G. Gafurov, *Istoriia tadzhikskogo naroda v kratkom izlozhenii – S drevneĭshikh vremen do*

- Velikoĭ Oktiabr'skoĭ sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii 1917 g. (izd. 2)*, vol. 2, Moscow 1952, pp. 390–8; Bartol'd 1963, pp. 407–10; *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda*, vol. II, ed. B. I. Iskandarov and A. M. Mukhtarov, Moscow 1964, pp. 170–1; Iskandarov 1962, pp. 134–8.
- 5 Becker 1968, pp 136–47.
 - 6 Logofet 1911 (II), p. 263; N. N. Pokotilo, *Ocherk Bukharskikh vladenii na levom beregy r. Piandzha v 1886 g. In Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii, vyp. 25*, St Petersburg 1887, pp. 267–75; M. R. Rakhimov, *Zemledelie tadzhikov basseina r. Khingou v dorevoliutsionnyi period (istoriko- etnograficheskii ocherk)*, Stalinabad 1957, p. 82.
 - 7 In his recent essay 'Society and Politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920', Adeb Khalid describes the emirs' relation to the *ulema* as being 'dynamic'. He holds the view that the Emir Nasrullah both curbed the power of the tribal chiefs and – referring to the Ayni's *History of the Manghyt Emirs of Bukhara* – paid little attention to the *ulema*. In this view the *ulema* only asserted themselves when the Russians conquered Central Asia, whereas Emir Muzaffar 'utilized this situation brilliantly' to instrumentalise Islam for his own power interests (Khalid 2000, pp. 370–1). We do not fully agree with this view on Islam. If tribal structures were replaced by state structures in Central Asia, it occurred through the spread of Islamic law. In this process kadis were appointed by rulers and replaced tribal leaders (*bijis*) as judicial figures. Therefore he should present some evidence as to why it is wrong to regard the Islamic law as the foundation of the nineteenth-century emirate. In asserting that *tribal* leaders still opposed the *Manghyts* under the tsarist protectorate (p. 368) and that 'the amirs did not develop any centralized bureaucratic infrastructure to deal with the everyday concerns of administering justice and raising revenues' (p. 371), Khalid seems to describe the emirate rather as a tribal than as a state structure.
 - 8 Olufsen 1911, pp. 574–5; Logofet 1911 (I), pp. 232–3.
 - 9 Vámbéry 1872, pp. 213–17.
 - 10 Logofet 1911 (II), pp. 263–4; K. Shaniiazov, *Uzbeki-karluki (istoriko- etnograficheskii ocherk)*, Tashkent 1964, pp.135–7.
 - 11 Logofet 1911 (II), pp. 267–80.
 - 12 *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda II*, pp. 172–8, 187–91; Iusupov 1964, pp. 40–42; 1986, p. 24; Madzhlisov 1959, pp. 20–2.
 - 13 Terentiev, *Russia and England I*, pp. 176–7. 188–9. Quoted in Becker 1968, pp. 67–8.
 - 14 At that time the *divanbegi* seems to have been the most important official in the khanate by virtue of having taken over the duties of the former *qushbegi* (Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, p. 21).
 - 15 Becker 1968, pp. 72–4; *Istoriia Uzb. SSR II*, p. 108.
 - 16 This treaty was published in *PV*, 30 November–12 December 1873. We have used Becker's translation (Becker 1968, pp. 316–18). See also F. Burnaby, *Travels and Adventures in Central Asia: A Ride to Khiva*, New Dehli 1996 (1876), appendix D, pp. 397–401.
 - 17 Some of these demands had already been submitted to Khan Sayyid Muhammad (1856–64) during the Ignat'ev mission in 1858, but no treaty was signed, as the khan did not agree to unrestrained Russian navigation on the Amu-Darya. Cf. Ignat'ev 1984, pp. 79–91.)
 - 18 Burnaby 1996, pp. 415–19; Becker 1968, pp. 74–6.
 - 19 *Istoriia Turk. SSR I*, p. 194.
 - 20 *Istoriia Uzb. SSR II*, pp. 115–17.
 - 21 Becker 1968, pp. 83–4.
 - 22 Pogorel'skii 1968, p. 39.

TSARIST PROTECTORATES

- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 76–7.
- 24 Becker 1968, pp. 227–30; Pogorel'skiĭ 1968, p. 75.
- 25 Becker 1968, pp. 230–2.
- 26 Becker 1968, pp. 234–6.
- 27 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 71–4.
- 28 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 30–2; Lobachevskiĭ 1912, pp. 51–5.
- 29 Lobachevskiĭ 1912, p. 47.
- 30 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 58–61.
- 31 Lobachevskiĭ 1912, p. 59.
- 32 Cf. Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 86, 99–100; Lobachevskiĭ 1912, pp. 37–8, 45.
- 33 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, p. 25.
- 34 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 74–5; Lobachevskiĭ 1912, pp. 49–50.
- 35 D. V. Yaroshevski, 'The Mennonite Community in the Khanate of Khiva'. *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 16, 1982, pp. 403–6.
- 36 Girshfel'd and Galkin 1903, pp. 6, 82–3, 92–3.

PROSPECTS

Normative order in pre-Soviet Central Asia

In our study of communal and political change in pre-Soviet Central Asia, we have presented some evidence to conclude that both acephalous and cephalous tribalism formed relatively enduring normative political orders due to the tribesmen's commitment to customary law and shared political heritage. Both temporary and permanent political leaders were obliged to respect the narrated traditions of decent political action and conformed their agencies to these, if they did not want to risk the defection of tribal followers. Turkman *serdars* had to respect *däp*, which forbade the enduring appropriation of political power, as Kazakhs usually adhered only to Chingizid khans who respected the rights of their tribal leaders. Kyrgyz and Kara-Kalpaks did not acknowledge any khans at all. *Ming*, *Qunghiro*t and *Manghit* tribal leaders, however, disrespected former Uzbek political traditions by usurping supreme political power. This usurpation changed the very nature of khanship, which lost its sacrosanctity in the river oases.

Central Asian patrimonial states established normative order to some extent, if they were able to base the state on Islamic law. *Manghit* rulers best understood this necessity. They soon tried to replace tribal law with *sharia* and claimed the title '*amir al-mu'minin*', which was the traditional title of the political and religious leader of the Muslim *umma*. *Ming* rulers like Umar Khan and Khudayar Khan also experienced this political necessity and respected *sharia* within their courts. Hence the Islamisation of authority relations enabled the change from tribal following to patrimonially organised subservience, and promoted a new type of political order based on patrimonial authority relations. This process of change was linked to the acculturation of tribesmen to the settled oases culture based on Islamic law. As tribesmen formally had adhered to Islam without respecting *sharia*, this process of acculturation ensured their personal identity and reshaped their collective one.

It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that patrimonial state structures were established in all parts of Central Asia, by the introduction of the tsarist civil-military administration headed by governors-general, and *oblast'* and *uezd* commanders. From this time on,

tribesmen were no longer able to secure their own political integration and they started to rely on good relations with tsarist officials. Indigenous patrimonial state structures survived only within the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva, which were obliged to cede various territories to Russia and faced limited freedom of action as tsarist protectorates. This political alliance, however, evoked an additional legitimacy problem. Having faced the choice between a tribal or an Islamic bias to their rule, which either secured the support of tribal followers or that of *Sart* subjects, the Bukharan emir increasingly based his authority on Islamic political heritage and relied on the support of the *Sart* population. His alliance with the 'infidel' tsar might have increased his military power to overcome the resistance of reluctant provinces and extend his influence to Eastern Bukhara, but it discredited him as an Islamic ruler and destroyed the sacrosanctity of his rule. In Khiva, political alliance with the tsar undermined the fragile political integration of tribal and *Sart* populations and caused a declining obedience among both groups. Thus patrimonial state structures in tsarist Central Asia were based on domination rather than authority, due to the lack of shared legal and political community structures. For these and other reasons, normative political order became more fragile during the period of tsarist rule in Central Asia.

Some remarks on normative political order in Soviet and independent Central Asia

This study was originally designed to analyse communal commitment structures and political order in Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia, and aimed at giving only a preliminary introduction to the pre-revolutionary situation. Pre-Soviet Central Asian societies, however, turned out to be too complex to deal with in a single chapter, so that the focus of our study changed. Nevertheless, some implications from the approach applied to Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia can be drawn, and we can demonstrate the relevance of this approach for an understanding of contemporary Central Asian politics. With regard to contemporary Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, I have already attempted to sketch some of these implications and formulated a few hypotheses.¹ In what follows, I want to make some more general remarks.

Patrimonialism in Soviet and independent Central Asia

After the military victory of the Red Army in Central Asia, the Soviets faced the problem of establishing an enduring political order which would also be supported by the local population. For this purpose they initiated a nationality policy which was 'national' in form, but 'socialist' in content. In this way they included culturally similar population groups in newly created

administrative units, created literary languages for each of these units, promoted them by introducing compulsory education on the basis of these languages, and established cultural institutions for the discovery and protection of the various nationalities' 'cultural traditions'. The Soviets tried to spread a socialist interpretation of these 'traditions', and used 'nationality' as an administrative principle in order to achieve socialist societal and economic goals.²

On establishing the Central Asian Soviet republics, state structures also were re-established in the region. Although Europeans dominated the upper echelons of the state apparatus, natives who decided to become political allies of the Soviet power could hold high positions in the Soviet government, whereas local committees like the soviets of elders (*sovet aksakalov*) in mahallahs and tribal villages were run by traditional elites. Even Alash Ordists, who initially opposed the Bolsheviks and tried to form an independent Kazakh government, joined the Kazakh Communist Party. Thus in the NEP period Central Asian elites regained political influence on a regional level.

The highest degree of external control of the state apparatus was achieved by Stalin's purges of the 1930s, when Stalin ordered the liquidation of most local elites, including influential native communists. Prominent victims of these purges included the Chairman of the Turkman Supreme Soviet, Nederbay Aitakov; the Kazakh historian and communist Turar Ryskulov; the Uzbek Prime Minister, Fayzulla Khodzhayev; and the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Akmal Ikramov.³

In the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era, the *nomenclatura* system became firmly rooted. First secretaries outwardly showed loyalty to the General Secretary and formally complied with instructions from Moscow. In their own republics, however, they were able to increase their political influence by forming patronage networks which ensured the loyalty of regional and local leaders of economic and administrative elites. As *oblast'* and republican appointments were decided in Moscow, any change of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was usually linked with nominations of new first secretaries in the republics, who then built up new patronage networks by forming political alliances and changing administrative cadres.⁴ High-level positions, however, were appointed by Moscow. If local leaders, like Turkmenistan's First Secretary Sukhan Babaev (1951–8) should disrespect any of these tacit rules, they were quickly removed. On the other hand, first secretaries who became members of the Soviet Union's Central Committee or Politburo could lobby for more state economic investment in their republics. In this way D. A. Kunayev successfully exploited his close relations with Brezhnev to mobilise considerable economic means for Kazakhstan, as did Sharaf Rashidov and Turdiakun Usubaliyev in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively.

With regard to the prevailing form of political community, there seems to have been little variation in comparison to pre-Soviet patrimonialism in

Central Asia. As political order was based on relations of subservience and of political loyalty between the beg and the supreme ruler (khan or emir) or between the military commander and the tsar, so did these kinds of relations exist in the Soviet Union between first secretaries of the *rayon* and *oblast'* party committees, between first secretaries of *oblast'* committees and those of the republics' central committees. They all, however, expressed their political loyalty to the General Secretary, to whom they owed their political status and who very carefully selected his cadres. This was a particularly sensitive issue with regard to the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo, who had the power to sack their General Secretary, as they did Khrushchev in 1964. Whereas first secretaries could be criticised from above, criticism of their administration by subordinates, however, was taboo. It was only Mikhael S. Gorbachev who tried to abolish this 'cult of idolising the Politburo and General Secretary', and who described in his autobiography how Soviet patrimonialism worked.⁵ His demonstrative disrespect for 'the rules' of government became clearly visible during the twenty-seventh congress of the CPSU, when Gorbachev interrupted the session and demanded that delegates refrain from base flatteries and mindless subservience.⁶

With regard to these 'rules of power', *perestroika* initiated a full and direct assault on patrimonialism. From this perspective, Gorbachev did everything that experienced patrimonial rulers would not have done under any circumstances: he encouraged free mass media and invited criticism from below of formerly sacrosanct political leaders; he promoted the establishment of independent associations and made it easier for political opponents to get publicity on television and in the press. By so doing he systematically eroded the power base of the Communist Party and undermined central state structures. Neither did the introduction of a presidential system nor the upgrading of the Supreme Soviet create any new power base. The elimination of paragraph 6 of the Brezhnev constitution which confirmed the leading role of the Communist Party, the liquidation of the CPSU and the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, were the last milestones of Gorbachev's persistent disrespect for the rules of patrimonial politics.

From the Western perspective, Gorbachev promoted 'civil society', initiated the democratisation process and overcame the threat of 'totalitarianism'. From the Central Asian perspective, however, Gorbachev appeared as a weak leader who eroded state structures. It is no wonder that some Central Asian leaders sympathised with the 'August insurgents' in their attempt to restore the 'authority' of the Communist Party.

Perestroika, however, had little impact on the patrimonial basis of politics and authority relations in Central Asia. All ruling Central Asian presidents, with the exception of Tajik president Rahkmonov, were originally appointed by Gorbachev, who hoped to renew the state apparatus of the republics.

PROSPECTS

They used this mandate, however, to strengthen their positions as 'supreme rulers', and were less open than Gorbachev and other Soviet politicians to the 'Western temptation' of democratisation, which generated the decline of Soviet state structures to a considerable extent.

As Niyazov had never granted political freedom to opposition groups in Turkmenistan, he had fewer problems in securing the unity of the state in 1992, after Moscow's control of economic resources, *oblast'* committees and the republican apparatus declined and the newly independent republics had to cope with regional antagonisms on their own. Uzbekistan's President Karimov, who had initially tolerated independent movements like *Erk* (Freedom) and *Birlik* (Unity), outlawed these in 1992 after the outbreak of the Tajik civil war, which also threatened the political stability of Uzbekistan. After this he continued to strengthen his position and that of central state structures in the regions, which had become quite strong after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Even in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where political leaders wanted to present a more 'democratic image' to the West, and where the authorities recognised various political parties, these parties and the emerging parliamentarism remained marginalised. The declared press and media freedom continued to be limited. Instead, presidential administrations took over the infrastructures of the former communist parties. As in former times *rayon* and *oblast'* secretaries were appointed by the first secretaries and by Moscow, and presidents are now in a position to appoint governors and hakims to rule over districts and provinces.

Although the political elites of the independent republics maintained and transformed Soviet state structures by different means, there is some evidence that national independence had little impact on the prevailing form of political community in Central Asia. If this hypothesis is correct, we have to describe some of its implications for contemporary politics and their evaluation.

Implications for contemporary politics

Personalised authority relations

It is often not fully understood what is implied if a political order is not based on the rule of law. In Western democracies competition between various political parties is possible, because both citizens and politicians respect the rules of the constitution or common law which regulates political competition. Political power is linked to the attainment of majorities in constitutional assemblies, which decide on new laws executed by the government and its administrative staff and interpreted in the last resort by independent courts. Due to the rule of law, authority relations are de-personalised and stable

despite changes of political elites. The monopoly on physical coercion and taxation are secured by citizens' and officials' commitment to the law.

Political orders which form state structures but which are not based on 'legal authority', as Max Weber calls it,⁷ operate on a quite different basis. This form of political community relies on relations of piety and loyalty between ruler and ruled. The loyalty of administrative staff to the rulers is the constitutive principle of such a political order, which by this means tries to strengthen or secure its monopoly on taxation and the use of physical force.

As patrimonial politics depends on loyalty to the ruling head of state, democratic elections have destabilising effects on the polity. Whenever the supreme political position is vacant, various groups and regional leaders compete for political influence. The successful politician will re-arrange the balance of power by forming political alliances and granting influential administrative positions to other influential leaders. He will also try to deprive potential rivals of their influence, as occurred in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other Central Asian republics.⁸

If several strong eligible candidates are to be elected, people rather vote according to the candidate's regional origin than for his programme, as they believe that their candidate will promote their region's interest. The Tajik presidential election of November 1991 – the most free election in Central Asia since independence – is a clear demonstration of these regional political orientations and their destabilising effects. Whereas the ruling president Rahmon Nabyev obtained 57 per cent of the vote, mainly from residents of the ruling Khojand and Kuliab regions, the well known Tajik film director Khudanazarov was basically supported by people from deprived areas like the Garm Valley, Kurgan Tube and Badakhshan. In the latter province he – being a fellow-Ismaili – won almost all the votes. This was also the initial constellation of the opposed parties in the civil war.⁹

Ruling presidents are more often voted in for being guarantors of peace and stability in their republics. Incumbent presidents are also better able to mobilise their electorate with the help of their patronage networks during presidential campaigns and via their privileged access to mass media.¹⁰ Taking the low degree of political institutionalisation into account, it is not surprising that Central Asian presidents have tried to minimise the political risks of elections in several ways.

To begin with, they have used the instrument of the referendum to extend their term of office. In this way Niyazov's term was prolonged for six years in January 1994 by a 99.99 per cent vote. Uzbek president Karimov was confirmed in office for another five years in March 1995 by an official 99.6 per cent vote. In January 2002 Karimov's term was extended to seven years by another referendum. The Kazakh president won a 95.4 per cent vote in April 1995, which extended his term of office until 2000. This step was motivated by the fact that the constitutions of the states concerned limited presidency to

two five-year terms. In Kyrgyzstan, where no referendum was held, this problem became acute in 2000, when Akayev ran for a third term. However, well informed Kyrgyz experts in constitutional law discovered that Akayev's first term, from October 1991 to December 1995, should not be counted, as the election had taken place before the Kyrgyz constitution was drafted and enforced. After the re-election of Kazakh president Nazarbayev in 1999, a law was passed which would allow Nazarbaev certain political prerogatives and a seat in the National Council even after his political resignation. Up to now only Turkman president Niyazov has formally demonstrated his commitment to patrimonialism by becoming the first Central Asian president to be installed for an unlimited period from December 1999.

Second, incumbent presidents have influenced elections by manipulating the registration process of presidential candidates and parties. Central Asian elections in 1999 and 2000 delivered abundant empirical evidence on how so-called 'opposition candidates' were prevented from registering as candidates. From the perspective of patrimonial politics, undemocratic procedures are supported to prevent the emergence of any political group which may be inclined to make criticisms of both the government and the president. Authorities perceive this kind of criticism as an offence against the presidency and as disrespect for the constitutional order, and normally attempt to imprison or fine politicians and journalists who spread such views in public.

Third, they have not granted any significant powers to the parliament, else they have reduced existing powers in favour of strengthening the president's position, as has been the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Some Kazakh political analysts have argued that Nazarbaev dissolved the parliament in March 1995, ruled by decree, extended his term of office by referendum and enacted a new constitution for a strong presidential regime in December, in order to eliminate reluctant 'Middle and Small Horde opposition' to his rule as representative of the Great Horde.¹¹

Similarly, in October 1994 and February 1996 Kyrgyz president Akayev marginalised the parliament by organising referenda on amendments to the constitution. These amendments effectively abolished Kyrgyz parliamentarism and granted the president powers to appoint the chairman of the National Bank and of the Central Election Commission, and to appoint and dismiss ministers without consulting parliament. A presidential system comparable to those of other Central Asian states was introduced. Thus patrimonialism still operates in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, although the state apparatus is less able to penetrate all corners of society, as seems to be the case in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

'Ethnisation' of the republics

It is an established fact that patrimonial political order is based on an efficient state apparatus which secures the political integration of the

population and which is able to secure its external security. It is also obvious that Central Asian governments will risk revolts if they are not able to solve some of the most urgent economic and ecological problems of their republics. Improved economic performance alone does not solve the problem of order, however. The carrot-and-stick approach may enable opportunistic or factual political order, but is less efficient where the normative commitments of people are involved. When Nazarbaev states that 'efficient decisions sometimes may not be taken, because they offend traditional and deeply rooted national ideals', he refers to the influence of such commitments.¹² Despite the transfer of considerable financial subsidies to Central Asian republics during the Soviet era, contemporary assessments of the Soviet period in terms of 'totalitarianism' are rooted in the humiliation inflicted by harsh Soviet cultural policies which, for example, punished participants of traditional funerals who were simply paying their last respects to their loved ones. Normative commitments are most consistent when they also regulate the allocation of resources.

Facing the decline of the Soviet Union, most of Central Asian political elites realised that they had to find a new base for the political order of their republics. The dissolution of the Union was attended by the decline of Soviet patriotism, and of communism as totalistic worldview. Thus Central Asian leaders took over the cultural concerns of nationalistic groups like *Zheltoqsan* ('December') or the *Azat* ('free') movement in Kazakhstan, *Agzy-Birlik* ('concord') in Turkmenistan, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, and *Birlik* (unity) in Uzbekistan at the end of the 1980s, and already promoted the 'ethnisation' of their republics before their formal declarations of independence. The 'ethnisation' of state and society in post-Soviet Central Asia was not purely an invention of former communist elites to find a new political ideology for their rule, but occurred in response to increasing public concern for a more appropriate official acknowledgement of the titular nations' cultural and historical heritage. What could have happened without this responsiveness, was well demonstrated in Tajikistan, where political elites tried to retain communism as the normative base of government even after the failed August coup.¹³

Enduring political order and political community

Taking for granted that any new enduring political order emerges from the interpenetration of communal and political action orientations, such an order must also be rooted in communal commitment structures. Thus enduring political stability within the republics will also depend on the ability of the political elites to relate communal commitment to the political culture of these states.

The policy of 'ethnisation' aims at integrating communal commitment and regional political orientation into a newly interpreted political community of

Kazakhs, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tajiks or Kyrgyz, and at strengthening this community. This community is held to be the main social substrate of the independent states.

In Soviet times, nationality was only an administrative principle which was supposed to help to root socialist culture and politics in Central Asia. Collective identity linked to nationality did not matter, as Soviet power obviated its politicisation and limited the range of possible public representations and interpretations of this identity. National independence, however, urged local elites to find a new binding interpretation of collective identity which would be able to strengthen political community structures and lay a foundation of normative political order. Facing the prevalence of the national principle in international politics, and increasing public concern about the official acknowledgement of the titular nations' cultural and historical heritage, 'nationality' became the privileged nucleus of political discourse. The establishment of political community based on 'ethnic identity', however, faces serious problems in all Central Asian republics.

The Tajik civil war has already indicated how opposed forms of communal commitment and competing interpretations of collective identity might render it difficult to find a common ground for politics. Despite the Soviet atheist cultural policy, many Tajiks and Badakhshanis kept or rediscovered their Islamic roots, which were historically linked to the commitment to Islamic law. As these people do not have a tribal background, it is much more difficult for them to interpret their national heritage in anything other than an Islamic way.

Having formed only a province ruled by an Uzbek dynasty in pre-Soviet times, and being administratively separated from former cultural centres like Bukhara and Samarkand during the Soviet period, the Soviet Tajik identity remained weak. In addition, in some areas like Khojand and Kuliab the population and their political elites were much more committed to the Soviet order, which secured their privileged access to administrative structures and economic resources. In Tajikistan it was well demonstrated what could happen, if the governing elites ignored the normative implications of their rule and tried to retain communism as the normative base of authority, even after the failed August coup. The peace accord of June 1997, signed in Moscow by Tajik president I. Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) Said Abdullo Nuri, led only to a truce between groups adhering to opposed Islamic and secularist concepts of Tajik nationhood. Although the National Reconciliation Commission gradually promoted the integration of 'opposition' groups in the regular army and in central state structures, central control of 'oppositional' provinces remained weak. Thus the Tajik government was not able to prevent the military operations of Islamists from Tajik territory during the hostage crises in August and September 1999 in southern Kyrgyzstan. The lifting of the ban on religious parties by a nationwide referendum in September legalised once more

the Islamic Renaissance party. The parliamentary elections in February 2000 weakened the Islamic faction in Tadjikistan, however. Up to now President Rakhmonov has successfully resisted the political influence of the UTO and secured his renewed presidential election by a 94 per cent vote, denying eligible opposition figures the opportunity to register as presidential candidates. Tajikistan's participation in the 'International Coalition against Terrorism' and his support of the US-led Afghanistan war after the events of 11 September 2001, strengthened Rakhmonov's political position in support of a secular state. But the problem of enduring political order and of collective identity has yet to be solved.

In Uzbekistan the problem of political order is no less severe. In the pre-Soviet era a great part of the former *Sart* population of Uzbekistan was committed to sharia. This commitment did not fully die. Islamic cultural traditions continued to be covertly transmitted during the Soviet period. Mullahs had an important position in Soviet Uzbek society by performing religious ceremonies during family feasts, as was the case among other Central Asian nationalities. Thus many Uzbeks rediscovered this part of their historical heritage under the guidance of mullahs and became committed to sharia. When President Karimov increasingly began to oppose 'Islamic Fundamentalism' or 'Wah'habism' after the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan, he did not play the 'Islamic card' merely to secure his political position, but was reacting to a genuine threat to the secularisation of the young republic.¹⁴ In what followed there seems to have developed a reciprocity of repressive measures and the resistance of Islamists to such measures, which led to the bomb outrage against the president in Tashkent in February 1999, and the incursion of armed members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into southern Kyrgyzstan in the summers of 1999 and 2000. These armed Islamists wanted to pass through Kyrgyzstani territory to reach Uzbekistan in order to fight against the Uzbek government and to establish a caliphate there. After the assassination attempt of February 1999, Karimov tightened up controls over Islam, arrested putative Islamists and ordered the closure of many mosques.

On the other hand, President Karimov supported various attempts to find a new normative base for the young independent republic. In the case of Uzbekistan, it is not an easy task to produce an interpretation of national history and identity without excluding many sections of the former multi-ethnic population which gained the status of Uzbek nationality during Soviet rule. This problem is not only linked to opposed *Sart* and tribal ways of life among the pre-Soviet population, but also arises from the conflicting political heritage of three inimical patrimonial states and of opposed tribal groups.

The invention of Timur (1409–47) as the founder and father of modern Uzbekistan, which often amuses Western scholars, is not devoid of political calculation, however. But it was not Ozbek (1313–41), the khan of the Golden Horde who converted to Islam and from whom modern Uzbeks

take their name, nor Shaybani-Khan (1500–10), who occupied with the ‘Uzbek tribal confederacy’ the river oases of Transoxiana in 1500 and founded the Shaybanid dynasty in the river oases, but Timur and the Timurids who became the new national heroes of Uzbekistan. Born in Kesh near Samarkand, holding the title of an amir and sultan and having constructed Samarkand as his capital, Timur’s historical heritage should be appealing to Uzbeks of both tribal and *Sart* backgrounds. In this way Uzbeks could claim to have always been settled farmers and urban dwellers. On the other hand, Timur was a Turk and a leader of the *Barlos* tribal confederacy who never had claimed khanship but initially acknowledged khans as supreme rulers. This aspect of his biography shows affinity to the Shaybanid and *Qipchoq* Uzbeks who also had acknowledged Chingizid claims of political supremacy. Nevertheless, this extensive promotion of Timur as a strong national hero did not show the expected results and did not convince many Islamists. In contrast, many Uzbeks regarded this campaign rather as means to strengthen the position of people from Samarkand, where the president was born.

In the meantime the Uzbek government has launched a second campaign, which uses Jadid texts as authoritative sources for its secular government and which refers to less orthodox Sufi traditions for the re-interpretation of the Islamic heritage. Due to the parallel existence of Uzbek tribal tradition, Uzbeks have different traditions to Tajiks, to which this reshaping of historical heritage might appeal. Thus a majority of Uzbeks have appeared to retain their ignorance of Islamic customs by rooting their national heritage rather in their respect of their ancestors’ customs which they identify with *adat*.

Unlike Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan does not include large segments of population which shared Islamic communal commitment in former times. Although some of their putative ancestors were already Islamised under Seljuk rule, Turkman tribesmen did not embrace Islamic law, but remained committed to tribal customary law up to the tsarist conquest. The establishing of enduring political order faces different challenges in Turkmenistan, however.

In contrast to the Kazakh hordes, Turkman tribal confederacies were never politically unified and maintained mutual inimical relations before the tsarist conquest. In addition, independent tribal confederacies like those of the Akhal *Teke* and the Gurgan *Iomut* formed acephalous tribal political orders based on political equality. Thus tribesmen did not acknowledge enduring political authority relations.¹⁵

When President Niyazov strengthened his position as supreme political leader with the power to appoint all regional and district heads after independence, he appropriated a position which is new in Turkman history in two ways. He now not only headed a ‘people’ whose members had formerly regarded themselves as a ‘people without a head’,¹⁶ but also became able, as Akhal *Teke*, to command Turkmen from other regions and of different

descent. He does not seem to want to promote a new form of *Teke* tribalism or hegemony over other regions, but is attempting to strengthen Turkman patriotism. In this way he is omnipresent in the republic's public arena as 'Turkmenbashi', i.e. head of the Turkmen. Having lost his actual family in the Ashkhabad earthquake of 1948, this loss of relatives should give his claim to be 'Father of the Nation' some plausibility. Nevertheless, although the Turkmenbashi cult may be an effective way of increasing Niyazov's popularity, it is unlikely to promote any enduring political order, since such a cult can hardly be expected to survive the current president.

The recent political developments, the systematic neglect of education and health services, the impoverishment of the population, an inability to transform the economic sector, the current language policy which neglects both Russian and English as languages of higher education and of the scientific community, and the arbitrary use of power and of public funding, has weakened the political order and caused top Turkman officials like Boris Shikhmuradov to quit their jobs and to oppose the regime.

Concurrent with decline of the Soviet Union, the problem of political order has also emerged in Kazakhstan. Since republican leaders are no longer imposed from the outside, political leadership has to be authorised in a new way. In independent Kazakhstan this problem of political order has a number of different dimensions.

First, there is the question about who is authorised to become supreme ruler. Up to the introduction of the *prikaz* and sultan administration at the beginning of the nineteenth century, supreme political leadership was the privilege of Chingizids only. Their influence depended on the tribesmen's following and on their ability to protect the pastures and migration routes of the hordes. As the assumption of power is now not decided by legitimate elections, some officials around President Nazarbayev have tried to prove the Chingizid descent of their president. The president denies such claims, however. Nevertheless, such rumours seemed to have become an element of Nazarbaev's public image.¹⁷

Second, the new community of Kazakhs is challenged by enduring and strong affiliations to particular hordes and territories. Descent affiliation remains an important means of shaping social and political relations. As the hordes were independent political alliances up to the tsarist conquest, *zhüz* affiliation remains an important criterion for evaluating politics. Generally speaking, the Great Horde is regarded as the politically influential descent group whose most prominent members are the former First Secretary D. Kunayev and the ruling president N. Nazarbayev. The Middle Horde is often held to be the 'homeland' of Kazakh intellectuals, whose most prominent representatives are O. Suleymenov and M. Auyezov. The descent group of the Small Horde was less influential during Soviet times. As abundant oil resources exist in western Kazakhstan, *Kishi Zhüz* connections are said to have become more important in recent years.¹⁸ These examples indicate that

hordes are still important reference points for assessing politicians. It is not by chance that Nazarbaev seems to give careful consideration to the ethnic origins of his prime ministers: his first prime minister, S. Tereshchenko (1991–4) was from the republic's Slavonic population, and his successor, A. Kazhegel'din (1994–7) was from the Middle Horde. N. Balghymbayev (1997–9) was from the Small Horde. Prime minister K. Tokaev (1999–2002) could trace his descent to the Great Horde. Current prime minister Imanjali Tasmagambetov was born in Atyrau, which is a former Small Horde territory. Such high-placed appointments from all ethno-territorial groups aim at demonstrating that the Kazakhstani government is the government of all Kazakh and non-Kazakh people. In this way *zhüz* commitment is related to the nation-state of Kazakhstan.

The demonstrative appointment of Europeans in high administrative positions refers to a third problem of political integration which all Central Asian republics are facing and which is most severe in Kazakhstan: a nationalism which tends to promote a political community of members of the titular nationality at the expense of the political integration of ethnic minorities. In Kazakhstan only a half of the entire population is Kazakh.¹⁹ President Nazarbayev early on recognised this problem and emphasised the importance of a 'Kazakhstani patriotism', although he promoted the Kazakhisation of the republic at the same time. In numerous official statements he has argued for a collective identity of Kazakhstani citizens who are proud of the history and future prospects of their country, of the hymn and flag of the state, and who respect the laws and constitution of Kazakhstan.²⁰ The promotion of constitutional patriotism, however, is a very limited and abstract approach in a political culture which is not rooted in the rule of law. Thus it is hardly possible to advance commitment to the principles and legal norms of a constitution which is basically used as vehicle or rough framework for political struggle.

In Kyrgyzstan the 'ethnisation' of the republic faces similar problems: as Kyrgyz only represent around 60 per cent of the republic's population, open nationalism is an improper means to secure the political integration of all populations. Thus Kyrgyz president A. Akayev has often presented himself as the president of all citizens of Kyrgyzstan, one who cares for the interests of national minorities. Nevertheless, this concern did not prevent him from patronising the revival of the Kyrgyz national heritage. In this way the government supported numerous articles and books about the Kyrgyz epic of Manas, and promoted Manas as national hero of Kyrgyzstan, whose millenary was celebrated on various occasions in 1995.

Beside the problem of regionalism, there exists a serious rift between northern and southern Kyrgyzstan, one which is endangering the political integrity of the young republic. In pre-Soviet times these two areas were separated, and nomadising tribes maintained different political orientations. Whereas the northern Kyrgyz had much more contact with neighbouring

Kazakhs from the southern edges of the steppe, the Kyrgyz of southern Kyrgyzstan were influenced by the Khanate of Khokand, which promoted the Islamisation of the southern Kyrgyz. Both groups were autonomous and had almost no communication with each other. Neither was this rift overcome during the Soviet period.

Despite the more Islamised southern Kyrgyzstan, this republic has hardly any tradition of Islamic residential communal commitment. Kyrgyz are still more organised through kinship relations than Uzbeks, for example, and do not live in mahallahs. Thus Islam is unlikely to become 'Islamic', i.e. oriented towards sharia.

Our short sketch of the problems of political order in the various republics shows that enduring political order is not easily to be achieved in Central Asia, due to such a complex historical heritage.

Strong state structures and the establishment of legal culture

A functioning political order will be difficult to establish in these states if there is little legal consciousness, or if there are competing legal traditions regarding what is just and what is not. In pre-tsarist Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, legal conceptions were based on tribal customary law, which regulated social relations between tribesmen. These legal traditions were influential and continued to exist in a limited and modified way within tsarist local administration. At that time, numerous compilations of customary law were collected and published to spread knowledge about it among tsarist officials. Soviet politics deliberately abandoned these legal traditions, combated them and tried to replace them by socialist law, outlooks and practices.²¹ Although this struggle seems not to have been fully successful at local level, it deprived politics from its embedment in a legal culture shared by great parts of the population.

An evolutionary development of customary law towards the legal integration of authority relations and the constraint of state authority, such as took place in Anglo-American countries, is not possible in Central Asia: customary law no longer has any political significance. In addition, its pre-tsarist state of development does not allow any basis for conflict regulation within contemporary Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkman societies. Any evolutionary development of pre-revolutionary Islamic law is no less problematic for reasons mentioned above.²²

In contrast, during the Soviet period patrimonial authority relations emerged or were re-established. They secured the political integration of regions in the republics and guaranteed the maintenance of the social infrastructure and the allocation of resources without being embedded in a legal culture shared by the people. In contemporary Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, these state/society relations are still intact. The state did not lose control over strategic economic sectors, like the energy sector, and could

use its revenues to implement central policies. In this way Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have retained strong, hegemonic state structures, unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have opened their economies to international investment and privatised strategic parts of their economy. This has led to increasing competition between regional leaders and central government, and has decreased the state's ability to provide the population with basic social infrastructure.²³

Whereas the privatisation of state assets and ineffective investment of foreign loans weakened state structures and left behind a vulnerable economy unable to support a sustainable state budget which kept the masses in poverty in Kyrgyzstan. The state's withdrawal from economic and social responsibilities in Kazakhstan, backed by some financial and legal reforms, increased the protection of property and the rule of law in economic matters. This helped to recover the economy and increased income for private services. Thus only state structures are able to spread a legal culture in areas which have been deprived of their legal traditions. This culture is an important precondition for the attainment of some kind of political freedom.

On the other hand, the maintenance of strong state structures does not automatically guarantee the successful establishment of enduring political order, but often only produces worse human rights records and makes infringements on the private sphere. On considering the perseverance of patrimonial communal commitment structures, however, we have good reasons to assume that client/patron relations will remain a constitutive element of Central Asian politics, even if some kind of legal culture does emerge.²⁴

Asian community structures and the limits of political reform

The central hypothesis of our study has been that enduring, i.e. normative, political order emerges from the successful interpenetration of communal and political action orientations in Central Asia. If the interpenetration of these action orientations is not, or is only partly, successful, political regimes, in the long term, will face a legitimacy problem, i.e. one of diminishing political obedience. If this hypothesis is as relevant for Soviet and independent Central Asia as for the pre-Soviet times, our theoretical approach enables a plausible explanation of why parliamentary democracy faces serious problems in Central Asia.

If communal commitment structures are crucial for the establishing of enduring political order, the extent of future Asian communal commitment structures will set the limits for democratic reforms. To indicate the relevance of this hypothesis we have sketched some evidence for the supposition that patrimonialism as a form of political community has remained influential in independent Central Asia. In contrast to many political analysts, we do not think that the problem of political order is one of how democracy in terms of Western constitutionalism can be realised – a view often refuted by

Central Asian politicians, who insist that they have to follow their own path to democracy. For instead of promoting a democratic political culture, this approach will rather weaken or even destroy the integrity of state apparatuses and lead to the regionalisation of the republics.

Thus Western support of opposition movements does not and cannot promote a democratic opposition which is rooted in all parts of the republics. Instead, Western support rather helps some regional leaders to strengthen their position, or mistakenly attributes political influence to some activists which they do not in fact possess in their countries.²⁵ If they succeed in becoming president, however, even the most Europeanised politicians will soon realise that they need a loyal administrative apparatus and the support of regional leaders, if they want to rule an entire country and not just its capital. Moreover, there is little evidence to assume that 'opposition leaders', once elected, will grant more political freedom to their opponents than they themselves were previously allowed.²⁶

Notes

- 1 P. G. Geiß, 'The Problem of Political Order in Contemporary Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan', in Moshe Gammer (ed.) *The Caspian Region, Volume 1*, London 2002; 'Voraussetzungen und Grenzen politischer Reformen in Turkmenistan. Ein sozialwissenschaftlicher Erklärungsversuch zur Politik in Zentralasien', *Osteuropa*, 2000/2, pp. 176–88.
- 2 Cf. Geiß 1995, pp. 79–123.
- 3 Olcott 1987, pp. 199–223; A. Bohr, 'Turkmenistan and the Turkmen', in G. Smith (ed.) *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, 2nd edn, London and New York 1996, pp. 348–66, 350; Wheeler 1964, pp. 137–47.
- 4 Olcott 1987, pp. 241–6; Sh. Kadyrov, *Turkmenistan: chetyre goda bez SSSR*, Moscow 1996, 62–78; J. Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan. A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford 1991, pp. 18–35.
- 5 M. Gorbachev, *Erinnerungen*, Berlin 1996, pp. 308–10, 313–18, 467–72.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 285–6. According to Gorbachev's memoirs, the deputies were first dumbfounded at this, and then started to laugh. Finally there was a burst of frenetic applause, which Gorbachev interpreted as the deputies' awakening to the beginning of *perestroika*. The perplexity of his audience, however, is much more linked to the fact that somebody had dared to challenge the 'rules' and that it was the General Secretary himself.
- 7 Cf. Introduction.
- 8 The most prominent initial opponent of Niyazov was former Turkman foreign minister Abdy Kuliev, who openly declared his candidacy for the office of president. As a result he emigrated to Moscow, where he had to refrain from oppositional activities (cf. K. P. Dydarev, 'Turkmeniia. Postkommunisticheskii avtoritarnyi rezhim', in Rossiiskaia AN, Tsentri tsivilizatsionnykh i regional'nykh issledovaniĭ [ed.] *Postsovetskaia Tsentralnaia Aziia -- poteri i obreteniia*, Moscow 1998, pp. 170–1; Kadyrov 1996, pp. 86–9). According to Masanov, Nazarbaev did not forgive competition for power and criticism from other influential Kazakh leaders, when he was appointed First Secretary by Gorbachev in 1989. Thus he sacked Z. Kamalidnov, who was a strong Kazakh leader from western Kazakhstan, and other leaders from central Kazakhstan, such as Sh. Dzhanibekov, E. Auel'bekov and K. Salykov (N. Masanov, 'Kazakhskaiia

PROSPECTS

- politicheskaja i intellektual'naja élita: klanovaja prinadlezhnost' i vnutriétnicheskoe sopernichestvo', *VE*, vol. 2, 1996/1, pp. 53–4).
- 9 D. Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad. The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London 1995, p. 203.
 - 10 Cf. Institute for Development of Kazakhstan, *Kazakh tribalism today, its characteristics and possible solutions (analytical report)*, Almaty 1996, p. 14.
 - 11 For example Masanov 1996, pp. 56–7.
 - 12 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 November 1997, p. B2.
 - 13 Cf. Sh. Akbarzadeh, 'Why did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, 1996/7, pp. 1105–29.
 - 14 P. G. Geiss, 'Political Community and Islam in Central Asia', in A. Strasser, S. Haas, G. Mangott and V. Heuberger, *Zentralasien und Islam/Central Asia and Islam (Mitteilungen, Deutsches Orientinstitut, Band 63)*, Hamburg 2002, pp. 173–89.
 - 15 Cf. Chapter 3, first section.
 - 16 Vámbéry 1865, p. 249.
 - 17 N. Nazarbaev, *Without Right and Left*, London 1992, p. 2.
 - 18 Cf. Masanov 1996, pp. 46–61; M.-C. von Gumpenberg, 'Elitenwandel in Osteuropa', *Osteuropa*, 1999/3, pp. 261–8.
 - 19 The official statistics claim 51 per cent, other Kazakhstani statistics up to 56 per cent of the Kazakh population of Kazakhstan, which seems to exaggerate the Kazakh portion of the population for political reasons. However, if Kazakhs do not yet represent a majority, they will do so in few years due to higher birth-rates and the emigration of non-Kazakhs.
 - 20 M.-C. v. Gumpenberg, 'Kasachstan an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert. Präsident Nazarbaev zwischen Kollektiverinnerung und Zukunftsvisionen', *Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien*, 1998/2, pp. 253–71; P. Kolstø, 'Anticipating Demographic Superiority: Kazakh Thinking on Integration and Nation Building', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 50, 1998/1, pp. 56–8.
 - 21 The study of Soviet and post-Soviet local customary law has been neglected by researchers so far.
 - 22 P. G. Geiss, 'Legal Culture and Political Reforms in Central Asia', in *Central Asia and the Caucasus. Journal of Social and Political Studies*, vol. 12, 2001/6, pp. 114–25 (Russian: 'Pravovaia kul'tura i politicheskie reformy v stranakh Tsentral'noi Azii', *Tsentral'naja Azija i Kavkaz. Obshchestvenno-politicheskii zhurnal*, vol. 18, 2001/6, pp. 125–38).
 - 23 P. J. Luong, 'The Future of Central Asian Statehood', *CAM*, 1999/1, pp. 1–10.
 - 24 In this respect Dieter Senghaas' civilising hexagon is Eurocentric, as it does not consider the impacts of different communal commitment structures on political change (D. Senghaas, 'Frieden als Zivilisationsprojekt', in D. Senghaas [ed.] *Den Frieden denken*, Frankfurt 1995, pp. 196–231).
 - 25 P. G. Geiss, 'Wahlen und Politik in Kirgisien: Über die Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen 2000', *Orient. Zeitschrift des Deutschen Orient-Instituts*, 2001/2, pp. 309–23.
 - 26 Cf. Anna Matveeva, 'Democratization, legitimacy and political change in Central Asia', *International Affairs*, 1999/1, pp. 43–4.

GLOSSARY

Local terms

- adat** Customary law
- aga biī (Kyrgyz)** Eldest chieftain; an influential tribal leader
- aga manap (Kyrgyz)** Eldest *manap*; a influential *manap*
- agha (Kazakh)** Eldest brother; elder
- āyl (Kyrgyz)** A nomadic or settled village (Russian: *aul*)
- āyp (Kazakh)** Guilt; a fine
- aksakal (Kyrgyz, Russian)** A white beard; the head of a local community
- alaman (Kyrgyz, Turkman)** Disorder; a raid; a predatory excursion
- Alshyn** A large Kazakh tribal confederacy; another name for the Small Horde
- amin (Uzbek, Tajik)** The elder of a *rayon*; a tax collector at the bazaar
- amīr al-mu'minīn** Title of the caliph as religious and political leader of all Muslims
- amlok (Tajik, Uzbek)** State land; administrative unit
- amlokдор (Tajik, Uzbek)** A tax inspector and local commander
- aq süiek (Kazakh)** A 'white bone': Kazakh term for endogamous Kazakh nobility (Chingizids, sultans) who claimed descent from Chingiz Khan
- aqsaqal (Kazakh)** See *aksakal*
- aqtaban shūbryndy (Kazakh)** The Great Calamity (devastating Oirat attack on Kazakhs between 1723 and 1726)
- aqyn (Kazakh)** A poet; a singer of heroic epics
- arbob (Tajik)** An elder of a local community
- Arghyn (Kazakh)** A large Kazakh tribal confederacy; another name for the Middle Horde
- ariq (Uzbek)** A irrigational canal
- ark (Tajik, Uzbek)** A fortress; the citadel of the ruler in towns
- arizachee (Tajik), arizachi (Uzbek)** An emissary
- aruq (Kazakh)** A spirit of an ancestor
- aryk aksakal (Russian)** A salaried local official appointed by the military governor to supervise the main irrigation canals
- ash (Kyrgyz)** Food; a common meal
- askarboshee (Tajik), askarboshi (Uzbek)** Supreme military commander in Bukhara and Khokand

- atlyk (Turkman)** tax-free land granted for military service in Khorezm
- atqaminer (Kazakh)** A horseman; a tax officer
- aul'nyĭ skhod (Russian)** A native village assembly within the tsarist civil-military administration
- aul'nyĭ starshina (Russian)** An authorised village elder within the tsarist civil-military administration
- aul'skiĭ skhod (Russian)** See *aul'nyĭ skhod*
- auyl (Kazakh)** See *aiyl*
- awyl (Kara-Kalpak)** See *aiyl*
- avlod (Tajik)** A generation; extended family in Eastern Bukhara
- bakshy (Kyrgyz)** A shaman
- barymta (Kazakh, Kyrgyz)** Pillaging of livestock in order to recompense suffered injustice (Russian: *baranta*)
- batyr (Kazakh)** A hero; a military leader
- bäek (Kara-Kalpak)** Natural tax on the crop yield in Khorezm
- bahodur (Tajik), bahodir (Uzbek)** A giant; the brave
- bek (Uzbek, Tajik)** A beg (bey) or hakim (ruler of a province)
- beklarbegi (Uzbek)** A 'beg of begs'; a chief beg
- beklik (Uzbek)** The dignity of a *beg*; a province
- bi (Kazakh)** A chieftain; a tribal leader and judge
- biĭ (Kara-Kalpak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek)** See *bi*
- bir ata (Turkman)** 'From one father'; seven-forefather group among the *Teke* Turkmen
- bĭtĭm (Kazakh)** A peace negotiation among tribal leaders
- bobo (Uzbek)** An uncle; an elder; a head of a local community
- bukara (Kyrgyz)** A subject of a ruler; the folk; a recently arrived resident without relatives
- chala manap (Kyrgyz)** 'Not entirely' a *manap*; a minor *manap*
- charva (Turkman)** A nomadising Turkman tribesman
- choĭkhona (Uzbek)** A teahouse
- cholok manap (Kyrgyz)** A 'curtailed' *manap*; the village elder
- chomry (Turkman)** A settled Turkman tribesman
- chong kazan (Kyrgyz)** A 'large kettle'; a communal meal
- chong üĭ (Kyrgyz)** A 'large house'; extended family household
- chrezvychaĭnyĭ s"ezd (Russian)** A regional native court of the civil-military administration
- däp (Turkman)** The customs; customary law
- dasturkhonchi (Uzbek), dastarkhonchee (Tajik)** The cupbearer; treasurer at the Khanate of Khokand
- distanochnyĭ nachal'nik (Russian)** Authorised Kazakh tribal leader within the sultan administration.
- devon (Tajik, Uzbek)** Council of the ruler (Russian: *divan*)
- devonbegi (Uzbek)** First minister of the emir of Bukhara; high-ranked official (Russian: *divanbegi*)
- dodkhoh (Tajik, Uzbek)** A high-ranked official at the court of Bukhara; a military leader in the khanate of Khokand (Russian: *dadkhakh*)

GLOSSARY

- duban (Kyrgyz)** A council of tribal leaders
- dubana (Kyrgyz)** A Dervish
- dushman (Tajik, Uzbek)** An enemy
- el (Kazakh), él (Kyrgyz)** A tribe
- élat (Uzbek)** See *él*
- élbegi (Uzbek)** A tribal leader
- éllikboshi (Uzbek)** A 'head of fifty'; higher local commander or tribal leader within khanates and the emirate; elector of fifty households who votes for the *volost* commander of the tsarist local administration
- éshen (Kyrgyz)** An esteemed religious man; teacher of a Sufi order; a dervish (Russian: *ishan*)
- éshon (Tajik, Uzbek)** See *éshen*
- éshon-raïs (Tajik, Uzbek)** Highest *raïs* at the emirate
- fuqaro (Tajik, Uzbek)** A urban dweller; a subject; folk
- gan dushar (Turkman)** 'Blood reaches'; the seven-forefather group among Turkmen; group of blood liability
- gengesh (Turkman)** A tribal council
- gongshy (Turkman)** The (non-kin-related) neighbour
- gul (Turkman)** A slave; a Turkman of slavish origin
- guzar (Tajik, Uzbek)** A ward in towns
- hokim (Tajik, Uzbek)** Hakim (governor)
- hovuz (Uzbek)** A pond; a water basin in mahallahs
- iagy (Turkman)** A foe
- iap (Turkman)** A canal
- iarliq (Tajik)** See *iorliq*
- iashuly (Turkman)** An elder
- iasovul (Tajik, Uzbek)** An armed horseman (Russian: *esaul*)
- iasovulboshee (Tajik), iasovulboshi (Uzbek)** A commander of *iasovuls*
- Ichkilik (Kyrgyz)** Southern Kyrgyz tribal confederacy
- ig (Turkman)** A 'purely blooded'; Turkmen not descended from slaves (*guls*)
- il (Turkman)** Being on peaceful terms; a tribe; a tribal descent group
- imom (Tajik)** An imam (leader of the prayer in a mosque; honorific title; one of the former religious leaders of Shi'ites)
- inche iap (Turkman)** A small canal.
- inoq (Uzbek)** A friend; an Uzbek tribal leader; high office at the khan's or emir's court
- inorodtsy (Russian, plural of inorodets)** Foreigner; tsarist juridical term for nomadising people under tsarist jurisdiction since 1822; later term for the non-Slavonic population of the empire
- iorliq (Uzbek)** Land title
- iorliqli mulk (Uzbek)** Landed property due to title granted by the ruler
- ishan (Turkman)** See *éshen*.
- iuzboshi (Uzbek)** A 'head of a hundred'; a minor regional commander or tribal leader within the khanates and the emirate
- jadid (Uzbek)** 'New method'; a supporter of reformed schooling or reformed Islam in Central Asia.

GLOSSARY

- jamoā (Tajik, Uzbek)** A council; village community
- jamoat (Tajik, Uzbek)** A village council; community; society
- jigit (Kyrgyz)** A boy or young man; a follower; a warrior
- kalyng (Kyrgyz)** Bride money (Russian: *kalym*)
- kantseliariia (Russian)** Chancellery of the Governor General
- kent (Tajik, Uzbek)** A district
- khalfa (Uzbek)** A versed savant of *sharia*
- khalk (Turkman)** Tribal confederacy; tribal descent group; people
- khaslyk** State land
- kheradzh (Russian)** Initial tsarist harvest tax (cf. *mulki hiroj*)
- khoja (Tajik)** An honouree title; a person who is believed to descend from the four caliphs, see also *övlät*
- khoja kalon (Tajik)** Highest judge at the emir's court.
- khun (Turkman)** Blood money
- khūja (Uzbek)** See *khoja*
- Kishī Zhüz (K azakh)** The 'minor hundred'; the Small Horde
- Kök Tengir (Kyrgyz)** Blue Sky; object of shamanistic worship
- köshe (Kara-Kalpak)** Smallest descent group; a forefather group
- kun (Kyrgyz)** See *khun*
- kundar (Kyrgyz)** A person who is in charge of paying blood money
- lashkarboshee (Tajik), lashkarboshi (Uzbek)** Commander-in-chief
- madrasa (Tajik, Uzbek)** Madrassah (Islamic seminary)
- mahalla (Tajik, Uzbek)** Mahallah (a neighbourhood quarter in towns and large villages)
- mahram (Tajik, Uzbek)** Intimate friend; a high tax official in Bukhara and Khiva
- maktab (Tajik, Uzbek)** A religious school; primary school
- manap (Kyrgyz)** A Kyrgyz usurper; a Kyrgyz tribal leader
- Manghit (Uzbek)** Name of Uzbek tribes or tribal descent group; Uzbek dynasty in the emirate of Bukhara
- maslakhat (Turkman)** A council of elders
- māzhliis (K azakh)** Majlis (assembly)
- mejlis (Turkman)** See *māzhliis*
- meqtep (Kazakh)** See *maktab*
- Ming (Uzbek)** Name of Uzbek tribes or a tribal descent group; Uzbek dynasty in the khanate of Khokand
- mingboshi (Uzbek)** A 'head of a thousand'; a regional commander or tribal leader within khanates and the emirate
- mir (Uzbek, Tajik)** A ruler in east Bukhara.
- mirovōi sud (Russian)** A local tsarist peace court
- mirovōi sud'ia (Russian)** A lay magistrate at a local tsarist court
- mirob (Uzbek, Tajik), mirab (Russian)** An official charged with controlling irrigation canals.

GLOSSARY

- mirshab (Uzbek, Tajik)** Commander of the night-watchmen in towns of the emirate
- mirzo (Uzbek, Tajik)** Mirza (a scribe)
- mudarris (Tajik, Uzbek)** A teacher in madrassahs
- muftee (Tajik)** A savant of Islamic law (Mufti); the head of a religious community
- mufti (Uzbek)** See *muftee*
- mukhtor (Tajik, Uzbek)** The authorised; the second-ranked official at the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara
- mülk (Turkman)** Property acknowledged by Islamic law
- mulk (Tajik, Uzbek)** See *mülk*
- mulki hiroj (Tajik, Uzbek)** Garden lands taxed by one seventh to one half of their yield
- mulki huriiat (Tajik)** Tax-free lands
- mulki ushr (Uzbek, Tajik)** Lands paying one tenth of the yield to the ruler
- mulki-hurri-kholis (Uzbek)** see *mulki huriiat*
- murid (Tajik, Uzbek)** A pupil of an *ishan* or sheikh
- murut (Kyrgyz)** See *murid*
- mutavallee/mutavalli (Tajik, Uzbek)** A curator of religious endowments
- namoz (Tajik, Uzbek)** Daily prayers of a Muslim
- naqib (Tajik)** High Islamic dignitary
- nark (Kyrgyz)** Customary law; customs
- narodnyĭ sud (Russian)** A native court of the civil-military administration
- noib (Tajik, Uzbek)** A deputy; Uzbek governor with tribal background
- nöker (Turkman)** An armed tribesman; a soldier of the khan (Russian: *nuker*)
- oba (Turkman)** Nomadic or settled village
- oblast, plural: oblasti (Russian)** Regional tsarist administrative unit
- oblastnoe pravlenie (Russian)** Tsarist administrative board of an *oblast'*
- ogul (Turkman)** A son; a boy
- oĭ (Turkman)** A pit; lowland
- okhun (Uzbek), okhund (Tajik)** A teacher in madrassahs
- okrug (Russian)** A tsarist administrative unit (county)
- okruzhnoĭ prikaz (Russian)** The mixed county authority of the tsarist administration in central and eastern Kazakhstan in the first half of the nineteenth century
- okruzhnyĭ sud (Russian)** A tsarist *oblast'* court
- olavkhona (Tajik)** 'House of the fire': men's house and guest house
- onboshi (Uzbek)** A 'head of ten': a local leader within the khanates and the emirate
- Ong Kanat (Kyrgyz)** A 'right wing'; the northern Kyrgyz tribal confederacy
- oqsoqol (Uzbek)** See *aksakal*
- Orta Zhüz (Kazakh)** The 'Middle Hundred'; the Middle Horde
- otaliq (Uzbek)** A tribal leader; instructor of the heir apparent of the ruler
- övlät (Turkman)** Saint, member of one of the six holy tribes (Khoja, Shykh, Seĭit, Ata, Magtym, Müjevür)
- panjbegi** A minor water official of the emirate
- parvonachee (Tajik), parvonachi (Uzbek)** The supreme military commander in Khokand; high-ranked official in Bukhara

GLOSSARY

- pasheb** watchman and hangmen in Khiva
- piatidesiatnik (Russian)** An elector of fifty households who votes for the *volost'* commander of the tsarist local administration
- plemia (Russian)** A tribe; tribal confederacy; tribal descent group
- podsholik (Uzbek)** Land of the khan in Khiva
- politseĭmeĭster (Russian)** Local tsarist police authority.
- politseĭskiiĭ pristav (Russian)** See *politseĭmeĭster*
- pozemel'naia podat' (Russian)** Tsarist land tax replacing *tanap* and *kheradzh* taxation
- pristav (Russian)** A tsarist police officer
- pristavstvo (Russian)** A tsarist police district
- qala (Kazakh, Uzbek)** A town; a fortress
- qalyngmal (Kazakh)** See *kalyng*
- qara sūiek (Kazakh)** A black bone; Kazakh commoner
- qavm (Tajik, Uzbek)** A tribe or tribal descent group; relatives; a religious ward
- qishlov (Uzbek)** Winter quarters
- qishloq (Uzbek)** A village
- qozee (Tajik), qozi (Uzbek)** Kadi (Islamic judge)
- qozee/qozi kalon (Tajik, Uzbek)** Supreme judge; the supreme judge of the emirate's subjects
- qozi ordu** Military judge
- qūn (Kazakh)** See *khun*
- Qunghirot (Uzbek)** The name of Uzbek tribes or of a tribal descent group; Uzbek dynasty in the khanate of Khiva
- qushbegi (Uzbek)** First minister at the at the court in Khiva; a governor in the Khanate of Khokand; a high official
- qymyz (Kazakh)** Kumiss (fermented mare's milk – Russian: *kumys*)
- qystau (Kazakh)** A winter pasture
- rais (Tajik, Uzbek)** An official who supervises Islamic customs and controls measures at markets
- rod (Russian)** A tribe; a tribal descent group
- ru (Kazakh)** A tribe; a tribal descent group
- Saīid (Uzbek)** Sayyid (An honorary title; a Muslim claiming descent from Mohammad's grandson Husain)
- salghyt (Kara-Kalpak)** A monetised land tax in Khorezm
- salgyt (Turkman)** See *salghyt*
- Sanashik (Turkman)** The irrigated tribal land which is annually redistributed among tribesmen
- sarboz (Tajik, Uzbek)** An infantryman; a regular soldier of the emir
- sarkor (Tajik, Uzbek)** An elder; a commander; a tax collector
- Sart (Uzbek)** A non-tribal rural or urban dweller in pre-revolutionary Central Asia
- sbližhenie (Russian)** Rapprochement (of natives to the tsarist state)
- sel'skiiĭ skhod (Russian)** A *Sart* village assembly within civil military administration
- sel'skoe obshchestvo (Russian)** A Russian village community


GLOSSARY

- serdar (Turkman)** A leader of a predatory excursion; military leader
- s"ezd (Russian)** A local court of some of native judges
- shaikh (Tajik, Uzbek)** Sheikh (a tribal leader, the head of a Sufi brotherhood)
- shaikh ulislom (Uzbek)** Highest spiritual official of the emir and of the khan
- sharia (Uzbek, Tajik: shariat)** canonized islamic law
- shoh (Tajik)** Shah; a ruler in Eastern Bukhara
- sila (Russian)** Strength, force
- sipoh (Tajik, Uzbek)** Warrior, official
- Sol Kanat (Kyrgyz)** Left wing; the western Kyrgyz tribal confederacy
- stanitsa (Russian)** A Cossack settlement headed by an *ataman*
- starosta (Russian)** A Russian village elder
- starshīi aksakal (Russian)** A chief elder of an urban district
- sudebnaia palata (Russian)** Highest judicial instance of appeal in the Governor-generalship
- suv (Turkman)** Water
- tagma (Turkman)** A brand on livestock
- taīpa (Turkman)** A tribe; a tribal descent group
- tanapnyī sbor (Russian)** Initial tsarist moneyed land tax (cf. *tanop*)
- tangba (Kazakh)** See *tagma*
- tanho (Uzbek), tankhoh (Tajik)** Tax-free land granted by the emir for administrative service
- tanop (Tajik, Uzbek)** A square measurement (between 0.166 and 0.5 hectares) (Russian: *tanap*)
- toī (Kyrgyz)** A feast
- tölengit (Kazakh)** A follower of a Kazakh khan who has lost his tribal affiliation
- tuman (Tajik, Uzbek)** Ten thousand; a military unit; an administrative unit
- tūpa (Uzbek)** One of the four divisions to which Uzbek tribes belonged in Khorezm
- tūpchī boshi (Uzbek), tūpchee boshee (Tajik)** Commander of the artillery; commander of the regular army
- tupik (Uzbek)** A small street
- tuzemets, plural tuzemtsy (Russian)** Natives; tsarist term for the settled indigenous population of Russia since the middle of the nineteenth century
- uchastok (Russian)** Smallest tsarist administrative unit (section) headed by a *pristav*
- uchastok distantsii (Russian)** A range district of the sultan administration in western Kazakhstan
- uezd (Russian)** A bounty; a tsarist administrative unit
- Ūīsīn (Kazakh)** Name of a large Kazakh tribal confederacy; another name for the Great Horde
- ulema, singular olim** muslim scholars
- Ūly Zhūz (Kazakh)** The 'Senior Hundred'; Great Horde
- umma** Community of Muslim believers
- upravitel' (Russian)** Local native leader or headman of a *volost'*


GLOSSARY


- upravliaiushchiĭ kantseliarii (Russian)** The office director of the Governor-general's chancellery
- ūran (Kazakh), uraan (Kyrgyz), uran (Kara-kalpak)** A common war cry of tribesmen
- urug (Turkman)** A tribe or sub-tribe; a tribal descent group
- uruk (Kyrgyz)** See *urug*
- uruu (Kyrgyz)** Sub-tribe; a small tribal descent group
- uruw (Kara-Kalpak)** See *urug*
- ushr (Tajik, Uzbek)** Tithe; a tax of one tenth of the yield
- vaqf (Tajik, Uzbek)** A religious estate
- vekil (Turkman)** An (authorised) representative
- verkhniĭ sel'skiĭ sud (Russian)** A superior Russian rural court formed by the chairmen of the *volost'* courts of one *uchastok*.
- viloiat (Tajik)** A province (*vilayet*)
- vlast' (Russian)** Authority
- voennyĭ gubernator (Russian)** A military governor of an *oblast*
- voĭsko (Russian)** A Cossack territorially organised army which received land for military service and was headed by a *hetman*
- volost', plural volosti (Russian)** A district; a peasant community consisting of several villages
- volostnoe pravlenie (Russian)** A *volost'* board of Russian village elders
- volostnoĭ s'ezd (Russian)** Local district assembly of the tsarist civil-military administration
- volostnoĭ skhod (Russian)** A *volost'* assembly of representatives from various Russian villages representing each ten peasant households
- volostnoĭ starshina (Russian)** Head of a *volost'* of Russian peasants
- yasa** Mongolian customary law
- Zäkät (Kara-Kalpak)** Religious alms; a patrimonial tax on merchandise and on the tribesmen's livestock
- zakot (Tajik, Uzbek)** See *Zäkät*
- zakotchee (Tajik), zakotchi (Uzbek)** An official who collects the *zakot*
- zakotchee kalon (Tajik), zakotchi kalon (Uzbek)** Highest tax official in the emirate
- zamini jamoat (Tajik, Uzbek)** Communal land
- zang (Kazakh, Kyrgyz)** Customary law
- zekat (Turkman)** See *Zäkät*
- zemstvo (Russian)** Tsarist local self-government
- zhāĭlau (Kazakh)** Summer pasture
- zhīgīt (Kazakh)** See *Jigit*
- zhūt (Kazakh)** An enormous loss of livestock; famine
- zhüz (Kazakh)** A 'hundred'; a 'part'; a horde
- ziaket (Russian)** See *Zäkät*

MAPS




Map 1 Kazakh tribal structures (Source: Narodny Srednei Azii II, p. 324)








Map 2 Kyrgyz tribal structures (Source: Narodny Srednei Azii II, pp. 176-7)



Map 3 Turkmen tribal structures (Source: Narodny Srednei Azii II, p. 19)




Map 4 Territories of Turkmen tribes and confederacies
 (Source: Narodny Srednei Azii II, 1963, pp. 16-17)





Kyrgyz Tribal Groups

Bagysh	Saiak	Azyk	Cherik	Sary Bagysh
Mongoldor	Jediger	Adigine	Mungush	Bugu
Tynymse'nt	Solto	Chekir Saiak	Jetigen	Baaryn
Kirkuroo	Tobo'i	Suu Murun	Kongurat	Saruu
Munduz	Basyz	Kushchu	Kitai	Chong bagysh
Kypchak	Kangdy	Avat	Na'iman	No'igut
Te'nt	Orgy	Doolos	Boston	Jookesek
Kesek	Sart-Kalmak	Chala-Kazak	Kalmak	Karon
			Keldike	uninhabited territory


Map 5 Territories of Kyrgyz tribes and tribal confederacies
 (Source: Narodny Srednei Azii II, 1963, pp. 176-7)




Map 6 Kara-Kalpak tribal structures
 (Source: Narodny Srednei Azii I, p. 413)




Map 7
Territories of Kara-Kalpak tribal confederacies (Source: Narodny Sredney Azii I, 1962, pp. 416-17)




Map 8 Approximate location of Kazakh hordes in the eighteenth century







Map 10 Inner Horde, sultan and *prikaz* administration




Map 11 Routes of migration within the Middle Horde



Map 12 European settlement pattern in Kazakhstan in 1900



Map 13 European colonisation of Kazakhstan in 1915



Map 14 Tsarist administration in Central Asia, 1917

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography includes only materials used for this study. For a more comprehensive bibliography on pre-revolutionary Central Asia, see:

- Y. Bregel (ed.) *Bibliography of Islamic Central Asia*, 3 vols, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies: Bloomington 1995.
- R. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Selected Bibliography*, Berkeley 1953.

Social and political change

- J. C. Alexander, *The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons (Theoretical Logic in Sociology, vol. 4)*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1983.
- G. A. Almond, 'Zum Vergleich politischer Systeme', in Doeker 1971, pp. 57–76.
- D. E. Apter, 'Political Religion in the New Nations', in Geertz 1963, pp. 57–104.
- J. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in den frühen Hochkulturen*, Munich 1992.
- B. Barber and A. Inkeles (eds) *Stability and Social Change*, n.p. 1971.
- F. Barth, 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans', London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology no. 19, London 1959(a).
- 'Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 89, 1959(b).
- R. C. Baum, 'The System of Solidarities. A Working Paper in General Action Analysis', *Indian Journal of Social Research*, vol. XVI, April and August 1975, pp. 306–53.
- R. N. Bellah (ed.) *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, Chicago and London 1973(a).
- 'Religöse Evolution', in C. Seyfarth and W. M. Sprondel (eds) *Religion und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung*, Frankfurt 1973(b).
- D. Berg-Schlosser and F. Müller-Rommel (eds) *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, Opladen 1997 (1986).
- D. Berg-Schlosser and Th. Stammen, *Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft*, Munich 1995 (1974).
- G. Berger, *Social structure and rural development in the Third World*, Cambridge 1992.
- R. Bodéüs, *Le Philosophe et la Cité. Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d'Aristote*, Paris 1982 (English: *The Political dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics*, New York 1993).
- M. Brumlik and H. Brunkhorst, *Gemeinschaft und Gerechtigkeit*, Frankfurt 1993.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- O. Brunner, *Land and Lordship. Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria*, Philadelphia 1992 (German: *Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter*, 3rd edn, Vienna 1943).
- O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (eds) *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 5 vols, Stuttgart 1984.
- M. Buber, *Zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat*, Heidelberg 1952.
- L. Clausen and C. Schlütter (eds) *Hundert Jahre 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft'. Ferdinand Tönnies in der internationalen Diskussion*, Opladen 1991.
- A. Dempf, *Die unsichtbare Bilderwelt*, Zurich and Cologne 1959.
- K. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York 1966.
- G. Doeker (ed.) *Vergleichende Analyse politischer Systeme. Comparative Politics*, Freiburg 1971.
- E. Durkheim, *On Morality and Society. Selected Writings*, ed. R. N. Bellah, Chicago and London 1973.
- *Les formes élémentaire de la vie religieuse*, Paris 1994 (1912).
- *De la division du travail social*, Paris 1996(a) (1893).
- *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, Paris 1996(b) (1895).
- G. Dux, *Logik der Weltbilder. Sinnstrukturen im Wandel der Geschichte*, Frankfurt AM 1982.
- K. Eder, *Die Entstehung staatlich organisierte Gesellschaften. Ein Beitrag zu einer Theorie sozialer Evolution*, Frankfurt AM 1976.
- (ed.) *Die Entstehung von Klassengesellschaften*, Frankfurt AM 1973.
- I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Krieg und Frieden aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung*, Munich 1997(a) (1975).
- *Liebe und Haß. Zur Naturgeschichte elementarer Verhaltensweisen*, Munich and Zurich 1997(b) (1970).
- S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empire*, New York 1963.
- *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Englewood Cliffs 1966.
- 'Post-traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition', *Daedalus*, winter 1973, pp. 1–27.
- (ed.) *Max Weber. On Charisma and Institution Building*, Chicago 1968.
- Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology*, New York 1996.
- Encyclopaedia of Sociology*, eds E. F. Borgatta and M. L. Borgatta, New York 1992.
- L'Equipe écologie et anthropologie des sociétés pastorales (ed.) *Pastoral Production and Society: Proceedings of the International Meeting on Nomadic Pastoralism. Paris 1–3 December 1976*, Cambridge/London/New York/Melbourne 1979.
- T. H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives*, London 1993.
- A. Etzioni and E. Etzioni-Halevy (eds) *Social Change*, Basic Books 1964.
- E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer. A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*, Oxford 1947 (1940).
- M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds) *African Political Systems*, London 1940.
- H. Frankfort, *Kinship and the Gods. A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature*, Chicago and London 1978 (1948).
- M. Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society*, New York 1967.
- C. J. Friedrich, *Politik als Prozeß der Gemeinschaftsbildung. Eine empirische Theorie*, Cologne and Opladen 1970 (English: *Man and His Government. An Empirical Theory of Politics*, New York 1963).
- W. Fuchs-Heinritz, *Lexikon zur Soziologie*, 3rd edn, Opladen 1995.
- C. Geertz (ed.) *Old Societies and New States. The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, London 1963.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 1983.
- 'Tribalism and the State in the Middle East', in Khoury and Kostiner 1991, pp. 109–26.
- N. Glazer and D. P. Moynihan (eds) *Ethnicity. Theory and Experience*, Cambridge and London 1976 (1975).
- M. Granet, *Die chinesische Zivilisation. Familie - Gesellschaft - Herrschaft. Von den Anfängen bis zur Kaiserzeit*, Frankfurt 1988 (1929).
- J. R. Gusfield, 'Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 72, 1967/4, pp. 351–62.
- J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, 2 vols, Frankfurt 1988 (1981) (English: *The Theory of Communicative Action, - Reason and Rationalisation of Society* [vol. 1] London 1984; *A Critique of Functionalist Reason* [vol. 2] Cambridge 1987).
- 'Hannah Arendts Begriff der Macht', in *Politik, Kunst, Religion. Essays über zeitgenössische Philosophen*, Stuttgart 1989 (1978), pp. 103–26.
- B. Haller, *Repräsentation*, Münster 1987.
- R. Harré (ed.) *The Social Construction of Emotions*, Oxford 1986.
- M. Hauriou, 'La Théorie de l'Institution et de la Fondation. Essai de Vitalisme social', *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*, 1925/4, pp. 1–45.
- *Die Theorie der Institution und zwei andere Aufsätze von Maurice Hauriou*, Berlin 1965.
- P. Heelas, 'Emotional Talk across Cultures', in R. Harré (ed.) *The Social Construction of Emotions*, Oxford 1986, pp. 234–66.
- W. Hennis, 'Legitimität. Zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS)*, Sonderheft 7, 1976, pp. 9–39.
- H. Hillmann, *Wörterbuch der Soziologie*, 4th edn. Stuttgart 1994.
- E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983.
- H. Hofmann, *Repräsentation. Studien zur Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1974.
- J. Holmwood, *Founding Sociology? Talcott Parsons and the Idea of General Theory*, London and New York 1996.
- S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven and London 1968.
- W. Irons, 'Political Stratification among Pastoral Nomads', in *L'Equipe écologie* 1979, pp. 361–74.
- C. N. Johnson, *Aristotle's Theory of the State*, Basingstoke and London 1990.
- St. Kalberg, *Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology*, Cambridge 1994.
- D. Käsler, *Revolution und Veralltäglichung. Eine Theorie postrevolutionärer Prozesse*, Munich 1977.
- R. Kiely, *Sociology and Development. The Impasse and beyond*, London 1995.
- B. Kittel, *Moderner Nationalismus. Zur Theorie politischer Integration*, Vienna 1995.
- R. Koselleck, 'Standortbindung und Zeitlichkeit. Ein Beitrag zur historiographischen Erschließung der geschichtlichen Welt', in *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Frankfurt 1995 (1979), pp. 176–207 (English: *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time*, Cambridge MA 1979).
- L. Krader, *Formation of the State*, London/Sydney/Toronto/New Delhi/Tokyo 1968.
- 'The Origin of the State among the Nomads of Asia', in *L'Equipe écologie* 1979, pp. 221–34.
- F. Kramer and Ch. Sigrüst (eds) *Gesellschaften ohne Staat. Band 1: Gleichheit und Gegenseitigkeit*, Frankfurt 1978.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, New York 1982 (Oxford 1961).
- N. Luhmann, 'Interpenetration – Zum Verhältnis personaler und sozialer Systeme', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 1977/6, pp. 62–76.
- 'Interpenetration bei Parsons', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 1978/7, pp. 299–302.
- 'Talcott Parsons – Zur Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 1980/9, pp. 5–17.
- A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd edn, London 1994.
- H. Maier, H. Rausch and H. Denzer (eds) *Klassiker des politischen Denkens*, 2 vols, Munich 1987.
- W. E. Mühlmann, *Rassen, Ethnien, Kulturen – Moderne Ethnologie*, Neuwied and Berlin 1964.
- R. Münch, *Theorie des Handelns. Zur Rekonstruktion der Beiträge von Talcott Parsons, Emile Durkheim und Max Weber*, Frankfurt 1988 (1982).
- *Die Struktur der Moderne. Grundmuster und differentielle Gestaltung des institutionellen Aufbaus der modernen Gesellschaften*, Frankfurt 1992 (1984).
- *Die Kultur der Moderne*, 2 vols, Frankfurt 1993 (1986).
- F. Noor, 'Competing Notions of Political Order in Malaysia', paper presented at the 6th DAVO Congress of the German Middle East Studies Association, Hamburg, 2–4 December 1999.
- T. Parsons, *The Social System*, London and Henley 1951.
- *The Structure of Social Action. A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers*, New York 1961 (1937).
- *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, Englewood Cliffs 1966.
- *Politics and Social Structure*, New York 1969.
- 'On the concept of "influence"', in Parsons 1969, pp. 405–38.
- 'On the Concept of Value-Commitment', in Parsons 1969, pp. 439–72.
- *Action Theory and the Human Condition*, New York 1978.
- *Zur Theorie der sozialen Interaktionsmedien*, ed. S. Jensen, Opladen 1980.
- 'Über den Begriff der Macht', in Parsons 1980.
- T. Parsons, R. F. Bales and E. A. Shils. *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, Glencoe IL 1957.
- Peter Pawelka, *Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten*, Heidelberg 1985.
- E. L. Peters, 'Some Structural Aspects of the Feud among the Camel-Herding Bedouin of Cyrenaica', *Africa – Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. XXXVII, 1967/3, pp. 261–82.
- Plato, *The Collected Dialogues including the Letters*, eds E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Bollingen Series LXXI, Princeton 1994 (1961).
- A. Podlech, 'Repräsentation', in Brunner *et al.* (eds) *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Band 5*, Stuttgart 1984, p. 514.
- K.-G. Riegel, *Politische Soziologie unterindustrialisierter Gesellschaften: Entwicklungsländer*, Wiesbaden 1976.
- R. Robertson and B. Holzner (eds) *Identity and Authority. Explorations in the Theory of Society*, Oxford 1980.
- G. Roth, 'Introduction', in Weber 1978, pp. xxxiii–cx.
- J. J. Rousseau, *Der Gesellschaftsvertrag*, Stuttgart 1977.
- M. D. Sahlins. *Tribesmen*, Englewood Cliffs 1968.
- P. C. Salzman, 'Political Organization among Nomadic Peoples', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. III, 1967/2, pp. 115–131.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Tribal Chiefs as Middlemen: The Politics of Encapsulation', *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 47, 1974/2, pp. 203–10.
- 'Why Tribes Have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan', in Tapper 1983, pp. 262–82.
- M. Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (Gesammelte Werke, Band 8)*, Bern 1960 (1925).
- *Wesen und Form der Sympathie (Gesammelte Werke, Band 7)* Bern 1971 (1912).
- W. Schluchter, *Religion und Lebensführung: Studien zu Max Webers Kultur- und Werttheorie* (vol. 1); *Studien zu Max Webers Religions- und Herrschaftssoziologie* (vol. 2) Frankfurt 1991 (1988).
- C. Schmitt, *Legalität und Legitimität*, Berlin 1993 (1932).
- *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Berlin 1996 (1932).
- H. Schneider, 'Patriotismus und Nationalismus', *Concilium*, December 1995, pp. 499–509.
- A. Schütz, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie*, Frankfurt 1992.
- D. Senghaas (ed.) *Den Frieden Denken*, Frankfurt 1995.
- E. A. Shils, *Political Development in the New States*, The Hague 1962.
- *Centre and Periphery. Essays in Macrosociology*, Chicago 1975.
- Ch. Sigrist, *Regulierte Anarchie. Untersuchungen zum Fehlen und zur Entstehung politischer Herrschaft in den segmentären Gesellschaften Afrikas*, Olten and Freiburg 1967.
- G. Spittler, 'Herrschaftsmodell und Herrschaftspraxis. Eine Untersuchung über das legitimitätslose Herrschaftsmodell von Bauern in Niger'. *PVS*, 1976 (*Sonderheft 7*) pp. 270–88.
- J. Spurk, *Gemeinschaft und Modernisierung: Entwurf einer soziologischen Gedankenführung*, Berlin 1990.
- P. Sztompka, *The Sociology of Social Change*, Oxford 1993.
- E. Thiemer, 'Solidarität als ethischer, gesellschaftstheoretischer und politischer Begriff - Seine Bedeutung im Denken von Karl Marx, Max Scheler, Aristoteles und Talcott Parsons', Ph.D. thesis, University of Vienna, 1991.
- P. Tischleder, *Ursprung und Träger der Staatsgewalt nach der Lehre von Thomas von Aquin und seiner Schule*, n.p. 1923.
- F. Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Leipzig 1926 (1887).
- F. R. Vivelo, *Handbuch der Kulturanthropologie. Eine grundlegende Einführung*, Munich 1988, pp. 157–78 (English: *Cultural Anthropology Handbook. A Basic Introduction*, 1978).
- E. Voegelin, *Order and History*, 4 vols, Baton Rouge 1956, 1957, 1974, 1987.
- 'Historiogenesis', in *Anamnesis. Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik*, Munich 1966, pp. 79–116.
- *Die Neue Wissenschaft der Politik. Eine Einführung*, Freiburg and Munich 1991 (English: *The New Science of Politics. An Introduction*, Chicago 1952).
- M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1972 (1921–5) (English: *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, eds G. Roth and C. Wittich, 2 vols, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1978).
- *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen 1988(a) (1922).
- 'Die "Objektivität" sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis', in Weber 1988(a), pp. 146–214.
- *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I*, Tübingen 1988(b) (1920).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen', in Weber 1988(b), pp. 237–573.
- 'Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus', in Weber 1988(b), pp. 17–206.
- A. Webster, *Introduction to the Sociology of Development*, Harris 1988.
- R. Wenskus, *Stammesbildung und Verfassung*, Cologne 1961.
- B. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, London 1985.
- H. Wimmer, *Evolution der Politik. Von der Stammesgesellschaft zur modernen Demokratie*, Vienna 1996.
- K. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven 1957.
- W. Zapf (ed.) *Theorien des sozialen Wandels*, Cologne and Berlin 1969.

Central Asia

- M. Abduraimov, 'Perezhitki sel'skoï obshchiny v uzbekskom kishlake Khumsan', *SE* 1959/4.
- M. Abramov, *Guzary Samarkanda*, Tashkent, 1989.
- S. M. Abramzon, 'Formy rodoplemennoï organizatsii u kochevnikov Sredneï Azii', *Trudy Instituta étnografii*, vol. 14, 1951, pp. 132–56.
- 'K kharakteristike shamanstva v starom byte kirgizov', *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta étnografii AN SSSR*, vol. XXX, Moscow 1958, pp. 143–50.
- *Kirgizy i ikh étnogeneticheskie i istoriko-kul'turnye svyazi*, Frunze 1990 (1971).
- Abul'-Gazi, *Rodoslovnaia turkskogo plemeni*, Kazan 1854.
- A. Abyshkaev, *Karateginskie kirgizy v kontse XIX–nachale XX vv.*, Frunze 1965.
- S. A. M. Adshad, *Central Asia in World History*, London 1993.
- S. F. Akabirov, Z. M. Magrufov and A. T. Khodzkhakhanov, *Uzbeksko-Russkiï slovar'*, Moscow 1959.
- Akademiia Nauk SSSR, a. o. (ed.) *Materialy ob"edinennoï nauchnoï sessii, posviashchennoï istorii Sredneï Azii i Kazakhstana v dooktiabr'skiï period*, Tashkent 1955.
- Sh. Akbarzadeh, 'A Note on Shifting Identities in the Ferghana Valley', *CAS*, vol. 16, 1997/1, pp. 65–8.
- Sh. Akiner, *Islamic People of the Soviet Union (with an Appendix on the non-Muslim Turkic Peoples of the Soviet Union)*, London 1983.
- (ed.) *Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia*, London 1991.
- *The Formation of Kazakh Identity. From Tribe to Nation-State* (Former Soviet South Project), London 1995.
- N. A. Alekseev, *Der Schamanismus und Sufismus in Mittelasien* (Studia Eurasia. Monographienreihe zur Anthropologie und Archäologie der Völker Eurasiens) Hamburg 1985.
- E. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks. From the Fourteenth Century to the Present. A Cultural History*, Stanford 1990.
- (ed.) *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*, New York and London 1973.
- (ed.) *Central Asia. 130 Years of Russian Dominance: A Historical Overview*, updated 3rd edn, Durham NC and London 1994 (1967).
- 'The Hunger for Modern Leadership', in Allworth 1994, pp. 573–608.
- Altaica Berolinensia, *Permanent International Altaistic Conference. 34th meeting. Berlin, 21–6 July 1991: The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World*, ed. B. Kellner-Heinkele, 1993.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- I. Altynsarin, *Sobranie sochineniĭ v trekh tomakh, tom II*, Alma-Ata 1976.
- B. Amanaliev, *Kyrgyzstandagy diniĭ jana ėrkin oĭloonus tarykhynan*, Frunze 1967.
- J. Anderson, 'Political Development in Turkmenistan', *CAS*, vol. 14, 1995/4, pp. 509–27.
- P. Andreev, 'Turkmenskii sud', *IV*, 1900, vol. 81, pp. 524–55.
- V. Anichkov, *Prisiaga kirgiz pered russkim sudom*, Tashkent 1899.
- A. Apostolou, 'The Mistake of the Uzbek Economic Model', *CAM*, 1998/2, pp. 1–5.
- N. Aristov, 'Opyt vyiasneniia ėtnicheskogo sostava kirgiz-kazakov bol'shoĭ ordy i kara-kirgizov na osnovaniĭ rodoslovnnykh skazaniĭ i svedeniĭ o sychsh-estvuiushchikh rodovykh deleniakh i o rodovykh tamgakh, a takzhe istoricheskikh dannyykh i nachinaiushchikhsia antropologicheskikh izsledovaniĭ', *ZHS*, 1894/3–4, pp. 391–486.
- 'Zametki ob ėtnicheskom sostave tiurkskikh plemen i narodnostei i svedeniia ob ikh chislennosti', *ZHS*, 1896/3–4, pp. 277–458.
- E. E. Bacon, *Obok. A Study of Social Structure in Eurasia*, New York 1958.
- Central Asians under Russian Rule. A Study in Cultural Change*, New York 1966.
- J. L. Bacqué-Grammont, 'Tūrān, une description du khanat de Khokand vers 1832 d'après un document ottoman', *CdMRS*, vol. XIII, 1972/2, pp. 192–231.
- B. Baĭbulatov, *Adamdardyn ang-sezimindegi ötköndün kaldyktaryn joiuu jönündö*, Frunze 1957.
- I. Baldauf, 'The Making of the Uzbek Nation', *CdMRS*, vol. 32, 1991/1–3, pp. 79–96.
- Schriftreform und Schriftwechsel bei den muslimischen Rußland- und Sowjettürken (1850–1937)*, Budapest 1993.
- I. Baldauf and M. Friedrich (eds) *Bamberger Zentralasienstudien. Konferenzakten ESCAS IV – Bamberg, 8-12 October 1991 (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen. Band 185)* Berlin 1994.
- L. Balliuzek, 'Narodnye obychai imevshie, a otchasti i nyne imeiushchie, v maloĭ kirgizskoĭ orde sily zakona', *Materialy po kazakhskomuy obychnomuy pravuy*, 1998, pp. 217–99 (also in *Zapiski Orenburgskogo Otdela IRGO, Vypusk 2*, Kazan 1871, pp. 46–167).
- M. M. Balzer (ed.) *Shamanism. Soviet Studies of Traditional Religion in Siberia and Central Asia*, London 1990.
- Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757*, Cambridge MA and Oxford 1992 (1989).
- 'Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective'. in Khoury and Kostiner 1990, pp. 153–84.
- V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Vol. III, Mir 'Ali-Shir – A History of Turkman People*, Leiden 1962.
- Sochineniia*, 10 vols, Moscow 1963–9.
- 'Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni Turkestana (1927)', in *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, part I (*Obshchie raboty po istorii Srednei Azii – Raboty po istorii Kavkaza i vostochnoi Evropy*), Moscow 1963(a), pp. 169–433.
- 'Kirgizy. Istoricheskiĭ ocherk', *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, part 1, Moscow 1963, pp. 473–546.
- 'Sart', *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, part 2, Moscow 1964, pp. 527–9.
- W. Barthold and C. E. Bosworth, 'Khokand', *EI*, vol. V, 1985, pp. 29–31
- W. Barthold and M. L. Brill, 'Kĥiwa', *EI*, vol. V, 1986, pp. 23–5.
- V. N. Basilov, *Sredneaziatskoe shamanstvo*, Moscow 1973.
- 'Chosen by the Spirits', in Balzer 1990, pp. 3–48.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- N. A. Baskakov, *Qaraqalpaqsha-Russha sözlik*, Moscow 1958.
- N. A. Baskakov and M. Ia. Khamzaev, *Russko-turkmenskiĭ slovar'*, Moscow 1956.
- Sh. Bastug, 'Tribe, Confederation and State among Altaic Nomads', in Ertürk 1999, pp. 77–110.
- H. Bauer, A. Kappeler and B. Roth (eds) *Die Nationalitäten des russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897 – Quellenkritische Dokumentation und Datenhandbuch*, vols. A and B, Stuttgart 1991.
- S. Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia. Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, Cambridge MA 1968.
- T. K. Beĭsembiev, *'Ta'rikh-i Shakhrukhī' kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*, Alma-Ata 1987.
- 'Migration in the Qōqand Khanate in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century', in Komatsu *et al.* 2000, pp. 35–40.
- E. B. Bekmakhanov, *Vosstanie khana Kenesary (1837–1847)*, Alma-Ata 1992 (1943).
- N. Ė. Bekmakhanova, *Mnogonatsional'noe naselenie Kazakhstana i Kirgizii v ėpokhu kapitalizma (60-e gody XIX v. – 1917g)*, Moscow 1986.
- A. Bennigsen, 'Die Türken unter Zaren- und Sowjetherrschaft', in Hambly 1988, pp. 197–216.
- A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemerrier-Quellejey, *Le Soufi et le Commissaire. Les confréries musulmanes en URSS*, Paris 1986.
- A. Bennigsen and W. E. Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire. A Guide*, London 1985.
- L. Benson and I. Svanberg (eds) *The Kazaks of China. Essays on an Ethnic Minority*, Uppsala 1988.
- A. S. Bezkovic, 'Nomadenwirtschaft und Lebensweise der Kirgisen (19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts)', in L. Földes (ed.) *Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur*, Budapest 1969, pp. 94–111.
- K. Bodé, 'O Turkmenskikh pokoleniakh: iamudakh i goklanakh', *Zapiski RGO, kn. II*, 1847, pp. 203–35.
- A. Bodger, 'Change and Tradition in Eighteenth-century Kazakhstan: The Dynastic Factor', in Akiner 1991, pp. 344–60.
- Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand). Depuis les dernière années du règne de Nadir Châh (1153), jusqu'en 1233 de L'Hégire (1740–1818)*, trans. and ed. Ch. Schefer, Paris 1876.
- Y. Bregel, *Khorezmskie turkmeny v XIX v.*, Moscow 1961.
- 'The Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva', *Journal of Asian History*, vol. 12, 1978/12, pp. 120–151.
- 'Tribal Tradition and Dynastic History: The Early Rulers of the Qongrats according to Munis', *Asian and African Studies*, 1982, vol. 16, pp. 357–98.
- 'Atalik', *EI*, supplement, fascicules 1–2, Leiden 1980, pp. 96–8.
- 'Kosh-Begi', *EI*, vol. V, 1986, pp. 18–19.
- 'Nomadische und sesshafte Elemente unter den Turkmenen', *TF*, vol. 12, Hamburg 1989, pp. 131–164 (English: 'Nomadic and Sedentary Elements among the Turkmen', *CAJ*, vol. XXV, 1981/1–2).
- 'Mangits', *EI*, vol. VI, 1991, pp. 418–19.
- *Notes on the Study of Central Asia* (Papers on Inner Asia, no. 28), Bloomington 1996.
- 'Introduction: Notes', in Munis and Agahi 1999, pp. vii–lxv, 543–659.
- The Administration of Bukhara Under the Manghits and some Tashkent Manuscripts (Papers on Inner Asia, no. 34) Bloomington 2000.
- A. E. Brehm, *Reise zu den Kirgisen. Aus dem Sibirienbuch 1876*, Leipzig 1982.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- O. M. Bronnikova, 'Sarty v étnicheskoï istorii Srednei Azii (k postanovke problemy)', in *étnosy i étnicheskie protsessy. Pamiati R. F. Itsa*, Moscow 1993, pp. 151–8.
- F. Burnaby, *Travels and Adventures in Central Asia: A Ride to Khiva*, New Delhi 1996 (1876).
- A. Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, 3 vols, London 1834.
- A. Burnes, L. Leech, P. B. Lord and L. Wood, *Reports and Papers, Political, Geographical and Commercial, Submitted to Government, Employed on Mission in the Years 1835–36–37 in Scinde, Afghanistan, and Adjacent Countries*, Calcutta 1839.
- A. Burton, *The Bukharans. A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History (1550–1702)*, Richmond 1997.
- D. Carlisle, 'Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan', in *Ro'i* 1995, pp. 71–104.
- Ch. F. Carlson, 'The Concept of Sovereignty in Kazakhstan', *Altaica Berolinensia* 1993, pp. 57–68.
- H. Carrère d'Encausse, *Réforme et révolution chez les Musulmans de l'Empire russe*, Paris 1981 (1966).
- 'Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories', in Allworth 1994, pp. 151–71.
- 'Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884', in Allworth 1994, pp. 131–50.
- J. Castagné, 'Les tamgas des Kirghizes', *Revue du Monde Musulman*, October 1923, pp. 3–15.
- St. C. Caton, 'Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power', in Khoury and Kostiner 1997, pp. 74–108.
- L. Chermak, 'Osedlye Kirgizy-semledel'tsy na r. Chu', *Zapiski Zapadno-Sibirskogo Otdela IRGO* (Omsk), vol. XXVII, 1900, pp. 1–24.
- G. Chirkin, 'Zemleustroïstvo kirgiz v sviazi s kolonizatsiei stepi', *VK*, 1907/2, pp. 44–68.
- A. Chotonov, *Éldik traditsiialar jana alardyn tarbiialyk maanisi*, Frunze 1967.
- H. Collett, *Central Asia, Section I – Part IV. A Contribution towards the better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnography, Resources and History of the Khanate of Khiva*, Calcutta 1873.
- W. E. Curtis, *Turkestan: 'The Heart of Asia'*, London 1909.
- M. A. Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day*, Oxford 1918.
- Dala ualaitynyng gazetii*. Adam, Kogham, *Tabighat (1888–1902) - 'Kirgizskaia stepnaia gazeta'*. *Chelovek, obshchestvo, priroda (1888–1902)*, ed. U. Subkhanberdina, Almaty 1994.
- K. Daniyarov, *Istoriia Ablai-khana – gosudarstvennogo deiatelia, polkovodtsa, diplomata, politika*, Almaty 1998.
- G. I. Danilevskii, 'Opisanie Khivinskogo khanstva', *IRGO, Zapiski* V. 1851, pp. 62–139.
- S. M. Demidov, *Turkmenskie oviady*, Ashkhabad 1976.
- 'Sufismus in Turkmenistan', *TF*, vol. 2, Hamburg 1988 (Russian: *Sufizm v Turkmenii – evolutsiia i perezhitki*, Ashkhabad 1978).
- G. J. Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896–1916*, Bloomington and The Hague 1969.
- D. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde. Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition*, Pennsylvania 1994.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- K. Dilger, 'Tendenzen der Rechtsentwicklung', in Ende and Steinbach 1984, pp. 170–197.
- V. Dingelstedt, *Le Droit coutumier des Kirghiz d'après l'étude entreprise sous ses auspices du gouvernement russe (Revue générale du droit, de la législation et de la jurisprudence en France et à l'étranger)*, Paris 1890.
- A. I. Dobrosmyslov, *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoiashchem. Istoricheskiĭ ocherk*, Tashkent 1912.
- Goroda Syr-Dar'inskoĭ oblasti. Kazalinsk, Petrovsk, Turkestan, Aulie-ata i Chimkent*, Tashkent 1912.
- R. Dor, *Contibution à l'étude des Kirghiz du Pamir Afghan (Cahiers Turcica 1)*, Paris 1975.
- R. Dor and C. Naumann, *Die Kirghisen des Afghanischen Pamir*, Graz 1978.
- A. Dshikijew, 'Das Turkmenische Volk im Mittelalter', *TF*, vol. 18, Berlin 1994 (1991).
- St. A. Dudoignon, 'Une segmentation peut en cacher une autre: régionalismes et clivages politico-économiques au Tadjikistan', *Sommaire*, July-December 1994, pp. 73–130.
- M. B. Durdyev, 'K voprosu o sootnoshenii shariata i adata v Turkmenskom prave v kontse XIX – nachale XX v. Turkmenistan', in 'Turkemenistan SSR Ylymlar Akademiiiasynnyng khabarlary jemgyetchilik Ylymlaryng Seriiasy', *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Turkmenskoĭ SSR, Seriiā obshchestvennykh nauk*, 1969/1, pp. 18–25.
- K. P. Dydarev, 'Turkmeniia. Postkommunisticheskiĭ avtoritarnyiĭ rezhim', in Rossiĭskaia AN. Tsentr tsivilizatsionnykh i regional'nykh issledovaniĭ (ed.) *Postsovetskaia Tsentral'naiā Aziia – poteri i obretniia*, Moscow 1998.
- S. Dzhabbarov, *Shariat, semeĭnoe i obychnoe pravo v Uzbekistane: istoriia i sovremenost' (opyt sotsial'no-pravovogo issledovaniia)*, Tashkent 1996.
- B. Dzhamgerchinov, *Prisoedinenie Kirgizii k Rossii*, Moscow 1959.
- Ocherk politicheskoi istorii Kirgizii XIX veka (pervaia polovina)*, Frunze 1966.
- M. B. Dzhamgerchinov and A. M. Mokeev, 'Kirgizstan v XVI – pervoi polovine XVII v', *Istoriia Kirgizskoĭ SSR I*, pp. 442–76.
- A. D. Dzhikiev, *Ėtnograficheskie dannye po ėtnogenezy turkmen-salyrov*, Moscow 1964.
- Ėtnicheskaia istoriia naseleniia iuzhnogo i iugo-vostochnogo Turkmenistana v XVI-XIX vv.*, Avtoreferat and Tashkent 1988.
- EI – The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, Leiden and London 1960–2002.
- W. Ende and U. Steinbach (eds) *Der Islam in der Gegenwart*, Munich 1984.
- M. M. Ėrmatov, 'K istorii proiskhozhdeniia slova "sart"', *Sbornik iz istorii Uzbekistana. Nauchnykh trudov, tom 146*, Tashkent 1975, pp. 133–41.
- I. V. Erofeeva, 'Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie kazakhskogo obshchestva v XVIII–ser. XIX.v', in M. K. Kozybaev 1993, pp. 186–200.
- K. A. Ertürk (ed.) *Rethinking Central Asia. Non-Eurocentric Studies in History, Social Structure and Identity*, Reading 1999.
- S. Esenova, '"Tribalism" and Identity in Contemporary Circumstances: the Case of Kazakhstan', *CAS*, 1998/3, pp. 443–62.
- H. M. Fazil Khan, *Tarikh-i-Man azili-Buhara*, Srinagar 1981 (1813).
- A. P. Fedchenko, *Puteshestvie v Turkkestane* (reprint of A. P. Fedchenko, *Puteshestvie v Turkestan, vypusk 7, tom I, chast' II – V Kokanskom khanstve*, St Petersburg and Moscow 1875), Moscow 1950.
- R. Fox, *People of the Steppe*, London 1925.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- B. Fragner, 'Probleme der Nationswerdung der Usbeken und Tadshiken', in Kappeler *et al.* 1989, pp. 19–34.
- B. G. Gafurov, *Istoriia tadjikskogo naroda v kratkom izlozhenii - S drevneishikh vremen do Velikoï Oktiabr'skoï sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii 1917 g. (izd. 2)*, vol. 2, Moscow 1952.
- I. I. Geier, *Turkestan*, 2nd edn, Tashkent 1909.
- P. G. Geiß, 'Staatenbildung und Nationenwerdung in Mittelasien', in E. Bruckmueller, S. Linhart and Ch. Maehrdel (eds) *Nationalismus - Wege zur Staatenbildung in der außereuropäischen Welt*, Vienna 1994, pp. 77–99.
- *Nationenwerdung in Mittelasien* (Reihe Politikwissenschaft, Band 269), Frankfurt/Berlin/Bern/New York/Paris/Vienna 1995.
- 'Turkman Tribalism', *CAS*, vol. 18, 1999/3, pp. 347–57.
- 'Communal Commitment and Political Order in Change. Pretsarist and Tsarist Central Asia', Ph.D. thesis, University of Vienna 2000.
- 'Mahallah and Kinship Relations. A Study on Residential Communal Commitment Structures in Central Asia of the Nineteenth Century', *CAS*, vol. 20, 2001/1, pp. 197–206.
- 'Tribal Commitment and Political Order in Central Asia. A Reconsideration', in Giampiero Bellingeri (ed.) *Why not Central Asia, a Decade of Reforms, Centuries of Memories?*, *Orientalia Venetiana*, Fondazione G. Cini, Istituto Venezia e l'Oriente/L. Olschki, Florence (forthcoming).
- E. Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, London 1969.
- 'The Tribal Society and its Enemies', in Tapper 1983, pp. 436–48.
- 'Foreword', in Khazanov 1984, pp. ix–xxv.
- D. Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus. Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860–1914*, Göttingen 1977.
- P. R. Girs, *Otchet revizuiushchogo po vysochaishemy povoleniiu, Turkestanskiï kraï, Taïnogo Sovetnika Girs'a*, St Petersburg 1884.
- Captain Girshfeld and General-major Galkin, *Voenno-statisticheskoe opisaniie Khivinskogo oazisa, chast' 2*, Tashkent 1903.
- P. B. Golden, 'Die Migration der Oguzen', *TF*, vol. 10, Hamburg 1987, pp. 7–50.
- *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples. Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East*, Wiesbaden 1992.
- A. D. Grebenkin, 'Tadjhiki', in Trotskiï 1872, pp. 1–50.
- 'Uzbeki', in Trotskiï 1872, pp. 51–109.
- N. I. Grodekov, *Voïna v Turkmenii. Pokhod Skobeleva v 1880–1881 gg.*, St Petersburg 1883–4.
- *Khivinskiï pokhod 1873 g. Izd. 2.*, St Petersburg 1888.
- *Kirgizy i karakirgizy Syr-dar'inskoï oblasti - Iuridicheskii byt*, Tashkent 1889.
- Jo-Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims of Central Asia. Expressions of Identity and Change*, Durham NC and London 1992.
- S. S. Gubaeva, *Étnicheskii sostav naseleniia Fergany v kontse XIX-nachale XX v.*, Tashkent 1983.
- U. Halbach, "'Heiliger Krieg" gegen den Zarismus. Zur Verbindung von Sufismus und Djiihad im anticolonialen islamischen Widerstand gegen Rußland im 19. Jahrhundert', in Kappeler *et al.* 1989, pp. 213–34.
- G. Hambly (ed.) *Zentralasien*, Frankfurt 1988 (1966).
- 'Der Verfall der usbekischen Khanate', in Hambly 1988, pp. 186–96.
- William L. Hanaway, 'Fāsi the Vatan and the Millat in Bukhara', in Allworth 1973, pp. 143–50.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- D. Harrison, *The Sociology of Modernisation and Development*, London and New York, 1988.
- G. Hausmann, 'Türksprachen', in Bauer *et al.* 1991, pp. 236–267.
- B. Hayit, *Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt 1956.
- *Turkestan zwischen Rußland und China. Eine ethnographische, kulturelle und politische Darstellung zur Geschichte der nationalen Staaten und des nationalen Kampfes Turkestans im Zeitalter der russischen und chinesischen Expansion vom 18. bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, Amsterdam 1971.
- W. Heissig, *Die Religionen der Mongolei* (Die Religionen der Menschheit, vol. 20), Stuttgart 1970, pp. 299–427.
- K. Hesse, *Abstammung, Weiderecht und Abgabe. Zum Problem der konsanguinal-politischen Organisation der Mongolen des 13. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1982.
- M. Holdsworth, *Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century. A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva*, Oxford 1959.
- A. E. Hudson, *Kazak Social Structure*, London 1938.
- N. Idinov, 'Unbalanced Scales of Justice in Kyrgyzstan', *CAM*, 1998/1.
- N. Ignat'ev, *Missiia v Khivu i Bukharu v 1858 gody*, St Petersburg 1897 (English: *Mission of N. P. Ignat'ev to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858*, translated and edited with notes and introduction by J. L. Evans, Newtonville 1984).
- A. Il'iasov (ed.) *Prisoedinenie Turkmenii k Rossii (sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov)*, Ashkabad 1960.
- S. I. Il'iasov, 'O patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniakh kochevykh narodov Kirgizii', in *Akademiia nauk Soiuza SSR* 1955, pp. 43–9.
- K. Imanaliev and J. Mukambaev, *Pamirdik-Karategindik Kyrgyzdarda. Tarykhyĭ-ĕtnografiialyk, lingvistikalyk jana fol'klorduk kabarlar*, Frunze 1966.
- L'institut français d'études sur l'Asie centrale (IFEAC), 'Inde-Asie centrale. Route du commerce et des idées', *Cahiers d'Asie centrale*, 1996/1–2, Tashkent and Aix-en-Provence 1996.
- W. Irons, *The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social Organisation among a Central Asian Turkic-speaking Population*, Ann Arbor 1975.
- 'Political Stratification among Pastoral Nomads', in *L'Equipe écologie* 1979, pp. 361–74.
- V. I. Iskandarov, *Vostochnaia Bukhara i Pamir vo vtoroi polovine XIX v.*, part 1, Dushanbe, 1962.
- Istoriia Karakalpakskoi ASSR (S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei)*, Tashkent 1986.
- Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, 5 vols, ed. Akademiia nauy Kazakhskoi SSR, Alma-Ata 1975–81.
- Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR I, S drevneishikh vremen do serediny XIX v.*, ed. V. M. Ploskikh, Frunze 1984.
- Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR II, Dobrovol'noe vkhozhdenie Kirgizii v sostav Rossii i ego progressivnye posledstviia (razlozhenie patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh i razvitie kapitalisticheskikh otnoshenii. 1855–Mart 1917 g.)*, ed. S. I. Il'iasov, Frunze 1986.
- Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda*, vol. II, eds B. I. Iskandarov and A. M. Mukhtarov, Moscow 1964.
- Istoriia Turkmenskoi SSR I*, ed. Akademiia nauy Turkmenskoi SSR, Ashkhabad 1957.
- Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vols I and II, ed. Akademiia nauy Uzbekskoi SSR, Tashkent 1967–8.
- K. K. Iudakhin, *Kirgizsko-Russkii slovar'*, Moscow 1965.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Sh. Iusupov, *Ocherki istorii Kuliabskogo bekstva v kontse XIX – nachale XX veka*, Dushanbe 1964.
- *Ocherki istorii Kabadianskogo bekstva v kontse XIX – nachale XX. v.*, Dushanbe 1986.
- B. Iuzefovich: 'O byte kirgizov Turgaïskoï oblasti', *RV*, vol. 146, 1880, pp. 799–832.
- M. Ivanin, 'Vnutrenniaia ili Bukeevskaia kirgizskaia orda', *Epokha, 1864*, vypusk XII, pp. 1–48.
- P. P. Ivanov, *Vosstanie kitaï-kipchakov v Bukharskom khanstve, 1821–1825. Istochniki i opyt ikh issledovaniia*, Moscow and Leningrad 1937.
- *Kazakhi i Kokandskoe khanstvo (K istorii ikh vzaimootnosheniï v nachale XIX v.)*, ZIVAN, 1939, vol. 7, M.-L., pp. 92–128.
- *Arkhib khivinskikh khanov XIX v.- Issledovanie i opisanie dokumentov s istoricheskim vvedeniem*, Leningrad 1940.
- *Ocherki po istorii Sredneï Azii (XVI-ser. XIX v.)*, Moscow 1958.
- N. Izraztsov, 'Obychnoe pravo ("adat") kirgizov semirechenskoï oblasti: semeïnye soiuzy', in *Ètnograficheskoe obozrenie – Izdanie ètnograficheskogo otdela imperatorskogo obshchestva liubiteleï estestvoznaniia, antropologii i ètnografii, sostoiaščego pri moskovskom universitete, 1897/3*, pp. 67–94.
- W. Jochelson, 'Peoples of Asiatic Russia', American Museum of Natural History, n.p. 1928.
- L. Jonson and M. Esenov (eds) 'Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia', Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Conference Paper 24, Stockholm 1999.
- Sh. Kadyrov, *Turkmenistan: chetyre goda bez SSSR*, Moscow 1996.
- D. Kandiyoti, 'Rural Livelihoods and Social Networks in Uzbekistan: Perspectives from Andijan', *CAS*, vol. 17, 1998/4, pp. 561–78.
- A. Kappeler, 'Die zaristische Politik gegenüber den Muslimen des Russischen Reiches', in Kappeler *et al.* 1989, pp. 117–129.
- *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung – Geschichte – Zerfall*, Munich 1993 (1992).
- A. Kappeler, G. Simon and G. Brunner (eds) *Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien. Identität – Politik – Widerstand*, Cologne 1989 (English: A. Kappeler, G. Simon, G. Brunner and E. Allworth (eds) *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, Durham NC 1994).
- I. Karimov, *Uzbekistan: natsional'naiia nezavisimost', èkonomika, politika, ideologiya*, vol. 1, Tashkent 1996.
- B. Kh. Karmysheva, 'Ètnicheskie i territorial'nye gruppy naseleniia severo-vostochnoi chasti Kashka-Dar'inskoï oblasti Uzb. SSR', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta ètnografii AN SSSR, t. XXXIII*, Moscow 1960(a).
- *O nekotorykh drevnikh tiurkskikh plemenakh v costave uzbekov (po ètnograficheskim dannym)*, XXV *Mezhdunarodnyï kongress vostkovedov. Doklady delegatsii SSR*, Moscow 1960(b).
- G. Karpov, *Plemennoi i rodovoï sostav Turkmen*, Ashkhabad 1925, pp. 1–24.
- 'Rodoslovnaia Turkmen', *TU*, 1928/12, pp. 27–32.
- 'Alamany', *TU*, 1931/5–6, pp. 28–9.
- 'Die Genealogie der Turkmenen. Teil II', *TF*, vol. 1, Hamburg 1978(a), pp. 19–42 (Russian: 'Rodoslovnaia Turkmen', *TU*, 1929/1, pp. 56–70).
- *Kistorii Turkmen-Sarykov*, Ashgabat 1945, pp. 1–13.
- 'Tagmas', *TF*, vol. 2, Hamburg 1979, pp. 31–41 (Russian: 'Tamga', 1929/8–9[b]).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ‘Turkmeniia i turkmeny’, *TU*, 1929/10–11, pp. 35–42.
- ‘Die Jomud’, *TF*, vol. 2, Hamburg 1979(c), pp. 45–52 (Russian: ‘Iomudy’, *TU*, 1931/7–9, pp. 69–70).
- G. I. Karpov and P. B. Arbekov, ‘Die Salor’, *TF* vol. 1, Hamburg 1978, pp. 43–61 (Russian: ‘Salyry’, *TU*, 1930/6–7, pp. 25–28, Ashkhabad).
- A. Karryev, ‘Rodo-plemennaiia organizatsiia i rasselenie turkmenskikh plemen. Khoziaistvo turkmen v pervoi polovine XIX v’, *Istoriia Turkm. SSR I*, pp. 26–46.
- R. Karutz, *Unter Kirgisen und Turkmenen. Aus dem Leben der Steppe*, Leipzig 1911.
- N. O. Katanov, *Étnograficheskiĭ obzor turetsko-tatarskikh plemen*, Kazan 1894.
- A. A. Kaufman, *K voprosy o russkoĭ kolonizatsii Turkestarskogo kraia*, St Petersburg 1903.
- A. Kaufmann, *Russkaia obshchina v protsesse ee zarozhdeniia i rosta*, Moscow 1908 (quoted in an unpublished German translation by A. Augustin, ‘Der russische gemeinschaftliche Bodenbesitz im Prozess seiner Entstehung und seines Wachstums’, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Vienna).
- A. Kenisarin, *Sultany Kenisary i Syzdyk. Obrabotano dlia pechati i snabsheno primechaniiami E. T. Smirnova*, Alma-Ata 1992 (Tashkent 1889).
- A. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1998.
- ‘Society and politics in Bukhara’, *CAS*, vol. 19, 2000/3–4, pp. 367–98.
- Ibn Khaldūn, *Discours sur l’Histoire universelle, Al-Muqaddima*, 3 vols, new translation, preface and notes by Vincent Monteil, Sindbad: Paris and Bayreuth 1967–8.
- Ia. V. Khanykov, ‘Ocherk costoianiiia vnutrennei Kirgizskoi ordy v 1841 gody’, *Zapiski RGO, 1847, knizhka II*, pp. 27–60.
- N. V. Khanykov, ‘Gorodskoe upravlenie v Srednei Azii’, *Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del*, St Petersburg 1844, book 5, pp. 340–54.
- Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva*, St Petersburg 1843 (English: *Bokhara: Its Amir and Its people*, London 1845).
- A. M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, Cambridge 1984.
- Ph. S. Khoury and J. Kostiner, ‘Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East’, in Khoury and Kostiner 1991, pp. 1–24.
- Ph. S. Khoury and J. Kostiner (eds) *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, London and New York 1991.
- P. Khvorostanskiĭ, ‘Kirgizskiĭ vopros v sviazi s kolonizatsiei’, *VK*, 1907/1, pp. 53–104.
- N. A. Kisliakov, *Sledy pervobytnogo kommunizma u gornykh tadjhikov Vakhio-Bolo*, Moscow and Leningrad 1936.
- Patriarkhalno-feodal’nye otnosheniia sredi osedlogo sel’skogo naseleniia Bukharskogo khanstva v kontse XIX–nachale XX veka*, Moscow, Leningrad 1962.
- Ocherki po istorii sem’i i braka u narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, Leningrad 1969.
- Nasledovanie i razdel imushchestva u narodov Srednei Aii i Kazakhstana (XIX–nachalo XX v.)*, Leningrad 1977.
- T. Koïchuev, S. S. Daniyarov and V. M. Ploskikh (eds) *Istoriia kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana*, Bishkek 1996.
- T. Koïchuev, V. Mokrynin and V. Ploskikh, *Kyrgyzy i ikh predki. Netraditsionnyi vzgliad na istoriiu i sovrmennost’*, Bishkek 1994.
- H. Komatsu, Ch. Obiya and J. S. Schoeberlein (eds) *Migration in Central Asia: Its History and Current Problems*, *JCAS Symposium Series 9 – Population Movement in the Modern World III*, Osaka 2000.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- W. König, 'Zur Gesellschaftsorganisation der Turkmenen. Die Stammesstruktur der Teke', in *Museum für Völkerkunde Leipzig* (ed.) *Beiträge zur Völkerforschung, Hans Damm zum 65. Geburtstag, Veröffentlichungen des Museums für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig, Heft 11*, Berlin 1961, pp. 342–51.
- *Die Achal-Teke. Zur Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft einer Turkmenen-Gruppe im XIX. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1962.
- V. Koroteyeva and E. Makarova, 'Money and Social Connections in the Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbek city', *CAS*, 1998/4, vol. 4, pp. 579–596.
- I. Koslow, 'Das Gewohnheitsrecht der Kirgisen', *Russische Revue*, vol. 21, 1882, pp. 456–74 (Russian: 'Obychnoe pravo kirgizov. Obshchie osnovaniia kirgizskogo suda', *Materialy po kazakhskomy obychnomy pravu*, pp. 300–19).
- L. Kostenko, *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenii v neĭ russkoĭ grazhdanstvennosti*, St Petersburg 1871.
- *Turkestaniskii kraĭ. Opyt voenno-statisticheskogo obozreniia Turkestanского voennogo okruga. Material dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii, tom I*, St Petersburg 1880.
- M. K. Kozybaev (ed.) *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneĭshikh vremen do nashikh dneĭ*, Alma-Ata 1993.
- L. Krader, 'Principles and Structures in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe Pastoralists', *SWJoA*, vol. 12, 1955/2, pp. 67–92.
- *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Nomads*, The Hague 1963.
- *Peoples of Central Asia*, Bloomington 1966.
- 'The Origin of the State among the Nomads of Asia', in *L'Equipe écologie* 1979, pp. 221–34.
- I. Kraft, 'Priniatie kirgizskimi russkogo poddanstva', in Kraft 1898, pp. 1–57.
- (ed.) *Sbornik zakoneniĭ o kirgizakh*, Orenburg 1898.
- I. Kreindler, 'Ibrahim Altynsarin. Nikolai Il'minskii and the Kazakh National Awakening', *CAS*, 1983/3.
- I. I. Kryl'tsov, 'Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i sud v Sredne-Aziatskikh khanstvakh nakanune zavoevaniia Turkestana tsarskoĭ Rossieĭ', *Uchenye zapiski Sverdlovskogo ivrisdicheskogo instituta*, vol. 2, 1947.
- D. Kshibekov, *Kochevoe obshchestvo: genesis, razvitie, upadok*, Alma-Ata 1984.
- B. A. Kuftin, 'Kirgiz-Kazaki, kultura i byt', *ĕtnologicheskie ocherki tsentral'nogo muzeia narodovedeniia*, no. 2, Moscow 1926.
- Anke von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie in den Werken ihrer Historiker (18. – 19. Jahrhundert)*, Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag 2002 (*Türkische Welten*, vol. 9/Beiruter Texte und Studien, vol. 86).
- T. M. Kul'teylev, 'Kazakh Customary Law', *CAR*, vol. V, 1957/2, pp. 127–43 (Russian: *Ugolovnoe obychnoe pravo Kazakhov*, Alma-Ata 1955).
- P. I. Kushner (Knyshev), *Gornaia Kirgiziia – sotsiologicheskaiia razvedka*, Moscow 1929.
- A. Kuzembaŭily and E. Abilev, *Istoriia Kazakhstana (S drevneĭshikh vremen do 20-x godov XX v.)*, Almaty 1996.
- Kyrgyzstandyn tarykhy. I tom*, (*Kyrgyz SSR Ilmder Akademiiasy – Tarykh Institutu*), Frunze 1958.
- H. Lansdell, *Russian Central Asia*, 2 vols, London 1885.
- I. M. Lapidus, 'Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History', in Khoury and Kostiner 1991, pp. 25–47.
- Ch. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, 'Die Kasachen und Kirgisen', in Hambly 1988, pp. 152–161.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- P. Lerch, *Khiva oder Kharezm. Seine historischen und geographischen Verhältnisse*, St Petersburg 1873.
- A. de Levchine, *Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks ou Kirghiz-Kaissaks*, Paris 1840.
- D. Levinson and M. Ember (eds) *Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology*, New York 1996.
- L. Levitin, *Islam Karimov -- President novogo Uzbekistana*, Vienna (1996).
- C. Lindholm, Kinship structure and political authority: the Middle East and Central Asia, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1986, vol. 28, pp. 334–55.
- V. Lobachevskii, *Khivinskiĭ raion. Voенno-statisticheskoe opisanie Turkestanakogo voennogo okruga*, Tashkent, 1912.
- D. I. Logofet, *Strana bez pravii. Bukharskoe khanstvo i ego sovremennoe sostoianie*, St Petersburg 1909.
- *Bukharskoe Khanstvo pod russkim protektoratom*, 2 vols, St Petersburg 1911.
- A. Lomakin, *Obychnoe pravo turkmen (adat)*, Ashkhabad 1897.
- P. B. Lord, 'A memoir on the Uzbek State of Kundooz, and the Power of its Present Ruler Mahomed Murad Beg', in Burnes *et al.* 1839, pp. 96–124.
- R. Lorenz, 'Die Turkmenen. Zum historischen Schicksal eines mittelasiatischen Volkes', in E. von Mende (ed.) *Turkestan als historischer Faktor und politische Idee. Festschrift für Baymirza Hayit zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*, Cologne 1987, pp. 120–48.
- A. Madzhlisov, *Karategin nakanune ustanovleniia sovetskoĭ vlasti*, Stalinabad 1959.
- H. A. Maev, 'Aziatskiĭ Tashkent', in Maev 1876, pp. 260–313.
- (ed.) *Materialy dlia statistiki Turkestanakogo kraia, vyp. IV*, St Petersburg 1876.
- Kh. Makhmudov and G. Musabaev, *Qazaqsha-oryssha sözdik*, Almaty 1954.
- S. Mambetaliev, *Kyrgyzstandagy musulman sektalary*, Frunze 1966 (Russian: *Musul'manskoe sektanstvo v Kirgizii*, Frunze 1968).
- *Perezhitki некotorykh musul'manskikh techeniĭ v kirgizii i ikh istoriia*, Frunze 1969.
- *Sufizm jana anyn kyrgyzstandagy agymdary*, Frunze 1972.
- B. F. Manz, 'The Development and Meaning of Chaghatay Identity', in Gross 1992, pp. 27–45.
- G. E. Markov, 'K voprosy o formirovanii turkmenskogo naseleniia Khorezmskogo oazisa', *SE*, 1953/4, pp. 41–55.
- *Oчерk istorii formirovaniia severnykh Turkmen*, Moscow 1961.
- *Kochevniki Azii. Struktura khozjaĭstva i obshchestvennoĭ organizatsii*, Moscow 1976.
- 'Les sociétés traditionnelles d'Asie Centrale', *CdMRS*, 1990, XXXI/2–3, pp. 397–402.
- V. Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe. The Kazakhs and the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the 19th century*, London 2001.
- Ch. Marvin, *Merv. The Queen of the World and the Scourge of the Man-Stealing Turcomans*, London 1881.
- N. Masanov, *Kochevaĭa tsivilizatsiia Kazakhov (osnovy zhiznedeiatel'nosti nomadnogo obshchestva)*, Almaty and Moscow 1995.
- Materialy po istorii karakalpakov*, AN SSSR – Trudy instituta vostokovedeniia, t. vii, Moscow and Leningrad 1935.
- Materialy po istorii Kazhkskoĭ SSR*, Moscow and Leningrad 1940.
- Materialy po istorii kirgizov i kirgizii, vypusk I*, Moscow 1973.
- Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana (co vremeni prisоеdineniia Kazakhstana k Rossii do Velikoĭ Oktiabr'skoĭ revoliutsii), tom I*, Alma-Ata 1960.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Materialy po istorii turkmen v Turkmenii, vol. II -Iranskie, Bukharskie i Khivinskie istochniki (MITT II)*, Moscow and Leningrad 1938.
- Materialy po istorii Uzbekistana*, Tashkent 1963.
- Materialy po Kazakhskomuy obychnomuy pravuy*, (*Istoriia Kazakhstana: Issledovaniia, dokumenty*), Almaty 1998, pp. 39–40 (1st edn: Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, *Materialy po kazakhskomuy obychnomuy pravuy, Sbornik I*, Alma-Ata 1948).
- Materialy po musul'manstvu, vypusk I (Kratkiĭ obzor)*, Tashkent 1898.
- Materialy po musul'manstvu, vypusk II (Dervishizm v Turkestane)*, Tashkent 1898.
- R. D. McChesney, *Central Asia: Foundations of Change*, Princeton 1996.
- L. Meier, *Kirgizskaia step'*, *Materialy dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannnye ofitserami general'nobo shtaba*, St Petersburg 1865.
- Ruth I. Meserve, 'A Description of the Position of Turkmen Tribal Leaders according to 19th century Western Travellers', *Altaica Berolinensia*, 1993, pp. 139–48.
- G. Meyendorf, *Voyage d'Orenburg à Boukhara*. Paris 1826.
- Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l'Asie. Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand depuis les dernière années du règne de Nadir Chah, 1153. jusqu'en 1233 de l'hégire, 1740–1818 A.D.*, Persian text, published from a unique manuscript, with a French translation and introduction, notes and appendices, ed. Ch. Schefer, Amsterdam 1970 (Paris 1876).
- Mirza Shams Bukhari, *O nekotorykh sobytiakh v Bukhare, Khokande i Kashgare. Zapiski Mirzy-Shemsa Bukhari, Izdannyya v tekste, s perevodom i primechaniiami*, ed. V. V. Grigorev, Kazan 1861.
- N. Mordvinov, 'Sud u oslednykh inorodtsev Turkestana'. *RV*, 1899/6, pp. 707–13.
- D. O. Morgan, *The Mongols*, Oxford 1986(a).
- 'The "Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan" and Mongol Law in the Ilkhanate', *BSOAS*, vol. 49, 1986(b)/1, pp. 163–76.
- H. Moser, *A Travers l'Asie Central*, Paris 1885.
- M. N. Mouraviev, *Reise nach Turkomanien und Khiva in den Jahren 1819 und 1820*. Jena 1823(a) (Russian: *Puteshestvie v Turkmeniiu i Khivu v 1819 i 1920 godakh gvardeiskogo general'nogo shtaba kapitana Nikolaia Murav'eva*, Moscow 1822).
- Voyage en Turcomanie et à Khiva fait entre 1819 et 1820*. Paris 1823(b).
- Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi, *Firdaws al-ighâl - History of Khorezm*, translated from Chaghatay and annotated by Yuri Bregel, Leiden/Boston/Cologne 1999.
- I. Murray Matley, 'Agricultural Development', in Allworth 1994, pp. 266–308.
- R. M. Mustafina, *Predstavleniia, kul'ty, obriady u kazakhov (v kontekste bytovogo islama v iuzhnom Kazakhstane v kontse XIX–XX vv.)*, Almaty 1992.
- W. Myer, *Islam and Colonialism: Western Perspectives on Soviet Asia*, RoutledgeCurzon: London 2002.
- P. V. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskogo khanstva*, Kazan 1886.
- Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, vols I and II, eds S. P. Tolstov, T. A. Zhdanko, S. M. Abramzon and N. A. Kisliakov, Moscow 1962–3.
- V. Naumkin (ed.) *State Religion and Society in Central Asia. A Post-Soviet Critique*, Reading 1993.
- A. A. Nikishenkov, *Stepnoi zakon. Obychnoe pravo kazakov, kirgizov i turkmen*, Moscow 2000.
- K. Nishiyama, 'Russian Colonization in Central Asia: A Case of Semirechye, 1867–1922', in Komatsu *et al.* 2000, pp. 65–84.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Christine Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-century Afghanistan. The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–1863)*, Richmond 1997.
- Obozrenie Kokandskogo khanstva, 'v nyneshnem ego sostoianii', *ZRGO*, 1849, vol. 3, pp. 176–216.
- K. Odgaard and J. Simonsen, 'The New Kazak Elite', in Svanberg 1999, pp. 17–46.
- M. B. Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Stanford 1987.
- O. Olufsen, *The Emir of Bokhara and His Country*, London, Copenhagen 1911.
- A. Orazov, 'Familie und Familienverhältnisse bei den Turkmenen des Balchan-Gebietes Ende des 19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts', *TF*, Band 6, Hamburg 1985, pp. 118–58 (Russian: Sem'ia i semeinye otnosheniia pribal'khanskikh turkmen v kontse XIX. – nachale XXv, *Khoziastvo i kul'tura naseleniia severo-zapadnoi Turkmenii v kontse XIX–nachale XXv.*, Ashkhabad 1972, pp. 80–149).
- V. F. Oshanin, *Karategin i Darvaz*, St Petersburg 1881.
- N. P. Ostroumov, *Sarty. Étnograficheskie materialy*, Tashkent 1890.
- K. K. Palen, *Pereselencheskoe delo v Turkestanskom krae (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, 18 vols, St Petersburg 1910–11.
- *Sudebnye uchrezhdeniia deistvuiushchie v Turkestane na osnovanii sudebnykh ustavov Imperatora Aleksandra II (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(a).
- *Uchebnoe Delo (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(b).
- *Oroshenie v Turkestane (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(c).
- *Nalogi i poshliny. Organy finansovogo upravleniia (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(d).
- *Kraevoe upravlenie (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(e).
- *Gorodskoe upravlenie (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(f).
- *Oblastnoe upravlenie (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(g).
- *Politsiia, bezopasnosti (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(h).
- *Sel'skoe upravlenie, russkoe i tuzemnoe (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(i).
- *Uezdnoe upravlenie (Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia)*, St Petersburg 1910(j).
- R. Patai, 'Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian', *SWJoA*, 1951, pp. 401–14.
- J. Paul, Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler. Ostiran in *Vormongolischer Zeit (Beiruter Texte und Studien)*, Vol 59, Beirut 1996.
- E. Petrie, 'Über die Rechtsbegriffe der Kirgisen', *Das Ausland*, 1886/4, pp. 70–1.
- K. I Petrov, *Ocherki feodal'nykh otnoshenii u kirgizov v XV–XVIII vekakh*, Frunze 1961.
- R. A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia 1867–1917. A Study in Colonial Rule*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1960.
- 'Die russische Eroberung und Verwaltung Turkestan (bis 1917)', in Hambly 1988, pp. 217–36.
- V. M. Ploskikh, *Ocherki patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnoshenii v iuzhnoi Kirgizii (50–70-e gody XIX v.)*, Frunze 1968.
- *Kirgizy i Kokandskoe khanstvo*, Frunze 1977.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Politicheskaiia istoriia i patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnosheniia Kirgizov vo vtoroi polovine XVIII-seredine XIX v', *Istoriia Kyrg. SSR I*, 1984, pp. 477–584.
- V. I. Pogorel'skiĭ, *Ocherki ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Khivinskogo khanstva kontsa XIX i nachale XX vekov*, Leningrad 1968.
- N. N. Pokotilo, 'Ocherk Bukharskikh vladenii na levom beregu r. Piandzha v 1886 g', *Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii*, vyp. 25, St Petersburg 1887, pp. 267–75.
- S. P. Poliakov, *Istoričesktsa etnografiia Srednejĭ Azii i Kazakhstana. Kkhoziaĭstvo - soial'naia organizatsiia - etnicheskaiia istoriia*, Moscow 1980.
- Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiĭskoi imperii*, Sobranie vtoroe (1825–81), 55 vols (St Petersburg 1830–84); Sobranie tret'e (1881–1913), 33 vols (St Petersburg 1885–1916).
- L. P. Potapov, 'O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnoshenii u kochevykh narodov Srednej Azii i Kazakhstana', in *Akademiia Nauk SSSR* 1955, pp. 17–42.
- Proekt vsepoddanneishogo otcheta Gen.-Ad'iutanta K. P. von Kaufmana po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu i ustroistvu v oblastiakh Turkestarskogo general'-gubernatorstva (7 noiabria 1867–25 marta 1881 g.)*, St Petersburg 1885.
- Bruce G. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkestan. Kazak Religion and Collective Memory*, Curzon Press: London 2001.
- W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien. Lose Blätter aus dem Tagebuch eines reisenden Linguisten*, 2 vols, Leipzig 1884.
- M. Raeff, *M. Speransky*, 2nd edn, The Hague 1969.
- *Siberia and the Reforms of 1822*, Seattle 1956.
- M. V. Rahimee and L. V. Uspenskaia, *Lughati Tojikee-Rusee*, Moscow 1954.
- M. R. Rakhimov, *Zemledelie tadjikov basseĭna r. Khingou v dorevoliutsionnyiĭ period (istoriko-etnograficheskii ocherk)*, Stalinabad 1957.
- 'Ob institute "tankho" v Darvaze', in *Akademiia nauk tadjikiskoĭ SSR - Izvestiia otdeleniia obshchestvennykh nauk* 4, Stalinabad 1953, pp. 129–38.
- R. R. Rakhimov, 'Muzhskie doma' v traditsionnoi kul'ture tadjikov, Leningrad 1990.
- G. Rasuly-Paleczek, 'Beg, Moyzafid und Arbab: Das politische System der Chechka-Uzbeken und der afghanische Zentralstaat', in A. Gingrich, S. Haas, G. Paleczek and Th. Fillitz (eds) *Studies in Oriental Culture and History: Festschrift for Walter Dostal*, Frankfurt 1993, pp. 89–105.
- 'Kinship and Politics among the Uzbeks of Northeastern Afghanistan', in Baldauf and Friedrich 1994, pp. 11–28.
- 'Tribe and State: The Afghan and Central Asian Example', in Z. Šmitek and R. Muršič, *Mediterranean Ethnological Summer School*, vol. 3, Ljubljana 1999, pp. 261–83.
- L. I. Rempel', *Dalekoe i blizkoe*, Tashkent 1982.
- V. A. Riasanovsky, 'Customary Law of the Kirghiz', *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. XXI, 1937/2, pp. 190–220.
- Y. Ro'i (ed.) *Muslim Eurasia, Conflicting Legacy*, London 1995.
- A. A. Rosliakov, 'Alamany', *SE*, 1955/2, pp. 41–53.
- J.-P. Roux, *L'Asie Centrale - Histoire et civilisations*, Paris 1997.
- S. I. Rudenko, 'Kazaki - Antropologicheskie ocherki', in *Akademiia nauk SSSR - Materialy osobogo komiteta po issledovaniiu soiuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik*, vyp. 11, Leningrad 1927.
- P. P. Rumiantsev, *Kirgizskii narod v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, St Petersburg 1910.
- V. V. Rusinov, *Vodozemel'nye otnosheniia i obshchina u Turkmen*, Tashkent 1918.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- N. Rychkov, *Dnevnaia zapiski puteschestviia kapitana Nikolaia Rychkova v kirgiskaisatskoï step', 1771 gody*, St Petersburg 1772.
- A. N. Samoïlovich, 'Sokrashchennÿy perevod otrывkov iz khivinskiikh khronik XIX veka o khivinsko-karakalpakskikh otnosheniakh', *Trudy instituta vostokovedeniia*, vol. 7, 1935, pp. 91–143.
- 'O slove "kazak"', in Rudenko 1927, pp. 5–16.
- A. A. Sapelkin, *K istorii feodalizma v Kirgizii v kontse XIX – nachale XX vv (administrativnoe ustroïstvo i nalogovaia sistema)*, Frunze 1968.
- M. Saray, *The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism: A Study of the Turkmen People and Their Incorporation into the Russian Empire*, Ankara 1982.
- E. Sarkisyanz, *Rußland und der Messianismus des Orients. Sendungsbewußtsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens*, Tübingen 1955.
- Ch. Schmidt, 'Stände', in Bauer *et al.* 1991(a).
- John S. Schoeberlein-Engel, 'Identity in Central Asia: Construction and contention in the conceptions of "Özbek", "Täjik", "Muslim", "Samarqandi" and other groups', Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 1994.
- W. Schott, 'Über die echten Kirgisen', in *Abhandlungen der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Aus dem Jahre 1864*, Berlin 1865, pp. 429–75.
- E. Schuyler, *Turkistan. Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, 2 vols, London 1876.
- *Turkistan. Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, ed. G. Wheeler, London 1966.
- A. A. Semenov, *Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroïstva Bukharskogo khanstva, Trudy Sredne-Aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria II. Orientalia, vyp. 1*, Tashkent 1928.
- 'Bukharskiï traktat o chinakh i zvaniakh i ob obiazannostiakh nositelei ikh v srednevekovoi Bukhare', *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie V*, Moscow 1948.
- *Ocherk ustroïstva tsentral'nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo chanstva pozdneishego vremeni*, Stalinabad 1954.
- M. Nazif Shahrani, *The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan: Adaption to Closed Frontiers*, Seattle 1979.
- 'The Kirghiz Khans: Local Leadership in Central Asia', *CAS*, vol. 5, 1986/5, pp. 255–71.
- B. F. Shakhmatov, 'O sushchnosti patriarkhal'no-feodal'nykh otnosheniï u kochevykh narodov Kazakhstana', in Akademiia nauk SSSR 1955.
- V. F. Shakhmatov, *Kazakhskaiia pastbishchno-kochevaia obshchina (voprosy obrazovaniia, èvoliutsii i razlozheniia)*, Alma-Ata 1964.
- V. G. Shakhmatov, 'The Basic Characteristics of the Kazakh Patriarchal Feudal State Organization', *CAR*, 1961/9, pp. 126–132.
- U. Kh. Shalekenov, *Kazahki nizov'ev Amudar'i – k istorii vzaimootnosheniï narodov Karakalpakii v XVIII-XX vv.*, Tashkent 1966.
- K. Shaniiazov, *Uzbeki-karluki (istoriko-ètnograficheskiï ocherk)*, Tashkent 1964.
- *K ètnicheskoi istorii uzbekskogo naroda (istoriko-ètnograficheskoe issledovanie na materialakh kipchakskogo komponenta)*, Tashkent 1974.
- K. A. Sheremet'eva, *Russkie puteshestvenniki i issledovateli o Kirgizakh*, Frunze 1973.
- D. Shibekov, *O feodal'no-baïskikh perezhitkakh i ikh preodolenii*, Alma-Ata 1957.
- F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross, *The Heart of Asia. A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times*, London 1899 (reprinted in *The Middle East Collection*, New York 1973).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- L. A. Slovkhotov, *Narodnyĭ sud obychnogo prava kirgiz maloĭ ordy*, Orenburg 1905.
- G. Smith, *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, 2nd edn. London and New York 1996.
- G. P. Snesarev, 'O nekotorykh prichinakh sokhraneniia religiozno-bytovykh perezhitkov u uzbekov Khorezma', *SE* 1957/2.
- Sobranie Kirgizskikh zakonov 'i polozhenie na onye Omskogo vremennogo komiteta (8-go fevralia 1824 goda)', *Materialy po kazakhskomy pravu*, 1998, pp. 35–91.
- B. Spuler (ed.) *Geschichte Mittelasiens (Handbuch der Orientalistik. Erste Abteilung - Der nahe und mittlere Osten. Fünfter Band - Altaistik, Fünfter Abschnitt)*, Leiden and Cologne 1966.
- 'Djānids', *EI*, vol. 2, p. 446.
- G. Stökl, *Russische Geschichte. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Stuttgart 1990 (1963).
- O. A. Sukhareva, 'Traditsionnoe sopernichestvo mezhdu chastiami gorodov v Uzbekistane (konets XIX – nachalo XX v.)', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta étnografii AN SSSR*, vyp. XXX, Moscow 1958, pp. 121–9.
- Bukhara v XIX–nachale XX veka*, Moscow 1966.
- Kvartal'naia obshchina pozdnefeodal'nogo goroda Bukhary (v sviazi s istorieĭkvartalov)*, Moscow 1976.
- R. B. Suleĭmenov and V. A. Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka (o vneshnei i vnutrennei politike Abilaia)*, Alma-Ata 1988.
- I. Svanberg, 'The Nomadism of Orta jüz Kazaks in Xinjiang 1911–1949', in Benson and Svanberg 1988, pp. 109–21.
- 'The Kazakh Nation', in Svanberg 1999, pp. 1–16.
- (ed.) *Contemporary Kazaks. Cultural and Social Perspectives*, London 1999.
- L. Sykiäinen, 'Shari'ah and Muslim-Law Culture', in Jonson and Esenov 1999.
- M. Szuppe, 'En quête de chevaux turkmènes. Le journal de voyage de Mir 'Izzatullāh de Delhi à Boukhara en 1812–1813', *IFÉAC*, 1996, pp. 91–112.
- R. Tapper, 'Introduction', in Tapper 1983, pp. 1–75.
- 'Raiding, Reaction and Rivalry: The Shahsevan Tribes in the Constitutional Period', *BSOAS*, vol. XLIX, 1986, pp. 508–31.
- 'Anthropologists, Historians and Tribespeople and State Formation in the Middle East', in Houry and Kostiner 1991, pp. 48–73.
- (ed.) *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. New York 1983.
- S. P. Tolstov, 'Perezhitki totemizma i dual'noi organizatsii u turkmen', *Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv*, Moscow and Leningrad 1935/9–10, pp. 3–41.
- 'Khorezmskaia arkhologo-étnograficheskaia ékspeditsiia AN SSSR (1945–1948)', *Trudy Khorezmskoĭ archeologo-étnograficheskoi ékspeditsii AN SSSR*, vol. 1, Moscow 1952; vol. 2, 1958; vol. 3, 1958.
- L. S. Tolstova, *Karakalpaki Ferganskoĭ doliny (Istoriko-étnograficheskiĭ ocherk)*, Nukus 1959.
- 'The Kara-Kalpaks of Fergana', *CAR*, 1961/9, pp. 45–52.
- Karakalpaki za predelami Khorezmskogo oazisa v XIX – nachale XX veka*, Nukus and Tashkent 1963.
- S. E. Tolybekov, *Kochevoe obshchestvo kazakhov v XVII – nachale XX veka. Politiko-ékonomicheskii analiz*. Alma-Ata 1971.
- A. L. Troitskaia, *Materialy po istorii Kokandskogo khanstva XIX v. po dokumentam arkhiva Kokandskikh khanov*, Moscow 1969.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- V. N. Trotskiĭ (ed.) *Russkiĭ Turkestan. Sbornik izdanyĭ po povodu politekhnicheskoi vystavki, vyp. II – Stat'i po étnografii, tekhnike, sel'skomu khoziaĭstvu, i estestvennoi istorii*, Moscow 1872.
- M. Trotter, *Central Asia – Section II, Part IV. A Contribution Towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnography, Resources and History of the Khanate of Bokhara*, Calcutta 1873.
- Zh. M. Tulibaeva, *Kazakhstan i Bukharskoe khanstvo v XVIII-pervoĭ polovine XIX v.*, Almaty 2001.
- O. Tumanovich, *Turkmenistan i Turkmeny (Materialy k izucheniiu istorii i étnografii)*, Ashgabad 1926.
- Ch. E. de Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd, *Le Kohistan, le Ferghanah et Kouldja avec appendice sur la Kachgharie*, Paris 1878.
- *Le Syr-daria – le Zérafchâne. Le pays des sept-rivières et la Sibérie-occidentale*, Paris 1879.
- K. U. Usenbaev, *Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia kirgizov v period gosподstva Kokandskogo khanstva (XIX vek – do prisoedineniia Kirgizii k Rossii)*, Frunze 1961.
- *Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia kirgizov vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX vv.*, Frunze 1980.
- Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, 'Sochineniia', *Zapiski IRGO po otdeleniiu étnografii, tom XXIX*, St Petersburg 1904.
- 'Ablai', in Valikhanov 1904, pp. 1–7.
- 'Kirgizskoe rodoslovie', in Valikhanov 1904, pp. 286–305.
- 'O kochevkakh kirgiz', in Valikhanov 1904, pp. 321–6.
- 'Sledy shamanstva u kirgizov', in Valikhanov 1904, pp. 8–36.
- 'Zapiska o sudebnoi reforme u kirgiz Sibirskogo vedomostva', in Valikhanov 1904, pp. 151–78.
- *Sobranie sochineniĭ v piati tomakh*, Alma-Ata 1958–68.
- *Sobranie. sochineniĭ v piati tomakh*, 5 vols, Alma-Ata 1984–6.
- 'Tenkri (Bog)', in Valikhanov 1984 (I), pp. 208–15.
- 'Zapiski o kirgizakh', in Valikhanov 1985 (II), pp. 7–82.
- 'Zapiska o Kokanskome khanstve', in Valikhanov 1985 (III), pp. 314–24.
- G. P. Valil'eva, 'Turkmeny-Nokhurli', in *Sredneaziatskiĭ étnograficheskiĭ sbornik I. (AN SSSR – Trudy instituta étnografii im. N. N. Miklukho-Maklaia - novaia seriia, tom XXI)*, Moscow 1954, pp. 82–215.
- H. Vámbéry, *Reise in Mittelasien von Teheran durch die Turkmanische Wüste an der Ostküste des Kaspischen Meeres nach Chiwa, Bochara und Samarkand, ausgeführt im Jahr 1863*, Leipzig 1865 (English: *Travels in Central Asia: Being the Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara and Samarcand*, New York 1865).
- *Geschichte Bochara's oder Transoxaniens von den frühesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart. Nach orientalischen benützten und unbenützten handschriftlichen Geschichtsquellen*, Stuttgart 1872.
- *Das Türkenvolk in seinen ethnologischen und ethnographischen Beziehungen*, Osnabrück 1970 (1885).
- P. S. Vasil'ev, *Akhal-Tekinskiĭ oasis, ego proshloe i nastoiashchee. (Istoriko-geograficheskie i oro-geologicheskie ocherki Zakaspiĭskoi oblasti)*, St Petersburg 1888.
- M. Veniukov, *Puteshestvia po okrainom russkoi Azii i zapiski o nikh*, St Petersburg 1868.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- G. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's Yasa', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 1938/1, vol. 3, pp. 337–60.
- V. L. Viatkin, 'Karshinskii okrug, organizatsiia v nem voiska i sobytiia v period 1215–1217 (1800–1803) godov', *Izvestiia Sredne-Aziatskogo otdela gosudarstvennogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, tom XVII*, 1928, pp. 12–3.
- V. P. Viatkin, *Batyr Srym*, Moscow and Leningrad 1947.
- Ia. R. Vinnikov, 'Dorevoliutsionnoe rodoplemennoe delenie kirgizov i rasselenie ikh v iuzhnoi Kirgizii', in *Kratkie soobshcheniia instituta étnografii AN SSSR, vyp. XXVI*, Moscow 1957, pp. 71–5.
- *Khoziaĭstvo, kul'tura i byt sel'skogo naseleniia Turkmenskoĭ SSR*, Moscow 1969.
- V. V. Vostrov and M. S. Mukanov, *Rodoplemennoiĭ sostav i rasselenie kazakhov*, Alma-Ata 1978.
- G. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Central Asia*, London 1964.
- D. S. M. Williams, 'Native Courts in Tsarist Central Asia', *CAR*, 1966/1, pp. 6–19.
- 'Taxation in Tsarist Central Asia', *CAR*, 1968/1, pp. 51–63.
- D. V. Yaroshevski, 'The Mennonite Community in the Khanate of Khiva', *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 16, 1982, pp. 403–6.
- T. Yuan, 'Yakub Bek (1820–1877) and the Moslem Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan', *Central Asiatic Journal*, 1961/6.
- I. Zabelin, *Chokan Valikhanov (Körünüktüü geograftar jana saiakatchylar)*, Frunze 1960.
- K. L. Zadykhina, 'Perezhitki vozrastnykh klassov u narodov Srednei Azii', Sb. "Rodovoe obshchestvo" in *Materialy i issledovaniia*, *Trudy instituta étnografii AN SSSR, tom XIV*, Moscow 1951.
- G. S. Zagriazhskii, 'Iurisdicheskii obyčaj kirgiz i o narodnom sude u kochevogo naseleniia Turkestanskogo kraia, po obychnomy pravu (zan')', in *Maev 1876*, pp. 151–202.
- Zametki o turkmenskome dukhovenstve, *TU*, 1928/3–4 (7–8), pp. 5–20.
- Zapiski N. V. Vitkevicha, Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve* 1983, pp. 84–129.
- Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve (Otchety P. I. Demezona i I. V. Vitkevicha) – Tsentral'naiia Aziiia v istochnikakh i materialakh XIX – nachala XX veka*, Moscow 1983.
- Zapiski P. I. Demezona (1834), Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve* 1983, pp. 17–83.
- T. A. Zhdanko, *Ocherki istoricheskoi étnografii karakalpakov. Rodo-plemennaiia struktura i rasselenie v XIX – nachale XX veka*, Moscow 1950.
- 'Karakalpaki', *Narody Srednei Azii*, vol. I, 1962, pp. 408–527.
- (ed.) 'Materialy i issledovaniia po étnografii karakalpakov'. *Trudy Khorezmskoi arkheologo-étnograficheskoi ékspeditsii*, vol. III, Moscow 1958.
- S. Z. Zimanov, *Obshchestvennyĭ stroĭ kazakhov pervoi poloviny XIX veka*, Alma-Ata 1958.
- *Politicheskii stroĭ Kazakhstana kontsa XVIII i pervoi poloviny XIX vekov*, Alma-Ata 1960.
- V. Zysin, *Vosstanie v Tashkente v 1892 g.*, Tashkent 1934.

INDEX

- Abagat* (*Abat*) (Kyrgyz) 266
Abaq (Kazakh) 265
Abdal (Turkman) 267
Abdalahad Khan (Sayyid Amir) 128, 136, 228
Abdallahim 128, 147
Abdu'l Kerim 144
Abdul Madzhid 154
Abdul Malik 223
Abd-us-Sattar-Kadi 100
Ablay Khan 114–15, 175, 185
Abramov, General 223
Abramzon, S. M. 4, 61, 102, 109
Abu'l Muhammad Khan 114, 175
Abul Ghazi Bahodur Khan 44, 137
Abulkhayr 46–7
Abulkhayr Khan (fifteenth century) 47
Abulkhayr Khan (eighteenth century) 43, 46–7, 53, 114, 175–6, 184
acculturation 10
action orientation 7
adab (Tajik, Uzbek) 88
Adaï (Kazakh) 185, 226, 264
adat *see* customary law
Adigine (Kyrgyz) 41, 108, 147, 266, 271
Afghanistan 4, 193, 223
Africa 3
aga biï (Kyrgyz) *see* tribal leaders
aga manap (Kyrgyz) *see* tribal leaders
Aghysh (*Aghys*) (Kazakh) 42, 265
AGIL-scheme 6
Agzybirlik (Turkman) 245
Ahmat 48
Ahmed Khan 114
Aimak (Turkman) 268
Aitakov, N. 240
aiyl (Kyrgyz) 41, 56, 61
aiyp (Kazakh) 36
Ajät 48
Aji Gui 51, 62–3
Ajy (Turkman) 267
Ak (Turkman) 267
Ak Atabaï (Turkman) 39–40, 48, 62–3, 102
Ak Buïym (Kazakh) 264
Akayev, A. 243, 250
Akhä 4, 41, 59, 100, 104, 139–40, 192, 248
Akiner, Sh. 4
Ak-Mechet *see* Qyzyl Orda
Akmolinsk (Astana) 173, 278–9, 279–80, 284
aksakal (Kyrgyz, Russian) *see* elders
Akteri (Turkman) 267
Aktyubinsk 280–1, 282
Al Goli (Turkman) 49, 64
Alai 108, 150–1, 153, 174
alaman (Kyrgyz, Turkman) 58, 98, 112
Alash 47–8, 53, 114
Alash Orda 240
Alasha (Turkman) 267
Alasha (Kazakh) 48, 264
Alban (Kazakh) 46
Alikhanov 103–4
Alili (Turkman) 41, 270
Alim Khan (Sayyid Amir) 128, 146–7, 160
Älim (Kazakh) 38
Älim Üly (Kazakh) 38, 48, 264
Allah Quli Khan 128, 139
Allworth, E. 2, 5
Almaty (Alma Ata) 278; *see also* Verny
Al-Muqaddima 126
Alshyn (Kazakh) 38, 42, 48, 54, 117
Altaï (Kazakh) 265
Altai 97, 172
Altı-Ata (Kara-Kalpak) 29
Altyn (Kazakh) 264
Altynsarin, I. 183
Alymbek-Dodkhoh 151, 153

- Alymkul 151
Amansha (Turkman) 58, 267
Amansha-Gökche (Turkman) 41
amin (Tajik, Uzbek) 133
amir al-mu'minīn 129, 148, 150, 238
amlök (Tajik, Uzbek) 131, 155, 203
amlökдор (Tajik, Uzbek) 90, 131–4
 Amu Darya 107, 222, 227–8, 275, 279
 Amu Darya delta 29, 43, 58, 137, 139, 160, 274–5
 Amu Darya Otdel 173, 227–8, 231
 Amu-Dar'insky Okrug 173
 ancestor cult 47
Andas (Kazakh) 266
 Andijan 147, 151, 210, 281, 284
 Andijan uprising 210
 animism 47, 114
 Anna Ivanovna 175
 Appaq 149
aq sütek (Kazakh) 115–6
 Aqarys 54
 Aqban 54
aqsaqal (Kazakh) *see* elders
aqtaban shübryndy (Kazakh) 186
aqyn (Kazakh) 180
 Arabs 270
 Aral Sea 113, 177, 226, 278–81, 284
Araliat (Uzbek) 135
Arbachi (Turkman) 270
arbob (Tajik) 87, 132, 134
Arghyn (Kazakh) 38, 42, 45, 48, 117, 185, 267
 Arghyngazy Khan 114
ariq oqsoqoli *see* irrigation
 Aristov, N. 30, 38–9
arizachi (Uzbek) 133
 ark (Tajik, Uzbek) 146
Ärsary (Turkman) 40, 48, 136, 139, 269–70
aruq (Kazakh) 47
aryk (Russian) *see* irrigation
aryk aksakal (Russian) *see* irrigation
Aryk Garaja (Turkman) 269
Aryq Tynym (Kazakh) 266
Arys Qongyrat (Kara-Kalpak) 275, 277
asabiyya 126
 Asaka 151
 Asfandiyar Khan 128, 229
ash (Kyrgyz) 53
Ashamaily (Kara-Kalpak) 275, 77
Ashamaily Kerei *see* *Abaq*
 Ashkhabat (Ashkhabad) 192, 249, 279, 282
 Ashtarkhanids *see* Janids
 Asiatic Department 14
askarboshi (Uzbek) 131, 153
Assyk (Kyrgyz) 41
 Astrabad 144, 279
 Astrakhan 177–8, 279
 At-Bashy 56
Ata (Turkman) 268 *see* *övlät*
ata balasy (Kazakh) 53
Atabai (Turkman) 39, 267
ataman (Russian) 183, 200
 Atbasar 279, 282
atlyk (Turkman) 142–3, 228
atqaminer (Kazakh) 190
 Atrak 102, 193
Atyghai (Kazakh) 265
 Auyezov, M. 249
aul (Russian) 179
aul schools 183
Aulie-Ata 279–80, 282 *see* *Jambil*
aul'nyi skhod (Russian) 181–2, 201
aul'nyi starshina (Russian) 190, 193
 authoritarianism: mentality 2
 authority 7, 242; patriarchal 8;
 patrimonial 9; legal 9–10, 243
auyl (Kazakh) 56–7
Avat (Kyrgyz) 273
 Avaz Inoq 128, 138
avlod (Tajik) 91
awyl (Kara-Kalpak) 29, 57
 Ay Khoja 209
 Ayshuak Khan 114, 176
Azat (Kazakh) 245
Azyk (Kyrgyz) 266, 271

Baaryn (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
 Babaev, Sukhan 240
 Bacon, E. B. 3, 6, 31, 44, 98
 Bacqué-Grammont, L. 5
 Badakhshan 243
 Badakhshanis 246
Badrak (Turkman) 40, 48, 102, 267
Baga (Turkman) 40, 48, 102, 267
Baghanaly (Kazakh) 265
Bagshy (Turkman) 41, 49, 103, 267
Bagysh (Kyrgyz) 148, 266, 271
bahodur (Tajik) 149
Bai (Turkman) 267
Bai Uly (Kazakh) 38, 42, 47–8, 264
Baiat (Turkman) 268
Baibaqty (Kazakh) 48, 176, 264
 Baighara 54
Bailar-Zhandar (Kazakh) 265
 Bailybek 46
Bairach (Turkman) 267
Bairam Shaly (Turkman) 39, 267
 Baishora 46–7
Baishyghyr (Kazakh) 264
Baizhigii (Kazakh) 265
Bäkelke (Turkman) 40, 62, 267

INDEX

- Bakhshi Shah Murad 230
Bakhtiar (Kazakh) 46
bakshy (Kyrgyz) 109
Balghaly (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Balghaly (Kazakh) 264
 Balghymbaev, N. 250
 Balkash 276
 Balkashin, N. N. 38
 Balkh 126, 130, 279
 Balkhan 34
Baltaly (Kazakh) 265
 Barfield, T. J. 3, 31, 61–2, 159, 212
Bargy (Kyrgyz) 266
Barlos (Uzbek) 44, 248
 Barlybaï 54
 Barskoon 149
 Barthold, V. V. 5
barymta (Kazakh, Kyrgyz) *see* customary law
Basan Tiyn (Kazakh) 265
 Bashkir 175–6
 Bastug 32, 51, 55
Basyz (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
batyr (Kazakh) *see* tribal leaders
 Batyr Khan 114
 Becker, S. 2, 5
Bedeng (Turkman) 267
Beg (Turkman) 49, 58, 103–4, 267
 beg 100, 129, 132–4, 155, 225; *see also* hakim
Behällke (Turkman) 63, 102
 Behbudi 211
bek (Uzbek) *see* beg
 Bekarys 54
beklarbegi (Uzbek) 143
beklik (Uzbek) 131, 154–5 *see also* viloiat
Bekovul (Turkman) 267
 Bek-Pulad 138
 Bennigsen, A. 38
Berish (Kazakh) 48, 180, 264
 Beïsembiev, T. K. 128
bi (Kazakh) *see* tribal leaders
biï (Kara-Kalpak, Kyrgyz) *see* tribal leaders
bir ata (Turkman) 33, 52, 101
bir atanyn baldary (Kyrgyz) 52
Birlik (Uzbek) 242, 245
Bisat (Kazakh) 50
 Bishkek (Pishpek) 149, 279, 282
 ‘black bone’ *see* qara süiek
 Bodger, A. 4
Boghys (Kazakh) 265
 Bolat Khan 114
 Bolsheviks 240
Bor (Kyrgyz) 56
 borders: Russian-Afghan 193; Russian-Persian 39, 61, 193
Borshy (Kazakh) 265
 Borsuk Biy 56
Börü (Kyrgyz) 266
Boston (Kyrgyz) 152, 266, 271
 Boston Terek 149
Botpaï (Kazakh) 42, 46–7, 264
Bozojy (Turkman) 267
 Bregel, Y. 5, 98, 128, 145, 197
 Brezhnev, L. 240
 bribe-taking 174
 Britain 173
 British India 207
 Buddhism 108
Bugu (Kyrgyz) 41, 56, 110–12, 149, 266, 271
 Buidashe Khan 114
 Bujnurd 100
 Bukey Horde *see* Inner Horde
 Bukey Khan 114, 177
 Bukhara 61, 98, 100, 126–37, 222–6, 279, 282
Bükri (Turkman) 267
Bulat (Kyrgyz) 41
Bura (Kazakh) 42, 265
 Buranbay 111
Burkoz (Turkman) 267
 Burnaq 54
 Burnes, A. 14
Burunjyk (Turkman) 267
Büşman (Kazakh) 265
 Buzachi (Uzbek) 135

 caliphate 126, 247
 camp group 55
 Carrère d’Encausse, H. 5, 213
 Caspian Sea 113, 172, 226, 278–9, 282
 Catharine II 172
 Caucasia 192
 Chaghatay 13–15; *see also* Chingizid claims
Chakyr (Turkman) 267
Chala Kazak (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
chala manap (Kyrgyz) *see* tribal leaders
Chandyr (Turkman) 268
Chärjev Salyry (Turkman) 267
 Charjuy 136, 223–6, 279
 Charykov, N. V. 224
charva (Turkman) 58–9
Chatrak (Turkman) 267
 Chatterjee, S. 6
Chekich (Turkman) 267
Chekir (Turkman) 267
Chekir Saiak (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
Chensuli (Turkman) 49, 52, 63–4

- Cherik* (Kyrgyz) 110, 149, 266, 271
 Cherniaev, M. G. 181, 199, 209
 chieftain 8, 55
 Chimbay 143, 275
 Chimkent 42, 147, 278–9, 282
 China 108, 147, 175, 188
 Chingiz Khan 115, 126
 Chingizid claims of supreme authority:
 138, 146–7; Chaghatay 43, 157–9;
 Shaybanid Jochid 43–4, 113–17, 126,
 157–9; Tuqayid Jochid 157–9;
 ‘Uzbek’ claims 126–61
 Chingizids (sultans) 232; *see also* aq
 süiek
Chirichi (Kyrgyz) 41
choïkhona (Uzbek) 88
 cholera epidemic 206
cholak manap (Kyrgyz) *see* tribal
 leaders
chomry (Turkman) 58–9, 194
Chong Bagysh (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
chong kazan (Kyrgyz) 56
chong üi (Kyrgyz) 56
Chony (Turkman) 40, 48, 62, 101–2, 267
Chony Atabaï (Turkman) *see* *Chony*
Chovdur (Turkman) 139–40, 193, 26
chrezvychaïnyĭ s’ezd (Russian) of native
 judges 194, 196, 201–2
 Christianity 10
 Chu 112, 148, 212, 276, 279
 chuddar (chador) 231
 Chust 147
 ‘civil society’ 241
 clan 31; conical 3, 31
 ‘class struggle’ 97
 Collett, H. 15
 colonisation 187
 commercial agent 222
 commitment: communal 11, 32, 92–3,
 105; political 10; residential 86–92,
 158; tribal 91–3, 158
 communist parties 240
 constitutionalism 252
 Cossacks 152; Semirechie 199; Siberia
 172, 183, 200; Ural 172, 176, 183
 customary law (*adat, dāp, zang,*
 nark, yasa) 35–8, 51, 99, 113, 126–7,
 135, 145, 193–5, 251; blood money
 (*khun, kun, qūn*) 34–8, 49–50, 52–3,
 116, 192; bride price (*kalyng,*
 qalyngmal, kalym) 36, 112; fines
 (*toghyz, toguz*) 36–7; raids (*alaman,*
 barymta) 34, 37, 57–8, 98, 101, 112,
 135, 184, 189; Russian 200; seven-
 generation rule 34, 51–5; *su* rights
 194; vendetta 33–8, 99, 196
 Danilevskij, G. I. 14
 Daniyal Biy 128
dāp (Turkman) *see* customary law
 Darvaz 149, 223, 225
Dashaïak (Turkman) 269
dasturkhonchi (Uzbek) 148
 Däuletquldyn 54
Daz (Turkman) 40, 48–9, 62–4, 102, 267,
 271
 Demko, G. J. 5
 Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan 245
 democratisation 2, 241–2
Denajy (Turkman) 267
 Denau 226
Depe (Turkman) 267
deputaty (Russian) 178
 descent groups 31, 65; basic 51–5;
 confederate 46–9; forefather 33, 50–5,
 101; sub-tribal/tribal 49–51
 Desht-i-Kipchak 43
 ‘despotism’ 111, 129
 detribalisation 44, 92
Devedschi (Turkman) 39
devon (Uzbek) 131, 227–9
devonbegi (Uzbek) 14, 131, 141, 227–30
 DeWeese, D. 47
distanochnyĭ nachal’nik (Russian) 178
divide et impera 207
 Djunaid Khan 230, 234
dobrovol’noe prisoeдинenie (Russian) 175,
 184
Doburga (Turkman) 267
dodkhoh (Uzbek) 152, 156
 domination 8, 118, 185, 225, 235, 339
Döölös (Kyrgyz) 41, 266, 271
Dört Ata Ogul (Turkman) 49, 62–4
duban (Kyrgyz) 109
Düeji (Turkman) 64, 102, 267
 Dukhovskiy, S. M. 199, 210
Dulat (Kazakh) 42, 46, 264
 Durkheim, E. 7
Dürman (Uzbek) 43
dushman (Tajik, Uzbek) 134
 East Siberia 197
 Eastern Bukhara 91, 223–4, 226
 East Turkestan 147, 149
Eïmir (Turkman) 102, 267
el (Kazakh) 31
el (Kyrgyz) 31
elbegi (Uzbek) 133–4, 136
 elders 55; *aksakal* 46, 55–6, 201:
 aqsaqal 52, 56–7; *iashuly* 58, 97–8,
 195; *oqsoqol* 87–9, 132, 134, 136
 elections 243–4
 Eliias Guli 48

- ellikboshi* (Uzbek) 133, 201 *see also*
piatidesiatnik
 Emirate of Bukhara 127–37, 222–6, 279,
 282
Emrely (Turkman) 140, 268
Enaīāt (Turkman) 49, 63–4
 endogamy 28–9, 159
 Erali Khan 114, 176
Ergenektī (Kazakh) 265
Erk (Uzbek) 242
Erli (Turkman) 267
 Erofeeva, I. V. 116
esaul (Russian) 178
Esenmengli (Turkman) 267
Esentemir (Kazakh) 48, 264
ëshen-murut (Kyrgyz) *see* Sufism
ëshon (Tajik, Uzbek) *see* Sufism
ëshon-raīs (Tajik, Uzbek) 130
 Esim Khan 114
Eski (Turkman) 139, 268
Etbash (Turkman) 267
 ‘ethnisation’ 244–6, 250
 ethnonyms 159
 exogamy 28–9, 31
 ‘exploitation’ 97

 family ceremonies 88
 ‘fanaticism’ 6
 Farsi 135
 Ferghana 28, 44, 56, 58, 147–61, 282
Ferghana-Measures 198
 forefather group *see* descent groups
 ‘fundamentalism’ 6
fuqaro (Tajik, Uzbek) 130

Gabasakal (Turkman) 267
Gaburdy (Turkman) 267
Gagshal (Turkman) 267
Gaiy (Turkman) 267
Gal Bash (Turkman) 267
 Galkin, Gen. Maj. A. S. 14, 230, 231
gan dushar (Turkman) 33–4, 51
Ganekmaz (Turkman) 48, 102, 267
Ganjy Iusup (Turkman) 267
Gara (Turkman) 41, 267
Gara Bash (Turkman) 49, 63–4
Gara Bölke (Turkman) 39
Gara Chodur (Turkman) *see* Chovdur
Gara Choka (Turkman) 39, 267
Gara Julik (Turkman) 49, 64
Gara Keri (Turkman) 49, 64
Garadashly (Turkman) 268
Garaja (Turkman) 267
Garaman (Turkman) 267
Garavi (Turkman) 102

 Garm 243
 Gasprinsky, I. B. 211
Gazył Myrad (Turkman) 267
 genealogy 31, 45–55, 65, 101, 212
 General Secretary 240
 Geppener 230
 Germans 268
Girai (Turkman) 39
 Girs Commission 205
 Girs, F. K. 14, 173, 181
 Girshfel’d 14, 231
Gojuk (Turkman) 48, 102, 267
 Gok Tepe 173, 192, 196–7, 279
Gökche (Turkman) 267
Gökleng (Turkman) 100, 139, 140, 144,
 193, 267
 Golden Horde 115, 247
 Gomzin 156
gongshy (Turkman) 62
Gongur (Turkman) 41, 58, 267
 Gorbachev, M. S. 241–2
 Governor-generalship of the Steppe
 181–92, 284
 Governor-generalship of Turkestan
 173–4, 182, 192–213, 224, 235, 282
 ‘Great Calamity’ 186
 Great Horde (*Uly Zhüz*) 37–8, 42, 42–6,
 54, 113, 117, 188, 249–50, 264, 276
 Grebenkin, A. D. 134
 Grodekov, N. I. 28, 37, 39, 42, 45, 50, 56,
 99–100, 174, 192, 199, 206
 Gubaydulla Khan 114
guberniya *see* Governor-generalship
Güchük (Turkman) 48, 102, 267
gul (Turkman) 65
Gulegenje (Turkman) 49, 64
Günesht (Turkman) 269
Gurama (Turkman) 269
Gurama Künesht (Turkman) 267
 Gur’ev 279, 282
 Gurgan 30, 39, 48–9, 59, 64, 101, 139, 248
 Gutli Temur 48
guzur (Tajik, Uzbek) 86
Gyzyl Aiak (Turkman) 267
Gyzylı (Turkman) 49, 64
Gyzylıja (Turkman) 267

Häbibli (Turkman) 63
hadd offences 89n21; *see also* Islamic law
 hakim 131, 142
 Hamza 211
Hanka (Turkman) 62
 Haq Nazar Khan 114
haqq ädamı 38
haqq Alläh 36
 harem 146

- Haydar (Sayyid Amir) 128–9, 136
 hay-making 187
 headsman 55
hetman (Russian) 183, 200
hiroj (Tajik, Uzbek) 203, 131n48
 Hissar 126, 135–6, 223, 226
hokim (Tajik, Uzbek) *see* hakim
 Hokim Khoja 209
 Holdsworth, M 4
hovuz (Uzbek) 88
 Hudson, A. E. 3, 44, 60
 Husayn 128
- labany* (Turkman) 267
iagy (Turkman) 30, 101
lalavach (Turkman) 267
iap (Turkman) 41
iaraly (Turkman) 39, 267
iashuly (Turkman) *see* elders
iasovul (Uzbek) 141; *see also* *esaul*
iasovulboshi (Uzbek) 135, 141
Iazy Jusup (Turkman) 267
 Ibn Khaldūn 126
Ichkilik (Kyrgyz) 38, 108, 147, 266
ig (Turkman) 65
Igdir (Turkman) 48, 102, 269
 Ignat'ev, N. 129
 Ikramov, A. 240
il (Turkman) 30, 33
 Ilek River 177
 Il'minsky, N. A. 183, 205
 Iltuzar Khan 128, 138–9, 144, 160
 imam 212
 Iman Biy 56
inche iap (Turkman) 103
 Inner Horde 114, 176–8, 180, 185, 188, 278
inoq (Uzbek) *see* tribal leaders
inoq council 138
inorodtsy (Russian) 173, 204
inqiyd 126
 interpenetration 3, 7, 7n64, 105–6,
 117–18, 11, 252
Iolma (Turkman) 63
Iomut (Turkman) 4, 28, 30, 33–4, 39–40,
 48, 51, 59, 62, 100–3, 106, 138–40,
 144, 193, 227–8, 230, 248, 267
 Iranians 134
 Irdana Biy 128, 147
 Irdjar 222
 Irgiz 281, 284
 Irons, W. 4, 30, 39, 48, 62, 105
 irrigation 41: *aryk aksakal* 202–3; *ariq*
oqsoqoli 132
 Irtys 175, 183–4, 276
- Isatay Tayman 180, 188, 233
Isdir (Turkman) 267
 Iset Kutebar 180, 185, 188
 Isfara 147
 Ish Muhammad Biy 128
ishan (Turkman) *see* Sufism
ishan-murid *see* Sufism
Ishim (Kazakh) 45
 Ishim 183, 186, 276
 Ishim Khan 114, 176
 Iskhak Asan-uulu 152–3
 Islam-i kitāb 86
 Islam–Khoja 229
 'Islamic Fundamentalism' 247
 Islamic law (sharia) 35, 89–90, 126, 231;
 first refusal 88; kadi 35, 90, 92,
 131–2, 142–3, 202, 211–12, 233; penal
 law 35–7; 89–90; hereditary law 90;
 property 90: *vaqf* 90, 147, 155–6, 202,
 204, 233
 Islamic Renaissance Party 247
 Islamic ruler 136
 Islamisation 13, 35, 91–2, 109, 136, 210,
 238
 Ismaili Shiites 91
Isöngül (Kyrgyz) 41
 Issik Kol 112, 149, 279, 282
Iteli (Kazakh) 265
Iuz (Uzbek) 43
iuzboshi (Uzbek) 133, 135, 142, 154
 Iuzefovich, B. 53
 Ivanov, N. A. 199
 Ivanov, P. P. 5
ÿylgāi (Turkman) 39, 48, 64, 102, 267
- Jadidism 5, 211, 248
 Jafar Kuli Khan 100
Jafarbai (Turkman) 39–40, 48, 64, 102
Jafer (Turkman) 39
Jagalmaï (Kyrgyz) 266
Jalair (Uzbek) 43
 Jalalabad 208
 Jambil 42, 148, 278
 Jan Khoja Numhammad 180, 233
 Janabel, J. 4
 Jangir Khan 114, 178, 180
 Janid dynasty 126, 137, 152
 Jan-Tore Khan 114, 176
Jediger (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
 Jeti Su (Semirechie) 114, 147, 176
Jetigen (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
jigit (Kyrgyz) 112
 jihad 152
 Jizzakh 148, 282
Jookesek (Kyrgyz) 271

- Jory* (Kyrgyz) 266
 Juma Kudaimeni 177
 Jungal 149
 Jungarian Khanate 108, 112, 147, 175–6
 Jungarians; *see also* Oirats

 kadi *see* Islamic law
 Kaip Khan 114
 Kala Darya 177
 Kalan 136
Kalmak (Kyrgyz) 41, 266, 271
 Kalmyks (Volga) 175–6; *see also* Oirats
kalym (Russian) 36
kalyng (Kyrgyz) 112
Kamakchi (Turkman) 268
Kangdy (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
Kangly (Kazakh) 264
 Kanibadam 147
kantselariia (Russian) 174, 182
Kara Bagysh (Kyrgyz) 266
 Karaganda 278
 Kara-Kalpak tribalism: exogamy 29;
 tribal unit 43, 57–8
Kara-Kalpaks 270 Amu Darya delta
 57–8, 107, 143, 228; 275–7; Ferghana
 58, 158; Lower Sir Darya 107
 Karashura 47
 Karatay Khan 114
 Karategin 131, 135, 149, 223
 Karimov, I. 2, 242–3, 247
 Karki 223–5
Karkyn (Turkman) 268
 Karmysheva, B. Kh. 4
 Karpov, G. I. 39
 Karryev, A. 104
 Karshi 135, 223, 226, 279
 Kasansay 148
 Kashgar 108–9, 148–9, 279
 Kaufman, K. P. von 152, 173–4, 198–9,
 205, 210, 222, 226–7
 Kaufmann, A. 28
 Kazakh hordes 1–2, 28, 113–18
 Kazakh khanate 113
 Kazakh Steppe 14, 57, 174–92
 Kazakh tribalism 3–4; exogamy 28–9;
 political order 113–18; residence
 groups 56–7; tribal unit 42–2
 Kazakhs 113–17, 135, 142, 147–8,
 175–92, 249–50, 268
 Kazakhstan 242–3, 249–50
 Kazalinsk 282
 Kazhegel'din, A. 250
Keche (Turkman) 49, 64
 Kegeyli 107
 Keikibaï 46
Keldike (Kyrgyz) 266, 271

 Kelif 226
 Kemal ad-din 209
Keneges (Kara-Kalpak) 43, 107, 273–5
Keneges (Uzbek) 43, 129, 134
 Kenesari Qasim-uli 114, 188, 185, 233
kent (Tajik, Uzbek) 131
Kerderi (Kazakh) 54, 264
Kerei (Kazakh) 38, 42, 265
Kereiit (Kazakh) 54, 264
 Kermine 131, 226
Kesek (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
 Kesh 248
Kete (Kazakh) 264
 Ketmen Tube 148–9, 151
 Khaji Biy 147
khalfa (Uzbek) 109
 Khalid, A. 5, 211
khalk (Turkman) 30, 48
 Khanate of Astrakhan 172
 Khanate of Kazan 172
 Khanate of Khiva 137–46, 226–32, 275,
 279, 282
 Khanate of Khokand 146–59
 Khanate of Sibir 172
Khanka (Turkman) 49, 63–4
 khanship *see* Chingizid claims
khanskaia stavka (Russian) 178
 Khanykov, N. V. 14, 135, 159
 Khasan Biy 151
khaslyk 155
Khatab (Turkman) 268
 Khazanov, A. M. 3, 110
kheradzh (Russian) 203 *see also* hiroj
Kherzeki (Turkman) 267
 Khiva 39, 48, 61, 98, 128, 137–46,
 226–32, 279, 282
 Khodjeili 230, 234, 275
 Khodzhayev, F. 240
khoja (Turkman) 270; *see also* övlat
khoja (Tajik) 90, 149
khoja kalon (Tajik) 130, 154
 Khojand 147, 151–2, 222, 246, 279, 282
 Khokand 61, 108, 110, 113, 128, 146–61,
 279, 282
 Khorasan 98, 139
 Khorezm 44, 86, 137, 146
Khorosanly (Turkman) 267
 Khrushchev, N. 240
 Khudanazarov, D. 243
 Khudayar Khan 110, 128, 150–5, 160, 238
khun (Turkman) *see* customary law
 Khydyr Guli 48
Khydyr-Eli (Turkman) 268
Kichi Aga (Turkman) 267
 kinship 9, 44–5, 60, 65, 90–1
 Kipchak *see* *Qipchoqs*

INDEX

- Kirgizskaia stepnaia gazeta* (Russian) 183
Kishī Zhüz (Kazakh) *see* Small Horde
 Kisliakov, N. A. 4
 Kitab 223, 226
Kitai (Kyrgyz) 271
Kodshuk (Turkman) 39
 Kogham 46
 Koiyldyr 46
Kök Müryn (Kazakh) 265
Kök Shal (Kazakh) 265
Kök Tangri (Kazakh) 47
Kök Tengir (Kyrgyz) 47
Kök Zharly (Kazakh) 265
 Kokchetav 279, 282
koleno (Russian) 49
 Kolpakovsky, G. A. 174, 182
Kongurat (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
 König, W. 4, 30, 37
Kort (Turkman) 49, 64
Kosh Tamga (Kyrgyz) 266
köshe (Kara-Kalpak) 51–2
 Köshken 54
 Krader, L. 3, 28, 31–2, 50, 54, 106–7, 212
 Krasnovodsk 192, 279, 282
 Kratai Nurali 177
 Krivoshein, A. V. 206
 Kroak 54
Ktai (Uzbek) 43–4, 129, 134–5
 Kügelgen, A. von 5, 128
 Kuliab 131, 135, 149, 223, 226, 246
Kultak (Turkman) 267
 Kunayev, D. A. 240, 249
Kungrad (Russian) *see* *Qunghiro*t
 Künzhebaī 54
Kuraish (Turkman) 267
 Kurbanjan-Dodkhoh 152
 Kurbat Biy 147
 Kurds 268
 Kurgan Tube 226, 243
Kürküröö (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
Kürön (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
 Kuropatkin, A. N. 193, 199
 Kurtka 149
Küş Sansyz (Kazakh) 265
Kushchu (*Kutchu*) (Kyrgyz) 110, 147, 266, 271
 Kushid Khan 100, 105, 140, 234
 Kushner, P. I. 111–12, 208
 Kustanai 278–9
Kutenshi (Kazakh) 50
Kuzeli (Turkman) 49, 64
Kypchak (Kazakh) 185
Kypchak (Kyrgyz) 108, 266, 271; *see also* *Qipchoqs*
 Kyrgyz 107–13, 147–53, 156–61, 208–13, 250–1, 266, 270
 Kyrgyz tribalism 3–4; exogamy 28; political order 107–13; residence groups 55–6; tribal unit 41
 Kyrgyzstan 242–7, 250–1
Kytaī (Kyrgyz) 266
Kyzka Ak (Turkman) 63

Lambe (Turkman) 267
lashkarboshi (Uzbek) 150
 law: community 32; legal culture 251
Lebensordnung (German) 8
 Leninsk *see* Asaka
 Levshin, A. 1–2, 34–6, 38–9, 42, 50, 115, 126
 lineage 31
 Lobachevsky, V. 231
 Logofet, D. I. 2, 15, 132
 Lomakin, A. 195
Loqaī (Uzbek) 43
 Lorenz, R. 4

machit-qavm (Uzbek) 86
mudhalla 126
 madrassah 88
mahalla (Uzbek) *see* residential group
 mahallah *see* residential group
mahram (Tajik, Uzbek) 141
 Maīqy 46
 Makhram 152
 Makhtum Kuli Khan 197
 Maksheyev 42
maktab (Tajik, Uzbek) 88
Malaī (Kazakh) 45
 Malla Khan 128, 151, 153
 Mambetaliev, S. 109
 Mämet Guli 48
Mämetalyk (Turkman) 63
Mamysh (Turkman) 267
Managar (Turkman) 63
manap (Kyrgyz) *see* tribal leaders
 Manas 250
 Manchus 108
Mangghyt (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Manghit dynasty (Uzbek) 43–4, 126–37, 231
Manghits (Uzbek) 134–5, 138
 Mangishlak 139, 185, 192
Mangyt (Kara-Kalpak) 107
 Marghilan 147, 150–1, 154, 210
 Markov, G. E. 4
 Martin, V. 5
 Martson, F. V. von 199, 230
 Martub 113
 Marxism-Leninism 97

- Mashryk* (Turkman) 267
maslakhat (Turkman) 98, 145, 193–5, 233, 235
Masqar (Kazakh) 48, 264
Matai (Kazakh) 265
 Mawaraunnahr *see* Transoxiana
 McChesney, R. D. 5
 Mekrail 46
 Mennonites 231
meqtep (Kazakh) 192
Merkit (Kazakh) 265
 Merv 100, 103–4, 129, 136, 140, 173, 192, 279, 282
 Meserve, R. I. 4
Meshrik (Turkman) 39
Mesir Garabagshy (Turkman) 267
 methodology: idiographic 6;
 generalisation 13; nomothetic 6, 12;
 sources 12–15; structure 12–13
 Middle East 3, 32, 103, 159
 Middle Horde (*Orta Zhüz*) 5, 38, 42, 44–5, 54, 113, 117, 249–50, 265
 Ming dynasty (Uzbek) 128, 146–60
mingboshi (Uzbek) 133–4, 142, 148, 150–1, 153–4
Mings (Uzbek) 43, 134
 Min-Tube 210
mir (Tajik, Uzbek) 131, 225
 Mir Abdu'l Kerim Bukhary 138
mirab (Russian) 202; *see also* mirob
mirob (Tajik, Uzbek) 132, 134
mirovoi sud (Russian) 182
mirovoi sud'ia (Russia) 190, 200, 235
mirshab (Tajik, Uzbek) 131
 mirza 133, 141
 Mishchenko, P. I. 199
Molqy (Kazakh) 265
 monetisation 139
Mongoldor (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
 Moscow 226–7, 240
mudarris (Uzbek) 88
 mufti 90, 142
Mūghul (Uzbek) 43
 Mughulistan 108
 Muhammad Ali Khan 128, 149–50, 210
 Muhammad Amin Inoq 128, 138
 Muhammad Amin Khan 128, 139–40, 234
 Muhammad Khan (Sayyid) 128, 140
 Muhammad Murad 227–8
 Muhammad Rahim Khan 128, 160
 Muhammad Rahim Khan I 128, 138–9, 145–6
 Muhammad Rahim Khan II (Sayyid) 128, 140, 226–9
 Muhammad Vafa Bakalov 230
Müiten (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Müjevür (Turkman) 267; *see also* övlat
 Mukanov, M. S. 38
mukhtor (Tajik, Uzbek) 141, 227
Mukry (Turkman) 268
mulk (Tajik, Uzbek) 90, 155–6
mülk (Turkman) 59, 194
mulki hiroj (Tajik, Uzbek) 131n48, 203;
mulki hurri (Uzbek) 203, 131n46, 131n48
 Munawwar Qari 211
Munduz (Kyrgyz) 41, 266, 271
Mungush (Kyrgyz) 108, 266, 271
 Murad 150
 Murav'ev, M. N. 14, 41, 145–6
Murchaly (Turkman) 41, 268
 Murghab 103–4, 139
murid (Tajik, Uzbek) *see* Sufism
Mürun (Kazakh) 42, 265
 Murzala 54
 Musulmankul 150–1, 153
mutavalli (Uzbek) 209
 Muzaffaraddin Khan (Sayyid Amir) 128, 222–4
 Myng Zhüz 46
Myrza (Kazakh) 264

 Nabiyev, R. 243
 Nadarov 182
 Nadir Shah 137
 Nadyr Qozha 54
Nadyrbek (Kyrgyz) 41
 Naib Abul Samat 129
Naïman (Kazakh) 38, 42, 185, 265
Naïman (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
Naïman (Uzbek) 135
 Nalivkin, P. V. 15
 Namangan 109, 148, 151, 154, 279, 282
namoz (Tajik, Uzbek) 135
naqib (Tajik) 142
 Naqshbandiya 127, 210
 Narbota Biy 128
nark (Kyrgyz) *see* customary law
narodnost' (Russian) 28;
narodnyi sud (Russian) 182
narodnyi sudia (Russian) 201
 Naryn 56, 112, 149
 Nasiraddin Khan 128, 152
 Nasrullah Khan (Sayyid Amir) 128–30, 133, 136, 138, 150
 National Reconciliation Commission 246
 nationality 239, 246
natsiia (Russian) 28
 Nazar 54
 Nazarbayev, N. 244–5, 249–50
Nedim (Turkman) 39
 NEP 240

- Nesemli* (Turkman) 268
 New Bukhara 224
 'new method' schools 229; *see also*
 Jadidism
 Niyazov, S. 2, 242–3, 248–9
noib (Tajik, Uzbek) 142
Noigut (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
nöker (Turkman) 103, 105, 142
Nokhurly (Turkman) 105n49, 268
 Nökis *see* Nukus
 nuker (Russian) 133; *see also* nöker
 Nukus 137, 275
Nukus-Manghit (Uzbek) 137
 Nur Verdi Khan 100
 Nurali Khan 114, 175–6
Nuraly (Turkman) 39
 Nurfais 54
 Nuri, S. A. 246
Nurrek (Turkman) 50, 64

oba (Turkman) 58–9, 61, 97, 102
oblast' (Russian) 174
oblastnoe pravlenie (Russian) 174
obok (Mongol) 31
Ögem (Turkman) 265
 Oghuz 104
Ogurjaly (Turkman) 39, 268
 Oirats 43, 108–9, 115, 147, 184
 okhun (Uzbek) 142
okrug (Russian) 179, 186
okružnoi prikaz (Russian) 179–80
okružnyi sud (Russian) 182
Öküç (Turkman) 39, 267
Olam (Turkman) 268
olavkhona (Tajik) 88
 Olcott, M. 4, 116
 Olufsen, O. 15, 134, 225
Omar (Turkman) 267
 Omsk 172–3, 177–8, 279, 282
On Tört Uruw (Kara-Kalpak) 29, 273, 275
onboshi (Uzbek) 133
Ong (Kanat) (Kyrgyz) 30, 38, 108, 266
ongon (Mongol) 47
 opposition movements 252
oqsoqol (Uzbek) *see* elders
Oraqty (Kazakh) 264
 Oraz Khan 100
Orazgeldi (Kazakh) 265
 Orenburg 172–3, 177–8, 279, 282
 Orenburg border commission 14
Orgy (Kyrgyz) 271
Orlat (Uzbek) 43
 Ormon 110, 118
Orsukchy (Turkman) 267
Orta Zhüz (Kazakh) *see* Middle Horde
Osek (Kazakh) 115

 Osh 147–8, 153–4, 210, 282
Oshaqty (Kazakh) 46, 264
 Ostroumov, N. P. 15, 205
otaliq (Uzbek) *see* tribal leaders
Otamysh (Turkman) 40–1, 103–4, 267
Otuz Uul (Kyrgyz) 266
 Ovez-Khoja 230
övlät (Turkman) 97
 Ozbek Khan 247
Ozin Ak (Turkman) 63

 'pacification' 189, 196
Pakka (Turkman) 50, 62–4
 Palen, K. K. 14–15, 197–8
 Pamir 108, 149
Pamir Boundary Settlement 223
panjbegi 132, 134
 parallel cousin marriage 29, 159
 parliamentary democracy 244, 252
 party committees 241
 party secretaries 240–1
parvonachi (Uzbek) 131, 153
 pasheb 141
 'patriarchal-feudal' 4,
 patrilineage 45, 106
 patrimonialism: 252; state 2, 4; Soviet 240
 patronymic sib 212
 Pavlodar 280–1, 282
 Persian 13–5, 100, 139, 143
 Persians (Irani) 268
 'personality cult' 6
 Peter the Great 172
 Petro-Aleksandrovsk 227, 282
 Petropavlovsk 172, 278–9, 282
 Perovsk *see* Qyzyl Orda
piatidesiatnik (Russian) 201, 207
 Pierce, R. A. 5
pir (Turkman, Uzbek) 38, 129; *see also*
 Sufism
 Pishpek *see* Bishkek
plemia (Russian) 28–31, 40
 Ploskikh, V. M. 5
poddanstvo (Russian) 175, 184
 Poliakov, S. P. 4, 61, 91
 Politburo 241
 political agent 235
 political community 3, 7; acephalous 7–8;
 cephalous 7; egalitarian 8; legal 9–10;
 patriarchal 8–9; patrimonial 9–10
 political order 2; factual 7, 245;
 legitimacy 2, 7–8; normative 7–8,
 7n61, 10; piety 8; problems 1, 10
 political orientations 32
 political sociology 6
politseimeister (Russian) 200
politseiskii pristav (Russian) 200

- polovzy* (Russian) 43
 Potanin 38
 Potapov, L. P. 97
 power 7, 7n67
pozemel'naiia podat' (Russian) 204
pravda (Russian) 172
prikaz administration 178–9, 185, 192, 232
prikaz *see* *okruzhnoi prikaz*
 primogeniture 45, 106–7
pristav (Russian) 174, 193
pristavstvo (Russian) 193
Provisional Steppe Statute 181
Provisional Transcaspia Statute 193
Provisional Turkestan Statute 40, 181
Provisional Zarafshan Statute 198
 Pulat 'Khan' 152
- Qadyr-Qozha 48
Qaishyly (Kara-Kalpak) 29
Qaishyly (Kazakh) 264
Qalluq (Uzbek) 43
Qalpe (Kazakh) 264
Qalqaman (Kazakh) 265
qalyngmal (Kazakh) *see* customary law
Qandekli (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Qanghli (Uzbek) 43–4
Qanghli-Qipchoq (Uzbek) 137
Qangly (Kazakh) 42, 46
Qanzhyghaly (Kazakh) 42, 265
Qara Balyq (Kazakh) 265
Qara Kereï (Kazakh) 265
Qara Kesek (Kazakh) 264, 265
Qara Saqal (Kazakh) 264
Qara Shapan (Kazakh) 264
qara süïek (Kazakh 115–6, 176)
Qara Uyl (Kazakh) 265
 Qarakol 149
Qaramoïyn (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Qaraqas (Kazakh) 265
 Qarasha-Bi 46
 Qarashora 46
Qarataï (Kazakh) 265
 Qarmys 54
Qarpyq (Kazakh) 265
 Qart-Kazaq 48
Qarzhas (Kazakh) 265
 Qasim Khan 113–14
Qataghan (Uzbek) 43, 134
Qauchin (Uzbek) 43
qavm (Uzbek) 86, 146
 Qayip Ali 180, 188
Qiiat (Uzbek) 43
Qipchoq tribalism: endogamy 29; tribal unit 43–4
Qipchoqs (Uzbek) 43–4, 129, 134, 137, 147, 150–2, 155, 231,
- Qirk* (Uzbek) 43
qishloq (Uzbek) 87–9
Qoldawly (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Qöldeneng (Kazakh) 265
Qongrat (Kara-Kalpak) 30
Qongrat (Kazakh) 38, 50, 265
Qonq Sadaq (Kazakh) 265
Qostamghaly (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Qozghan (Kazakh) 265
qozha (Kazakh) 50 *see also* *khoja*
qozi (Uzbek) *see* *kadi*
qozi kalon (Uzbek) 130, 142, 254, 209–10
qozi ordu 142
Qtaï (Kara-Kalpak) 29, 107
 Qudaïberdi 54
Qūlzhghash (Kazakh) 267
qūn (Kazakh) *see* customary law
qundas 50, 192
 Qunduz 130
 Qunghirof 137–8, 231, 274–5
Qunghirof dynasty (Uzbek) 128, 137–146, 160, 234
Qunghirof-Qiiat (Uzbek) 137
Qunghirots (Uzbek) 43–4, 135, 137, 231
 Qurmaq 54
 Qurzhau 54
qushbegi (Uzbek) 130–2, 138, 141, 154–5
 Qutluq Murad Khan 128, 140
 Qutlygai 54
Qyiat (Kara-Kalpak) 43, 273, 275
qymyz (Kazakh) 190
Qypshaq (Kara-Kalpak) 29, 107, 273, 275
Qypshaq (Kazakh) 38, 42, 265
 Qyryq Zhüz 46
qystau (Kazakh) 114
Qytai (Kara-Kalpak) 43, 273, 275
 Qyzyl Orda 148
Qyzyl Qūrt (Kazakh) 48, 54, 264
- Radloff, W. 14, 36, 38–9, 42, 56, 132, 187
 Raëff, M. 5
 Rahim Birdi 129
 Rahim Quli Khan 128, 139
 Rahmanov, E. 241
 raids *see* customary law
rais (Tajik, Uzbek) 88, 130–1, 142
 Rakhmonov, E. 241, 247
Ramazhan (Kazakh) 54, 264
 Rashidov, Sh. 240
 referendum 243
 residence groups 31, 55–9
 residential group (mahallah) 32, 86–92, 213, 240, 251
 residentialisation 92
 Riza Shah 61–2
rod (Russian) 29–31, 49–50, 61

- Roliakov 39, A. A.
 Rosenbach, N. O. 199, 210
 Ross, E. D. 15, 195
 Roy, O. 93
ru (Kazakh) 30, 33, 45, 60
 rule of law 242
Rules for the Orenburg Kyrgyz 177
Rules for the Siberian Kyrgyz 40, 177–8
 Rushan 149, 223
 Russian native schools 183, 205
 Russian Orthodoxy 172, 209
 Russian peasants 200
 Russians 270
Russo-Bukharan Commercial Convention 198, 222
Russo-Khivan Peace Treaty 198, 227
 Rychkov, N. 38–9
 Ryskulov, T. 240
- s'ezd* (Russian) of native judges 193, 201–2
 Sabol, St. 5
Sadyr (Kazakh) 267
Saiak (Kyrgyz) 110, 148–9, 266, 271
Saiatly (Turkman) 268
 saints (Muslim) 97
Sakar (Turkman) 139, 268
Sakhani (Turkman) 63
 Sakharov, Lt. Gen. 182
saklau (Turkman) 106
Salak (Turkman) 39, 102, 267
salyt (Turkman) 141, 145
Salyr (Turkman) 30, 52, 100, 267
 Samarkand 87, 126, 173, 222–4, 248, 279, 282
 Samokvasov, D. Ia. 36
 Samsonov, A. V. 199
sanashik (Turkman) 59, 194
 Saratov 231
Sarbas (Kazakh) 265
sarboz (Tajik, Uzbek) 129, 155
sarkor (Tajik, Uzbek) 131, 154, 203
Sarly (Turkman) 267
Saroi (Uzbek) 15, 43, 135
Sart (Uzbek) 115, 134, 137–8, 145–6, 149, 153, 156, 201–2, 206, 211, 268; Khivan 139, 141–2, 231
Sart Kalmak (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
Sart Qipchoq 158
Sart (Uzbek) 158
Sarttar (Kyrgyz) 268
Saruu (Kyrgyz) 41, 111, 266, 271
 Sary (Kyrgyz) 110
Sary Bagysh (Kyrgyz) 41, 109–12, 148–9, 266, 271
Sary Uisin (Kazakh) 46, 264
Saryk (Turkman) 100, 140, 267, 268
 Sarysu 186, 279
 Sarzhan Qasim-uli 180, 188
Sarzhomart (Kazakh) 265
 Sayram 113, 147, 276
 sayyid 126
 Sayyid Abdallah (1855) 128, 140
 Sayyid Abdullah (1918–20) 128
 Sayyid Muhammad Khan 128, 140
 Sayyid Sultan 128, 151
 Schuyler, E. 14, 132, 151, 157–8
 segmentary lineage system *see* tribalism
 segmentary opposition *see* tribalism
Seit (Turkman) 268 *see also* *övlät*
 Seljuks 37, 248
selo (Russian) 200
sel'skiï skhod (Russian) 201
sel'skiï sud (Russian) 235
sel'skoe obshchestvo (Russian) 183, 200
Semedin (Turkman) 39
 Semenov, A. A. 5
 Semipalatinsk 172–3, 190, 278, 282
 Semirechie 173, 187, 197, 280, 282; *see also* *Jeti Su*
 seniority 45–6, 59
serdar (Turkman) *see* tribal leaders
Serkesh (Kazakh) 48, 264
 Shady 150
 Shah Muhammad Khan 114
 Shah Murad (*Ming*) 151
 Shah Murad 126–9, 133, 136, 160–1
 Shahr-i Sabz 126, 129–30, 135–7, 223, 279
 Shahrukh 128, 147
shaikhulislom (Uzbek) 130, 150
Shaïqylar (Kazakh) 48, 264
 Shammi-Kel 229
Shanshar (Kazakh) 265
Shanshqyly (Kazakh) 264
Shaprashly (Kazakh) 46
Shaqshaq (Kazakh) 265
Shar Zhetim (Kazakh) 265
 sharia *see* Islamic law
 Shaybanid *see* Chingizid claims
 Shaybanids 152 *see* Chingizid claims
 Shaybani-Khan 248
 Sheikh Nazar-Beg 229
Shekti (Kazakh) 180, 264
Sheref (Turkman) 39–40, 48, 62, 101–2, 267
Sheref Jafarbai (Turkman) 39, 267
Sheref Nuraly (Turkman) 267
Sherushi (Kazakh) 265
 Shi'ites 226
 Shir Ali Khan 128, 150, 153
 Shir Ghazi Khan 40, 114, 139, 176
Shirmämitle (Turkman) 63

- Shmitt, E. O. 182
shoh (Tajik) 135, 225
Shömekei (Kazakh) 264
Shu Moïyn (Kazakh) 265
Shübar Aïghyr (Kazakh) 265
 Shughnon 149, 223
Shulluk (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
Shu-Manaq (Kazakh) 264
Shykh (Turkman) 268; *see also övlat*
Shymyr (Kazakh) 42, 46, 264
 sib 31
 Siberia 172, 179, 195
silä (Russian) 197
 Sinkiang 108, 147, 152
sipoh (Tajik, Uzbek) 155
 Sir Darya 43–4, 49, 139, 147, 152, 173,
 177, 185, 187, 189, 192, 197, 205, 212,
 230, 276–7
 Sirim Batir 176, 188
 Skobelev, M. D. 152, 196
 Skrine, F. H. 15, 195
 slavery 65, 222
 Small Horde (*Kishî Zhüz*) 38, 40, 42–3,
 46, 54, 113–14, 117, 177–8, 249–50,
 264, 273
 Sokolov, A. 112
Sol (*Kanat*) (Kyrgyz) 30, 38, 108, 266
Solto (Kyrgyz) 41, 110, 149, 266, 271
soviet aksakalov (Russian) 240–1
 Sovietisation 239–40
Sozma (Turkman) 49, 64
 Spassky 38–9, 42
 Speransky reform 5
 Speransky, M. M. 179, 181, 186
 St Petersburg 193, 226–8
 Stalin, J. V. 240
stanitsa (Russian) 183, 200
starshîi aksakal (Russian) 202–3
starshina (Russian) 200
 state 9; agricultural 9, 11; constitutional
 11; industrialised 9; 11; mercantile 11
 Steppe Commission 181, 197
Steppe Statute 181
Suan (Kazakh) 46
 Subotich, D. I. 199
 sub-tribe 55–56
sudebnaia palata (Russian) 182
 Sufism 248; *ishan* (*eshon, eshen*) -*murid*
 (*murut*) relations 38, 90, 98, 109, 140,
 161, 210; ruler 127–9
 Sukhomlinov, V. A. 182, 230
 Sukhotin, N. N. 182
Sukty (Turkman) 267
Süleiman (Turkman) 267
 Suleyman Khoja 150
 Suleymenov, O. 249
 sultan *see* tribal leaders
 sultan administration 177–8, 185
 Sultan Bukey 185
 Sultan Murad 103
 Sultan Sadyk 185
 Sultan Suiuk 176
Sultaniz (Turkman) 267
Süpatai (Kazakh) 264
Surkh (Turkman) 267
Surkhy (Turkman) 267
 Susamyr 56
Suu Murun (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
sv rights (Turkman) *see* customary law
Sychmaz (Turkman) 41, 49, 103, 267
 Sygay Khan 114
Syïqym (Kazakh) 42, 46, 264
Syïvrshy (Kazakh) 264
Syr-Manaq (Kazakh) 264

Tabaqty (Kazakh) 265
 Tabriz 129
 Tabulda Manap 56
Tabyn (Kazakh) 54, 264
Tagai (Kyrgyz) 108, 266
Tagan (Turkman) 267
 Tahir Khan 114
taïpa (Turkman) 49
 Tajikistan 2, 246–7
 Talas 148, 150–1
 Taldy-Kurban 278
Tama (Kazakh) 53–4, 264
Tana (Kazakh) 48, 264
Tanabüga (Kazakh) 265
tanapnyï shor (Russian) 203
tankhoh (Tajik) 129
tanop (Tajik, Uzbek) 228
Taraqty (Kazakh) 265
 Tash Korgon 149
 Tashkent 42, 87, 114, 126, 132, 147,
 149–152, 181, 197, 199, 206, 209, 224,
 279, 282
 Tasmagambetov, I. 250
 Tatars 172, 209
 Taube, M. A. 182
 Tauke Khan 35–6, 114–15
 Taulkel Khan 114
 taxation 131–2, 131n46, 131n48, 141,
 155–6, 201, 203–4, 228
Tazdar (Kazakh) 48, 264
Teïit (Kyrgyz) 108, 266, 271
 Tejen 103, 192, 279, 282
Teke (Turkman) 30, 37, 40–1, 48, 51–2,
 58–9, 100, 102–3, 139–40, 144, 173,
 192, 197, 234, 238, 267
Temir (Kyrgyz) 41
 Temir Erali 177

- Temirsk 282
Terbish (Kazakh) 265
Terekme (Turkman) 39
 Tereshchenko, S. 250
Teri Tangbaly (Kazakh) 265
 Terjüman 211
 Termez 224–5
 Teviashov, N. N. 199
 theory: interpenetration 7–11, 105–6,
 117–18; utilitarianism 7, 105–6
 Tian Shan 108, 147, 174
 Timur (Tamerlane) 247–8
tire (Turkman; Kara-Kalpak) 51, 61
 Tiuliuk 54
Töböi (Kyrgyz) 266, 271
 Tobol 177, 186, 275, 282
Togachy (Turkman) 267
Togdari (Turkman) 49, 63–4
toghyz (Kazakh) *see* customary law
toguz (Kyrgyz) *see* customary law
toï (Kyrgyz) 53, 112
 Tokaev, K. 250
Tokhtamysh (Turkman) 40–1, 103–4, 267
 Toksaba Manap 56
tölengit (Kazakh) 115
Töleu (Kazakh) 54, 264
 Tolstov, S. P. 4
 Tolstova, L. S. 4
 Tolybekov, S. E. 4
 Tomsk 284
Töölös (Kyrgyz) *see* *Döölös*
Toqbolat (Kazakh) 265
töre (Kazakh) *see* *aq süiek*
Tört Qara (Kazakh) 264
Tört Ül (Kazakh) 42, 265
Tory Aïghyr (Kazakh) 265
 'totalitarianism' 241, 245
 Transcaspia 174–5, 192–7
 Trans-Chirchik district 222
 Transoxiana 5, 115
 tribal chief 55
 tribal confederacy 8, 11, 30
 tribal descent groups 146
 tribal leaders: *aq süiek* (*töre*, sultan) 36, 50;
 batyr 45, 143, 112; *bi* 56–7, 116, 190–1;
 biï 41, 43, 52, 56, 107–10, 112, 141–2,
 231, 235; *inoq* 141, 145; *manap* 41, 56,
 109, 111–13, 208; *otaliq* 127, 130,
 137–8, 141–3, 155; *serdar* 97, 143–4
 tribalism: acephalous, egalitarian 11, 32,
 159; Altaic 55; Arabian 3, 32;
 cephalous 11; conical clan 3, 32;
 segmentary lineage system 32, 44;
 segmentary opposition 101–6; seven-
 generation 34; Turco-Mongolian 31
 tribe 28, 30, 32
 Trotter, J. M. 15
 Tugun Khan 114
 Tuguz-Toro 149
Tulakly (Uzbek) 134
 Tüebi 46
Tüiyqsha (Kazakh) 265
tuman (Tajik, Uzbek) 131
tüpa (Uzbek) 137
tüpchi boshi (Uzbek) 131
tupik (Uzbek) 87
 Turgay 173, 182–3, 278–9, 282
Türk (Uzbek) 43, 134
 Turkestan *see* Governor-generalship of
 Turkestan
Turkestan Statute 181
Turkestanskaia tuzemnaia gazeta
 (Russian) 205
 Turkistan 113–15, 181, 279
 Turkman tribalism 3–4; exogamy 28,
 political order 97–106; residence
 groups 58–9; tribal unit 40
 Turkmen 97–106, 136–46, 192–7, 248–9
 Turkmenbashi *see* Niyazov
 Turkmenistan 243, 248–9
 Tursyn Khan 114
Tüs Pakka (Turkman) 49, 64
Tynaï (Kyrgyz) 41
Tynymseüit (Kyrgyz) 266, 271

Uaq (Kazakh) 265
Uaqkereï (Kazakh) *see* *Uaq*
 Uch Kurgan 158
uchastkovyï narodnyï sud (Russian) 193
uchastok (Russian) 174, 183
uchastok distantsii (Russian) 177
Uchuruk (Turkman) 41, 267
uezd (Russian) 174, 187, 207
 Ufa 209, 279
Uïghur-Naïman (Uzbek) 137
Uïghur (Uzbek) 138
Ûisin (Kazakh) 48, 116
Ûisin Sirgeli (Kazakh) 46
 Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd, Ch. E. de 156
 ulema 130, 225
 ultimogeniture 58, 93
Ulug (Turkman) 267
Ûly Zhüz (Kazakh) *see* Great Horde
 Umar Khan 128, 148, 153, 156, 158, 161,
 238
 United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 246
upravliaiushchii kantseliarii (Russian)
 174
 Ura Tube 147, 151
uraan (Kyrgyz) 30
 Ural 175, 177, 183–4
 Ural-Irtysh line 183

INDEX

- Uralsk 173, 182, 278–9
uran (Kara-Kalpak) 29–30
ūran (Kazakh) 29–30
 Urganch 231
 Urgut 87
urugh (Uzbek) 31
uruk (Kyrgyz) 30
uruu (Kyrgyz) 30
uruw (Kara-Kalpak) 43
Ushak (Turkman) 39, 267
Ushakon (Turkman) 267
ushr (Tajik, Uzbek) 144
 Ust-Kamenogorsk 172, 278–9, 282
 Usubaliev, T. 240
 Utli Temur 48
 Uzbek Khanate 47
 Uzbek tribalism 3–4; endogamy 29;
 tribal unit 43–4
 Uzbekistan 2, 242, 247
 Urbeks 43–4, 127–61, 197–235, 238n101,
 247–8, 268, 275
Uzūn (Kazakh) 265
ūzyn qūlaq (Kazakh) 57
- Vakhan 149, 223
 Vali Khan 42, 114, 175, 178
 Valikhanov, Ch. 14, 38, 45, 111–13, 118,
 187
 Vámbéry, H. 14–5, 39, 146, 158, 226
vaqf (Tajik, Uzbek) *see* Islamic law
Vekil (Turkman) 49, 100, 103–4, 269
 Verny 281, 284; *see also* Almaty
 vilayet 64
 vendetta *see* customary law
verchnyi sel'skiĭ sud (Russian) 183, 200,
 235
 village camp (*aĭyl, oba, auyl, awul*) 55
viloiat (Tajik) 131 *see also* vilayet
vlast' (Russian) 197
voennyĭ gubernator (Russian) 174
voĭsko (Russian) 183, 200, 235
 Volga 177
 Volga Kalmyks *see* Kalmyks
volost' (Russian) 179, 189, 207
volostnoe pravlenie (Russian) 200
volostnoi upravitel' (Russian) 189, 195,
 200–3, 207
volostnoi s"ezd (Russian) 181–2
volostnoi skhod (Russian) 183, 200
volostnoi starshina (Russian) 183, 200
 Vostrov, V. V. 38
 Vrevsky, A. B. 199, 210
- 'Wah'habism' 247
 Weber, M. 8, 243
- Weltanschauung* (German)
 West Siberia 173, 182
 'white bone' *see* *aq süiek*
 Wood, W. 4
- Yakub Beg 152
yasa see customary law
 Yasi *see* Turkistan
Yslam (Turkman) 267
Ysty (Kazakh) 46, 264
 Yusuf Beg 153
- zakot* (Tajik, Uzbek) 131, 139, 141, 144,
 149, 204
zakotchi (Uzbek) 131–2
zakotchi kalon (Uzbek) 130
zamini jamoat (Tajik, Uzbek) 155–6
 Zarafshan 28, 44, 129, 132–4, 173, 198,
 222–3
zblizhenie (Russian) 204–5
zekat (Turkman) 40 *see also* zakot
zemstvo (Russian) 205
Zhadig (Kazakh) 115
Zhadyq (Kazakh) 265
Zhaghalbaily (Kazakh) 54–5, 264
zhailay (Kazakh) 114
Zhalaiyr (Kazakh) 46, 264
Zhamanbai (Kazakh) 50, 265
 Zhanarys 54
 Zhansakal 46
 Zhanshora 46–7
Zhantekei (Kazakh) 265
Zhanys (Kazakh) 42, 46, 264
Zhappas (Kazakh) 48, 264
Zharqyshak 46
Zhas Taban (Kazakh) 265
Zhawynghyr (Kara-Kalpak) 273, 275
 Zhdanko, T. A. 4, 29–30, 102
Zheltoqsan (Kazakh) 245
Zheti Kāshe (Kara-Kalpak) 29
Zheti Ru (Kazakh) 38, 42, 48, 53–4,
 264
Zhetimder (Kazakh) 265
 Zhientūra 54
 Zhiyq 54
 Zholbarus Khan 114, 175
 Zholmambet 46
Zhoō Kesek (Kyrgyz) 266
zhügiünüys (Kazakh) 57
 Zhumanbai 46
zhūt (Kazakh) 37, 176
 Zhūtqara 54
zhüz (Kazakh) 113, 249 *see also* Great,
 Middle and Small Hordes
ziaket (Russian) *see* zakot

This study, written from the perspective of political sociology, represents the first comparative examination of Central Asian communal and political organisation before and after the tsarist conquest of the region. It covers Turkman, Kazakh and other tribal societies, analyses the patrimonial state structures of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Khokland, and discusses the impact of the established tsarist civil military administration on the communal and political orientations of the Muslim population.

Changing concepts of collective identity are described in reference to acknowledged or refuted claims of political authority by various population groups. The study also provides some evidence which helps us to understand the region's resistance to democratisation and the continuity of patrimonial politics in the present newly independent states.

Paul Georg Geiss is a Research Fellow at the German Institute for Middle East Studies, Hamburg. He specialises in the social history and comparative politics of Central Asia.

Central Asia/History/Politics

 Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE • 29 West 35th Street, New York NY 10001
www.routledge.com Printed in Great Britain



ISBN 0-415-31177-2